IR 05000321/1978032
| ML19256A273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1978 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Dance H, Riley B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256A258 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-78-32, 50-366-78-40, NUDOCS 7811280012 | |
| Download: ML19256A273 (5) | |
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Report Nos.:
50-321/78-32 and 50-366/78-40 Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366 Licensee Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Licensee: Georgia Power Company E. I. Hatch P. O. Box 442 Baxley, Georgia 31513 Facility Name:
E. I. Hatch Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Baxley, Georgia Inspection conducted: September 13-15, 1978 Inspectors:
F. S. Cantrell B. W. Riley (September 13-14, 1978)
H. C. Dance (September 14, 1978)
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Approved by: E N.a xa %
H. C. Dance, Chief Date Reactor Project Section No. 1 Reactor Operations Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summ qy Inspection on September 13-15, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-321/78-32 and 50-366/78-40)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection to review LER's; procedures.'r making 10 CFR 21 reports and conducting Fire Equipment Inspections; Jff-Gas System Hardware; Status of Modification to LPCI and Recirculation System Valves required to comply with Admendment No. 48 to Unit 1 Technical Specifications, and to review responsibility for preparing radioactive waste shipments. The inspection involved 38 inspector-hours on site by three NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in the areas inspected.
78112800 R
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RII Report Nos. 50-321/78-32 and 50-366/78-40 I-1 DETAILS I Prepared by:,
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F. S. Centre 11, Frof%4t Inspector
'Date Reactor Froject Section No. 1 Reactor Operations Nuclear Support Bianch Dates of Inspection:
September 13-15, 1978
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\\b IEDM Reviewed by:
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.m L uch H. C. Dance, Chief T
Date Reactor Project Section No. I Reactor Operations Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Persons Contacted
- M. Manry, Plant Manager
- H.
C. Nix, Assistant Plant Manager
- S. X. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
- G.
B. Ellis, Acting Superintendent of of Maintenance T. R. Collins, Health Physics Supervisor T. V. Greene, Superintendent, Engineering Services C. R. Miles, Jr., QA Field Supervisor, GPC C. E. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor W. B. Thigpen, QA Field Representative
- Denotes persons present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Noncompliance (Closed) Infraction (366/78-33-01) Procedure HNP-2-3353, Fire Equipment Inspection, was revised to include all fire equipment associated with Unit 2 including the fire extinguishers identified in the citation.
The data sheet included in this procedure is on file, and shows that unit fire equipment was inspected per the procedure during August 1978.
3.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Two unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraph 7 and 12 of this repor.
o RII Report Nos. 50-321/78-32 and 50-366/78-40 I-2 4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee represenatives (Denoted in paragraph 1)
on September 15, and reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
5.
Personnel Changes M. O. Schliessman, Maintenance Superintendent, was transferred September 15, 1978.
G. B. Ellis was appointed Acting Maintenance Superintendent.
Effective September 15, 1978, a Shift Supervisor was assigned to each operating shift.
Both Shift Foreman will report to the Shift Supervisor.
6.
Plant Status Unit I was operating at close to 100% power. Unit 2 had completed modifications to the Drywell Ventilation System that were required to correct air distribution problem identified during startup testing.
Plant startup was scheduled September 16, 1978.
7.
Two Stage Safety Relief Valves (SRV)
In reviewing the specifications for the safety relief valves supplied for Unit 2, the reactor vendor determined that the valves would not operate reliably under worse case conditions with operating air pressure at 70 PSIG, but would provide reliable operation at 90 PSIG minimum.
Normal plant air pressure is 120 PSIG. A licensee representative stated that the minimum air pressure value was 90 PSIG, and that an evaluation would be made to confirm that the accumulators for the SRV's associated with the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
would still provide sufficient air to operate its SRV five times after a failure of the air supply described in the Unit 2 FSAR (Section 6.3.2.2.).
(Unresolved Item 366/78-40-01).
8.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported By The Licensee The following licensee event reports were reviewed in office for potential generic problems, to detect trends, to determine whether the information included in the report meets NRC reporting requirements, and to consider whether the corrective action di, cussed in the report appears appropriate.
Licensee action with respe t to selected reports was reviewed further at the site to verify that the events were reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Technical Specifications, that corrective action wa: taken by the licensee, and that safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting conditions for operations were not exceeded. The inspector examined selected Plant Review Board minutes, incident reports, logs, and records, and inspected equipment and interviewed selected personnel. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
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RII Report Nos. 50-321/78-32 and 50-366/78-40 I-3 No.
Date of Report Subject
- 321/78-14 3/24/78 Sealant Deterioration In Secondary Contain-ment Openings
- 321/78-51 7/17/78 RHR Test Valve Failed During Surveillance Test
- 321/78-64 8/18/78 Nitrogen Inventory Less Thar. 2000 Gallons
- 321/78-66 8/23/78 Rod Block Monitor Failed During Test 321/78-58 7/27/78 RWCU Leak Detection Logic Failed 321/78-59 7/31/78 Weekly Fire Pump Test 321/78-61 8/4/78 secondary Containment Leak Rate Report Not Submitted 321/78-62 8/23/78 RCIC Steam Line Delta P Set High
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321/78-68 8/30/78 Hydraulic Snubber Low Fluid
- Addis.:nal review conducted at the site.
9.
Responsibilities For Shipping Radioactive Waste The inspector discussed responsibilities for the proper preparation of radioactive vaste shipment. The licensee was provided information on a shipment involving contamination of the driver and truck cab during a shipment as described in a letter from the S. C. Bureau of Radiological Health dated July 13, 197..
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RII Report Nos. 50-321/78-32 and 50-366/78-40 I-4 10.
Power Supply for LPCI and Recirculation System Valves Design Change Request (DCR)76-153 was issued to change the primary source of emergency power for LPCI system injection valves, and the recirculation pump suction and discharge valves from the diesel genera-tors to a battery supplied inverter (250VDC/600VAC). Amendment No.
48 to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications required implementing this change prior to unit startup following the second refueling outage (spring 1978).
Plant records show that the DCR was completed and closed out April 26, 1978. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
10 CFR 21 Reports of Defects Plant procedures were reviewed to ascertain that controls have been established for identifying, evaluating ar.d reporting defects as required by 10 CFR Part 21.
Controls have been establishing to insure that each applicable procurement document specifies the provisions of Part 21.
Two procurement documents were reviewed to verify that the provisions of Part 21 were specified.
Deviation reports generated during. Tune-August 1978 were reviewed against the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 21.
All of the required reports were submitted under applicable Technical Specification. No defects were identified that required a separate report under 10 CFR 21.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Plant Tour During a tour of the Unit I refueling floor on September 15, one of the two gate seals at each end of the spent fuel pool was leaking air from the inflatable seal.
Inflatable seals are used to prevent water leakage past the spent fuel pool gates. The air valves to both seals appeared to be open to a common supply, thus providing a path to deflate redundant seals in the event of a loss of the air supply. A licensee representative stated that the air supply would be evaluated to determine what corrective action was necessary (Unresolved Item 321/78-32-01).