IR 05000315/1988022
| ML17326B461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1988 |
| From: | Foster J, Patterson J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17326B460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-88-22, 50-316-88-25, NUDOCS 8809190352 | |
| Download: ML17326B461 (39) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-315/89022(DRSS);
50-316/8S025(DRSS)
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Licenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site, Bridgeman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
August 22-26, 1988 Inspectors:
J.
Foster Team Lea D
e J.
Pat son
/
M.
mith,/
D. e Date Approved By:
Snel
,
hief mergency Preparedness Section D te Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Au ust 22-26 1988 Re orts No. 50-315/88022 DRSS
.
50-316/88025 DRSS emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301).
The inspection was conducted by three NRC inspectors and one consultant.
Section 8 of this report provides an updated summary of the TMI Safety Issuees Management System (SIMS) items related to Emergency Preparedness.
Results:
No Violations, Deficiencies or Deviations were identified.
The licensee demonstrated an acceptable response to a hypothetical scenario involving equipment destruction and a large release of radioactive material.
One previous Exercise Weakness (Open Item) was closed in this inspection.
One Exercise Weakness was identified in the area of Dose Assessment, and is summarized in the Attachment to the report's transmittal letter.
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted a 0 NRC Observers and Areas Observed J.
Foster, Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Staging Area (OSA),
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
J. Patterson, OSA F.
Indiana Michi an Power Com an IMPC
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Alexich, Vice President, Nuclear Operations Smith, Jr., Plant Manager Blind, Assistant Plant Manager Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager Baker, Operations Harshberger, Emergency Planning Coordinator Krieger, Plant Emergency Planning Coordinator Loope, Radiation Protection Supervisor Barfelz, STA Gerschoffer, Security Scherer, Training Williams, TPS Wojcik, TPS Ptacek, S&A/STA Droste, Maintenance Svensson, MGRL/Cook Plant Kaercher, MGRL/I&M Erikson, NOD Postlewait, Technical Engineering/IMP Stephans, Operations/IMP Ross, Computer Department Superintendent Kriesel, EOF Manager Brewer, Nuclear Safety
& L Klementowicz McRae, NOD Griffin, I&C/Planning Heydenburg, Site gA Huerter, Site QA Jepkema, Site gA Pinkowski, Site gA Labis, Security Kauffman, Construction Manager Matthias, Administration
"Denotes licensee personnel present at the August 25, 1988 exit meetin.
Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Items Closed 0 en Item No. 315/87006-01 316/87006-01:
Exercise Weakness.
During the previous exercise, PMP 2081 EPP.305, Attachment 2, "Protective Action Recommendation Worksheet" could not be adequately completed in the intervals between State notifications nor was there time to verify the accuracy of the initial calculations.
The delay in completing calculations using this form left little or no time for discussion of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs).
The procedure for determining a
PAR has been computerized as a part of the Dose Assessment Program (DAP), and no problems with this portion of dose assessment/PARs were experienced during this exercise.
This item is closed.
3.
General An exercise of the D. C.
Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan was conducted at the D.
C.
Cook plant on August 23-24, 1988.
The exercise tested the licensee'
and offsite emergency support organizations'apabilities to respond to a simulated accident scenario resulting in a major release of radioactive material.
Attachment 1 to this report describes the Objectives of the exercise and Attachment 2 describes the exercise scenario.
The State of Michigan and Berrien County fully participated in this exercise.
NRC Region III and NRC headquarters personnel also participated as players in this exercise.
On August 24, 1988, an injection pathway exercise involving the States of Michigan and Indiana was conducted.
4.
General Observations
'a
~
Procedures
'b.
This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements using the D.
C.
Cook Power Plant Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the exercise events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit State and local authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
Actions taken to mitigate onsite events were appropriate and timely.
C.
Observers The licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with four NRC observers.
Offsite portions of the exercise were observed and evaluated by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which will be issuing a
separate repor d.
Exercise Criti ues A critique was held by licensee personnel on August 25, 1988, the day after the exercise.
The NRC discussed their observations during an exit interview on the same date.
Attending personnel are listed in Section l.
A public meeting to present the tentative onsite and offsite findings of the NRC and FEMA was held on August 26, 1988.
5.
S ecific Observations 82301 a.
Control Room The entire Control Room for Unit 2 was utilized for this exercise, which increased the amount of exercise realism significantly (a simulator Control Room should be available for the 1989 Exercise).
Additional realism was added when normal lighting was disconnected following the simulated explosion.
Initial conditions for the beginning of the exercise were provided to Control Room personnel via hypothetical shift logs.
Control Room personnel demonstrated an excellent response to the security event and following bomb-initiated reactor accident.
A good decision was made early on to "selectively dismiss" some plant non-essential personnel due to the bomb threat (this was properly halted by Controller action).
Attention to detail was evident when control panels were examined for possible explosives, and a bomb search of the Technical Support Center was specifically requested.
Personnel were knowledgeable of, and used both emergency operating procedures and Emergency Plan implementing procedures.
Initial classifications were rapidly and accurately made.
Notifications to onsite and offsite personnel were performed in accordance with procedure, and well within notification timeframe goals.
Operator response to the simulated explosion and following reactor events (anticipated transient without scram, loss of pressurizer level, safety injection, faulted steam generator)
was excellent.
Steps of the appropriate emergency operations procedure were read to the Reactor Operators, who confirmed the procedural steps and repeated instrument readings in a professional manner.
Transition from one emergency procedure to another was announced before proceeding.
During communications, use of "this is a drill" was noted to precede and follow messages.
Noise levels in the Control Room were acceptable throughout the exercise.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptabl III
Technical Su ort Center TSC The TSC was staffed and assumed command and control well within one hour of the Alert notification.
Personnel located and followed procedures, and activated all equipment smoothly.
The Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) effectively briefed the TSC staff during the activation process, assuring everyone was knowledgeable of status of the security problem.
Communications were immediately established and maintained with the Control Room, Emergency Operations Facility, and the Operations Staging Area.
Radiological habitability of the TSC was continuously monitored by a Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) and a beta gamma meter.
A contamination control step-off pad area was established at the foot of the stairway leading to the TSC.
The SEC managed the TSC effectively.
Briefings were rather informal, but frequent and effective.
More formal briefings should be considered.
The SEC displayed good decision-making capabilities; an example of this was the consideration of large personnel doses for inplant teams vs a small release offsite.
TSC personnel maintained a professional attitude throughout the exercise.
The SEC effectively coordinated efforts of all technical groups.
All personnel were aware of plant status and radiological conditions throughout the exercise.
The event status electronic copyboard with a self-copying capability was a valuable asset and provided an official log of events.
The TSC does not presently have a plant systems status board, and TSC personnel rely on copies of screen
"dumps" of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) to a printer.
As was noted in the 1987 exercise, a status board for trending plant parameters of special interest was not available.
The SPDS system would be available during an actual event and has trending capability; however, a
central location to trend selected parameters would be a valuable asset to engineering personnel in overall problem solving.
Trending of reactor parameters was not observed in the TSC, Status boards were available and effectively used to track inplant teams and repair jobs'he Operations Staging Area (OSA)
communicator effectively requested and tracked inplant team support.
Proper consideration of personnel dose extensions for emergency workers on inplant teams was demonstrated.
Discussions were conducted regarding plant events, radiological controls and problem solving options.
Noise levels remained acceptable.
Although formal log keeping or checklists were not used by personnel, a scribe took notes, and enough records were
available to allow reconstruction of plant activities and actions taken to protect the public health and safety.
Additional formal logs for the Plant Evaluation Team (PET) would aid in reconstruction of the deliberative process for actions taken during an accident.
Assembly and Accountability was completed well within 45 minutes and properly reported to the TSC.
Meteorological data was obtained at frequent intervals and posted on a township map along with protective action recommendations.
Although these were adequate, a more definitive method of displaying this important information would increase the TSC staff's awareness of offsite actions.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.
However, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Provide the TSC with a status board for important plant system parameters.
Provide the TSC with a status board to trend selected plant parameters.
Consider the use of logs for PET members to better document decisions made and actions taken.
Provide a more effective display of meteorological data and protective action recommendations in the TSC.
0 erations Sta in Area OSA The OSA was activated within 16 minutes of the announcement from the Control Room asking for activation of the OSA and TSC.
No public address or other form of announcement of OSA activation was made.
The activation process was efficient and thorough, indicating effective training and knowledge of activation procedures.
Included in the activation process was establishment of a radiation contamination control point manned by a security guard.
Concerns related to the security event precluded a public address message to explain the Alert declaration.
However, the Site Area Emergency (SAE) announcement also gave no reason for the SAE.
The status boards in the OSA indicated the SAE was due to an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS).
For those not part of the emergency response organization, a short explanation of the basis for the SAE declaration would be beneficia The Maintenance Supervisor, Radiation Protection Director and his assistant were continuously briefing personnel, readying in-plant teams and other staff members.
Few OSA Manager briefings were observed.
Status boards were maintained on a timely basis.
The use of magnetic status board tags with the in-plant specialists'ames inserted in each tag was very helpful.
Separate columns on the status board identified whether an available person was a
maintenance, electrician, radiation protection technician or other special ist.
The OSA Manager, following his emergency preparedness procedure, provided for a shift turnover.
On the list he developed were the names, positions, and home phone numbers of those who could be called on to relieve the current shift.
Habitability checks were made at initial OSA activation and periodically as events progressed.
All in-plant teams were given proper dosimetry and, where required, took full face respirators and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) with them.
Personnel donned anti-contamination clothing as soon as they arrived at the OSA and waited in the north classroom for assignment.
Although preparation activities, including team briefings were well performed, there was an inordinate time delay between team requests and their actual dispatch.
From the time a team was identified with a task, it took approximately one to one and one half hours before they left for their assignment.
These delays were partially due to the time taken obtaining team members'xposure history and approval of specific task extended radiation exposure limits.
Also, the Assistant RPD was very busy and couldn't always immediately brief a team.
There may have been other contributors to this delay not observed, such as deliberate team delay per the orders of the Site Emergency Coordinator.
A realistic time for dispatch of these teams should be 30-45 minutes.
In-plant teams No.
1 and No.
3 were accompanied by an NRC observer.
Both teams were directed to find the source of steam coming from a steam generator leak and close valves to isolate the leak.
Both teams demonstrated good knowledge of emergency procedures, use of SCBAs and respirators, and communication skills.
Demonstration of communication was limited since only one person on each team had a
communicator system (ClearCom V).
Team No. I demonstrated good problem solving techniques by reviewing plant diagrams and identifing an alternate path to approach the valves in question without going through a radiation field.
The
scenario writers had not anticipated this approach, and a
Controller properly intervened.
The scenario provided for a radiation reading of 30 R/hr with hot steam in the team's path before reaching the auxiliary building entry to Unit 2.
After the initial retreat from these high radiation fields on recommendation of the Radiation Protection (RP) Technician, three of the team returned, pulling a fire hose to be directed at any radioactive steam emanating from the Unit 2 auxiliary building door.
With high radiation levels established, the RP Technician could have approved one or two of the team to hold the hose for a specified time, then substitute others, and the cumulative dose for each would have been less.
The scenario for Team No.
3 was less demanding, since radiation levels were decreased and accessibility increased.
Part of this team was an Auxiliary Operator with a Beta/Gamma meter, and a
separate controller equipped with headset to relay information to the Control Room.
The team donned their SCBAs in a nearby area and proceeded into the problem area where a
1500 mR/hr field existed.
This team performed realistic simulation of air sampling, and called their results back to the OSA.
Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:
The in-plant teams should be dispatched in a more timely manner.
A team dispatch goal of 30-45 minutes from team request to team dispatch should be established.
Prior to the initial manning of the EOF, workers were observed in the facility checking and verifying equipment operability.
The equipment was placed in its normal standby condition prior to the arrival of the exercise EOF staff.
Initial manning of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was rapidly accomplished in a professional manner.
The staff promptly activated the EOF equipment and established communications with the plant, State, Federal and local agencies.
No bomb search, to determine whether a bomb had been planted in the EOF, was observed.
While the EOF is a fenced, normally. locked and alarmed facility, a bomb search of the facility should have been performed during initial facility activation, as the scenario involved bomb threat Phone communications with the above organizations were effective.
throughout the exercise.
Information flow to the State was adequate to support the requirements and needs of the State organization.
The licensee demonstrated the ability to provide hard copy (FAX) of the State Notification Form at the required 15 minute intervals during the exercise.
-Corporate staffing and augmentation was accomplished in a timely and well controlled manner.
The first dose projection calculations performed resulted in erroniously high thyroid doses due to a personnel fai lure to convert monitor readings to the correct values for input to the dose assessment computer.
Evaluation and review personnel did not recognize that the thyroid doses and source term did not correlate.
These erroneous values resulted in excessively conservative Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the States.
The general emergency (GE) declaration was influenced by these incorrect doses.
The licensee dose assessment team recognized the above error at approximately 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />.
This was considered an exercise weakness (Open Item 315/88022-01).
There was no formal announcement identifying the recovery manager in the EOF after the initial manning of the facility.
While most plant or corporate personnel were well aware of the identity of the recovery manager, it was less evident to non-licensee personnel.
General status briefings to the EOF staff were infrequent.
No briefings occurred between 1055 and 1245 hours0.0144 days <br />0.346 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.737225e-4 months <br />.
Radio communications from the offsite monitoring teams was lost at distances beyond 3.5 miles South of the reactor site.
Licensee personnel indicated that improve radio reception/transmission capability for offsite teams is being researched.
The EOF has very few status boards, and no status boards devoted to plant parameters or trends.
Current practice is to rely on distribution of plant status forms, or "Log Group" summaries of plant parameters at fifteen minute intervals.
These forms included hot leg temperatures, pressurizer levels, injection flows, etc.
The EPZ map at the front of the EOF was not effectively maintained.
AT 1005 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.824025e-4 months <br />, the map indicated that the evacuation zones were 0 to 2 miles, all sectors, when it should have indicated 0 to 5 miles, all sectors.
After the radioactive release had been stopped, the emergency level was de-escalated to an Alert.
Current NRC philosophy is that an emergency level should not be de-escalated, but a "Recovery" phase should be declare No security liasion position exists in the EOF (or the TSC), making security related information difficult to obtain.
Based o'n the above findings, the following items should be considered for improvement:
Improved communications capability for offsite teams.
Improved status boards for the EOF should be considered.
Increased number of briefings in the EOF.
A position of Security Liasion should be established for the EOF and TSC.
6.
Exercise Scenario and Control The exercise scenario was considered challenging and difficult (both fast-moving and complex), including a significant radiological release and some wind direction shifts.
This scenario exercised all aspects of the Emergency Plan.
Evaluation of the exercise took into consideration the degree of challenge to the licensee's organization.
Exercise control was considered adequate in all areas.
Several observers noted that a bogus announcement regarding the start of the drill was made in the training center.
This resulted in a limited number of personnel from the training center arriving at their assigned emergency response facility earlier than called for by the scenario.
7.
Exercise Criti ues NRC representatives observed the critiques which took place immediately following the exercise, and attended the final licensee critique held immediately prior to the Exit Interview.
The licensee's critiques identified all exercise problems of significance, and demonstrated the licensee'
ability to evaluate exercise performance.
8.
TMI Safet Issues Mana ement S stem SINS Items On October 31, 1980, the NRC issued NUREG-0737, which incorporated into one document all TMI-related items approved for implementation by the Commission at that time.
On December 17, 1982, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to provide additional clarification regarding Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2)
Application to Emergency Response Facilities, Emergency Response Facilities, and Meteorological Data, as well as other areas.
The status of the completion of these TMI SIMS items are internally tracked by the NRC.
Cl
The listing below provides the status of the SINS items related to emergency preparedness.
The listing indicates how the item was tracked as of May 26, 1988 on SINS, as well as what we have determined to be the correct and current status of the item.
In some cases the status of items tracked by SIMS are incorrect and/or should be updated based on recent inspection findings.
The comments provide a background and basis for the current status.
III.A.1.1 SIMS Status:
Open Current Status:
Open This item refers to implementation of Chapter 8 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, and should be closed upon completion of the yet to be scheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
N/A Current Status:
Closed III.A.1.2.1 This item involved short term improvements to the emergency preparedness program and was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Reports No. 50-315/82-05; No. 50-316/82-05 dated June 30, 1982.
SIMS Status:
Closed Current Status:
Closed III.A.1.2.2 This item involved interim upgrades to the ERF's and was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Reports No. 50-315/82-05; No. 50-316/82-05 dated June 30, 1982.
SIMS Status:
Not Listed Current Status:
N/A III.A.1.2.3 This item involved design criteria for upgraded ERF's, but was subsequently determined to be not applicable (N/A).
SIMS Status:
Open Current Status:
Closed III.A.2.1 Because this item involved ERF modifications that were incorporated into MPA-F-63, 64 and 65, this item was closed based on the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Reports No. 50-315/82-05; No. 50-316/82-05 dated June 30, 1982.
SIMS Status:
N/A Current Status:
Closed
This item involved the submittal of upgraded emergency plans.
This item was closed with the issuance of the SER:
Reports No. 50-315/83-09; No. 50-316/83-10 dated September 8,
1983.
SIMS Status:
N/A Current Status:
Closed This item involved the submittal of emergency procedures.
This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Reports No. 50-315/82-05; No. 50-316/82-05 dated June 30, 1982.
SIMS Status:
Not Listed Current Status:
Closed This item involved an acceptable interim meteorological program.
This item was closed at the conclusion of the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal:
Reports No. 50-315/82-05; No. 50-316/82-05 dated June 30, 1982.
SIMS Status:
Closed Current Status:
Open This item involves an acceptable final meteorological program and will not be closed until completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
Closed Current Status:
Open This item involves an acceptable Class A meteorological model and will not be closed until completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
Closed Current Status:
Open This item involves a licensee's review of their Class A
meteorological model and will not be closed until completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
Not Listed Current Status:
N/A This item required the licensee to provide a description of the Class B meteorological model to the NRC.
Based on the current structure of the ERF Appraisal program, the NRC is not reviewing submittals of the Class B model.
Therefore this item is not applicable (N/A).
III.AD2.8 SIMS Status:
Closed Current Status:
Open MPA-F-63 This item involves an acceptable Class B meteorological model and will not be closed until completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
Open Current Status:
Open MPA-F-64 This item involves a review of the TSC during the ERF Appraisal and should be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
Open Current Status:
Closed MPA-F"65 This item involved a review of the OSC, which was completed during the June 10, 1986 exercise:
Reports No. 50-315/86016(DRSS);
No. 50-316/86016(DRSS)
dated June 26, 1986.
SIMS Status:
Open Current Status:
Open MPA-F-66 This item involves a review of the EOF during the ERF Appraisal and should be closed upon completion of the as yet unscheduled ERF Appraisal.
SIMS Status:
Open Current Status:
N/A This item involved the Nuclear Data Link, which has been superseded by the Emergency Response Data System (EROS).
Therefore this item is not applicable (N/A).
9.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on August 25, 1988, with the representatives denoted in Section 1.
The NRC Team Leader discussed the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee was also asked if any of the information discussed during the exit was proprietary.
The licensee responded that none of the information was proprietary.
Attachments:
l.
D.
C. Cook 2.
D.
C.
Cook 1988 Exercise Objectives 1988 Exercise Scenario Outline
DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT C
V
~OBJEC V
OVERALL LICENSEE OBJECTIVES A-1 Demonstrate the ability of the emergency response organization to implement DCCNP Emergency Plan and Procedures, the
?&M Emergency Response Manual and the AEPSC Emergency Response Manual.
A-2 Demonstrate the ability to establish emergency management command and control, and maintain continuity of this function for the duration of the postulated event.
A-3 Demonstrate the ability to establish communications and information flow between DCCNP emergency response facilities and participating offsite agencies.
A-4 Demonstrate the ability to designate subsequent shifts of the emergency response organization.
A-5 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.
B.
CONTROL ROOM OBJECTIVES B-1 Demonstrate the ability to recognize symptoms and parameters indicative of degrading plant conditions and to classify degraded conditions as emergencies'-2 Demonstrate the ability. to initiate notification of off-site authorities and plant personnel.
B-3 Demonstrate communications flow to and from the Technical Support Center.
B-4 Demonstrate the ability to transfer emergency authorities and responsibilities from the on-shift emergency organization to the DCCNP emergency response organization.
C.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OBJECTIVES C-1 Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility activation.
C-2 Demonstrate the ability to provide analytical assistance and operational guidance to the Control Room.
C-3 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate on-site activities in response to an emergency.
ERE-88 2-2
~OBJEC V
C.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
C-4 Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain hard copy communications with the EOF and verbal communications with the EOF, OSA, IAG, and JPIC.
C-5 Demonstrate the ability to provide analytical and radiological assistance to the OSA and Control Room.
C-6 Demonstrate the ability to obtain data from the OSTC/PSSD system.
C-7 Demonstrate the ability to request emergency response teams from the OSA.
C-8 Demonstrate the ability to designate a second shift for TSC operation.
C-9 Demonstrate the ability to evaluate the results of TSC/OSA habitability surveys and assess the need to evacuate these facilities.
C-10 Demonstrate the ability to recognize degrading plant conditions and classify plant conditions as an emergency.
C-11 Demonstrate the ability to determine the level of core damage based on plant parameters provided.
C-12 Demonstrate the ability to process personnel dose extension request.
C-13 Demonstrate the ability to assess the need for, and process request for potassium iodide administration.
C-14 Demonstrate the ability to direct the implementation of site assembly and accountability.
C-15 Demonstrate the ability to correct unit vent grab sample analysis for line loss, if a grab sample is taken.
C-16 Demonstrate the actions required to be taken in the TSC if the emergency involves a breach of the reactor coolant system.
D.
OPERATIONS STAGING AREA OBJECTIVES D-1 Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring facility activation.
ERE-88 2-3
Q~i~C~V D.
OPERATIONS STAGING AREA OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
D-2 Demonstrate the ability to assemble, brief and dispatch the following emergency response team(s):
a.
Damage Control Team b.
Post Accident Sampling Team c.
On-Site Radiation Monitoring Team d.
Off-Site Radiation Monitoring Team D-3 Demonstrate the ability to designate a second shift for OSA operation.
D-4 Each emergency response team assembled and dispatched shall demonstrate the following actions as applicable to the team type and mission:
a.
Assembly of tools/equipment b.
Preoperation checks of equipment and communications devices c.
Performance of appropriate radiological precautions d.
Performance of simulation of team mission e.
Post-mission debriefing and radiological controls D-5 Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency radiological support.
As a minimum the following activities should be demonstrated:
a.
Establishment of emergency dosimetry and exposure tracking system.
b.
Establishment of emergency control points.
c.
Performance of habitability surveys prescribed by procedure.
d.
Analysis of radiological conditions to be encountered by emergency response teams.
e.
Specification of radiological controls and precautions for emergency response teams.
D-6 D-7 Demonstrate the ability to perform offsite radiological monitoring.
As a minimum, two teams should be dispatched and direct radiation monitoring as well as airborne radioactivity analysis should be demonstrated.
Demonstrate the ability to implement damage control activities in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Procedures.
D-8 Demonstrate the ability to perform onsite radiological monitoring in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Procedures.
This monitoring should include direct radiation surveys and analysis of airborne radioactivity.
ERE-88 2-4
IS
QOU1~CIVFc D.
OPERATIONS SThGING hREA OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
D-9 Demonstrate the ability to implement reentry activities in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Procedures.
D-10 Demonstrate the actions required for an individual to exceed the exposure limits of 10CFR20.
Included in this demonstration should be a discussion of post exposure actions and limitations.
D-11 Demonstrate the actions required to administer potassium iodide.
This demonstration should include a discussion of the follow,-up actions associated with KI administration.
D-12 Demonstrate the ability to obtain environmental samples in accordance with applicable Emergency Plan Procedures.
The following samples should be obtained:
a.
Vegetation b.
Soil D-13 D-14 Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze a grab sample from the unit vent effluent, if a grab sample is requested.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain post accident samples from the reactor coolant system and complete appropriate chemical and isotopic analysis within three hours of the sample request.
D-15 Demonstrate the ability to obtain radiological base data required to evaluate the release level from the secondary plant during a steam generator tube rupture.
D-16 Demonstrate the ability to respond to a contaminated person.
Included in this demonstration, personnel decontamination shall be simulated.
E.
EMERGENCY OPERhTIONS PhCILITY OBJECTIVES E-1 Demonstrate the ability to activate the facility within one hour of declaration of an emergency requiring emergency activation.
E-2 Demonstrate the ability to establish overall command and control of the DCCNP emergency response within one hour of declaration of a site area emergency or general emergency, as applicable.
ERE-88 2-5
~OBJEC V
E.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
E-3 Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective emergency communications with each of the following agencies and facilities:
a.
State of Michigan b.
Berrien County c.
NRC d.
Joint Public Information Center f. Initial Assessment Group E-4 Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain hard copy data transmission and reception with each of the following facilities:
a.
Joint Public Information Center c.
Initial Assessment Group E-5 Demonstrate the ability to direct Offsite Radiation Monitoring Teams in order to determine the geographical location and radiological magnitude of the postulated plume.
E-6 Demonstrate the ability to designate a second shift for EOF operation.
E-7 Demonstrate the ability to develop protective action.
recommendations based on pro/ected dose and/or core and containment status.
E-8 Demonstrate the ability to update the State of Michigan on the status of the emergency at 15 minute intervals.
E-9 Demonstrate the ability to respond to inquiries from the TSC, JPIC, IAG and State of Michigan in a timely manner.
E-10 Demonstrate emergency de-escalation and termination.
E-11 Demonstrate the ability to pro)ect the magnitude of offsite dose using the Dose Assessment Program and the IBM terminal.
E-12 Demonstrate the corporate augmentation of the EOF staff.
F.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVE F-1 Demonstrate activation of the Joint Public Information Center.
F-2 Demonstrate the ability to conduct media briefings.
ERE-88 2-6
E.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PhCILITY OBJECTIVES Cont'd.
F-3 Demonstrate the ability to respond to actual or simulated inquiries from media representatives.
F-4 Demonstrate the ability of rumor control personnel to respond to simulated inquiries from the general public.
F-5 Demonstrate the ability to monitor media transmissions and respond to inaccurate information being transmitted by the media.
F-6 Demonstrate the ability to designate subsequent shifts for JPIC operation.
F-7 Demonstrate coordination of new releases with State and County representatives.
ERE-88 2-7
BASIC SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Clock Time Scenario Time Event 0715 00:00 Initial Conditions Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with the core off loaded to the Spent Fuel Pit.
Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator is out of service for its 18 month surveillance.
This work has been underway for 2 weeks and diesel disassembly has been completed.
Unit 1 is on backfeed being powered through 1AB and 1CD transformers with both 101AB and 101CD tagged out for maintenance and test (Benton Harbor's request).
Unit 1 Condensate Storage Tank has been drained and opened for cleaning.
Cleaning has started and is expected to be completed in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
Unit 1 CVCS cross-tie to Unit 2 is out of service for orifice replacement.
This work has started and "feet of the piping has been cut out for this job.
Unit 2 is at 80% power with electrical load of 890 MW with RCS boron at 890 ppm and control bank "D" at 210 steps and Tavg at 570 F.
Unit 2 has high RCS activity.
The unit has been on 120 gpm letdown for the last couple of weeks due to gross beta and gamma readings from RCS samples.
Unit 2 failed fuel detector is out of service.
Unit 2 Control Room fire detection is out of service due to faulty wiring.
Unit 2 Control Room cable vault halon system is out of service for bottle replacement.
421 traveling screen is out of service for motor replacement.
523 circulating water pump is out of service for motor replacemen CS
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Clock Scenario Time Time Event Unit 2 East Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (EMDAFP) is out of service.
The pump has been inoperable for the last 63 hours7.291667e-4 days <br />0.0175 hours <br />1.041667e-4 weeks <br />2.39715e-5 months <br />.
Following a successful surveillance test, the motor failed and has been replaced.
The midnight shift has completed the repairs and the pump should be ready for service today prior to its 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time limit expiring.
Meteorological conditions are as follows:
50'ind direction
= 337 150'ind direction = 337 Air temperature
= 68 F
Wind Speed (both 50'nd 150')
=
7 mph 0730
15 Telephone call to Personnel Supervisor from disgruntled employee who states he is going to take revenge on the Plant (Company) for unfair treatment.
To prove that he is not joking, the employee suggests that the 633'urbine deck be searched for something "interesting" that could cause an explosion.
0733 00:18 0740 00:25 The Personnel Supervisor reports the call and potential threat of a bomb to the Shift Security Supervisor and the Shift Supervisor as required.
An UNUSUAL EVENT is declared at this time based on discussions between the Shift Supervisor and the Security Shift Supervisor and PMP-2080.EPP.101, ECC-7.
0741 00:26 Governmental and Plant Management notifications are underway.
0830 01:15 Security search turns up a box of materials that could be fabricated into an explosive device, however, has not been.
A note in the box states that these materials are proof that the caller is capable of getting such materials into the Protected Area of the site.
The note goes on to say that an actual explosive device has been fabricated and is set to go off sometime this morning.
0833 01:18 The finder of the box of materials telephones or radios the information about what has been found back to the Security Shift Supervisor.
0835 01:20 The Security Shift Supervisor relays the message to the Shift Supervisor and he declares an ALERT, also in accordance with ECC-7.
0836 01:21 Governmental and Plant management notifications are underway, along with a plant-wide bomb searc Page
Clock Time Scenario Time Event 0905 01:50 The OSA and TSC should be operational at this time and the EOF will be shortly.
0910
55 A loud explosion is heard coming from the Unit 2 side of the Auxiliary Building.
and 23 blowdown lines have been severed upstream of DCR-320/330.
0911 01:56 Reactor Trip.
Turbine Trip Safety Injection Phase A
ATWS Unit trip without reactor trip.
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump starts but due to a malfunctioning governor valve only comes to 2000 rpm.
One tube in both 522 and N23 Steam Generators rupture when the blowdown lines are blown off resulting in a 500 gpm RCS leak into each of the steam generators.
Core damage occurs due to high core temperature due to the ATWS.
0912 01:57 Unit blackout due to the loss of both 201AB and 201CD transformers.
(Ground fault on transformer 54.)
CD Emergency Diesel Generator starts and picks up 4KV buses
"C" and "D".
AB Emergency Diesel Generator fails to start receives
"incomplete shart" annunciator.
4KV buses
"A" and "B" are de-energized resulting in a loss of all Train B equipment.
This includes the West Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
AEO dispatched to open reactor trip breakers.
0914 01:59 A worker in the Auxiliary Building calls CR saying that a loud, explosion-like, noise came from the vestibule on the 591'evel of Unit 2.
That noise was followed by a roaring sound and when he went to investigate he received a hot blast of steam when he opened the door to that area.
He also reports that the frisker in the frisker station nearby is alarming and that his/her dose rate meter reads about 480 mR/h Page
Clock Time Scenario Time Event The AEO sent to open the Rx trip breakers calls back to the CR to report that they are open, but that the motorgenerator sets were already off when he got to the room.
Also, the lights in the turbine room and 4KV room are out.
0915 02:00 The RDDS indicates that ERS-2300 has failed and that there seems to be a slight increase in the ten (10)
minute averages for the GSLO and SJAE monitors.
Damage Control Team (DCT) requested to repair EMDAFP.
0918 02:03 The CR dispatches an AEO to determine what is wrong with the TDAFP.
The AEO finds a milk-like liquid coming out of the fillcap.
He reports this to the CR, along with the fact that his self-reading dosimeter appears to have gone off-scale high.
0920 02:05 Emergency power (69kv) is connected to the T21D bus and the WMDAFP is now back in service.
South Security Building reports portal monitors are alarming and cannot be reset.
0925 02:10 DCT requested to repair TDAFP.
0929 02:14 AEO is dispatched to locally verify SG safeties and stop valve bypasses are closed on SG 22 and 23.
0930 02:15 RDDS indicates 5 Ci/sec Noble gas reading by vent stack monitors plus elevated GSLO and SJAE readings and failed ERS-2300.
EOF declared activated and begins dose assessment and protective action recommendations.
0931 02:16 Control Room requests SG secondary samples.
0934 02:19 Request DCT to verify closure of DCR-320/330.
0935 02:20 GENERAL EMERGENCY declared.
0937 02:22 Offsite and onsite Radiation Monitoring Teams (RMT)
are dispatched.
0939 02:24 Post Accident Samples (PAS) requested.
0945 02:30 Noble gas release rate reaches 20 Ci/sec.
Noble gasses and Zodine now detectable two (2) miles from Plant in Sector I
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Clock Time Scenario Time Event 0952 02:37 Control Room requests shutdown margin determination.
1000 02:45 Wind shift into Sector J and Noble gasses and Iodine now detectable three (3) miles from Plant in that direction.
1030 03:00 Noble gas release reaches its peak and begins to diminish.
1200 04:45 Releases are less than 3 Ci/s and declining rapidly.
Begin recovery activitie '