IR 05000334/1991002
| ML20029C237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1991 |
| From: | Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029C227 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-91-02, 50-334-91-2, 50-412-91-02, 50-412-91-2, NUDOCS 9103270033 | |
| Download: ML20029C237 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 Report Nos.
91-02 Docket Nos.
50-334 50-412 License Nos.
DPR-66 NPF-73 Licensee:
Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center 301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Shippir.gport, Per.nsylvania Inspection Period:
January 1 - February 14, 1991 Inspectors:
J. E. Beall, Senior Resident inspector P. R. Wilson, Resident Inspector J. S. Stewart, Project Engineer, Region 1 K. S. Kolaczyk, Resident inspector, Millstone 9/
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Approved by:
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W. H. Ruland, Chief '
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Reactor Projects Section No. 4B Inspection Summary This inspection report documents routine and reactive inspections during day and backshift hours of station activities including: plant operations; radiological controls; surveillance and maintenance; emergency preparedness; security; engineering and technical support; and safety assessment / quality verification.
i 9103270033 910315 PDR ADOCK 05000334 O
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SUMMARY Beaver Valley Power Station (
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Report Nos. 50-334/91-02 & 50-412/91-02
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- Plant Goerations l
The facility was operated safely during the period. A strong safety perspective was
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demonstrated by the decision to shut down Unit 1 following the discovery of a small Reactor
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Coolant System leak. In addition, three Engineered Safety Feature actuations were reviewed.
l Appropriate operator and corrective actions were taken for each event. One event (see Detail
2.3.2) was caused by a very unusual mechanism which involved vacuum drag of water from a tank into the Unit 1 steam generators. Housekeeping at both units was excellent.
Radiological Protection i
Routine review of the area identified no noteworthy observations.
Maintenance and' Surveillance
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- Maintenance activities associated with two events were reviewed. The repair of a Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System-leak represented a notable strength. This effort included exce!!cnt -
planning with a parallel path approach and use of functional mock ups. The repair and adjustment activities associated with a Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater valve rictuator were weak.
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The work im;tructions lacked the necessary air pressute setting data and workers chose an erroneous setting rather than research other documents to determine the correct value.
Emergency Prenaredness
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- The licensee correctly classified a Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System leak as an Unusual Event
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due to pressure boundary leakage. All required notifications were made.
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Security
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Corrective actions following a temporary loss of power to a site access metal detector were reviewed..~ Short term corrective actions were found to be good; long term corrective actions were still being formulated at the close of the inspection. Routine review of this area identified no noteworthy observations.
Engineering and Technical Support The status of corrective actions which resulted from a March 30,1990, reactor trip were reviewed. The trip was caused by a main feedwater regulating valve failing partially shut due
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to instrument air moisture buildup. Th_e short term actions were found to be good. The long.
-term actions also appeared to be good but were not yet completed.. The licensee was verified
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to be performing weekly l samples of the instrument air system and _had developed appropriate procedures to compensate for a loss of instrument air as stated in the response to Generic
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J Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification Routine review of this area identified no noteworthy observations.
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1.0 SUMMARY Or FACILITY ACTIVITIES
/it the beginning of the inspection period Unit I was operating at approximately 30 percent and Unit.2 was operating at full power. On January 2, Unit I returned to full power operation. 'On January 17, a Unit I controlled shutdown and cooldown to Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) wa's performed due to a small Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak (See Detail
2.3.1) Unit I returned to power operation on February 1 and.was operated at full power for
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the remainder of the period. Unit 2 operated at full power throughout the period.
-2.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (IP 71707, 71710, 93702)
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Operational Safety Verification i
The inspectors otiserved plant operation and verined that the plant was operated safely and in-accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Regular tours were-
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Safeguard Areas Control Room
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Service Buildings -
Auxiliary Buildings
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Turbine Buildings Switchgear Areas
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Access Control Points
- Intake Structure
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Yard Areas Protected Area Fence Line
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Diesel Generator
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' Spent Fuel Btillding _
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Containment Penetration Areas
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During the course of the inspection, discussions were conducted with operators concerning -
= knowledge'of recent changes to procedures, facility con 0guration and plant conditions. The inspector verified adherence to approved procedures for ongoing activities observed. Shift -
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turnovers _were witnessed and staf0ng requirements confirmed. The inspectors found that Leontrol. room access was properly controlled and a professional atmosphere was maintained /.
~ Inspector comments or' questions resultin'g from these reviews were resolved by licensee '
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personnel.-
- Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation
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Operability of engineered safety. features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources were verified., The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and con 0rmed that operator response was in accordance with plant operating procedures,
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Compliance with TS'and implementation of appropriate action statements for equipment out
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of servic+ was inspected. Logs and records were revic'wed to determine if entries were
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accurate and identified equipment status or denciencies. ' These records included operating -
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logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags, and the jumper and lifted lead book. The inspector also examined the condition of various fire protection, meteorological, and seismic monitoring.<ystems.
Plant housekeeping controls were monitored, including control and storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. The inspector conducted detailed walkdowns of accessible areas, of both Unit I and Unit 2. Housekeeping at both units was excellent.
2.2 Enginetred Safety Features System Walkdown The operability of selected engineered safety feature systems was verined by performing detailed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems. The inspectors confirmed that system components were in the required alignments, instrumentation was valved in with appropriate cal % tion dates, as-built prints reflected the as-installed systems and the overall conditions observed were satisfactory. The systems inspected during this period include the Emergency Diesel Generators, Safety injection Auxiliary Feed and Recirculation Spray systems. No concerns were identified.
2.3 Event Followup During the inspection period, the inspectors provided onsite coverage and followup of unplanned events. Plant parameters, performance of safety systems, and licensee actions were reviewed. The inspector confirmed that the required notifications were made to the NRC. The following events were reviewed:
2.3.1 Unit 1 Shutdown and Unusual Event Due to RCS Leak On January 17,1991, a Unit I controlled shutdown from 100 percent power was commenced due to a small RCS leak of about 1/3 gallon per minute (gpm). On January 18, the source of the leak was determined to be a cracked weld connecting a small line to the body of a RCS loop isolation valve (IPC-593). Since the leak was in the RCS pressure boundary, an Unusual Event was declared and the unit was cooled down to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdewn) for repairs. All off site notifications were made in accordance with the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Plan. The Unusual Event was terminated upon entry into Mede 5 on January 19, 1991. Upon completion of repairs (see Section 4.3), Unit I was started up and returned to power operations on February 1,1991. Unit 1 Technical Specifications allow one gpm of unidentified leakage. The licensee deraonstrated a strong safety perspective in the decision to shut down Unit I following the discovery of the leak.
2.3.2 Unit 1 Feedwater Isolation On January 19, 1991, following the Unit I cooldown to Mode 5, a feedwater isolation occurred due to high water level in the 1 A steam generator. At the start of the event, a steam generator (SG) cooldown was in progress. The heat sink was provided by the main condenser via a steam dump valve. Makeup to the steam generators was provided via the normal feedwater and condensate systems with one condensate punip running.
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Appi aximately two hours prior to the feedwater isolation (FWI), control room operators observed SG water level increasing in all SGs and subsequently took a series of unsuccessful actions to control water level. The feedwater bypass line block valves were shut, the running condensate pump was stopped, and SG blowdown flow was set for maximum flow.
However, SG levels continued to increase and when level in the l A SG reached 75 percent, the feedwater containment isolation valves closed as designed. Main condenser vacuum was broken at approximately the same time as the FW1. The SGs level rise turned and SG levels decreased to below the FWI setpoint. SG level control was subsequently reestablished. The event was reported to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72.
l The licensee subsequently determined the cause of the event. The vacuum in the main l
condenser was reflected in the SGs following SG cooldown. The vacuum in the SG drew water into the SGs from the Primary Grade Water Storage Tank via the Auxiliary Feedwater System. When vacuum was broken in the main condenser, flow from the tank stopped and SG levels subsequently decreased. The abcyc phenomena had not been observed during previous SG cooldowns. A higher than normal vacuum had been established in the main condenser du; to a low river water temperature. When the higher than normal vacuum was reflected in the SGs, it was sufficient to draw water into the SGs via the Auxiliary Feedwater System's water source.
The Ospector reviewed the event and concluded that the control room operators took appropriate actions based on prior operating experience. To prevent recurrence, the iicensee stated that precautions would be added to the appropriate procedures warning operators of the above phenomena. The inspector had no further questions.
2.3.3 Unit 1 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation
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On January 31,1991, while Unit I was in Hot Standby (Mode 3), the three steam generator (SG) blowdown headers automatically isolated during post maintenance testing following the repair of a steam admission valve to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Each SG blowdown header is provided with an air operated isolation valve (TV-BD-100 A,B,C) which automatically closes on a phase "A" containment l'
Sn signal (an Engineered Safety Feature) or auxiliary feedwater pump discharge p..
.: of greater than 500 psig. Prior to the event, SG blowdown had been manually isolated downstream of the automatic isolation valves described above.
The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump is provided with two normally closed, air operated steam admission valves. The valves are designed to fall open on a loss of air. The air actuator diaphragm of one of the two valves failed. The pemp was declared inoperable and steam was isolated upstream of the steam admission valves. The diaphragm was subsequently replaced. When steam was unisolated, the repaired valve partially opene 1 (1/8
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inch) causing the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine to roll. When pump discharge pressure exceeded 500 psig, the blowdown header isolation valves closed as designed. Steam to the
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turbine driven pump was promptly isolated. No water was pumped into the SGs. The
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blowdown header isojation valves were subsequently reopened. The event was reported to the NRC as required per 10 CFR 50.72.
The !icensee subsequently determined that the air set pressure of the affected steam admission valve was incorrectly adjustea to 15 psig below the required pressure following the replacement of the actuator diaphragm. Due to the low pressure setting, the valve partially opened when steam was admitted to the valve. The air set pressure was subsequently properly adjusted and no leakage past the valve was detected (see Detail 4.4 for further assessment of the maintenance activities associated with this event). The auxiliary feedwater pump was declared operable after satisfactory completion of the required surveillance tests.
The inspector reviewed the event and found that, aside from concerns related to the
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maintenance activity, the event was of only minor safety significance. At the time of the event, the unit was shut down in Mode 3 and SG blowdown had been previousi / isolated.
No water was pumped into the SGs. Operator rcsponse to the event wr prompt.md correct.
2.3.4 Unit 1 Auxillary Feedwater Pump Automatic Start On February 11, 1991, Unit I was at 100 percent power and operators were performing routine operating surveillance test OST 1.24.1, "S/G Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves Exercise " During performance of the test, the steam supply *;aNe to the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-P-2) unexpectedly opened starting the pumo. The steam generator blowdown valves also closed. After determining thz no valid in
. ing conditivas existed, operators secured the pump and returned blowdown to service, ihe components were found to have started due to the apparently spurious actuation of the relay which transfers control of the steam valve from the control room to the emergency shutdown panel. The inspector myiewed ine licensee's investigatory activities and noted that licensee re-performance of the test was not able to repeat the event. The inspector had no further questions.
3.0 RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (IP 71707)
Posting and centrol of radiation and high radiation areas were inspected. Radiation Work Permit compliance and use o emnel monitoring devices were checked. Conditions of r
step-off pads, disposal of prw lothing, radiation control job coverage, area monitor operability and calibration (portote and permanent) and personnel frisking were observed on a sampling basis.
There were no notable observations.
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Maintennce Observation.
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-i fThe inspector reviewed _ selected maintenance activities to assure that:
- the activity did not violate Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation
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and that redundant coinponents were operable;-
required _ approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work; j
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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the c trade;j R
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Jactivities w cre accomplished by qualified personnel;
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_whe:c necestry. radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and.
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implemen'ed;
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. QC holu points were established where required and observed;-
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fequi_pment was properly; tested and returned to service.
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intenance activities reviewed included:
.NR 910187.
' Repair Support for. ITS-VS-4-18 MWR 912177-1 L Repair Leak at MOV-RC-593 !
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' CMWR~ 915125-.
Fuel Pool Cooling Pump Boric Acid Removal-
' Notable observations are discussed in Section 4.3 'and Section 4.4.
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e4.2i - Surveillance Observations.
i The;inspectols. witnessed / reviewed selected' surveillance tests to determine whether properly
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- approved procedures _were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly;
' calibrated and usedf Technical Specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by'
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squalified personnel and. test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly
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ldispositionedi The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:'
Unit 1 OST 1.24.31. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test (IFW-P-3B)
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- OST 2.36.2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2EGS*EG2-2) Monthly Test i
There were no notable observations.
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Repair of Reactor Coolant System Leak
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The maintenance activities associated with repair of the RCS leak under MWR 912177 (see Section 2.3.1) were well planned and executed. The leak was from a weld connecting a small unused (blank flanged) line on the body of a RCS loop isolation valve. Due to its-location, the leak could not be isolated from the RCS. Substantial preparation and planning
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were involved in the leak repair.
- The licensee constructed a mock-up of the components and tested various alternative -
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approaches under. water pressure which corresponded to the vertical head of water that would be present'during the_ work. A tapered pbg was demonstrated successfully on the mock-up.
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A rubber plug was also made for use if the tapered plug failed to seat properly.
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The line'was cut and the tapered plug was tamped into place. This successfully stopped the -
-leak. The line was removed and the fitting on the valve body was prepared for the weld
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. repair. A second plug was welded onto the fitting which completed the repair.
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The inspector determined that the licensee's planning and troubleshooting activities associated
~-with the repair constituted a notable strength. Several repair approaches were developed independently. This parallel path approach, together with the use of mock-ups, allowed
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management to select a repair method with good confidence of success.
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4.4_ -' Auxiliary Feedwater Repair Activity The inspector reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities associated with the repair and
, adjustment of a Unit I tur&,v Mven auxiliary feedwater pump steam admission. valve air cactuator_which resulted it.i. advertent automatic steam generator blowdown isolation (see
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Detail 2.3.3 for discussion of the event). The event resulted from the incorrect adjustment of
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. the air set pressure of the valve operator following the replacement of the air actuator
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~The maintenance was performed under maintenance work request (MWR) 910194. The MWR work instructions were inadequate in that the MWR did not specify a pessure setting
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for the air actuator. The drawings referenced by the MWR also did not contain the necessary
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calibration data. There was a corrective maintenance procedure (CMP) available.which e
contained the correct pressure setting, but it was.not referenced on the MWR nor utilized by-the repair technicians.
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Without any specific pressure settings, the repair technicians adjusted the air set pressure of the air operator to 35 psig (the specified setting in the CMP was 50 psig) based on prior experience with air operators of the same sire. This pressure was inadequate to prevent the valve from opening once steam was admitted below the closed seat during post maintenance testing. There appeared to have been no effort on the part of the technicians to obtain the correct pressure setting prior to the post maintenance testing.
The inspector found that several factors contributed to the event. Supenision of the maintenance activity was inadequate. The work instructions prepared by the maintenance supervisor revealed a lack of attention to detail in that a pressure setting was not specified nor was the CMP referenced for use. The repair technicians lacked a questioning attitude and demonstrated an over reliance on prior experience in that attempts to obtain the required pressure setting were not made prior to post maintenance testing. In the aggregate, the above concerns indicated a weakness in the training of maintenance supervisors and technicians.
The licensee performed an independent root cause analysis of the event which identified similar causes. Corrective actions for the event were still under development by the end of tne inspection period.
The inspector concluded that die event was of minor significance (see Detail 2.3.3) and no past similar occurrences were idantified. The licensee promptly reported the event to the NRC as required. Pending the inspector's assessment of the licensee's corrective actions, this item is Unresolved (50-334/91-02-01).
5.0 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (IP 71707)
The licensee declared an Unusual Event following the identification of a Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary leak (see Detail 2,3.1). The inspector reviewed the event ud confirmed that the licensee had correctly classified the event and had made all the required notifications.
The resident inspectors had no noteworthy other findings during this inspection period.
6.0 SECURITY (IP 71707)
6.1 Monthly Security Observation Implementation of the Physical Security Plan was observed in various plant areas with regard to the following:
protected Area and Vital. Area barriers were well maintained and not compromised;
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isolation zones were clear;
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personnel and vehicles entering and packages being delivered to the Protected Area
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were properly searched and access control was in accordance with approved licensee
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persons granted access _to the site were badged to indicate whether they have
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unescorted access or' escorted authorization; security access controls to Vital Areas were maintained and that persons in Vital Areas
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were authorized; security posts were adequately staffed and equipped, security personnel were alert
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and knowledgeable regarding position requirements, and that written procedures were available; and
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adequate illumination was' maintained.
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There were no notable observations, 6.2 Temporary Loss of Power to Metal Detector At about 2:00 p.m. on Feb.uary 2,1991, a security guard identified that the metal detector in service at the site entrance was not working. A different detector was put in service and technicians _wcre requested to troubleshoot the detector that was not working. - The technicians
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' determined that another technician had inadvertently de-energized the detector around noon for a duration of about two hours.
The licensee reported the event as a potential safeguards event per 10 CFR 73.71. The licensee reviewed the event and determined that it did not represent a significant degradation -
in plant physical security. The event was also reviewed by NRC security inspectors who had no concern with the licensee's conclusions. - Long term corrective actions were still being formulated at the close of(ne inspection and will be reviewed during the next security.-
specialist inspection.
7.0 ENGINEERING AND TECIINICAL SUPPORT (IP 37700,37828,71707)
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Followup of Unit'l Instrument Air Moisture Concerns
LOn' March 30,~ 1990, Unit 1 tripped from 100% of rated thermal power when the 1C Main
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Feedwater Regulating Valve (MFRV) stroked partially shut. Subsequent licensee
~ investigation of the event revealed a significant amount of water in the instrument air lines of the failed MFRV. - The excessive moisture buildup was attributed to the intermittent failure of '
instrument air dryer (IA-D-1) which resulted in the dryer being bypassed, allowing only the symin filters to treat the air.
Licensee Actions
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To improve instrument air reliability, the licensee implemented the following short term corrective actions: (1) Higher capacity temporary air compressors were installed; one diesel, the other electric. This action enabled the use of dryer (IA-D-2), which was installed in 1986 but had been bypassed due to the inadequate air flow developed by the station air compressors. (2) The instrument air system was walked down by a licensee engineer v,ho compared the as installed configuration to the plant drawings. Discrepancies, whien were noted during the walkdown, were identined and drawing revisions submitted. Systen'
material condition discrepancies, such as leaking fittings and valves, were identined and corrected. Repairs which could not be accomplished during plant operation were deferred to the upcomhig April 1991 refueling outage. (3) The plant operator logs were modined to require daily blowdown of the low points in the instrument air system.
Long term corrective actions include: (1) Installation of permanent higher capacity station air compressors and an additional instrument air dryer during the upcoming refueling outage. (2)
Review of the instrument air system by a outside contractor for the purpose of developing a system maintenance program.
Inspector Review and Assessment The inspector reviewed licensee corrective actions and discussed the event with operations and engineering personnel. The inspector also reviewed applicable station operating procedures and the licensee's resmse to Generie Letter 88-14, " Instrument Air System Problems." The inspector verifio the beensee was performing weekly samples of the instrument air system and had developed appropriate procedures to compensate for a loss of instrument air as stated in the response to Generic Letter 88-14. Prior to the March 30, 1990, trip, the air sampling program had identined moisture in the instrument air system; however, the licensee failed to recognize the significance of this discovery. Consequently, adequate corrective action was not taken. The inspector considered the licensee's short and long term corrective actions described above in response to the trip to be good. The inspector had no further questions, 8.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION (IP 40500,71707, 90712, 91700)
The inspector reviewed LERs and other reports submitted to the NRC to verify that the details of the events were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated and whether the evei.t warranted onsite followup. The following LERs were reviewed:
Unit 1:
90-018-00 Engineered Safety Features Actuation - Automatic Start of River Water Pump Due to Operator Error
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90-019-00 Closure of Main Steam Trip Valve During Partial Stroke Testing.
90-020-00 Computer Failure Causes Inoperable Flux Difference Monitor lInit3:
?90-026-00 ESF Actuation - Containment Radiation Monitor Inlet Isolation Valve Closure
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'90-027-00 Excessive Airflow through Control Room Outside Air Inlet Damper The above LERs were reviewed with respect to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.and the guidance provided in NUREG 1022. Generally, the LERs were found to be of high quality with good. documentation of event analyses, root cause determinations, and corrective actions.
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EXIT MEETING
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Preliminary Inspection Findings Exit Meetings were held with senior facility management throughout the inspection to discuss the inspection scope and findings. A summary of the findings was furth' discussed with the '
. licensee at the conclusion of the' report period on March 1,1991.
9.2 Attendance at Exit Meetings Conducted by Region-Based Inspectors
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Inspection Reporting Dates Subiect -
Reoort No.
InspectoI 1/8 - 1/11/91-QA Program 50-334/91-01; Finkel 50-412/91-01 I
9.3T Management Meeting with Licensee
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On January.28,1991, Duquesne Light Company visited the Region I Nuclear Regulatory.
- Commission Office to present a licensee update of self assessment. The licensee described programs and initiatives designed to enhance the site's professionalism, performance
. standards, and team work. The licensee's presentation was based on excerpts from a-
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-Duquesne Light report entitled, "SALP Period September 1,;1989, to December 31,1990, for Duquesne Light Company, Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2."
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