IR 05000327/1993025
| ML20046C241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046C240 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-93-25, 50-328-93-25, NUDOCS 9308100028 | |
| Download: ML20046C241 (9) | |
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AT L ANTA. GEORGI A 30323 g,s%.[g*
JUL 2 91993 Report Nos.:
50-327/93-25 and 50-328/93-25 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Look Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name:
Sequoyah 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 29 - July 2,1993 Inspector:
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fet,M /993 W. M.'Saft W Jr.
D te Signed Accomp ving Personnel:
G. Bryan, Comex Corp.
S. Sparks, NRC, Region II F. Wright, NRC, Region II Approved by:
N d PL/7f3 K. P. BarrW1'ef pate / Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of'
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The limited participation exercise was conducted on June 30 and July 1,1993, between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m.
Selected areas cf the licensee's emergency response facilities and organization were observed to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of the Radiological Emergency Plan and procedures during a simulated emergency. The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's critique.
Results:
In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. The emergency response organization's performance was satisfactory to mitigate the accident postulated by the scenario which consisted'of an event at the Alert classification.
9308100026 930729 gDR ADDCK 05000327 FDR;
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I REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees l
- J. Baumstark, Operations Manager
- R. Beecken, Plant Manager
- C. Benton, Corporate Exercise and Emergency Facility Manager
- D. Branham, Work Control Group Manager
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- L. Bryant, Maintenance Manager i
- N. Catron, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- K. Clayton, Mechanical Maintenance Foreman
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- D. Driscoll, Site Quality Manager
- G. Elmore, Technical Support Engineer
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- R. Fenech, SQN Site Vice-President
- C. Kent, Manager, SQN RadCon
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- R. Kitts, Manager, Corporate Emergency Preparedness
- J. Klien, HVAC/ Predictive Maintenance Manager
- M. Lorek, Engineering Design
- B. Marks, EP Program Procedures Manager, Corporate
- W. McArthur, Vice President, Technical Support, Corporate
- K. Phifer, Technical Support Engineer
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- K. Powers, Plant Manager Designate
- A. Ray, Instrument Maintenance Foreman
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- H. Rogers, Technical Support Program Manager
- A. Rosemond, Training Instructor
- M. Skarsinski, Manager, Technical Prngrams and Performance
- S. Turner, Electrical Maintenance Foreman
- J. Vincelli, RadCon Operations Manager
- E. Webb, QA Program Manager
- N. Welch, Operations Superintendent
- C. Whittamore, Compliance Licensing
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- H. Williamson, EP Planning Specialist
- C. Wilson, Maintenance Engineer Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members,
technicians, and administrative personnel, j
NRC Resident Inspector ~
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- W. Holland i
- Attended exit interview i
2.
Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated emergency response
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capability and a major portion of the basic elements within the
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licensees' Emergency Plan, as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and
Section IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
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The scenario for this off-hours exercise was reviewed in advance of the exercise. The narrative summary indicated the highest classification would be an Alert or a Site Area Emergency, dependent upon the corrective action taken by the emergency response organization (ERO). The accident mitigation path taken by the ERO during the exercise resulted in the i
simulated emergency not proceeding beyond the Alert classification.
The inspector informed licensee representatives that the latitude provided by NRC Information Notice No. 87-53:
Emergency Response Exercise, in not requiring an exercise to proceed to severe core damage was predicated on an interactive. scenario that would lead to an improved emergency response capability. The inspector noted the scenario was interactive and it was also a challenge since the simulated accident involved the unit in Mode 5 rather than the unit at 100 percent power.
The inspector stated that one area for scenario improvement was providing more detailed and timely information to the offsite agencies during periods when the emergency classification does not change (See Paragraph 6). Proper evaluation of this improvement area would necessitate a detailed examination of the information flow from the l-Operations Duty Specialist (0DS) to the offsite agencies during this l'
exercise before the responsibility for offsite notifications was assumed by the Central Emergency Command Center (CECC).
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's organization was observed during the exercise to determine whether the requirements of Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 (as addressed in the Emergency Plan) were implemented with respect to descriptions, responsibilities, and assignments of the onsite i
emergency response organization.
The inspector determined that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that primary and alternate assignments for the positions in the augmented emergency organization were clearly designated. During the exercise, the inspector observed that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the initial onsite emergency organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangements to accommodate State and local personnel at the Emergency Response Facility (E0F) were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting-the planned response were identified as specified
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by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.C of NUREG-0654 (Revision 1).
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An inspector noted that the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures identified other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response.
The scope of this exercise did not include any support from
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offsite resources other than for receipt of communications / notifications.
The one exception to this was the representative form the State of Tennessee whose participated at the CECC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was insured by the licensee as required by
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and to determine whether that scheme was adequately implemented.
The licensee had an emergency action level scheme in place.
It was used by the Site Emergency Director in making the Alert declaration due to a helicopter crash on site. Members of the ER0 in the Technical Support Center (TSC) continued to review the Emergency Action Levels (EAL) during the exercise, but no escalation was required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and a means to provide early notification to the population within the plume i
exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for providing emergency information to Federal, State, and local response organizations, and for alerting and mobilizing the licensee's augmented ERO. The inspector
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noted that implementing procedures for notifications had been established and were adequate to provide guidance to personnel for initial
.i notification to the State and local authorities.
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The notifications to the State and local authorities are made via the i
DDS in Chattanooga who notifies the State. The Alert was declared at 1914 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.28277e-4 months <br /> and the ODS notified the State within 15 minutes.
By 2014 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.66327e-4 months <br /> a second event had occurred which affected Unit I and also met the EAL for an Alert.
However, the notifications did not indicate this information was provided to the State in a timely manner. The licensee also recognized the need for improvement as indicated by their critique which identified the following item for corrective action:
Improve TVA's ability to expeditiously notify the State of initial emergency declarations and to provide subsequent followups of significant events.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications capability existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organizations and offsite authorities.
No communications hardware problems were observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
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The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the TSC, Operations Support Center (OSC) and CECC.
The facilities were staffed and activated in a timely manner.
The facilities and their dedicated equipmeat facilitated the emergency response.
No violat tons or deviations were identified.
9.
Accident Acsessment (82301)
This area was observed to assure that methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a
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radiological emergency condition were in use as required by
}0 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program reviewed by the inspector included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from simulated accident.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel were implemented promptly as
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t required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and the specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
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Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations (PARS) from the offsite
populace within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). - No protective l
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actions were required for this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Exercise Critique (82301)
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine the deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise, and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, t
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The licensee conducted evaluator / controller critiques prior to the formal presentation to facility management on July 2, 1993.
The licensee's critiq'ie to their management was adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and results were summarized on July 2,1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the
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areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection team's observations. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary
information is not contained in this report.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from
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the licensee.
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Attachments:
Goals and Objectives and Narrative Summary
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CONFIDENTIAL SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 1993 GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY REVISED: 6-24 page 1 INITIAL CONDITIONS Detailed initial conditions will be provided to players through pre-exercise initial conditions packages and are summarized as follows:
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UNIT-1 Shut down for 7 days in mode 5 preparing for Steam Generator (SG)
sludgelancing. Sludgelancing is being done due to the introduction of a chemical contaminate (NaOH) into the SGs. All SGs have been
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drained and the hand holes have been removed. Sludgelancing equipment is being installed.
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- The cavitating venturi for 1A-A and 1B-B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps have been removed for inspection.
down.
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- Currently on day 141 of a continuous run at 100% power.
l COMMON Floor Drain Collector Tank (FDCT) is full and the Auxiliary Building
Waste Evaporator Feed Pumps are tagged out due to locked rotor.
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- The Auxiliary Building Floor and Equipment Drain Sump has been aligned to the Tritiated Drain Tank (TDT). The TDT is half full.
EXERCISE Five minutes into the exercise (T=00:05) a helicopter sent to pickup the VIPS experiences an engine failure as it is approaching the helicopter landing pad at SQN. The helicopter attempts to-land'on the
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road to the ERCW building but falls about 25 feet crashing on the road.
No'one is' injured. The helicopter sustained some damage to its landing supports and. undercarriage.
Fifteen minutes into the exercise (T=00:15) an ALERT should be
declared based on HA3, Aircraft crash within the site area.
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Eighteen minutes into the exercise (T=00:18) an air line used for sludgelancing in U-1 containment bursts stirring up radioactive dust.
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Twenty minutes into the exercise (T=00:20) the airborne radioactivity
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causes the lower compartment monitor 1-RE-90-106A to alarm. Personnel are evacuated by Radcon until surveys are done and assessed.
Fifty minutes into the' exercise (T=00:50) a leak begins on the RHR i
system in RHR 1A-A pump room between 1-FCV-74-3 and where the 14 inch shutdown cooling pipe enters the room. Leak rate is initially 65 to 70 gpm. The leak is the result of a weld failure on the pressure equalization line for 1-FCV-74-3.
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CONFIDENTIAL SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) 1993 GRADED EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE SUMMARY REVISED: 6-24 page 2 Fifty-five minutes into the exercise (T=00:55) the flooding alarm LS-40-29 is activated due to the rising water level in RER 1A-A pump room.
One hour and five minutes into the exercise (T=01:05) an ALERT may be declared based on FA4, RCS leakage > 50 gpm.
Two hours and five minutes into the exercise (T=02:05) if TSC/ Control
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Room has not isolated the RHR leak then the leak will increase to about 105 gpm.
The TSC/ Control Room have several options regarding the leak in the RHR system.
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- They may elect to allow the leakage to continue. The consequences of this decision would eventually be flooding of the Auxiliary Building.
We expect that they may do this until they have another heat sink available or until the leakage can not be contained within the
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If the TSC/ Control Room closes 1-FCV-74-1 and 1-FCV-74-2 to isolate
the leak and repair the RHR piping without another heat sink then when the RCS temperature rises above 200 degrees Fahrenheit a SAE should be declared based on SS2, loss of RHR shutdown l cooling when only method of RCS heat removal and in Mode 4.
If the TSC/ Control Room closes 1-FCV-74-1 and 1-FCV-74-2 to isolate
the leak and repair the RHR piping while using a Steam Generator as the heat sink then when the RCS temperature rises above 200 degrees Fahrenheit an ALERT should be declared based on SA2, loss of ability
to remain < 200 degrees Fahrenheit.
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- If the TSC/ Control Room closes 1-FCV-74-1 and 1-FCV-74-2 to isolate the leak and repair the RHR piping using " feed-and bleed" through the pressurizer as the heat sink then an ALERT should;be declared based on FA4, RCS leakage > 50 gpm. If more flow is needed to keep the RCS temperature below 200 degrees Fahrenheit than the charging
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pumps are capable of providing and a safety injection pump is started then a SAE may be declared based on FS3, RCS leak greater than centrifugal charging pump capacity, r
The exercise terminates when the RHR piping break is repaired and RHR is returned to shutdown cooling or at the discretion of the Exercise'
Coordinator.
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