IR 05000333/2005301
| ML051940525 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/2005 |
| From: | Conte R Division of Reactor Safety I |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| Shared Package | |
| ML042440205 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-333/05-301 50-333/05-301 | |
| Download: ML051940525 (23) | |
Text
July 13, 2005
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR INITIAL EXAMINATION REPORT NO. 05000333/2005301
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This report transmits the results of the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) licensing examination conducted by the NRC during the period of May 16 to 20, 2005. This examination addressed areas important to public health and safety and was developed and administered using the guidelines of the Examination Standards for Power Reactors (NUREG-1021, Revision 9).
Based on the results of the examination, three of five Senior Reactor Operator applicants passed all portions of the examination. Two Senior Reactor Operator applicants failed the written portion of the examination. The five applicants were all instant SROs. Mr. Steven Dennis discussed performance insights observed during the examination with Mr. Rick Devercelly on May 20, 2005. On June 15, 2005, final examination results, including individual license numbers, were given during a telephone call between Mr. Richard Conte and Mr. Steve Reininghaus.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). These records include the final examination and are available in ADAMS Package Accession Number ML042440205; SRO Written - Accession Number ML051930243; SRO Operating Section A - Accession Number ML051930218; SRO Operating Section B - Accession Number ML051930227; and SRO Operating Section C - Accession Number ML051930234, and Facility Post Examination Comments on the Written Exams - Accession No. ML051930393.
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Mr. Theodore Sullivan Should you have any questions regarding this examination, please contact me at (610) 337-5183, or by E-mail at RJC@NRC.GOV.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Richard J. Conte, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
Initial Examination Report No. 05000333/2005301
REGION I==
Docket No.
50-333 License No.
DPR-59 Report No.
05000333/2005301 Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Entergy Nuclear Northeast Facility:
James A. Fitzpatrick Dates:
May 20, 2005, Written Examination Administration May 16-19, 2005, Operating Test Administration May 19-31, 2005, Receipt of Final Licensee Post Examination Comments and Grading June 9, 2005, Examination Grading Examiners:
S. Dennis, Senior Operations Engineer (Chief Examiner)
T. Fish, Senior Operations Engineer H. Williams, Operations Engineer (Consultant)
M. Brown, Operations Engineer Approved by:
Richard J. Conte, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
ii Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000333/2005301; May 16, 2005 to May 20, 2005; James A. Fitzpatrick; Initial Operator
Licensing Examination. Three of five applicants passed the examination (3 SRO instants).
The written examinations were administered by the facility and the operating tests were administered by three NRC region-based examiners. There were no inspection findings of significance associated with the examinations.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Mitigating Systems - Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) Initial License Examination
a. Scope
of Review The NRC examination team developed the written and operating initial examination and together with Fitzpatrick training and operations personnel verified or ensured, as applicable, the following:
- The examination was prepared and developed in accordance with the guidelines of Revision 9 of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors. A review was conducted both in the Region I office and at the Fitzpatrick plant and training facility. Final resolution of comments and incorporation of test revisions were conducted during and following the onsite preparation week.
- Simulation facility operation was proper.
- A test item analysis was completed on the written examination for feedback into the systems approach to training program.
- Examination security requirements were met.
The NRC examiners administered the operating portion of the examination to all applicants from May 16 to 19, 2005. The written examination was administered by the Fitzpatrick training staff on May 20, 2005.
b. Findings
Grading and Results Three of five applicants (SROIs) passed all portions of the initial licensing examination.
Two applicants (SROIs) passed all sections of the operating portion but failed the written portion of the initial licensing examination.
The facility had four post-examination comments on the written examination. The NRC resolutions of these comments are attached. In summary, there were two changes, one question was deleted and another had an answer change. Two licensee comments were denied. Based on these comment resolutions, the NRC regraded all of the applicants written examinations. The regrading of the written examinations did not result in the two SROI applicants achieving passing grades on the written exam.
Examination Administration and Performance No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Exit Meeting Summary
On June 15, 2005, the NRC provided conclusions and examination results to Fitzpatrick management representatives via telephone. License numbers for three of the five applicants were also provided during this time. Two applicants passed all sections of the operating portion but failed the written portion of the initial licensing examination and therefore denied a license at this time.
The NRC expressed appreciation for the cooperation and assistance that was provided during the preparation and administration of the examination by the licensees training staff.
ATTACHMENT 1
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
LICENSEE
- P. Berry, Manager, Training & Development
- S. Rieninghaus, Operations Training Supervisor
Rick Devercelly, Operations Training
Donald Binkley, Operations Training
NRC
- S. Dennis, Senior Operations Engineer
- T. Fish, Senior Operations Engineer
- H. Williams, Operations Engineer (Consultant)
- M. Brown, Operations Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
ITEM NUMBER
TYPE
DESCRIPTION
NONE
ATTACHMENT 2
Licensees Post Written Examination Comments Publically Available
ADAMS Accession No. ML051930393
FITZPATRICK 2005 NRC Written Examination Post Exam Comments & NRC Resolution
The NRC staff reviewed the licensees comments for the questions below. In addition, the staff
reviewed abnormal, emergency, operating, and other pertinent procedures as noted. The
NRCs resolution for these four post exam comments is based on the independent reviews that
were conducted by both the NRC examiners assigned to the exam team as well as the Branch
Chief.
SRO Question # 40 (Licensee Comments Highlighted)
An accident has resulted in the following conditions:
Drywell Hydrogen 6%, Steady
Drywell Oxygen 2%, Steady
Torus Hydrogen 6%, Steady
Torus Oxygen 3%, Steady
Drywell Radiation 3100 R/Hr, Steady
Reactor Coolant Activity 250 uci/gm, Steady
RPV Pressure 600 psig, Lowering at 20 psig/min
Torus Pressure 55 psig, Rising at 1 psig/min
Torus Water Temperature 180° F, Rising 0.5° F/min
Torus Water Level 14 Feet, Rising 1/min
Fifteen minutes from now, the expected Control Room actions will be to:
a. Declare a Site Area Emergency. Vent and Purge the Torus and Drywell.
b. Declare a Site Area Emergency. Emergency Depressurize the Reactor Pressure Vessel.
d.
Declare a General Emergency. Evacuate a 2 mile radius and 5 miles downwind.
Answer Key:
d.
Post-Exam
Evaluation
Recommendation:
Accept both c and d as correct responses
Challenge Issue:
Required reference inadvertently omitted creating an unrealistic From
Memory expectation - The candidate should have been provided with EAP-
4, Attachment 1. Providing this reference is supported by program objective
10.02 in lesson Plan EP-12.5.4.2 which states Evaluate plant conditions and
determine PARs using EAP-4. Failure to provide the required reference
was an oversight on the part of the Exam Development Team. Both Training
Program and Station Management expectations are that Protective Action
Recommendations will not be made without first referencing EAP-4. In the
absence of the necessary reference, c is also an appropriate and
conservative response.
Candidate
Performance:
of 5 Selected d while the remaining two candidates selected c
D.
d.
CORRECT: The given conditions are 7 psig and 7 minutes from
violating the PCPL Curve. IAW EOP-4, venting of primary containment
is required prior to exceeding PCPL. General Emergency EAL 3.1.3 is
applicable when primary containment venting is required due to PCPL.
Whenever a General Emergency is declared, EAP-4 directs a Protective
Action Recommendation to evacuate a 2 mile radius and 5 miles
downwind.
A.
Incorrect: The hydrogen values given warrants a Site Area Declaration
on EAL 3.3.1. Using this rational, the hydrogen and oxygen values
given only result in vent and purge of the drywell and Torus if the
resultant off-site release rate will remain below the off-site release rate
vented, will clearly violate the release rate LC
directs EAL entry at the highest level indicated by the conditions.
B.
C.
Incorrect: A Site Area Emergency 3.2.1 is declared if conditions cannot
be maintained below HCTL. Although the values of RPV Pressure and
Torus Temperature are in the GREY area of the HCTL curve, they are
below that of 14 feet and trending parallel to the curve. An emergency
depressurization is also required for the violation of PS
IAP-2 directs EAL entry at the highest level indicated by the conditions.
cc
.
CORRECT: The given conditions are 7 psig and 7 minutes from
violating the PCPL Curve. IAW EOP-4, venting of primary containment
is required prior to exceeding PCPL. General Emergency EAL 3.1.3 is
applicable when primary containment venting is required due to PCPL.
Without an available reference (EAP-4 Att. 1) to make a specific PAR,
this would be a conservative decision on the operators part; with
answer d being a subset of c.
Technical
Reference(s):
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during
examination:
IAP-2 Attachment IAP-2.1, EOP-
4, 4A, and 11
NRC Resolution - Q. #40
In regard to answer D (the original correct answer):
The staff recognized that the applicants were not provided with the necessary reference, EAP-4,
Att. 1, to determine the correct answer. The staff also recognized that per station management
expectations and the license operator training program, PARs will not be made without first
referencing EAP-4.
The NRC staff reviewed the original licensee justification, references noted above, the licensees
post exam comments, and found that answer D, Declare a GE. Evacuate a 2 mile radius and
miles downwind, was correct. The staff determined that answer D remains the correct
answer.
In regard to answer C (the proposed additionally correct answer):
The staff recognized that the applicants were not provided with the necessary reference, EAP-4,
Att. 1, to determine the correct answer. The staff also recognized that per station management
expectations and the license operator training program, PARs will not be made without first
referencing EAP-4.
The NRC staff reviewed the original licensee justification for C being an incorrect response,
the references noted above in support of that determination, and found that answer C,
Declare a G
- E. Evacuate a 5 mile radius and 10 miles downwind, was NOT supported by the
references. The licensees post-exam statement that the answer was also appropriate because
it was a conservative response does not make the response correct in accordance with station
procedures. No procedural justification was provided by the licensee in regard to a conservative
response being acceptable for a PA
- R. Therefore, the staff determined that answer C was NOT
correct.
In regard to answers A and B:
Based upon the original staff review and post-exam review of the question, it was determined
that these answers remain INCORRECT. (No change from original submittal.)
Conclusion
The NRC staff determined that the ONLY correct answer, based on procedural references, was
Answer D. The fact that C may be a more conservative decision did not make it a correct
answer. The staff recognizes that the licensee inadvertently failed to provide the applicants the
reference required to determine the correct answer and that prior to making a PAR
determination a referral to the reference was required by training and station management
expectations. No procedural justification was provided by the licensee in regard to a
conservative response being acceptable for a PAR.
Based on the fact that the procedure reference to determine the correct answer was not
provided to the applicants, the NRC staff has determined that the question should be deleted
from the exam. The licensee comment to accept both C and D as correct is denied.
SRO Question # 62 (Licensee Comments Highlighted)
An Equalizing Charge is in progress on Alpha Station Battery. MCC-253 is lost midway through
the charging cycle, resulting in the loss of:
Alpha Air Handling Unit 72 AHU-30A
Alpha Exhaust Fan 72FAN-46C
Alpha Recirculation Fan 72FAN-31A
The correct course of action, relative to Alpha Station Battery / Ventilation, is to:
a. Initiate actions to begin lining up emergency ventilation to Alpha Battery Room in
accordance with AOP-58 Station Battery Room Emergency Ventilation
b. Open Fire Dampers 72FD-3 and 72FD-6 to cross-connect Alpha and Bravo Supply and
Exhaust Fans in accordance with OP-33 Fire Protection
Answer Key:
c.
Post-Exam
Evaluation
Recommendation:
Accept both c and d as correct responses.
Challenge Issue:
Stem Clarity - As worded, both c and d are correct responses. The initial
operator action, as detailed in the attached copy of ARP-HV-7A-05, is to
ensure that the standby exhaust fan is operating properly. Guidance to
determine proper operation, including power supplies and damper
positions, would be found in OP-59A. The action to utilize the ARP and
associated OP is appropriate, supported by station management
expectations, and is in accordance with training program objectives
concerning procedure usage.
Discovery of the failure of the standby Exhaust Fan to start would be made
as a result of the reference to OP-59
subsequent, or ultimate operator action for the presented conditions would
be to secure the equalizing charge in accordance with the stated Precaution
in OP-43A. The following correction to the last stem statement will make c
the only correct response:
The correct ultimate course of action, relative to the Alpha Station Battery /
Ventilation, is to:
Candidate
Performance:
C.
of 5 Selected d while the remaining candidate selected a
Explanation:
D
CORRECT: OP-43A Precaution states Equalizing charges shall only be
applied to batteries while battery room ventilation is operating to prevent
hydrogen buildup. Therefore, the charge must be secured.
A.
Incorrect: AOP-58 actions are only warranted when a fire in one of several
possible locations causes the loss of Battery Room Ventilation.
B.
- D.
Incorrect: Both Fire Dampers areProperty "Contact" (as page type) with input value "D.</br></br>Incorrect: Both Fire Dampers are" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., in fact, located in the supply and exhaust
lines. 72FD-6 does cross-connect the supply line, but is normally open.
2FD-3 is located in the Alpha-side exhaust, but does not cross-connect
and is normally open. Additionally, OP-33 does not address Fire Damper
positioning for the aforementioned dampers.
d.
CORRECT: Alarm response in ARP-HV-7A-05 directs the operators first
(priority) action to be to Ensure the standby Exhaust Fan (72FN-46A) is
operating properly. This action is independent of the cause-effect
relationship and/or condition. Guidance to determine proper operation,
including power supplies and damper positions, would be found in OP-59A.
Technical
Reference(s):
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during
examination:
NONE
NRC Resolution - Q. #62
In regard to answer C (the original correct answer):
Answer C states Initiate actions to begin lining up emergency ventilation to Alpha Battery
Room in accordance with AOP-58 Station Battery Room Emergency Ventilation.
The staff reviewed the supporting references and found:
1.
The loss of MCC-253, which was a given condition in the question stem, results in a loss
of power to both exhaust fans 72FAN-46A and 72FAN-46C. These are the only fans
available to provide exhaust ventilation from the battery room.
2.
In accordance with Lesson Plan SDLP-72B, Objective 1.04, the power supply to the
battery room exhaust fans shall be known from memory and without error.
3.
Procedure OP-43A, 125 VDC Power System, Rev.22, Precaution C.2.1. states,
Equalizing charges shall only be applied to batteries while battery room ventilation is
operating to prevent hydrogen buildup.
The staff also noted that the question asked the applicants to determine The correct course of
action, relative to Alpha Station Battery / Ventilation. In this situation, the applicants must first
recognize that power is unavailable to both exhaust fans. With that determination, the applicants
must then recognize that the action stated in Answer D, Ensure the standby exhaust fan starts
..., is a moot point. Therefore, with no exhaust fans available, the applicants must abide by
the procedure precaution and, as stated in Answer C, secure the equalizing charge as the
correct course of action.
Therefore, the staff determined that Answer C was correct.
In regard to answer D (the proposed additionally correct answer):
Answer D states, Ensure standby Exhaust Fan (72FAN-46A) for Alpha Battery Room starts
in accordance with OP-59A Battery Room Ventilation.
The staff reviewed the supporting references and found:
1.
The loss of MCC-253, which was a given condition in the question stem, results in a loss
of power to both exhaust fans 72FAN-46A and 72FAN-46C. These are the only fans
available to provide exhaust ventilation from the battery room.
2.
In accordance with Lesson Plan SDLP-72B, Objective 1.04, the power supply to the
battery room exhaust fans shall be known from memory and without error.
3.
Procedure OP-43A, 125 VDC Power System, Rev.22, Precaution C.2.1. states,
Equalizing charges shall only be applied to batteries while battery room ventilation is
operating to prevent hydrogen buildup.
The staff also noted that the question asked the applicants to determine The correct course of
action, relative to Alpha Station Battery / Ventilation. In this situation, the applicants must first
recognize that power is unavailable to both exhaust fans. With that determination, the applicants
must then recognize that the action stated in Answer D, Ensure the standby exhaust fan starts
..., is a moot point and would serve no purpose as a correct course of action to address the
situation given in the question stem. Additionally, because the equalizing charge is not secured,
the safety consequences of a hydrogen buildup in the battery room due to the ventilation loss,
would not be addressed and this answer would not constitute a correct course of action.
Therefore, the staff determined that Answer D was NOT correct.
In regard to answers A and B:
Based upon the original staff review and post-exam review of the question, it was determined
that these answers remain INCORRECT. (No change from original submittal.)
Conclusion
The NRC staff conducted detailed reviews of all references provided as well as the information
stated in the question stem. It was also noted that no inquiries were made by the applicants in
regard to this question during exam administration. The staff concluded Answer C was the
ONLY correct answer. The licensee comment to accept both answers C and D as correct is
denied.
RO Question # 9 (Licensee Comments Highlighted)
A common-cause failure has resulted in all 137 CRD Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) Accumulators
becoming inoperable. Per the Technical Specification Bases, which of the following reactor
pressures is designated as the transition point between acceptable and unacceptable Control Rod
Scram Times?
e. 750 psig
g. 850 psig
Answer Key:
b.
Post-Exam
Evaluation
Recommendation:
Change Answer Key from b to d
Challenge Issue:
Answer Key Incorrect / Stem Clarity - The stem requests the candidate
to demonstrate knowledge between acceptable and unacceptable
Control Rod Scram Times and not necessarily control rod operability.
The original intent of the question was control rod operability as
described in the lesson material and TS 3.1.4 Bases in relation to
preventing fuel damage. However, with the introduction of the
inoperable accumulators to the stem of the question the candidates
interpreted the question based on TS 3.1.5. The Bases of TS 3.1.4
does not deal with inoperable accumulators, but the Bases of TS 3.1.5
does discuss how reactor pressure and accumulator pressure work to
perform the scram function. See attached Tech Spec excerpt.
The stem requests the candidate to demonstrate knowledge between
acceptable and unacceptable Control Rod Scram Times as they relate
to the scram function. This demonstration is based on the knowledge
of the Tech Spec Bases and how the accumulators and RPV pressure
are used to perform the scram function. (continued on next)
Challenge Issue:
(cont.)
The stem of the question states that all accumulators are inoperable,
therefore the scram function is relying on reactor pressure only.
Tech Spec Bases states that above 900# the scram function will be
performed using reactor pressure alone assuming the accumulators are
inoperable. However, less than 900# the function of accumulators, in
providing the scram force, becomes much more important and at even
lower pressures the scram function could become severely degraded.
Therefore, with the accumulators inoperable 900# is the transition point
between acceptable and unacceptable scram times.
Candidate
Performance:
of 5 selected d, 1 selected B and 1 selected c
B.
Explanation:
b.
Incorrect: Reference Tech Spec Bases 3.1.4 and SDLP-03a,
Figure 8 Accumulator to Reactor Pressure Scram Times.
Although 800 psig is the pressure below which reactor pressure
alone will result in insufficient scram times to prevent exceeding
fuel thermal limits during Design Basis Accidents and transients, it
is bound by the Technical Specification reactor pressure of 900
psig below which scram times may not meet requirements.
A.
Incorrect: Incorrect pressure. Although bounded by the specified
900 psig reactor steam dome pressure, no reference in Technical
Specifications, or Bases, to a reactor pressure of 750 psig being a
transition point for control rod operability.
C.
D.
Incorrect: Incorrect pressure. Although bounded by the specified
900 psig reactor steam dome pressure, no reference in Technical
Specifications, or Bases, to a reactor pressure of 750 psig being a
transition point for control rod operability.
d.
CORRECT: Reference TS 3.1.5 Bases. With one control rod
scram accumulator inoperable and reactor steam dome pressure >
900 psig, the control rod may be declared slow, since the control
rod will still scram at the required operating pressure but may not
meet required scram times. Thus, at reactor pressures less than
900 psig with an inoperable accumulator, further degradation in
scram performance and excessive scram times would result.
Technical
Reference(s):
SDLP-03A, Figure 8
T.S. 3.1.4 / 5 and Bases
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during
examination:
None
NRC Resolution - RO Question # 9
In regard to answer B (the original correct answer):
Answer B stated 800 PSIG. The staff pre-exam review of the references supported this as
the correct answer.
The additional reference provided by the licensee and reviewed by the staff, Technical Specification Bases 3.1.5, supports 900 PSIG as the correct value to be designated as the
transition point between acceptable and unacceptable control rod scram times. The staff also
noted that the question stem stated that all control rod accumulators were inoperable. This
would support the statement in TS bases 3.5.1 in regard to the reactor pressure limit at which
control rod scram times would be unacceptable in the event of one inoperable control rod.
Additionally, the stem was more focused on control rod scram times and not control rod
operability (the bases for the 800 PSIG).
The staff has determined that TS references do not support answer B as correct.
In regard to answer D (the proposed correct answer)
Answer D stated 900 PSIG. The staff pre-exam review of the references did not support this
as the correct answer.
The additional reference provided by the licensee and reviewed by the staff, Technical Specification Bases 3.1.5, supports 900 PSIG as the correct value to be designated as the
transition point between acceptable and unacceptable control rod scram times. The staff also
noted that the question stem stated that all control rod accumulators were inoperable. This
would support the statement in TS bases 3.5.1 in regard to the reactor pressure limit at which
control rod scram times would be unacceptable in the event of one inoperable control rod.
Additionally, the stem was more focused on control rod scram times and not control rod
operability (the bases for the 800 PSIG as stated in TS Bases 3.1.4).
The staff has determined that TS references support answer D as correct.
In regard to answers A and C:
Based upon the original staff review and post-exam review of the question, it was determined
that these answers remain INCORRECT. (No change from original submittal.)
Conclusion
The NRC staff conducted detailed reviews of all references provided as well as the information
stated in the question stem. It was also noted that no inquiries were made by the applicants in
regard to this question during exam administration. The staff concluded that Answer B (the
original correct answer) was INCORRECT and that Answer D should be accepted as the ONLY
correct answer. The licensee comment to accept only answer D as correct is accepted.
RO Question # 75 (Licensee Comments Highlighted)
A reactor startup is in progress, following a refuel outage, with the following plant conditions:
IRMs on mid-scale on Range 7
Average Reactor Coolant Temperature is currently 200° F and rising slowly
A Zone RB-1W (Reactor Building West Crescent) Fire Alarm is received. An NPO is quickly
dispatched to the location and reports significant heat, smoke, and flames. All AOP-28,
Operation During Plant Fires prompt operator actions are completed satisfactorily. Which
of the following accurately reflects the plants current Mode of Operation?
a. Mode 2: Startup / Hot Standby
d. Mode 5: Refueling
Answer Key:
c.
Post-Exam
Evaluation
Recommendation:
Accept both b and c responses
Challenge Issue:
Stem Clarity - The stem conditions indicate power in the heating range
with coolant temperature slowly rising from 200 degrees. It was
unintentional that the Exam Development Team exposed the
candidate to a heatup in progress. Assuming a nominal heatup rate of
degrees per 15 minutes (procedural target), 9 minutes of elapsed
time will result in exceeding 212 degrees; resulting in a Mode change
and making the b response correct. Without a specified timeframe
for completing actions, and with some candidates taking a safety
analyses (UFSAR) approach to operator actions, it is reasonable to
expect that at least 10 minutes could elapse between the receipt of a
fire alarm, dispatching operators to verify conditions, AOP-28
procedure entry and step execution. Likewise, completing these
actions in less than 9 minutes is also reasonable; making the c
response correct.
Candidate
Performance:
candidates selected b, the remainder selected c
Explanation:
c.
CORRECT: Initial conditions place the plant in Mode 2. With a
confirmed fire in Zone RB-1W, a Reactor Scram would be inserted
and AOP-1 will direct taking the Mode Switch to Shutdown;
resulting in either Mode 3 or 4 operation. With resulting Average
Reactor Coolant Temperature below 212° F, Mode 4 operation
would result.
a.
Incorrect: Plant in Mode 2 currently. If candidate fails to recognize
AOP-28 Prompt Action Reactor Scram, this would be the resulting
mode.
b.
CORRECT: With IRMs on Range 7 and resulting Average
Reactor Coolant Temperature at 200° F and rising slowly, it is
inferred that a heatup is in progress; and Mode 3 operation would
result in as little as 9 minutes. If procedural actions take 9
minutes, or more, then a Mode change would occur based solely
on Reactor Coolant Temperature.
d.
Incorrect: See above. Mode switch can be in Shutdown for
Mode 5 if vessel head not fully tensioned. If candidate fails to
recognize dependency on tensioning, this could be the resulting
mode.
Technical
Reference(s):
ITS (Mode Definitions)
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during
examination:
None
Learning Objective:
JLP-OPS-ITS02, EO 1.03 (As available)
LPAOP, EO 1.03
NRC Resolution - RO Question # 75
In regard to answer C (the original correct answer):
Answer C stated Mode 4: Cold Shutdown. The staff pre-exam review of the references
supported this as the correct answer.
The original justification for this answer was based on the alarm condition, entry into AOP-28,
Operation During Plant Fires, and the first prompt action stated at step 1.2.1, Manually
scram the reactor and execute AOP-1 concurrently. The staff took into account that a heatup
was in progress but noted that with the first prompt action step of AOP-28, the reactor was
scrammed. This action would mitigate the heatup. Therefore, being in Cold Shutdown
accurately reflected the plants mode of operation and was supported by plant references.
The staff determined that Answer C was correct.
In regard to answer B (the proposed additional correct answer):
Answer B stated Mode 3: Hot Shutdown. The staff pre-exam review of the references
supported this as an incorrect answer.
The original justification for this answer being incorrect was based on the question stem
statement that the prompt actions of AOP-28 were completed satisfactorily, the first of which
was to manually scram the reactor. The staff determined that the reactor scram would mitigate
the heatup and that Mode 3: Hot Shutdown would not have been achieved. Therefore, answer
B was incorrect.
The licensees comment makes the following assumptions in regard to achieving Mode 3: Hot
Shutdown, and therefore accepting answer B as correct
1.
A nominal heatup rate of 20 degrees per 15 minutes.
2.
A time frame of greater than nine minutes elapsing before AOP-28 actions are executed.
The staff reviewed the licensees comment and assumptions in support of answer B and also
noted that no questions were asked by the applicants during exam administration in regard to
the conditions stated in the question stem. As stated in NUREG 1021, Rev. 9, Appendix E,
Step 7, when answering questions do not make assumptions regarding conditions that are not
specified in the question unless they occur as consequence of other conditions. Because no
time frame was stated in the stem other than the word quickly and the fact that the initial
prompt actions ( including a manual reactor scram) were stated as complete, an assumption that
minutes have elapsed goes beyond what is given in question stem. There were no indications
in the stem that the actions required to be completed were delayed and there was no indication
in the question stem that a nominal heatup rate of 20 degrees per 15 minutes had been
achieved. Finally, with the prompt actions of AOP-28 complete, a manual scram would have
occurred mitigating any heatup and the plant would be in cold shutdown.
Therefore, the staff determined that Answer B was incorrect.
In regard to answers A and D:
Based upon the original staff review and post-exam review of the question, it was determined
that these answers remain INCORRECT. (No change from original submittal.)
Conclusion
The NRC staff conducted detailed reviews of all references provided as well as the information
stated in the question stem. It was also noted that no inquiries were made by the applicants in
regard to this question during exam administration. The staff concluded that only Answer C
(the original correct answer) was CORRECT. The licensee comment to also accept answer B
as correct is denied.