IR 05000334/1993003
| ML20035G924 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1993 |
| From: | Laughlin J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G918 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-93-03, 50-334-93-3, 50-412-93-03, 50-412-93-3, NUDOCS 9304300186 | |
| Download: ML20035G924 (9) | |
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
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i Docket / Report:
50-33 8/93-03 and 50-412/93-03 l
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I License:
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Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company
Post Office Box 4
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Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
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Facility Name:
Beaver Valley Atomic Power Station
e Inspection:
Alarch 16-18, 1993 l
Inspection At:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania l
Inspectors:
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J. Lakhlin,dfmergency Preparedness Specialist
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C. Gordon, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist R. DeLaEspriella, Reactor Engineer
L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector
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P. Sena, Resident Inspector F. Kantor, NRR/PEPB J. O'Brien, NRR/PEPB
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l Approved:
E. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section date
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Areas Inspected The licensee's annual, panial-participation exercise conducted on March 17,1993.
l Results i
Exercise performance indicated that adequate on-site response measures can be taken in a i
radiological emergency. Exercise strengths included prompt, accurate information flow from
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the Control Room to the Technical Support Center and liaison with State and Commonwealth representatives in the Emergency Operations Facility. No exercise weaknesses were identified.
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9304300186 930422 PDR ADOCK 05000334 PDR G
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DETAILS I.0 Persons Contacted The following individuals attended the exit meeting on March 18,1993.
R. Brusi, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Planning D. Caruthers, Supervisor, Unit Electrical Maintenance E. Chatfield, General Manager, Nuclear Support A. Dulick, Manager, Chemistry L. Freeland, General Manager, Nuclear Operations R. Hecht, Director, I&C Maintenance S. Hovanec, Senior Engineer W. Lacey, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Planning and Development F. Lipchick, Senior Licensing Supervisor G. McKee, Emergency Prepanxiness Specialist R. Moser, Heahh Physics Associate T. Noonan, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Safety K. Ostrowski, Unit 1 Operations Manager J. Sasala, Director, Nuclear Communications F. Schuster, Unit 2 Operations Manager J. Sieber, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer G. Sovick, Senior Licensing Supervisor D. Spoerry, Vice President, Nuclear Operations H. Szklinski, Health Physics Specialist G. Thomas, Vice Pmsident, Nuclear Services N. Tonet, Manager, Nuclear Safety R. Vento, Manager, Health Physics S. Vicinie, Senior QA Specialist l
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel.
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2.0 Emergency Exercise f
The Beaver Valley Atomic Power Station conducted a partial-panicipation exercise on March 17,1993, from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the States of
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Ohio and West Virginia panially panicipated. Off-site activities were not observed.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities
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Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on November 24,1992. The complete
scenario package was submitted on December 29, 1992. Following NRC review of the-submitted scenario, Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario.
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I Minor revisions were made to the scenario, which allowed adequate testing of the major ponions of the Beaver Valley Atomic Power Station Emergency Plan and its Implementing Procedures.
The scenario also provided the opponunity for the licensee to demonstate most areas previously
identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
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i NRC observers attended a March 16, 1993 licensee briefing on the revised scenario. The l
licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent disrupting normal plant activities.
2.2 Exercise Scenario
The exercise scenario included the following simulated events:
Initial conditions: Beaver Valley Unit #2 had been at 100% power for 364 days and was i
at end of core life. Equipment out of service included the Steam-driven Auxiliary
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Feedwater Pump and Offsite Breaker 342B.
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Off-site train derailment caused a propane leak (an Unusual Event).
- f Transfer hose break during deborating deminemlizer resin transfer increased local
radiation levels (an Alen).
Stuck incore detector in the full-in position during flux mapping.
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15 gpm Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak at the Incore Seal Table Room.
- t Contaminated / injured person when a chemist splashed himself with reactor coolant and
severely cut his left wrist.
- Jammed Offsite Breaker 342B.
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RCS leakrate increase to 90 gpm in the Incore Room.
Offsite Breaker 342B racked in, i
RCS leakmte increase to 300 gpm in the Incore Room.
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Operator-attempted manual reactor trip, which failed, causing an anticipated transient
without scram (ATWS), a Site Area Emergency.
Recovery plan development and exercise termination.
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2.3 Activities Observed The NRC observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Facilities and
actions of the Emergency Response Organization staff. The following were observed:
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Selection and use of control room procedures.
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Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
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Direction and coordination of emergency response.
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Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
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Communications /infonnation flow, and record keeping, i
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Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses.
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Maintenance of site security and access control.
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Perfonnance of technical support, repairs and corrective actions.
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Provisions for communicating infonnation to the public.
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Accident analysis and mitigation.
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Accountability of personnel.
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Post-exercise critique by the licensee.
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3.0 Exercise Finding Classifications Emergency preparedness exercise findings were classified as follows:
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Exercise Strength: A strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnonnal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.
Exercise Weakness: Less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not of itself constitute overall respcmse inadequacy.
Area for Improvement: An aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for corrective action.
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4.0 Exercise Observations Activation and utilization of the Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency. Plan and Emergency Plan l
Implementing Procedures. The presence of Mr. G. Thomas, Vice President, Nuclear Services, and Mr. E. Chatfield, General Manager, Nuclear Support, in the ERFs during the exercise
showed management attention to EP. The following observations were made in the ERFs.
t 4.1 Control Room (CR)
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This exercise involved table-top drilling of the exercise CR staff. The CR opemtors msponded appropriately to simulated plant events. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were
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l properly implemented. Pmper classifications were made and notifications to off-site agencies were completed within allowed time limits. The Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) immediately
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recognized that the anticipated tmnsient without scram met the Site Area Emergency criteria and notified the Emergency Director (ED).
Communications between the CR and Technical Suppon Center were very effective. The Openitions Coordinator (OC) promptly passed vital plant infonnation, such as the Offsite
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Breaker 342B problem and seal table leak, to the ED. The OC also kept the NSS infonned of
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the status and priority of maintenance activities. The NSS provided regular briefings to CR staff
and ensured operators were briefed at the Radiological Operations Center before dispatch to the
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plant. No drill deficiencies were noted.
The following exercise strength was observed:
i Prompt, accurate infonnation flow to the TSC.
There were no exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement.
4.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was staffed and activated 25 minutes after the Alen declamtion. The Emergency l
Director (ED) provided good direction to his staff through periodic meetings. He changed job
priorities as the plant status changed. He also gave regular, infonnative briefings on plant status l
to the TSC and EOF staffs. The ED promptly and correctly declared the Site Area Emergency r
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(SAE) within three minutes of the initiating event, which was an anticipated tmnsient without Notification of State and local officials was completed in a timely manner.
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Accountability was begun at the SAE declamtion in accordance with licensee procedures.
The TSC staff provided good technical suppon. For example, they did an evaluation of the proposal for containment entry to attempt leak isolation at the seal table.
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L No exercise strengths, weaknesses, or areas for improvement were identified.
4.3 Operations Support Center (OSC) and Radiological Operations Center (ROC)
OSC/ ROC management was good. Activation of these facilities was timely and supported the I
response to the resin spill event, which was effective. Facility personnel were apprised of
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emergency status through effective infonnation flow. Discussion of job priorities / status was J
good. Damage control teams (DCTs) were briefed well.
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NRC observers evaluated the following two areas needing improvement from the last exercise.
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Together, these comprised a weakness (IFI 50-344/92-14-01):
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Coordination of DCTs by the OSC/ ROC. This was much improved. Assembly and dispatch of teams was effective.
Information flow between facilities was gcxxi.
I Maintenance task discussions were extensive and thorough. Teams were briefed, debriefed, and kept informed while in the field, i
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Prioritization of in-plant maintenance items. This was also improved. Prioritization of l
jobs was evident. New status boards were present in both areas to track job priorities,
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which were numbered and color-coded for easy recognition. Priorities were set by the TSC and changed as the plant situation changed.
i Therefore this weakness is closed.
Coordination of the contaminated / injured man event needed improvement. The simulated injury was a slashed wrist that was bleeding profusely. The Emergency Squad were trained in basic first aid only, and appeared unable to handle such a casualty. Also, simulation added to the lack of coordination. For example, the Emergency Squad failed to carry the injured man up a flight of stairs on a stretcher when a gurney was not available. Further, although an ambulance was called, it was not allowed into the protected area.
Ilealth physics aspects of the event were not effective in controlling the spread of contamination.
For example, the spill was not covered, contaminated area boundaries were not verified, personnel exited the area without frisking, there was no step-off pad, and no announcements were made to clear the area or the evacuation route.
NRC observers noted that OSC/ ROC procedures were often not used. Direction and control of these facilities were accomplished by managerial familiarity rather than use ofImplementing Procedure (IP) 1.5, " Emergency Support Centers (OSC & ROC) Activation, Operation, and Deactivation." IP 1.5 was very general in content. For example, terms such as " provide on-site radiological controls" and " maintain records" were used, instead of specific steps for
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management control of the emergency, such as " perform this action", "do this survey", or
" contact this person."
i There were no exercise strengths or weaknesses.
The following areas for improvement were noted:
Emergency Squad coordination of a personnel injury.
- Health physics practices during a contaminated person event.
- OSC/ ROC procedures were too general.
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4.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOl3 Staffing and activation of the EOF were in accordance with the Emergency Plan, which called for activation at the SAE. Staffing began at the Alert declaration and the facility was activated
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before the SAE due to detedorating plant conditions. This was a conservative decision made jointly by the ED and the Emergency Response Manager (ERM).
ERM command and control was satisfactory. The flow ofinformation was good. Information was posted promptly via status boards, tear-off pads, and overhead projectors. Logs were maintained at each functional position. The ERM provided adequate briefings to EOF staff and ED briefings to the TSC were heard in the EOF.
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EOF staffliaison with State representatives was excellent. The licensee provided thorough plant status briefings to State representatives by designated Offsite Agency Liaisons and the l
Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection (EADP) Coordinator. The States were fully l
integrated into EOF activities.
The EADP Group assumed responsibility for offsite radiological assessment prior to activation of the EOF in accordance with the Emergency Plan. The scenario contained no radiological releases but the EADP Group closely followed plant events and actively discussed the potential consequences of a release. Dose projections were performed on the Meteorological Information Data Acquisition System computer for two default cases using assumed source terms. In addition, two off-site field teams were positioned to monitor any release. Control of these teams was excellent.
At the conclusion of the exercise, the licensee conducted a recovery discussion. The ED and Assistant ED led a discussion on actions to be taken to clear each emergency classification and work necessary to fix priority maintenance items.
The following exercise strength was observed:
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Liaison with State representatives.
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No exercise weaknesses or areas for improvement were identified.
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4.5 Security and Accountability j
The NRC evaluated changes made to protected area accountability of personnel. Inspectors observed the following:
1327 Site Area Emergency declared.
1353 149 individuals identified on missing persons list.
1419 Initial search indicates 16 missing individuals.
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1436 All personnel accounted for.
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8 Demonstration of the revised procedure appropriately addressed previous NRC concerns in this area and appeared to be an improvement in the pmcess. Ilowever, at 1353 (twenty-six minutes after the SAE), the licensee reported that accountability was complete, despite reponing 149 individuals missing.
This number included controllers, observers, and exercise-exempt personnel. It did not appear to be meaningful to declare accountability complete with 149 individuals missing. Search and rescue activities could not be initiated until the list of missing individuals was reduced to a manageable number. Ilowever, no associated deviation from NRC requirements or guidance was found, and the inspector had no funher questions for the licensee on this matter.
5.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items The following areas for improvement identified during the previous annual emergency exercise (Inspection Repon Nos. 50-334/92-14 and 50-412/92-13) were acceptably demonstrated and not
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repeated:
Overall Controller provision of scenario infonnation to players.
Role of on-shif t doctor and nurse.
Control Room
Communication of event infonnation.
Technical Suppon Center Declaration of emergency conditions when recognized.
- Timely initiation of accountability.
- Knowledge of Imop Isolation Valve use.
Evaluation of Licensee / State cooperation concerning Geld team measurements.
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In addition, the inspectors followed up NRC-identified concerns (NRC Inspection Repon Nos.
50-334/92-14 and 50-412/92-13) fnnu the 1992 emergency exercise.
CLOSED (IFI 50-334/92-14-01) Control of damage repair teams.
The inspectors noted marked improvement in this area (See Detail 4.3).
OPEN (IFI 50-334/92-14-02) Communication of field team data and consideration of potassium iodide for licensee Geld teams.
The inspectors noted good progress toward resolution of this issue. The licensee revised
implementing procedures ;o provide speciOc instmetions for the use of potassium iodide (KI).
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But, this scenario did not specifically test these procedures since there was no radiological release. This item will remain open until the adequacy of the new procedures is demonstrated.
6.0 Licensee Critique and Exit Meeting The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on March 18, 1993. Licensee lead controllers summarized their observations. The critique was constructive and identified most
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NRC findings.
Following the critique, the inspectors met with the licensee personnel denoted in Detail 1.0 to
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discuss the inspection findings. The team leader discussed areas for improvement. The licensee was informed that their exercise performance demonstrated the ability to implement their Emergency Plan to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of an emergency. Licensee management acknowledged NRC findings.
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