IR 05000322/1981020
| ML20039C387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1981 |
| From: | Gallo R, Higgins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039C380 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-322-81-20, IEB-80-12, NUDOCS 8112290297 | |
| Download: ML20039C387 (11) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-322/81-20 Docket No. 50-322 License No. FR-95 Priority
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Category B
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l Licensee:
Long Island Lighting Company i
175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801
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Facility Name:
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Shoreham, New York Inspection conducted: October 20 - November 22, 1981 r!P/
Inspectors:
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date signed J[C.Hig$s,SeniorResidentInspector date signed date signed l 2-f?h /
Approved by:
ty-R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IA date sign'ed Projects Branch #1, DRPI Inspection Summary:
Inspections on: October 20-November 22,1981 (Inspection Report No. 50-322/81-20)
Areas Inspected: Routine onsite regular, backshift and holiday inspections by the resident inspector (150 inspection hours) and two regional supervisors of work activities, preoperational testing, and plant staff activities including: tours of the facility; test witnessing; review of test procedures; review of NRC Bulletins and Circulars; review of effluents released from plant; review of conformance of plant with FSAR; and followup on previous inspection findings.
Resul ts: No violations were identified.
8112290297 811209 gDRADOCK 05000322 PDR Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted D. Durand, Lead Startup Engineer (L)
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Gerecke, Quality Assurance Manager (L)
i J. Kelly, Field 0A Manaaer (L)
W. Klein, Lead Startup Engineer (L)
W. Matejek, Lead Advisory Engineer (SAW)
B. McCaffrey, Manager, Project Engineering (L)
M. Milligan, Project Engineer (L)
J. Morin, Senior Licensing Encineer (L)
A. Mueller, Acting 00A Engineer (L)
J. Riley, Lead Startup Engineer (GE)
J. Rivello, Plant Manager (L)
J. Smith, Manager, Special Projects (L)
D. Terry, Assistant Startup Manaqer (L)
E. Youngling, Startup Manager (L)
GE - General Electric L
- Long Island Lighting Company S&W - Stone and Webster The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance, operations, engineering, testing, quality assurance and construction personnel.
2.
Previous Inspe_ction Item Update a.
Items Closed (closed) Unresolved Item (322/81-04-01): Demineralized Water Preoperational Test: The licensee wrote and approved PT.107.002, " Demineralized Water Transfer System", effective 11/9/81, as a supplemental oreoperational test for the system. This test verifies the various required flow paths and process streams of the Demineralized Water System and tests the Demineralized Water Transfer Pumps. The ability of the Demineralizers to produce water to their design effluent specifications past the end of their design 144,000 gallon capacity was demonstrated previously as documented in the plant Chemistry Logs. The inspector reviewed the above documents and had no further questions. This item is closed.
(closed) Unresolved Item (322/81-12-02)-
CO to Cable Tunnel: This item
identified three issues related to the cable tunnel or Electrical Manhole No. 1.
First, the current draft of the facility Technical Specifications, Section 3.7.7.3, which lists required C02 subsystems or areas, has been revised to include Electrical Manhole No.1.
Second,EADCR #F-36132 was issued to revise the electrical installation drawings to include the local temperature switches for initiating CO2 flooding to the area.
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-3-On a plant tour the inspector noted that the temperature switches had been installed. Third, review has shown that the temperature switches for the cable tunnel are properly classified as ncn-safety related and hence are not required on the lists of safety related or Category I temperature switches. This item is closed.
(closed) Unresolved Item (322/81-12-09): Battery Room Warning Horns:
E&DCR #F-36132 was issued on 8/11/81 to revise the electrical installation drawings to include the warning horns in each battery room.
During this inspection, the inspector toured each Battery Room and noted that the warning horns and associated wiring had been installed. This item is closed.
(closed) Unresolved Item (322/81-14-02): Valve Stroke Times: The inspector had noted that containment isolation valve stroke times specified on Checkout and Initial Operation (C&IO) Test Data Sheets, in some cases, did not agree with the FSAR values of Table 6.2.4-1.
The licensee's representative affirmed the fact that the FSAR values were the correct ones and issued a tremo to all Startup personnel on 9/10/81 pointing out the need to adhere to the FSAR Table. The maximum stroke times for valves P42*MOV-035, 036, 047 and 048 were changed from 60 seconds to the FSAR value of 23 seconds. The inspector. reviewed the C&IO data for several other containment isolation valves and noted that the times specified were less than or equal to the FSAR values. The actual stroke times were also less than or eoual to this value in all cases reviewed but two.
In these two' cases where the stroke times were
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high an Engineering & Design Coordination Report (E&DCR No. F-36936) was written to perform an evaluation.
Engineering detennined that the as found stroke tires were acceptable and initiated an FSAR change to Table 6.2.4-1.
The licensees actions address the concern identified.
This item is closed, b.
Items Remaining Open (open) Unresolved Item (322/80-04-03): Regulatory Guide 1.52: On November 12, 1981 at a meeting to discuss FSAR conformance and a number of NRC unresolved items, the licensee's representative stated that the Control Room Air Conditioning System and the Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System would be reviewed for deviations from R.G.1.52.
These deviations would be documented and submitted to the NRC in order to update the R.G.1.52 compliance table given as FSAR Table 6.2.3-2, This item was also discussed in inspection report 80-06, paragraph 2 and remains.open.
(open) Unresolved Item (322/81-02-05):
FSAR conformance: A special meeting was held to discuss this item. See paragraph 8 for details. This item was also discussed in inspection report 50-322/81-18 and remains ope.
-4-(open) Violation (322/81-14-01): Failure to follow instructions relating to Jumpers and Tagging: The licensee responded to this-violation with a. letter dated October 13, 1981 detailing corrective (
and preventive items. The inspector reviewed the following documents issued as part of the preventive actions: 9/29/81 memo to Startup Distribution from W. Klein titled, " Wire lifted / Temporary Jumper Program
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Requirements"; 10/8/81 memo for W. Museler and Startup Distribution from E. Youngling, titled " Yellow / Blue Jurisdictional Tagoing"; SP-12.035.01
" Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers", Rev. 3 issued 10/13/81; 00A Surveillance 81-113, " Control of Lifted Leads and Jumpers" and Corrective Action Request (CAR) 021 both dated 9/28/81; and 00A Surveillance 81-115,
"Startup Tagging" dated 9/24/81. The inspector also reviewed the plant staff Jumper Log and toured the plant to observe tagging and the condition of panels and motor control center cubicles regarding jumpers and lifted leads.
No discrepancies were identified in the areas of danger tags or jurisdictional tags.
In the area of jumpers and lifted leads, the inspector did note some additional discrepancies as follows: The four previously identified jumper permits with no duration had the expected duration added but two permits issued on 9/17/81 had no expected duration; jumper permit 81-10-1 was issued on 10/17/81 using fonn SPF 12.035.01-1, Rev.1 vice Rev. 3; 00A Surveillance 81-113 dated 9/28/81 did not identify the 9/17/81 pereits with no expected deviation: two spare leads in the Halon Fire Protection-System Control Panel whose ends were not taped; two lifted leads in Panel P655 with no tags: and two jumpers and three lifted leads in Panel P627 with no tags. The licensee corrected each of these additional items. The inspector stated that this item would remain open pending further tours to verify whether the requirements for jumpers and lifted leads were being implemented.
3.
Plant Tour a.
Discussion The inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant during normal, backshift, and holiday hours.
During these tours, the following specific items were evaluated:
-- Hot Work: Adequacy of fire prevention / protection measures used.
-- Fire Equipment: Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
-- Housekeeping: Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanness levels of systems under or following testing.
-- Equipment Preservation: Maintenance of special precautionary measures for installed equipment, as applicabl,
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-- Security: Adequate site construction security.
-- Weld Rod Control: Observations to determine weld rod was being controlled in accordance with site procedures.
With the exception of the below item no discrepancies were identified.
b.
Valve Motor Housing The Shoreham FSAR paragraph 7.3.37 states that motor operated valves for containment isolation valves both inside and outside of containment are totally enclosed.
During tours of the plant, the inspector noted the design and condition of various containment isolation valves. The design was as stated but valve P42*M0V-036, in the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System, was noted to have a small hole in the motor easing.
This item is unresolved and is designated as unresolved item (322/81-20-01).
4.
Motor Control Center (MCC) Wiring The inspector toured the plant and observed the internal wiring of MCC cubicles and MCC relay sections for cleanliness, proper electrical terminations, and unauthorized jumpers or lifted leads.
For one cubicle the inspector compared the actual installed wiring terminations with the latest approved drawings and Engineering & Design Coordination Reports (EADCRs). No discrepancies were identi fied. The inspector noted that E&DCR #F-32337 for R24-MCC-111 changed the circuitry so that internal leads from the relay section to several cubes were no longer necessary. The leads in the cube section were de-tenninated and taped. The inspector questioned why the leads in the relay section were left attached.
The licensee's representative, after reviewing the situation stated that as a general practice, spare leads should be de-terminated at both ends.
Rev. B to the subject E&DCR was issued to determinate and tape the unused leads at the relay section end and to label the leads as soares. The inspecto-had no further questions.
5.
NRC Bulletins and Circulars a.
Documents Closed Circular 79-23: This circular, titled " Motor Starters and Contactors Failed to Operate", described potential defects in certain Gould, Inc.
NEMA Size 3 motor starters and contactors. The licensee and licensee contractors reviewed equipment records and specifications and determined that these components are not used at Shoreham. These items have also been added to the licensee's Deficient Items List to prevent procurement in the future. On plant tours the inspector observed various motor starters and contactors on a random basis and noted that none of the subject components were used.
This circular is closed.
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Bulletin 80-12 and Circulars 79-22 and 80-15: Bulletin 80-12, titled
" Decay Heat Removal bystem Operability" ano the Circulars which are titled " Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves" and " Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circulation Cooldown", respectively,
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address issues of. concern to pressurized water reactors. The licensee has reviewed the Bulletin and Circulars and determined that no action is
required. The Bulletin and the two Circulars are closed.
Circular 80-23: This. circular, titled " Potential Defects. in Beloit Systems Emergency Generators" described problems identified in the field leads of the subject generators. The licensee reviewed plant equipment
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and determined that no such generators are used in the facility. These generators have been added to the licensee's Deficient Items List to prevent procurement in the future without addressing the concerns in the circular. The inspector verified during tours of the plant that no Beloit Power Systems Generators were installed. This circular is closed.
Bulletin 79-26: This Bulletin, titled " Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades",
described a failure mode believed to be stress corrosion cracking for control blades which can cause a loss of boron poison material from the blade. This issue was also discussed in the Shoreham SER paragraph 4.2.3.14.
The licensee has written and approved procedure SP.57.010.01, Rev. O " Control Blade Management" to address the concerns of the Bulletin.
This procedure was reviewed by the inspector and a regional specialist.
The procedure does the following:
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- performs blade depletion calculations monthly for each control blade and maintains a controlled record of blade exposure and projected exposure through the current and following fuel cycle;
- establishes a plant policy to replace control blades if projections indicate depletion will exceed 34% before the end of the next cycle; and
- requires justification or plans for continued operation should any blade exceed 34% depletion and includes options of blade replacement or, as an interim measure, demonstration that actual shutdown margin exceeds Technical Specification requirements, considering the boron loss phenonmenon.
This procedure addresses the concerns identified in the Bulletin. The Bulletin is closed.
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Documents Remainina Open Bulletin 80-03: This Bulletin, " Loss of Charcoal from Standard lype II, z inch, Tray Adsorber Cells", described a problem where the charcoal could fall out of the cell filter housing due to spaces-between the
screen and cell casing. The Bulletin calls for a visual inspection of approximately five of each type of cell design / manufacturer. The licensee's response to the Bulletin dated 3/21/80 states that Shoreham has two different types of cells whose design should preclude loss of charcoal. The response further stated that a confirmatory visual inspection of each cell type would be performed.
Review of onsite documents indicates that only two of each type of cell were inspected vice approximately five. The inspector
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questioned the number inspected and stated that the Bulletin would remain open.
Bulletin 80-07: This Bulletin, "BWR Jet Pump Assembly Failure", describes a failure of a BWR Jet Pump due.to cracking of the holddown beam at the beam bolt location. This issue was also discussed as FSAR question 112.22 and SER open item #14.
In correspondence to NRR the licensee committed to reduce the beam bolt preload force from 30,000 pounds to 25,000 pounds to decrease the stress in the beam. The inspector reviewed the following i
onsite documents issued to implement this reduction in preload: FDI 104/88524, E&DCR #F34619, GEK 45856 " Jet Pump Tensioner for Initial Installation, and Reactor Controls Inc Jet Pump As-Built Data Sheet No. 8.
This information documented the beam bolt rotation but not a preload force.
The inspactor requested data which would correlate bolt rotation to beam preload force. The licensee's representative stated that General Electric
had such information and that it would be obtained. This Bulletin remains open.
Circular 80-16: This Circular is titled " Operational Deficiencies in Rosemount Model 510 DU Trip Units and Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters".
The licensee reviewed his safety related systems and concluded there were no Model 510 DU Trip Units with the affected serial numbers. All of the
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defective Model 510 DU Trip Units have been sold by Rosemount and hence none could be procured in the future. Review also revealed three Model 1152 Pressure Transmitters of the affected type used in safety-related
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systems onsite. The problem with the pressure transmitters is a defective-capacitor and so the three identified transmitters were verified to have
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the new replacement capacitor. The inspector reviewed onsite documentation
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and toured the plant to verify the accuracy of the conclusions. No Model 510 DU Trip Units of the affected serial numbers were observed.
One Pressure Transmitter of the affected type, Model 1152 --- E -- T0280, was identified in the plant installed as a safety related reactor vessel level transmitter, number B21*LT-159A. The inspector also noted that some of the affected transmitters were used on non-safety related systems. This Circular remains open pending a determination if all of the subject transmitters used in safety related systems have been identified and had their defective capacitors replaced.
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-8-Bulletin 80-16: Bulletin 80-16, " Potential Misapplication of Rosemount Inc.
Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters with either ' A' or 'D' Output Codes" describes a situation where these transmitters can give anomalous readings. The licensee's response dated 11/5/80 identified 22 transmitters on site in safety related systems and stated that they would be replaced, even though it was believed that no ansafe condition would result from their application. On 10/13/81 the 1 censce submitted a' deficiency report (number 81-00-06) to Region I, in accot iance with 10 CFR 50.55(e), concerning a diode failure mechanism in these same Model 1151/1152 transmitters with output codes 'A'
and 'D'.
This letter identified an additional 29 safety
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related transmitrers of the affected type-onsite and stated that all would be replaced. The inspector reviewed the onsite documentation and toured the plant to verify the accuracy of the response. The inspector noted that the affected transmitters were used in a number of non-safety related applications.
The inspector also noted an additional safety related.
transmitter for Drywell Pressure (number Z93*PT-003B) that was a Model 1152 with output code'A'. The Bulletin and reportable deficiency remain open pending_ a determination if all affected transmitters in safety related systems have been identified and replaced.
6.
Preoperational__ Testing a.
480 Volt Emergency Bus Distribution The inspector reviewed the following documents:
- PT.311.001A, "480v Emergency Bus Distribution Eus-111" Preoperational Test with TCN #1;
- FSAR Sections 8.3 and 14.1.3.7.2; i
- Selected Checkout and Initial Operation Tests (C&IO);
- Relay Setpoint Drawings and Electrical Distribution Drawings;
- Alarm Response Procedures; and
- System Descriptions.
The inspector compared the test procedure to regulatory requirements and licensee commitments and reviewed the C&IO to detemine if appropriate acceptance criteria had been met.
No discrepancies were identified.
The inspector witnessed portions of PT.311.001A, which were performed in the Emergency Switchgear Room and the Pain Control Room, including:
prerequisite completion; local and remote breaker operation, interlock checkout, indication and alarm operation, and treaker/ bus tripping.
During the test the inspector noted that:
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- the test procedure was approved and released for performance by the JTG:
- test procedure was in use by personnel performing the test;
- test equipment was calibrated within required time periods;
- test personnel were suitably qualified;
- quality assurance participation was as required;
- data was logged per the procedure; and
- test acceptance criteria were met for portions observed.
b.
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Limit Switches The valve position limit switches on the MSIVs are used for control room indication and as inputs to the reactor protection system. The switches for the reactor protection system trip when the MSIVs begin to close. They must trip when the valve is between 100% and 90% open.
The inspector reviewed the FSAR Chapter 7.2 and 8.3, the logic drawings, and the color coding scheme for the limit switches and associated wiring.
The inspector observed the slow stroking of the MSIVs and the measurement of the trip points of the various limit switches. The in.;pector also traced the wiring to various limit switches and valves in the primary containment and verified that electrical separation was maintained and that the logic was correct. No discrepancies were identified.
c.
Test Procedure Designation The licensee's preoperational test program includes two types of system tests. Preoperational Tests (pts) and Acceptance Tests (ATs).
pts are used for safety related systems and systems otherwise important to plant Safety as listed in Regulatory Guide 1.68.'
The remainder of the plant non-safety related systems are tested using ATs. Since the initial determination of which type of test muld be given to each system was completed and approved by the NRC (ref. FSAR questions #413.6 and 413.26)
several systems have been added to the plant's design due to post-TMI requirements delineated % NUREG-0737.
The inspector noted that the Joint Test Group had initially designated some of these systems as ATs (e.g. Primary Containment Inerting System, Post Accident Samplir.g System, and the Technical Support Center), and stated that this did not appear consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68 and NUREG-0737. After reconsideration, the licensee's representative stated that these systems would be tested with pts.
7.
Effluent Release The Shoreham FSAR paragraph 11.3.7 and the Environmental Report paragraph 3.5.3 state that the only release point for potentially contruinated gases is the elevated stack.
Paragraph 11.4.1.1 of the FSAR states that all normal and potential paths for release of radioactive materials are monitored.
Monitoring of contaminated effluents is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A,
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-10-Criterion 64 and by the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications.
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The inspector toured the outside of the Turbine Building and the Radio-active Waste Building'and noted all of the effluent pipes discharging from the buildings to the atmosphere. Each of these lines ms then traced
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back into the building to determine the source of the effluent, whether or
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not it could be potentially contaminated, and whether the line was monitored for radioactivity. The maiority_ of pipes discharging to the atmosphere were
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relief valve lines that came from clean systems such as: the carbon dioxide cystem; the main generator hydrogen system, and the hot water heating system.
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The inspector did note, however, five lines for gaseous effluent release out the north wall of the Turbine Building which would release Turbine Building air.- The Turbine Building air of a Boiling Water Reactor could potentially be contaminated during operation due to.the large number of radioact_ive process systems in the building. These five~1ines do not lead to the elevated i
stack release and are not monitored for radioactivity. The five lines in
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question are from the hydrogen seal oil system and the main lube oil system,
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and serve the following functions:
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-H2 seal oil air detraining tank vent;
-H2 seal oil vacuum pump discharge;
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- Vapor extractor discharge from the reactor feed pump turbine oil
reservoir tanks;
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- Vapor extractor discharge from the main turbine lube oil reservoir; and i
- Vapor extractor discharge from the main turbine lube oil conditioning
tank.
i These lines are shown on drawing FF-39. This item is unresolved and is
designated as Item No. (322/81-20-02).
l 8.
FSAR Conformance Feeting
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On November 12 the resident inspector, Region I management, and the licensing project manager for the NRC met with licensee management and representatives of the Architect Engineer (Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation) in order to discuss overall conforrance of plant design with the FSAR. Twenty individual inspection items generated during the past two years were also discussed both l
separately and in the light of how they related to the overall question of FSAR conformance. Stone & Webster (S&W) recently completed their own review of confomance to the FSAR, as discussed in inspection report 50-322/81-18, paragraph 2, and concluded that there were no significant or generic differences between licensing and design documents. The NRC in general agrees with that conclusion but nevertheless believes that more than'an acceptable number of discrepancies have been identified between the as-built: plant and the licensing
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-11-l documents. The NRC stated that LILC0 should establish an additional re-
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view to compare the final as-built plant and the FSAR,'in order to ensure that the two agree. The licensee's representative stated the considera -
s tion would be given to establishing this review and that LILCO would in-form the NRC of any plans in this area.
The meeting was attended by the following:
Long Island Lighting Company T. F. Gerecke, Quality Assurance Manager J. Kelly, Field QA Manager B. R. McCaffrey, Manager, Project Engineering
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J. P. Morin, Senior Licensing Engineer M. H. Milligan, Project Engineer J. L. Smith, Manager, Special Projects R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer Stone and Webster
't E. J. E.,4zon, Project Engineer
G. F. Dawe, Supervisor, Project Licensing
R. E. Fortier, Lead Power Engineer J. T. Murphy, Lead Licensing Engineer S. J. Yeradi, Assistant Project Engineer USNRC R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A, DRPI H. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1C
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L Narrow, Reactor Inspector J. Wilson, Licensing Project Manager, NRR 9.
Unresolved Items.
Areas for which more information is required to determine acceptability are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 3.b and 7 of this report.
10.
Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with plant management to discuss the scope and findings f this in-
spection.
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The resident inspector also attended the exit interviews for two inspec-tions conducted by region-based inspectors during the month, i.
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