Text

Integrated Inspection Report 05000315/2025003 and 05000316/2025003
	ML25363A015
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	12/29/2025
From:	Nestor Feliz-Adorno; NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB
To:	Ferneau K; Indiana Michigan Power Co
Shared Package
ML25192A048	List: IR 05000315/2025003; ML25192A063; ML25363A015;
References
	EA-24-047 IR 2025003
	Download: ML25363A015 (0)
	v • d • e

SUBJECT:

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2025003 AND 05000316/2025003

Dear Kelly Ferneau:

On September 30, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. On November 25, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with S. Dailey, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Due to the temporary cessation of government operations, which commenced on October 01, 2025, the NRC began operating under its Office of Management and Budget-approved plan for operations during a lapse in appropriations. Consistent with that plan, the NRC operated at reduced staffing levels throughout the duration of the shutdown. However, the NRC continued to perform critical health and safety functions and make progress on other high-priority activities associated with the ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300. On November 13, 2025, following the passage of a continuing resolution, the NRC resumed normal operations. However, due to the 43-day lapse in normal operations, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation granted the regional offices an extension on the issuance of the calendar year 2025, third quarter integrated inspection reports normally issued by November 15, 2025, to December 31, 2025. The NRC will resume the routine cycle of issuing inspection reports on a quarterly basis beginning with the calendar year 2025, fourth quarter integrated inspection reports, which will be issued 45 days after the fourth quarter ends on December 31, 2025.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional December 29, 2025 Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316 License Nos. DPR58 and DPR74 Enclosure:

As stated cc: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Feliz-Adorno, Nestor on 12/29/25

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Results in Failed Main Steam Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000315/202500301 Open/Closed

[P.2] -

Evaluation 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ). Specifically, after identifying that drains connected to Unit 1 Steam Generator #4 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) were clogged and that water had accumulated within the valve bodies, the licensee did not correct the condition, resulting in the valves becoming corrosion bonded and unable to open.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000315/2025001-00 LER 2025001-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Two Main Steam Safety Valves Failed Setpoint Testing 71153 Closed NOV 05000315,05000316/

202401101 Failure to certify operators re-activation in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 55.53(f) results in failures to meet minimum staffing requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i). EA24047 92702 Closed

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 12, 2025, there was a planned down-power to 98 percent to perform main turbine control valve testing. On September 13, 2025, the unit returned to rated thermal power and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 17, 2025, there was a planned down-power to 46 percent to perform main steam safety valve testing. On September 19, 2025, the unit continued down-power to shut down on September 20, 2025, for a planned refueling outage and remained offline for the rest of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Partial)

(1)

(Partial)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 essential service water system during the week ending September 30, 2025.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on July 30, 2025.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency diesel generator rooms during the week ending August 30, 2025.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during shutdown of Unit 2 for refueling outage U2C29 during the week ending September 20, 2025.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated an as-found simulator evaluation scenario on August 19, 2025.

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator just in time training in preparation for a Unit 2 refuel outage on September 16, 2025.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Maintenance Rule periodic 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(3) assessment on July 15, 2025.

(2) Actuator to valve misalignments on air operated valves in multiple systems as part of the root cause evaluation for the 2QRV251 valve packing failure documented in Action Request (AR) 20245270-26.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Risk management during Unit 1 Train A reserve feed scheduled maintenance with essential service water crossties open during the week ending August 30, 2025.

(2) Risk management during Unit 2 AB emergency diesel generator voltage regulator thermal overload work window during the week ending July 19, 2025.

(3) Risk management during unplanned unavailability of supplemental diesel generators and unplanned inoperability of Unit 1 east residual heat removal during the week ending September 13, 2025.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Nonconservative surveillance requirement for emergency diesel generator fuel oil day tank fuel oil volume, AR 20255747, on August 2, 2025.

(2) Operability assessment of Unit 1 CD emergency diesel generator after failed surveillance, AR 20255378, during the week ending July 12, 2025.

(3) Operability assessment of Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feed pump trip and throttle valve with hook misalignment, AR 20254413, during the week ending August 9, 2025.

(4) Operability assessment of Unit 1 CD battery with corrosion on terminal, AR 20256001, during the week ending August 9, 2025.

(5) Operability determination of Unit 2 solid state protection system exceeding drop-dead date affecting the surveillance of containment purge supply and exhaust system isolation instrumentation for the outage during the week ending September 20, 2025.

(6) Functionality assessment of supplemental diesel generator fuel oil usage during the week ending September 27, 2025.

(7) Operability determination of Unit 1 control room envelope when control room door wouldn't fully seal during the week ending September 20, 2025.

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)

(1)

(Partial)

The inspectors evaluated refueling outage U2C29 activities from September 20 to September 30, 2025.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 north safety injection pump PMT following planned work during the week ending August 30, 2025.

(2) Unit 1 east residual heat removal system after scheduled maintenance during the week ending August 12, 2025.

(3) Unit 2 AB emergency diesel generator PMT after automatic voltage regulator thermal overload extent of condition examination on July 15, 2025.

(4) Unit 1 AB battery PMT after battery replacement, during the week ending August 9, 2025.

Ice Condenser Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2 ice condenser ice basket weighing, during the week ending September 13, 2025.

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) FLEX diesel driven lift pump functional check during the week ending September 20, 2025.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)

(1) Glass-top exercise drill and exercise performance evaluation team 2 during the week ending August 30, 2025.

Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Glass-top exercise drill and exercise performance team 4 on August 25,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:

(1) Unit 2 regen heat exchanger room 2SV-64 valve replacement.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:

(1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room ventilation filtration system.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.

71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment

Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:

(1) Dose assessment of an individual who went into the reactor cavity on April 4,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===

Main article: IP 71151

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025)

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025)

(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

Main article: IP 71152

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1)2RU-15 Unit 2 steam generator #4 power operated relief valve 2MRV243 MOD 30 controller failure.

(2) Unit 1, two main steam safety valves on steam generator #4 failed surveillance high.

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71152

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in repetitive emergency diesel generator issues that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01)

Main article: IP 71153

(1) The inspectors evaluated repetitive failures of two emergency diesel generators (EDGs)the Unit 2 AB EDG failure to start on April 22, 2025, and the Unit 1 CD EDG failure to start on July 2, 2025both of which exhibited similar symptoms during slow-speed surveillance testing. In each case, the licensee determined the cause involved the same subcomponents. Per IMC 0309, Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Power Reactors, following the second similar instance on July 2, the NRC considered whether this inspection sample should be the subject of a reactive inspection and determined that a reactive inspection was not necessary, as documented in ADAMS Accession No. ML25192A063. This issue was reviewed as the 71152S sample documented in this report.

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000315/2025001-00,Two Main Steam Safety Valves Failed Setpoint Testing (ADAMS Accession No. ML25135A102). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71152A.

This LER is Closed.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

===92702 - Follow-Up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, and Orders The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to NOV 05000315/2024011, 05000316/202401101 and determined that the reason, corrective actions taken and planned to address recurrence, and the date when full compliance will be achieved for this violation is adequately addressed and captured on the docket.

Follow-Up on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, and Orders===

Main article: IP 92702

(1) The inspector reviewed the licensees response to a Severity Level IV violation (EA24047) concerning operators that did not re-activate their operator licenses during the period from 2021 - 2024 that assumed licensed operator duties in accordance with IP 92702, Followup on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations. Specifically, the inspector reviewed action request items, corrective action program entries, causal evaluations, and the revisions to the affected procedure. The inspector also reviewed licensee management assignment of responsibility for implementing corrective actions and licensee procedure/expectation changes with requirements.

The inspector did not identify any concern with the licensee's corrective actions or actions to prevent recurrence.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Results in Failed Main Steam Safety Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000315/202500301 Open/Closed

[P.2] -

Evaluation 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ). Specifically, after identifying that drains connected to Unit 1 Steam Generator #4 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) were clogged and that water had accumulated within the valve bodies, the licensee did not correct the condition, resulting in the valves becoming corrosion bonded and unable to open.

Description:

On March 20th, 2025, during scheduled setpoint verification testing of Unit 1 MSSVs, Steam Generator #4 Safety Valve 1B (1SV-1B4) failed to lift prior to exceeding 110 percent of its setpoint. The following day, the inspectors became aware of the MSSV failure through daily corrective action program (CAP) review, and the licensee tested Steam Generator #4 Safety Valve 2B (1SV-2B4) which also failed to lift like 1SV-1B4. There were five MSSVs per steam generator intended to limit the secondary system pressure to meet the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III. Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1, Main Steam Safety Valves, required five MSSVs per steam generator to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

In response to the two valves failing to lift, and with the intent of meeting ASME Code requirements, the licensee expanded testing to four additional valves; all four satisfied the test acceptance criteria. Following this discovery, Unit 1 entered its scheduled refueling outage and the two affected MSSVs were removed for investigation and replaced prior to exiting the outage.

Once inspected, the MSSVs were found to be corroded. The disc guides and disc holders had undergone corrosion bonding such that the valves' internal components were fused. This fusion resulted in the two valves being unable to open as designed. Subsequently, the site contracted Westinghouse to analyze the plant design with two safety-related MSSVs inoperable. This analysis showed that under conservative accident conditions the loss of two MSSVs was not a loss of safety function with the other MSSVs still available for secondary side pressure relief.

The site investigated the cause of the corrosion and attributed it to abnormal moisture retention in the tailpipe of the valve over an extended period of time. Moisture was allowed to enter and remain near the valve seat and body due to clogged drains. Water intrusion to the tailpipe is expected as normal intermittent valve leak-by will exit out the tailpipe in the same way that steam exits when the valve opens. The MSSV vendor manual, Instructions for Installation and Maintenance Consolidated Safety Valves Nuclear Type 3700, states that, ample provision for gravity drain shall be made in the discharge pipe at or near each pressure relief valve where water or condensation may collect, and that with drains plugged, condensate will accumulate inside the valve body.

The site had known about deficient clogged drains for multiple years prior to the failed tests.

MSSVs 1SV-1B4 and 1SV-2B4 were identified as having clogged drains and moisture retention most recently in Action Request (AR) 20195007 and AR 20238710, respectively.

During unit startups there was water overflowing from the valve bowls showing water was not draining adequately. It was identified and documented in the CAP that this could be a long term seat degradation issue, given normal seat leakage. However, the site did not categorize these discoveries as CAQs and treated the overflowing as primarily a housekeeping issue.

The ARs were closed to already outstanding work orders to clear the drains. No corrective action was planned or taken to address the potential long-term seat degradation. The work orders remained outstanding at the time the valves became corrosion bonded and unable to open.

Corrective Actions: The site tracked and removed similarly clogged drains in Unit 2, established a refurbishment schedule for the MSSVs to identify corrosion earlier, developed actions to clean the drains prior to winterization of the MSSVs in order to verify that a drain path exists when the tailpipe is covered, and is planning an engineering change for the design of the drains so that cleaning and inspection are easier while online. The licensee also submitted LER 05000315/2025001-00, Two Main Steam Safety Valves Failed Setpoint Testing (ADAMS Accession No. ML25135A102), to the NRC due to the issue representing a condition prohibited by TS.

Corrective Action References: ARs 20252169, 20254025

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to correct clogged drains and water accumulation in MSSVs 1SV-1B4 and 1SV-2B4, a CAQ, was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correct clogged drains and water accumulation in the MSSVs resulted in them becoming corrosion bonded and unable to open when required to meet their intended safety function. This resulted in a condition prohibited by TS needing reanalysis to establish that the overall function was maintained.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using the Mitigating Systems screening questions in Exhibit 2, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems). Specifically, an analysis determined that even with two safety-related MSSVs inoperable, the remaining valves were sufficient to provide secondary side pressure relief under accident conditions, meaning the valve failures did not constitute a loss of function.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, while the licensee identified the clogged drains and acknowledged the potential long-term effect on the valves function, their evaluation of the issue incorrectly determined it was not a CAQ. As a result, the proposed resolution was not prioritized commensurate with the issues safety significance.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

Contrary to the above, from May 8, 2019, to March 20, 2025, the licensee failed to correct a CAQ. Specifically, on May 8, 2019, and November 13, 2023, the licensee identified clogged drain lines and water accumulation in MSSVs 1SV-1B4 and 1SV-2B4, respectively. These conditions were entered in the CAP as AR 20195007 and AR 20238710. In these ARs, the licensee stated that the clogged drains presented a long term seat degradation issue, since water intrusion is expected with normal seat leakage. However, the site did not categorize these discoveries as CAQs and treated the overflowing as primarily a housekeeping issue.

The ARs were closed to already outstanding work orders to clear the drains. On March 20, 2025, during routine setpoint verification testing of the MSSVs, 1SV-1B4 and 1SV-2B-4 failed to lift due to corrosion of the disc guides and disc holders caused by moisture retention in the tailpipe of the valve over an extended period of time. No corrective action was planned or taken to address the potential long-term seat degradation. The work orders remained outstanding at the time the valves became corrosion bonded and unable to open. The failure of two of the five MSSVs on steam generator #4 to lift also resulted in noncompliance with TS LCO 3.7.1, which requires five operable MSSVs per steam generator in Modes 1, 2, and 3.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On November 25, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to S. Dailey, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On July 10, 2025, the inspectors presented the Follow-up on Corrective Actions for Violations and Deviations for Enforcement Action (EA24047) inspection results to K.

Harper, Senior Licensing Engineer, and other members of the licensee staff.

On September 30, 2025, the inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to K. Ferneau, Executive VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Fire Plans

FIRE-PRE-

PLANS-

VOLUME-1

Fire Pre-Plans Volume 1

Miscellaneous

25-035-C

Fire Drill No: 0325-035-C "MCC panel Fire 1-AB-D"

07/31/2025

71111.05

Procedures

PMP-2270-FRP-

001

Fire Response Plan

DCC-PV-12-

MC22-N

Flood Protection ESW Pipe Tunnel

MD-12-CW-005-N

Flooding due to Circulating Water Expansion Joint Failure

Calculations

PRA-FLOOD-014

Internal Flood Detailed Analysis

Drawings

OP-12-5125-69

Flow Diagram Sta. Drainage - Turb. Rm Units No. 1 & 2

1-OHP-4022-019-

001

ESW System Loss/Rupture

Procedures

2-EHP-4075-

TCA-001

Operator Time Critical Actions

55416154

2-DLA-701, Clean, Inspect and Calibr

04/03/2014

55467474

1-DLA-701, Clean, Inspect and Calibrate

05/31/2016

55480922

2-DLA-701, Clean, Inspect and Calibrate

01/04/2021

71111.06

Work Orders

55562205

1-DLA-701, Clean, Inspect and Calibrate

06/13/2022

71111.11Q

Miscellaneous

RQ-E-5004-U1-A

Period 5004 As-Found Simulator Evaluation Unit 1 Primary

AR 2013-11790

Chesterton 5800 Packing Kits with No End Rings

08/12/2013

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2024-5270-26

RCE for Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Leakage from

2-QRV-251

07/15/2025

Engineering

Evaluations

Unit 2 CVCS System - (a)(1) Action Plan

2/18/2024

D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant Periodic Assessment of

Maintenance Effectiveness Report

10/1/2021 -

03/31/2023

GT 2023-3795

Implementation of Maintenance Rule 1.5

05/17/2023

GT 2024-5110

Maintenance Rule Optimization Tracker

06/23/2025

71111.12

Miscellaneous

Hydrogen Igniter

system (AKA

Distributed

Maintenance Rule Scoping Document

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Ignition System,

or DIS)

Hydrogen

Recombiner

System

Maintenance Rule Scoping Document

2-EHP-5035-

MRP-001

Maintenance Rule Program Administration

Procedures

2-MHP-5021-

001-146

1-QRV-251 And 2-QRV-251 Valve And Actuator

Maintenance

273963

2-QRV-251 Refurb Act., Repack Valve, Replace Access

11/15/2019

55306360

2-QRV-251 Repair Packing Leak

05/08/2012

Work Orders

55429211

2-QRV-251 Valve Repack

11/03/2013

Miscellaneous

Plan of the Day Meeting - Guarded Equipment

08/26/2025

71111.13

Procedures

PMP-2291-OLR-

001

On-Line Risk Management

Calculations

MD-12-DG-010-S

Determination of Minimum Fuel Oil Level to Allow for 24

Hours of SDG Operation at 55% Load and Maximum Run

Time of SDG Operation at 100% Load

25-4413

U1 TDAFP T&TV

05/27/2025

25-5378

DG1CD failed its scheduled surveillance

07/02/2025

AR 2024-5646

Unconservative EDG Fuel Oil Consumption Rate

07/16/2024

AR 2025-5747

Nonconservative TS SR 3.8.1.4 Value - FODT Fuel Oil

Volume

07/17/2025

AR 2025-5752

Recalibrate 1-LLS-128, DG1CD FODT Low Level Switch No

07/18/2025

AR 2025-6483

Unit 1 Control Room Door 1-DR-AUX409A Not Fully Sealed

08/18/2025

AR 2025-6830

MD-12-DG-010-S Rev Impacts Previous Operations Impact

& TRM

09/03/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-6928

Document Review of U2 Tr B SSPS Surveillance to Exceed

DDD

09/09/2025

71111.15

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

25-6001

U1 CD Battery Cell 54 Has Corrosion

07/28/2025

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Miscellaneous

Contract 1221

Worthington Specifications NY 129-69 for Original Purchase

of EDGs

06/09/1969

Heavy Lift/High Risk Rigging Plan & Checklist for Removal

of Reactor Vessel Head

09/18/2025

71111.20

Miscellaneous

U2C29 Refueling Outage Shutdown Safety Plan Report

08/16/2025

AR 2023-3504

1-PP-26N Oil Analysis Indicates a Possible Oil Mix

07/20/2023

AR 2025-3437

2AB Diesel Trip After Failed Voltage Indication

04/22/2025

AR 2025-3502

EDG Voltage Regulator FIP Actions

04/24/2025

AR 2025-4862

Potential Part 21 on EDG Thermal Overloads

06/12/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-5378

DG1CD Failed Its Scheduled Surveillance

07/02/2025

Procedures

1-ohp-4030-117-

050e

East Residual Heat Removal Train Operability Test Modes

1-4

C10052281

1-PP-26N Oil Analysis Indicates a Possible Oil Mix (2023-

5304)

08/25/2025

c10065535011

1-BATT-AB: Perform Battery Discharge Test (PMT)

04/21/2025

c10068145

Ice Condenser Basket Weighing Surveillance

09/13/2025

C10083727

FLEX Diesel Driven Lift Pump Functional Test & Inspection

09/11/2025

71111.24

Work Orders

C10088586

25-3437-17 2-DGAB-VRCKT: EXTENT OF CONDITION

EXAMINATION

07/24/2025

71114.06

Miscellaneous

EP-GTX-25Q3

25 3rd Quarter Glasstop DEP Evaluation

RWP # 252160

U2C29 Seal Table Thimble Tube Movement Activities

ALARA Plans

RWP # 252175

Regen Heat Exchanger Room

09/17/2025

AR 2025-2049

Procedure Requirement from RPP-019 Not Followed

03/18/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-2527

Uncertain of Trip Ticket Requirements

03/28/2905

Miscellaneous

RWP # 252160

TEDE ALARA Evaluation for Seal Table Tube Cleaning,

Thimble Tube Pulling (Dry), and Eddy Current Activities

Procedures

PMP-6010-RPP-

001

General Radiation Worker Instructions

2160

U2C29 - Instrument Room Seal Table Activities

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

2175

U2C29 - Regen Heat Exchanger Activities

71124.01

Self-Assessments GT 2024-7494-2

Quick-Hit Self-Assessment Report 71124.01 Radiological

Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

01/29/2025

71124.01

Self-Assessments GT 2024-7715-1

Gap Analysis - 71124.01 Radiological Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls

07/16/2025

AR 2023-6643

Failure to Obtain Air Samples Within 30 Minutes

09/19/2023

AR 2023-6645

Air Sample Analyzed Late

09/19/2023

AR 2024-2165

Contamination of the Refuel Water Purification Pump Room

03/15/2024

AR 2025-2830

East Containment Spray Pump Leaking outside CA

Boundary

04/06/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-2873

Near Miss Verifying Respirator Qualification

04/07/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

AR 2025-7494

NRC Identified - Loose Hardware on TSC Ventilation

Ductwork

09/24/2025

Respirator Evaluation Reports

various

FFP-2281-RES-

201

Respiratory Protection Device Inspection Data Sheet

various

FPP-2281-RES-

203 Attachment 1

Breathing Air Systems Supplied Air Respiratory Equipment

Set-Up

various

Miscellaneous

FPP-2281-RES-

203 Attachment 2

Breathing Air Systems Breathing Air Quality Test

various

Procedures

EHI-5054-SWD-

001

System Walkdowns

GT 2024-7506-1

Quick-Hit Self-Assessment Report 71124.03 In-Plant

Airborne Radioactivity Control

2/27/2025

71124.03

Self-Assessments

GT 2024-7716-1

Gap Analysis - 71124.03 In-Plant Airborne Radioactive

Control and Mitigation

07/14/2025

Calculations

Whole Body Count Evaluation

04/08/2025

AR 2024-2855

SRD Dose Alarm Received

04/03/2024

AR 2025-1389

Required Finger Ring Dosimetry Not Used for Portable Xray

2/18/2025

AR 2025-2053

Procedure Requirements from RPP-701 Not Followed

03/18/2025

AR 2025-2243

Person - 2025-2

03/22/2025

AR 2025-2486

Worker Did Not Have SRD When Working in the Upper

Cavity

03/27/2025

AR 2025-2779

Poor Radworker Practice Led to PCL-4

04/04/2025

AR 2025-3813

Lost DLR

05/01/2025

AR 2025-5539

Online Percon 2025-7

07/10/2025

71124.04

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-6357

Personnel Contamination Event 2023-2

09/06/2023

CFR 61 Scaling Factor Data - 2024

03/25/2025

Jan 1, 2024 - Jun 30, 2024 Monitoring Period Dosimetry

Report

01/08/2025

Jul 1, 2024 - Dec 30, 2024 Monitoring Period Dosimetry

Report

07/23/2025

Jul 1, 2023 - Dec 31, 2023 Monitoring Period Dosimetry

Report

08/08/2024

Miscellaneous

RP-93-06

Technical Basis for the Internal Monitoring Program

09/08/2017

2-THP-6010-

RPP-107

Comparison of Self-Reading Dosimeter and Dosimeter of

Legal Record Results

Procedures

2-THP-6010-

RPP-206

Internal Dose Assessment and Calculation

Self-Assessments 2024-7718-2

Quick-Hit Self-Assessment Report 71124.04 Occupational

Dose Assessment

07/14/2025

Miscellaneous

Operations Narrative Logs

07/01/2024 -

06/30/2025

71151

Procedures

PMP-7110-PIP-

001

Reactor Oversight Program Performance Indicator and

Monthly Operating Report Datasheets (July 2024 through

June 2025)

AR 2025-1878

2-RU-15 SG4 PORV 2-MRV-243 Controller

3/11/2025

AR 2025-2169

1-SV-1B-4 Would Not Lift at 110% of Set Pressure

03/20/2025

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-2199

2-MRV-243 SG4 PORV setpoints fluctuating

03/21/2025

Miscellaneous

VTD-CONS-0001

Consolidated (A Division of Dresser Industries) Instructions

for Installation & Maintenance of Type 3700 Safety Valves.

71152A

Procedures

OHI-4021

Reactor Controls Instrumentation

AR 2025-2169

1-SV-1B-4 Would Not Lift at 110% of Set Pressure

03/20/2025

71153

Corrective Action

Documents

AR 2025-4025

MSSV Tailpipe Winterization in Procedure Without Temp

Mod

05/08/2025

23-9221

Licensed Operator Requal Inspection Actions

2/07/2023

24-1656

Revision to OHI-2070, Activation of Licenses

2/29/2024

Corrective Action

Documents

24-5755

NRC Violation - Licensed Operator Requalification

07/18/2024

OHI-2070