IR 05000334/1991006
| ML20024H390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1991 |
| From: | Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024H389 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-91-06, 50-334-91-6, 50-412-91-06, 50-412-91-6, NUDOCS 9106030239 | |
| Download: ML20024H390 (13) | |
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- U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1
Report Nos.
91-06
Docket Nos.
50-334 50-412 i
License Nos.
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r Licensce:
Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility:
lleaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Shippingport, Pennsylvania inspection Period:
March 17 - April 27,1991
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inspectors:.
J. E. Ileali, Senior Resident inspector P. R. Wilson, Resident inspector i
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Approved by:
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W. lif Ruland, Chief Da(e
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Reactor Projects Section No. 411 Inspection Summary -
This inspection report documents routine and reactive inspections during day and backshift hours of -
station activities including: plant operations; radiological protection: surveillance and maintenance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification, i
f a:M 9105t7 ccooo r:.,.2-o PDR
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TAIll.E OF CONTENTS bge EX EC UTI VE S U ht h1 A R Y....................................... iii
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l 1.0 SUhth1 ARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES.......................
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2.0 PLANT OPERA l'lONS (IP 71707, 71710) *
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I 2.1 Operational Safety Verification
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l 2.2 Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown.............
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2.3 Event Followup...............................
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2.4 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Clearance
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3.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (IP 71707)
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4.0 h1AINTENANCE AND SURVElLLANCE (IP 61726, 62703, 71707).......
4.1 hiaintenance Observation..............................
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4.2 SURVEILLANCE OllSERVATIONS
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5.0 Eh1ERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (IP 71707)......................
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6.0 SECURITY (IP 71707)
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7.0 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT (IP 37700,37828. 71707)
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7.1 UNIT 1 AUXILIARY FEi!DWATER SOLliNOID VALVE OVER PRESSURIZATION
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7.2 APPARENT FEEDWATER Ell'!OW CRACK.................
8.0 SAFETY ASSESSh1ENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION (IP 40500, 71707, 90712, 91700)
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8,1 Review of Written Reports.............................
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9.0 EXIT h1EETING...................
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9.1 Preliminary inspection Findings Exit....
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9.2 Attendance at Exit hicetings Conducted by Region-liased Inspectors....
!O The NRC manual inspection procedure (IP) or temporary instruction (TI) is listed for
each applicable report section.
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EXECUTIVE SUNINI AltY licaver Valley Power Station Report Nos. 50-334/91-06 & $0 412/91-06 ISanLQperations Ikith units were operated safely throughout the period without any significant plant transients.
One event concerning the unexpected closure of a Unit 1 safety injection recirculation line isolation valve was reviewed and it was determined that the licensee took all appropriate actions. Weaknesses were identified in the clearance activities associated with work on the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators, llousekeeping was found to be a strength despite the high level of outage activities.
Badiological.Prettclien Routine review of this area identined no noteworthy observations.
Maimit'1atict..a01UiEEcillance Maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and no noteworthy observations were identi6ed.
EtEIggucy Prethutdae33 Routine review of this area identi6cd no noteworthy observations.
SrCitrity Routine review of this area identined no noteworthy observations.
Engintenng.a011 TechnicaLSmpran The inspector reviewed the activities associated with the licensee's discovery by ultrasonic testing of a crack in a Unit I feedwater line elbow. The decision to replace the affected elbow despite the lack of conGrmatory radiographic examination, demonstrated a strong safety perspective. Additionally, the inspector reviewed activities associated with the licensee's identification of underrated solenoid valves for the air operated auxiliary feedwater pump long-term recirculation control valves. The inspector concluded that the operability of auxiliary feedwater system was unaffected; however, the underrated solenoids represented a degradation of the system.
Safety Assess 01cn1Hhalily_Ytri0satien Routme review of this area identified no noteworthy observatirns.
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Dlil21LS 1.0 SU51 malty Ol' FACll.lTY ACTIVITil'.S At the beginning of the period, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at full power. On April 12, Unit I was shut down for the eighth refueling outage. On April 13. Unit i entered Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) and on April 21, refueling operations were commenced tMoJe 6).
Unit i remained in Mode 6 for the remainder of the period. Unit 2 continued to operate at full power throughout the period.
2.0 Pl. ANT OPEllATIONS (IP 71707, 71710)
2.1 Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed plant operation and veritied that the plant was operated safely and in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Regular tours were conducted on the following plant areas:
Control Room
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Safeguard Areas
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Auxiliary lluildings
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Service lluildings
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Switchgear Areas
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Turbine lluildings
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Access Control Points
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Intake Structure
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Protected Areas
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Yard Areas Spent Fuel
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Containment Penetration Areas
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Diesel Generator fluildings During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning knowledge of recent changes to procedures, facility configuration and plant conditions. The inspector verified adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities observed. Shift turnovers were witnessed and stafling requirements confirmed. The inspectors found that control room access was properly controlled and a professional atmosphere was maintained.
Inspector comments or questions resulting from these reviews were resolved by licensee personnel.
Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements.
Operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources were verified. The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and confirmed that operator response was in accordance with plant operating procedures.
Compliance with TS and implementation of appropriate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected. Logs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags, and the jumper and lifted lead book. The inspector also examined the condition of various fire protection, meteorological, and seismic monitoring systems.
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Plant housekeeping controls were monitored, including control and storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. The insiretor conducted detailed walkdowns of accessible areas, of both Unit I aad Unit 2. A small decline in general housekeepmg was observed at both units at the beginning of the period. Unit 2 housekeeping improved and was execllent at the end of the period. Housekeeping at Unit I remained goal despite the high level of work activities associated with the Unit I refueling outage. Work areas, including those in containment, were generally kept free of debris, dirt and unused tools.
2.2 Engineered Safety l'eatures System Walkdown The operability of scieeted engineered safety feature systems was verified by performing detailed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems. The inspectors confirmed that system components were in the required alignments, instrumentation was valved-in with appropriate calibratien dates, as built prints reflected the avinstalled systems and the overall i
conditions observed were satisfactory. The systems inspected during this period include the l
Emergency Diesel Generators, Safety injection. Auxiliary l'ced and Reeirculation Spray systems. No concerns were identified.
2,3 Event Followup Durmg the inspection period, the inspectors provided onsite coverage and followup of unplanned events. Plant parameters, performance of safety systems, and licensee actions were reviewed. The inspector confirmed that the required notifications were made to the NRC. The following event was reviewed.
- Unit i Safety injection Recirculation Line laolation l
On April 5,1991, while Unit I was operating at 100 percent power, one of the two in series normally open recirculation line isolation valves (MOV-SI 88511) for the train #11" low head i
safety injection (SI) pump unexpectedly closed during surveillance testing. The valve that closed was designed as an Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) that was required to automatically close on low Refueling Water Storage Tank water level upon the initiation of the recirculation phase of a safety injection.
The cause of the event was determined to be a set of relay contacts that had failed closed.
The failed closed contacts in conjunction with an Si initiation signal generated by the surveillance test caused the valve to close. During the same surveillance test in October 1990, the same recirculation line isolation valve inadvertently closed due to the failure of the same contact pair (see IR 50-334/90-22; 50-412/90-22). Following that ESF actuation, the failed contact pair was replaced with a qualified spare. The licensee's root cause analysis of the failed contacts did not determine the cause of the failure.
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The valve and train ll" low head injection pump were declared inoperable and all appropriate Technical Specification (TS) action statements were entered. The affected
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recirculation valve was opened and de-energized to ensure pump protection during the
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injection of an St. The failed contact pair was subsequemly replaced with a quali6ed spare, the valve was re-energired, and the TS action statements were exited, Initial inspection of the failed contact pair did not reveal the cause of the failure. There was i
no indication of arcing or other damage. As an interim measure until Unit I was shut down
for refueling, operators measured the voltage across the new contact pair each shift to ensure that the contacts remained opened. The licensee informed the inspector that the relay i
(K64111) with the associated contact pair would be replaced during the current refueling
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outage.
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The inspector found that the licensee took all appropriate actions. The above HSF actuation was reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72. Due to the failure history of the same contact pair (twice within a six months), the licensee stated that a detailed root cause evaluation of the failed contact pair and its associated relay would be performed. The inspector will review licensee's evaluation and any further corrective actions during a
subsequent inspection.
2.4 Unit 2 Diesel Generator Clearance
While monitoring work activities being performed on the 2-2 Emergency Diesel Generator
(EDG) the inspector identified a weakness in the tagout clearance for the job (WR 000537).
The work involved draining the lubricating oil from one of the engine auxiliary systems (the t
rocker arm lube oil system). The clearance tagged the " local Remote" control switch in the
" Local * position which prevented remote and automatic start of the EDG. The clearance electrically disabled the lube oil pump and posted a caution for the control room operators on
the remote start buttons stating that the EDG was not operable.
I The inspector 'dentified that high pressure starting air was still available to the EDG, that no danger or cariion was posted on the kical start buttons, and that no operator was stationed in
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the work aret The inspector expressed the concern that the EDG could still be started (through coraponent failure or inadvertent brushing of the hical start switch) and pose a i
danger to equipment or personnel The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern and posted an operator at the EDG until high pressure air was isolated.
The applicable licensee procedures are the Clearance Procedure in Chapter 41 of the Site Administrative Procedures (SAP 41) and the Unit 2 Operating Manual. The purpose of SAP 41 is to provide "the methods to ensure equipment safety and the safety of personnel" during work on electrical or mechanical components. One provision of SAP 41 (VI. A.l.n) allows-
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"certain short-term minor maintenance jobs such as tightening sight glass packing or piping unions, battery replacement, insulating, painting, etc., or other adjustments or tests where it
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y is not desirable to isolate the equipment being worked on to be performed without a tagout clearance." Under the provision, a'i operator is posted *at the point (s) of isolation" to prevent inadvertent equipment operating.
Using the SAP 41 provision, an operator was posted at the 2-1 EDG on h1 arch 22,1991,
while the rocker arm lube oil system was drained and refilled following detection of some water in the system. The work was done with the " Local Remote" switch in "Iveal" but with no tagout clearance. The time required was just under cipht hours, or about one shift.
The licensee elected to change out the 2 2 EDG rocker arm lube oil as a preventive measure and this work war done on April 11, 1991. For the 2 2 EDO work, a clearance was used instead of posting an operator at the engine. As discussed earlier, the inspector identified a weakness in the clearance. The licensee subsequently evaluated the potential consequences of an inadvertent EDG start with the rocker arm system drained. The licensee concluded that there was no danger to personnel and no danger of catastrophic engine failure. Abnormal
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rocker arm wear was possible after several minutes if the engine was not secured. The inspector discussed the evaluation with licensee representatives and no safety issue was identified.
in summary, the work done on the 2-1 EDG on hiarch 22,1991, exhibited weakness in that it was performed without a clearance. The job required nearly a full eight hour shift and involved draining an auxiliary tube oil system and, as such, was potentially outside the scope of SAP 41 (VI.A.l.n). The licensee demonstrated a strong safety perspective in electing to perform the same maintenance on the 2 2 EDO. This work, however, also exhibited
weakness in that the posted clearance did not isolate high pressure air to the engine.
Inadvertent engine start with the rocker arm tube oil system drained had the potential to damage the machine.
3.0 RADIGl.OGICAl, CONTROI S (IP 71707)
i Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were inspected. Radiation Work
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Permit compliance and use of personnel monitoring devhes were checked. Conditions of step-off pads, disposal of protective clothing, radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability and calibration (portable and permanent), and personnel frisking were observed on a sampling basis.
There were no notable observations.
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4.0 AIAINTENA14CE AND SURYl:lLLANCE (IP 61726,62703,71707)
4.1 hlalutennnec Observation The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that:
the activity did not violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation
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and that redundant components were operable; required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work;
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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the
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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
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where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and
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implemented; QC hold points were established where required and observed;
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equipment was properly tested and returned to service.
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hiaintenance activities reviewed included:
IPhlP-36-EE FL-3A 3R ",1 Unit i Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Lube Oil Soakback Filter Replacement htWR 903817 Ur.it 1 EDG Air Start Solenoid SOV EE 103 Replacement h1WR 903818
. Unit 1 EDG Air Start Solenoid SOV EE 104 Replacement WR 000347 Repair Unit 2 Service Water Pump Seal Water Isolation Valve 25SWS SOV-1308 WR 000537 Drain and Refill 2-2 EDG Rocker Arm Lube Oil System Reservoir There were no notable observations.
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4.2 SlJitVEll.1,ANCE OltSEltVATIONS i
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, Technical Speci0 cations were satisfied, testing was performed by qualined personnel and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were proivrly
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dislositioned. The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:
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Umt.1 OST 1,15.2 lteactor Plant Comjonent Cooling Water Pump (ICCit-P-lii) Quarterly Test ITOP-91-008 itiver Water Flow hicasurement Test 1) nit 2 OST 2.36.1 Emergency Diesel Generator (2EOS EG21) hionthly Test There were no notable observations.
5.0 1 MEltGl:NCY PitEPAltEDNIWS (IP 71707)
The resident inspectors had no noteworthy findings during this inspection period.
6.0 SECURITY (IP 71707)
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Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed n various plant areas with regard to the following:
protected Area and Vital Area barriers were well maintained and not compromised;
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isolation zones wer: clear;
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personnel and vehicles entering and packages being delivered to the Protected Area
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procedure,;
I persons granted access to the site were badged to indicate whether they have
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unescorted access or escorted authorization; security access controls to Vital Areas were maintained and that persons in Vital Areas
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were authorized;
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security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security personnel weie alert
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and kno,vledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures were available; and adequate illumination was maintained.
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There were no noteworthy observations.
7.0 ENGINEERING AND TECilNICAl, SUPPORT (IP 37700,37828, 71707)
7.1 UNIT I AUXil.lARY FEEDWATER SOLENOID VAlWE GVER PRESSURIZATION On April 15, 1991, during a walkdown in response to NRC Information Notice 88-24 of Unit I air operated valves, the licensee determined that an over pressure condition existed on the three inch air operated Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump minimum now recirculation control valves. They determined that the operating differential pressure (35 psid) across the solenoid c
valves associated with the AFW pump minimum flow recirculation valves was greater than the solenoid maximum design differential pressure of 25 psid. A failure of one of these solenoid valves would have prevented its associated minimum now valves from opening when required. The solenoids involved were ASCO model No. Np8320A189E. The discovery of this outside design bases condition was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. Three other underrated solenoid valves were identified during the licensee's walkdown. One solenoid was kicated in the Primary Grade Water System and the other two solenoids were kicated in the Main Condenser Air Ejector System. The failure of these three solenoids would have no impact on plant safety since the associated air operated valves were designed to fail closed.
The minimum Dow recirculation control valves are designed to provide for AFW pump protection during long term low flow conditions and to control flow during AFW pump surveillance testing. A review of past control valve performance indicated the valves operated properly during AFW operation with the underrated solenoid valves. Each AFW pump has an additional, smaller recirculation line (one inch) which provides a relatively
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constant Dow through the pump lube oil coolers back to the pump's water source. Past AFW pump operating history demonstrated that the AFW pumps could be operated safely for approximately 20 minutes without overheating with only the one inch recirculation line in service, therefore providing short term pump protection. Additionally, the turbine-driven AFW pump is supplied with a high capacity relief valve which would provide long term pump protection if the three inch minimum now recirculation valve was unavailable.
The licensee performed an AFW operability determination evaluation and concluded that the AFW system was operable; however, the installation of the underrated solenoids represented a depraded condition. The inspector had no concerns with this determination based on AFW system design which provided short term pump protection for the two motor driven AFW
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pump and an additional means of long term pump protection for the turbine driven pump (sec Unit 1 UFSAR Section 10.3.5.2.2). Additionally, the licen:.ee had in place procedures
to direct o;vrators to protect the motor driven pumps during low Al:W pump Dow condition coincident with a low /no recirculation How condition. The inspector was informed that the
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solenoid valves would be replaced with higher differential pressure rated valves during the current outage. This design deficiency was apparently installed circa 1981. The licensee was unable to determine the exact cause of the denciency. The inspector had no further questions.
i 7,2 APPARENT l'EEDWATER ELilOW CRACK i
On April 20,1991, ultrasonic testing (UT) of the feedwater line pipe elbow closest to the IC
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Steam Generator (SG) found indications in the wcld counterbore area of the elbow closest to the SG feedwater noule. Evaluation of the UT data showed the indications to be approximately 7.4 inches in length and as deep as 0.17 inches at one location (24 percent of pipe wall thickness). This exceeded the acceptance standards of ASME Section XI, lWil-35141. As a confirmatory measure, the affected joint was subjected to radiographic examination; however, no indications were identified.
The feedline elbow indication problem had been previously identi0ed as a potentially generic concern with Westinghouse SGs. Additionally, this same problem was identified in 1979 and again in 1988; in both instances all three feedwater elbows had to be replaced. In 1989, UT
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examination of the feedline elbow to the l A SG found indications which were not con 0rmable with radiographic examination. This elbow was removed; however, it was subsequently determined that the UT indications were not from a Daw but were the result of machining grooves in the elbow.
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The licensee had postulated that the elbow indications were due to cyclic fatigue caused by local temperature strati 0 cation. To develop the optimum permanent repair of the elbows, the i
licensee installed temporary thermocouples and lanyard pots on the affected feed lincs to
l provide force and temperature gradient data during plant operation. Significant thermal cycles were observed during normal plant heatup (up to 29 percent reactor power) and post reactor trip / auxiliary feedwater injection.
l Bascd on the pipe data, a design change was approved to install thermal sleeves in the affected elbows; however, the sleeves were not available during the current refueling outage.
As an interim measure, the licensee is replacing the affected elbow with a like-in-kind
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replacement. The affected elbow will be sent to a test laboratory for destructive testing. The
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Unit 2 feedwater system utilizes the thermal sleeve design for the s:une elbows and similar problems have not been observed.
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The licensee's decision to replace the affected elbow despite the lack of conthmatory
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evidence from ra_diographic examination demonstrated a strong safety Ivrsivetive. The
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inspector will review the repair activities associated with the replacement of the elbow in a
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j subsequent inspection.
8.0 sal'ETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERil'ICATION (IP 40500,71707 90712, 91700)
8.1 Review of Written Reports The inspector reviewed LERs and other reports submitted to the NRC to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and
adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated and whether the event warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed:
Unit _1:
- LER 91-007-00 Partial less of Battery Chargers Causing Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3.
LER 91-008 00 Underrated Motor Termination Leads on low Ilead Safety injection Pump.
LER 914X)9-00 A Portion of Chemical and Volume Control Systs
- ping not Hydrostatically Tested in Accordance with ASt *t_
nn XI.
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None.
The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 and the guidance provided in NUREG 1022. Generally, the LERs were found to be of high quality with good documentation of event analyses, root cause determinations, and corrective actions.
9.0 EXIT MEETING
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i 9.1 Preliminary Impection 11ndings litt htectings were held with senior facility managemerit throughout the inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summaty of the f.ndings was further discussed with the licensee at the conclusion of the report period on hiay 3,1491. On htarch 25,1991, a SALP hianagement hiceting was held with NRC Regional and Duquesne Company management in attendance to discuss the recent S ALP report.
9.2 Attendance at Ihlt $1ectings Conducted by Region llased Impectors inspection Reporting Dalo SMhicC1 Ikp0ILlio l!15perler 3/18 22/91 Reload Safety 50 334/91 05 Trapp livaluation 4/23-26/91 Safeguards 50-334/01 08; Smith 50 412/91-0S
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