IR 05000321/2007005
| ML080290499 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/2008 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Madison D Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| 2-2007-016, 2-2007-020 IR-07-005 | |
| Download: ML080290499 (26) | |
Text
January 29, 2008
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2007005, 05000366/2007005 AND RELEASE OF OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION SYNOPSIS
Dear Mr. Madison:
On December 31, 2007, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 22, 2008, with yourself and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The enclosed inspection report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance which did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
Also, enclosed for your information are two synopses of NRC Office of Investigations' (OI)
completed reports. The first regarded failure to comply with radiation protection procedures. OI determined that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the allegation that a contract worker willfully failed to comply with the applicable radiation protection procedure while exiting the Radiation Controlled Area with hand carried items. The second regarded a Hatch Nuclear Plant employee assisting workers with taking General Employee Training (GET) tests. OI could not substantiate that an employee assisted workers taking the GET tests. We plan no further action with regard to these matters.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Enclosures:
1. Inspection Report 05000321/2007005,
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information 2. Investigative Synopsis, OI Case No. 2-2007-016 3. Investigative Synopsis, OI Case No. 2-2007-020
REGION II==
Docket Nos.:
50-321, 50-366 License Nos.:
05000321/2007005, 05000366/2007005 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location:
Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates:
October 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007 Inspectors:
J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector C. Stancil, Resident Inspector R. Chou, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R07)
Approved by:
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000321/2007-005, 05000366/2007-005; 10/1/2007-12/31/2007; Edwin I. Hatch
Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Event Followup The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and one DRS inspector. One Green finding was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow proper work practices during construction of two test leads in accordance with skill of the craft training. The failure of the test leads resulted in an abrupt speed decrease in the Unit 2 B Recirculation Pump and a reactor power reduction.
The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency existed because work practices were not followed in accordance with skill-of-the-craft training. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Event Cornerstone and affected the objective in that it resulted in a rapid 2B recirculation pump speed reduction and reactor power transient. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no complications associated with this transient and all mitigation systems remained available. The inspectors did not identify a specific cross-cutting aspect associated with this issue.
(Section 4OA3)
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near 100% RTP for the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100% RTP. On October 26, a reduction to 62%
RTP occurred while removing test equipment from the 2B Recirc MG set. Power was restored to 100% RTP on October 27. The unit operated at or near 100% RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
==1R01 Adverse Weather
a. Inspection Scope
Seasonal Readiness Review.==
The inspectors performed a seasonal review of licensee cold weather preparations. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure DI-OPS-36-0989, Cold Weather Checks, and walked down the completed portions of the procedure.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications (TS), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and drawings H-13395, H-23395 and H-12613 to verify the following three systems would remain operable during cold weather.
- Plant Service Water System at Intake Structure
- Fire Protection System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Area Tours.==
The inspectors toured the following 12 risk significant plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed and that transient combustibles were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, were in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 Working Floor and Stack Monitoring Rooms RB 203'
- Unit 2 EDG Area 130'
- Unit 2 Switchgear Rooms EDG 130'
- Condensate Storage Tanks Unit 1 and Unit 2
- Service Water Valve Pits
- Intake Structure
- Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks
- Railroad Airlock
- Unit 1 EDG Area 130'
- Unit 1 Switchgear Rooms DG 130'
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Biennial Heat Sink Performance.==
The inspectors reviewed inspection records, test results, and other documentation to ensure that heat exchanger (HX) deficiencies that could mask or degrade performance were identified and corrected. The test procedures and records were also reviewed to verify that these were consistent with Generic Letter 89 -13 licensee commitments, and industry guidelines. Risk significant HXs reviewed included the EDG HXs and Safeguard Equipment Area Room, the B/D Residual Heat Removal (RHR) & Core Spray Pump Area, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI),and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling room coolers. In addition, the inspectors also performed a walkdown of the intake channel and discharge outlet structures for the cooling water inlet and outlet to assess general material condition and to identify any degraded conditions of the structures. The inspectors also observed the performance testing for the Safeguard Equipment Area Room Coolers.
The inspectors reviewed site and corporate HX programs, procedures, minimum flow requirements, testing, inspections, cleaning, calculations, drawings, modifications, condition reports (CRs), and system health reports. The inspectors reviewed performance testing procedures, data collections, analyses, and acceptance criteria for Safeguard Equipment room coolers and Plant Service Water (PSW) and RHR Service Water (RHRSW) pump motor oil coolers. The inspectors reviewed HX and component inspection reports and Work Orders for EDG HXs, Intake Structures, Intake Traveling Screens, and the Intake Suction Pit. The reports and work orders included cleaning, debris removal, inspections, tube plugging, data sheets, evaluations, verification sign-off sheets, and operations clearance/release forms. For the EDG HX bundle replacements (jacket coolant, lube oil, and air), Eddy Current Tests were performed and the reports were reviewed. These documents were reviewed to verify inspection methods were consistent with industry standards, to verify HX design margins were being maintained, and to verify performance of the HXs under the current maintenance frequency was adequate.
The inspectors also reviewed general health of the PSW system via review of design basis documents, system health reports, annual intake structure diver inspections and cleaning, water sampling results, and corrosion monitoring. These documents were reviewed to verify design basis were being maintained and to verify adequate PSW system performance under current preventive maintenance, inspections and frequencies.
The inspector discussed the results of cleaning and inspection of HXs, Intake Structures, Intake Suction Pit, and water sampling with the PSW system engineer and a plant chemist for the presence of macroscopic biologic fouling such as Asiatic Clams and Zebra Mussels. The inspectors also reviewed modification packages to ensure components, system repairs, or replacements met the design requirements.
Condition report and corrective maintenance history were reviewed for potential common cause problems and problems which could affect system performance to confirm that the licensee was entering problems into the corrective action program and initiating appropriate corrective actions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
Resident Quarterly Observation.==
The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-50904-06, which included power at 60% and restoration of the 2B Reactor Feed Pump Turbine following maintenance, an Safety Relief Valve (SRV) fails open, the operating Control Rod Drive (CRD) flow control valve fails, Instrument Air header leaks that cause the scram discharge volume (SDV) isolation valves to close, a manual reactor scram, an anticipated trip without scram condition, Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) drifting closed, and entry into the Emergency Operating Procedures. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following three samples associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated CRs, Maintenance Work Orders (MWO), and the licensees procedures for implementing the Maintenance Rule to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Unit 1 and 2 Neutron Monitoring System
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Traveling Water Screen System
- Unit 2 Analog Trip & Transmitter System
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following five Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.
- October 8 through 12, Switchyard breaker 179480 replacement, 1C PSW Pump Motor replacement, Unit 2 SDV Functional Test & Calibration.
- October 27 through November 2, Intake Structure cleaning, Upstream Traveling Water Screen preventive maintenance, Unit 2 Alternate Reactor Protection System Power Supply preventive maintenance.
- November 10 through 16, Switchyard Breaker 179470 replacement, Unit 1 1B21N081A Analog Trip & Transmitter Calibration, Unit 2 CDR Pump B replacement
- November 19 through 22, 1B EDG Battery Charger calibration, Unit 2 CRD Pump B replacement, Unit 2 Reactor Manual Scram functional test
- November 3 through 9, Switchyard Breaker 179470 replacement, 1C RHR Pump Discharge Check Valve repair, 1A CRD Pump maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following three operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the TS and the FSAR to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 Replacement of the 1B EDG Batteries
- 1C RHRSW Pump Motor varnish flaking
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following permanent plant modification to determine if it adversely affected the reliability or functional capability of the associated system. The inspectors reviewed the applicable FSAR sections and the 10CFR50.59 assessment associated with the modification to determine if the design basis of the system was affected, as well as the implementing procedures and calculations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 MSIV Limit Switch Replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
For the following seven post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 2R24S012, Motor Control Center door handle repair
- 2E11F119A, RHRSW System Cross-tie Motor Operated Valve operator inspection
- 1E11C001D, RHRSW Pump Seismic Support repair
- 1E11C002C, RHR Pump Cooler Inlet Valve disassembly/repair
- 1E11F031C, 1C RHR Pump Discharge Check Valve disassembly/repair
- 2P41F035B, HPCI Cooler Outlet Valve diagnostic test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following four surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Surveillance Tests
- 34SV-C41-002-1, 1A Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test
- 34SV-R43-002-2, 1B EDG Monthly Run In-Service Test
- 34SV-E41-001-1, Unit 1 HPCI Valve Operability
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R23 Temporary Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification (TMM) and assessed each evaluation using criteria defined in licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018-0, Temporary Modification Control. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation were assessed using the design basis information provided in the FSAR to verify the modifications did not affect the safety functions of these systems. The inspectors also verified the modifications were installed in accordance with the TMM requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- TMM 1-06-026, 125VDC Battery 1R42-S002B Replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the following emergency plan evolution. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator, Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated events and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Emergency Plan Drill conducted on November 11
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee submittals for the PIs listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation And Reporting Of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI), Emergency AC Power System
- MSPI, High Pressure Coolant Injection System
- MSPI, Heat Removal System
- MSPI, Residual Heat Removal System
- MSPI, Cooling Water Systems
- Safety System Functional Failures
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Reactor Coolant System Leakage
- Reactor Coolant System Activity The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected since May 2006 for the Barrier Integrity indicators identified, since September 2006 for the Initiating Events indicators identified and since December 2006 for the Mitigating Systems indicators identified. The inspectors compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly.
Licensee event reports issued during the referenced time frame were also reviewed for safety system functional failures and are listed in Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the following CR and Operator Work Arounds (OWA) to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the CR against the licensees corrective action program as delineated in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- 2007107640, Continuous operation of three RBCCW Pumps
- Operations Work Arounds, Burdens, and Needs list dated November 11, 2007
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors had the following observations:
- The inspectors determined the disposition of CR 2007107640 was narrowly focused on developing a section in the operating procedure to allow continuous operation of three RBCCW pumps. The inspectors identified additional weaknesses in the operators use of procedures and decision making. Following questioning by the inspectors, the licensee took action to brief the operating crews on procedural usage and decision making expectations.
- The inspectors evaluated the cumulative impact of the OWAs identified as of November 11, 2007. They included recirc MG set step speed changes, load reductions required due to elevated condensate temperatures during the summer, and 1A RHR pump vibration when operating in certain flow values. The inspectors determined the licensees compensatory measures and corrective action plans were adequate.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of July 2007 through December 2007 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operability determinations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest Integrated Performance Assessments (IPAs).
Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b.
Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors compared the licensee IPA with the results of the inspectors daily screening and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends in the data that the licensee had failed to identify.
4OA3 Event Followup
a. Inspection Scope
On October 26, a rapid speed reduction of the 2B Recirculation Pump caused reactor power to decrease from 100% to 62%. The speed reduction occurred while workers where preparing to remove data recorders connected to the scoop tube positioner circuit. Reactor power momentarily traversed into the Immediate Exit region of the Power/Flow Map as expected, and operators manually reduced power to the Analyzed Region of the Power/Flow Map. Power was later restored in a controlled manner to 100%.
As part of the follow up to this event, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and strip charts to determine what occurred and how the operators responded, and to determine if the response was in accordance with plant procedures.
Additionally, the inspectors attended the human performance board meeting and discussed the event with operations and maintenance to gain an understanding of the event and assess information leading up to the transient. The inspectors later reviewed the root cause determination to assess the detail of review and adequacy of the root cause and proposed corrective actions. The documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
Introduction:
A Green self-revealing finding was identified for the licensees failure to follow proper work practices during construction of two test leads in accordance with skill of the craft training. The failure of the test leads resulted in an abrupt speed decrease in the Unit 2 B Recirculation Pump and a reactor power reduction.
Description:
The 2B recirculation pump experienced a rapid speed decrease during removal of test leads associated with the scoop tube positioner data recorder. When a technician was removing tape from the test leads, two test leads were inadvertently pulled from the data recorder due to improperly crimped lugs that attached the test leads to the recorder. The other end of the test leads remained connected to the scoop tube positioner terminal board. This condition resulted in the test leads shorting which caused a reduction in the positioner input signal. The scoop tube changed position to match the reduced input signal which caused a rapid speed reduction of the 2B recirculation pump from 96% to approximately 38%. Subsequently, a reactor power reduction to 62% occurred which coincided with the Immediate Exit region of the power/flow map. Operators entered the appropriate annunciator response procedure and initiated action to further reduce reactor power to exit the Immediate Exit region.
After stabilizing reactor power and the recirculation loop flows were matched, power was restored to 100%.
Analysis:
The inspectors determined that a performance deficiency existed because work practices were not followed in accordance with skill-of-the-craft training. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Event Cornerstone and affected the objective in that it resulted in a rapid 2B recirculation pump speed reduction and reactor power transient. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were no complications associated with this transient and all mitigation systems remained available. The inspectors did not identify an applicable cross-cutting aspect.
Enforcement:
Enforcement action does not apply because the performance deficiency did not involve a violation of a regulatory requirement. This finding is identified as FIN 05000366/2007005-01, Improper Test Lead Construction Results in Plant Transient.
4OA5 Other
.1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected ISFSI operations to verify that the licensee performed ISFSI activities safely and in compliance with approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the licensee had properly identified the parameters of each fuel assembly loaded, and that a physical inventory had been performed on all spent fuel in the ISFSI on a frequency of at least every 12 months.
- Licensing Document Change Request 2006-046DC, Revision of the HNP 10 CFR 72.212 Report to incorporate CoC 1014, Amendment 2 and HI-STORM 100 FSAR 3
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On January 22, 2008, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dennis Madison and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the observations. The inspectors confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- M. Ajluni, Site Engineering Manager
- J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager
- S. Bargeron, Plant Manager
- B. Goodwin, Design Manager
- G. Johnson, Operations Manager
- J. Lewis, Site Support Manager
- D. Madison, Hatch Vice President
- S. Soper, Engineering Support Manager
- J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
- R. Varnadore, Maintenance Manager
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000366/2007005-01 FIN Improper Test Lead Construction Results in Plant Transient (Section 4OA3)