IR 05000315/1988026

Safety Insp Repts 50-315/88-26 & 50-316/88-30 on 881107-29. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Finding,Recurring Problems W/Estimated Critical Position & Calibr of Nuclear Instrumentation Sys

ML17325B077
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	12/02/1988
From:	Phillips M, Wetzel B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17325B048	List: IR 05000315/1988026 ML17325B047
References
50-315-88-26, 50-316-88-30, NUDOCS 8812130005
Download: ML17325B077 (20)

Text

U.

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY,COMMISSION

REGION III

Repor ts No. 50-315/88026(DRS);

50-316/88030(DRS)

Docket Nos.

50-315; 50-316 Licenses No.

DPR-58; DPR-74 Licensee:

American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:

D.

C.

Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and

Inspection At:

D.

C.

Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:

November 7-29, 1988 u. cL s~!

Inspector:

B.

A. Wetzel Approved By:

Monte

. Phillips, Chief Operational Programs Section iz u c~

ate lz/c/zz ate Ins ection Summar Ins ection on November 7 throu h 29 1988 (Re orts No. 50-315/88026(DRS)

No..

-

8 03 R

Areas ns ected:

Safety inspection of licensee action on previous inspection fsndlngs 2 02), recurring problems with the estimated critical position (92701),

and calibration. of nuclear instrumentation systems (61705).

Results:

The licensee is currently'aking several measures to increase the accuracy of their estimated critical position calculations to avoid missing critical positions during startups, which had occurred in the past.

One open item,and one violation in the area of core physics were closed during this inspection.

One unresolved item, which dealt with a new methodology for calibrating excore detectors was identified.

The unresolved item will be referred to NRR for a technical evaluation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

88122Sgp05 BSS~O 6 "

ADOCk( 05000315 Pill@

DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Indiana and Michi an Electric Com an

~L.

S. Gibson, Assistant Plant t1anager

~R:

W.

Hennen, Nuclear Supervisor, Technical Engineering T. Postlewait, Technical Engineeri.ng Superintendent

~H.

F.

Runser, Production Supervisor, Operations B.

A. Svenson, Licensing Activities Coordinator

• N. M. Terry, Senior Performance Engineer, Technical Engineering

~A. Verteramo, Nuclear Group, Technical E'ngineering H. Whitley, Nuclear Group, Technical Engineering

~J.

Wojci k, Technical Physical Sciences Superintendent

~S.

J. Wolt, equality Assurance American Electric Power Services Cor oration (AEPSC)

z.

H. Ackerman, Nuclear 'Safety and Licensing Section G. John, Nuclear Fuels and Analysis Section D..Malin, Nuclear Fuels and Analysis Section E.

Neymotin, Nuclear Fuels and Analysis Section

"Denotes persons attending the exit meeting of November 10, 1988.

'I Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s (92701 and 92702)

a.

(Closed)

0 en Item (315/86006-03(DRS)

316/86006-03(DRS)):

This item was opene pen ing s review o ec nica peci ication (TS)

Clarification No. 17, TS 3.2.4, "Application of the quadrant Power Tilt Technical Specification,"

reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Review Committee on January 8,

1980.

TS Clarification No.

17 was initiated by American Electric Power (AEP) personnel to verify that the practice of normalizing out a core power tilt during an Incore/Excore calibration is appropriate.

TS Clarification No.

17 is consistent with "Westinghouse Position 'Statement on Core Tilt,"

dated November 10, 1982.

It states that the purpose of TS 3.2.4 is to limit gross changes in quadrant to quadrant power distribution between incore flux maps, therefore, indicated quadrant Power Tilts may be "zeroed out" after determination that the core peaking factor technical specifications are met.

The inspector consulted with personnel from NRR, Reactor Systems Branch, who also indicated that D.

C. Cook's practice of normalizing out the quadrant Power Tilt on the excore detectors following a flux map is acceptable.

NRR stated that the tilt is used as an alarm and every time an incore measurement is taken (i.e.,

a flux map is performed) the alarm can be reset.

It was also stated that the quadrant Power Tilt Ratio. (gPTR) limit of 1.02 is the lowest value

that can be used for an alarm without spurious action.

Other vendors, such as Combustion Engineering and Babcock and Milcox use a

larger value for their QPTR limit and do not zero out the Quadrant Power Tilt on the Excores following a flux map.

Based on a review of "Mestinghouse Position Statement on Core Tilt" and discussions with personnel from NRR, this item is considered closed.

,

The inspector had no further concerns in this area.

b.

(Closed) Violation (315/87028-02(DRS)):

A violation of Technical Specsfscatson 6.8. 1.

was discovered uring a review of completed Procedure

~~1-THP, 6040 PER.352,

"Rod Morth Verification Utilizing RCC Bank Interchange,"

performed October 6, 1987.

Step 8.2.5 of the pr'ocedure was. not followed, in that boron samples were not recorded on data Form No. 352-3, as instructed by procedure.

The inspector was also concerned that procedure reviews performed by licensee personnel failed to identify the error.

The Lead Nuclear Engineer subsequently found the boron samples recorded in the Nuclear Engineers'ogbook and added a revised Form No. 352-3 to the procedure, which included the boron samples that were previously missed.

All Nuclear Group personnel received training on the importance of following procedures and,performing adequate procedure reviews.

The inspector has no further concerns in this-area.

Estimated Critical Position (92701)

The inspector reviewed information pertaining to recurring pr'oblems with Estimated Critica'1 Position (ECP) calculations.

The most recent occurrence was during a startup on September 15, 1988, in which the reactor did not go critical at the calculated ECP plus a 500 pcm margin for error allowed by procedure.

A temporary change was made to Procedure

"~l-OHP 4021.001.001,

"Determination of Critical Conditions,"

to permit a margin of + 800 pcm in the ECP calculation a'nd the reactor was taken critical at approximately 514 pcm greater than the calculated ECP.

It should be noted that the + 500 pcm margin is strictly administrative; TS allow a margin of + 1000 pcm in the calculation of ECP.

Personnel from the AEPSC corporate office made a formal presentation to the inspector on November 9, 1988, which identified probable causes for the error in the ECP calculations and addressed potential methods for correcting the errors.

The first probable error was attributed to Boron-10 depletion.

Some past ECP calculations were adjusted for Boron-10 depletion, such as a

calculation performed for Unit 2 on April 8, 1987 which subtracted approximately 435 pcm from the ECP.

The ECP calculation for the startup on September 15, 1988 was not adjusted for Boron-10 depletion for several reasons.

The shutdown occurred near the end of cycle, therefore, the

boron concentration in the core was low and Boron-10 depletion effects on the ECP calculation were relatively small and well within the

+. 500 pcm error.

Also, the plant did not go into half-loop operation, during the brief shutdown, which replaces depleted boron with fresh boron and increases the error in reactivity due to Boron-10 depletion in the ECP calculation.

In retrospect, the error due to Boron-10 depletion for the September 15 startup was determined to be approximately

pcm and if this effect would have been taken into consideration the calculated ECP would have been within the

+ 500 pcm acceptance criterion.

The second error was attributed to the effects of Westinghouse changing their methodology for calculating the power deflect from a two-dimensional core model to a more accurate three-dimensional core model.

In past ECP calculations there was a cancellation of errors in terms, when Westinghouse computed a more accurate total power defect term the errors became additives The total power defect includes the following three terms:

DOP - reactivity change due to Doppler effect.

TD - reactivity change due to moderator temperature change.

FR - reactivity change due to flux redistribution effect.

The FR term was underpredicted in past calculations.

The difference

,

between previous power defect calcu1ations and new calculations is approximately 360 pcm.

As a result, AEP personnel are recalculating terms that are input into the ECP by considering secondary effects on the parameters and thereby reducing error 'in the terms..

Terms input into the ECP calculation were previously assumed to be separable; however, they are not.

The following secondary effects are being investigated:

I)

Xenon and Samarium negative reactivities influence differential boron worth.

For example, differential boron worth is higher in a Xenon-free core because the spectrum of neutrons is softer and Boron-10 contains a higher cross-section for. absorption of slower neutrons.

2)

3)

Flux redistribution effects may be lower than calculated because measured axial offset values were less negative than calculated values due to operation at reduced power levels.

Reactivity increase due to Plutonium buildup during reactor shutdown may be partly offset by deposition of certain isotopes of samarium.

It should be noted that the error in the ECP calculation of September

was in the conservative direction.

That is, the core had more negative reactivity than was expected.

Utility personnel are in the process of refining terms input into the ECP calculation to better predict criticality.

A computer code is also being approved for operator use to facilitate performance of more accurate ECP calculations by Operation,The inspector identified one concern during the review of the event.

Boron-10 depletion is expected to contribute error in an ECP calculation under certain operating conditions, such as a startup after a trip from an extended run, However, Procedure

"~l-OHP 4021.001.001, which

,calculates the ECP does not discuss Boron-10 depletion.

The licensee has agreed to revise the procedure to at least include a precaution or note that describes under what operating conditions Boron 10 depletion should be accounted for in the ECP calculation.

The procedure revision will also include the results from AEP personnel's investigation into secondary effects on reactivity parameters.

Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation S stems (61705)

The licensee is in the process of implementing a

new technique for performing Excore Detector calibrations known as the one-point method.

This technique permits calibration of excore instrumentation based on the results from one incore flux map 'rather than the previous method which used three to ten flux maps.

The inspector reviewed the following documents pertaining to the one-point calibration methodology:

~

"One Point Incore/Excore Methodology Verification for D.

C.

Cook, American Electric Power, August 31, 1988, Utility Resource Associates."

~

"Technical Evaluation - One Point Incore/Excore Cross Calibration Methodology for D.

C. Cook,.August 16, 1988, by Alberto Verteramo."

."Safety Review Memorandum:

New Technique for Calibrating the Ex-Core Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System."

Procedure,

• "1-THP 4030 STP.363,

"One Point Incore-Excore Detector Calibration," Revision 0.

The question of whether the one-point incore/excore calibration methodology is acceptable for use is an Unresolved Item (Nos.

315/88026-01(DRS)

and 316/88030-01(DRS))

and will be forwarded to NRR for review to determine whether implementation without prior NRC approval is acceptable.

Unresolved Items Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.

An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

on November 10, 1988.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.

The licensee acknowledged

statements made by the inspector and stated that the Utility Resources Associates Report dated August 31, 1988, was considered proprietary, but references to this document would not be considered proprietary.

A second exit meeting was held on November 29, 1988, via teleconference, to discuss the unresolved item denoted in Paragraph ATTACHMENT h RIII REPORT/LETTER TRAVELLER Total days to issue:

Licensee:

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE NDIANA & MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY Facility(s):

ND. C.

COOK - UNITS 1

& 2 License No(s):

'"DPR-58'PR-74 Draft Couple tion Date:

%7i58 Initial Typing:

Received Start End

+Inspector Review:

Start t

Date Mailed:

Date Received:

Reviev Process

Report No(s):

50-315/88oZQ 50-316/SBoBQ Inspection End Dat.e; D9 Nd v~ebW ~ i~88 Inspector~

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Cogent G-8xs+ed QC v. M98 Issue Date:

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Telephone Due Received Written Due Licensee Response:

Received Due Issued Received

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