IR 05000315/1988013
| ML17326B372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1988 |
| From: | Gardner R, Neisler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17326B371 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-88-13, 50-316-88-15, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8804150053 | |
| Download: ML17326B372 (8) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I II Reports No. 50-315/88013(DRS);
50-316/88015(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza Columbus, OH 43216 Licenses No.
D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and
Inspection At:
D.C.
Cook Site, Bridgman, Michigan Inspection Conducted:
March 15-31, 1988 Approved By:
Ronald N. Gardner, Chief Plant Systems Section ate Ins ection Summar Ins ection on March 15-31, 1988 Re orts No. 50-315/88013(DRS);
No, 50-316/88015 DRS d.i p
implementation of Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of equipment classification, vendor interface, post maintenance testing and reactor trip system reliability.
Closed TI2515/64RI and TI2515/91.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
804150053 880411 PDR ADGCK 05000315 G
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Persons Contacted DETAILS Princi le Licensee Em lo ees
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M; Smith, Plant Manager Blind, Assistant Plant Manager Svensson, Licensing Activities Coordinator Kroeger, Manager, guality Assurance, AEPSC Rutkowski, Assistant Plant Manager, Production DeLong, I8C Production Control Super visor Hueter, guality Assurance Beilman, Superintendent, IKC Postlewait, Superintendent, Technical Engineering Clark, Superintendent, AOR Ross, Superintendent, Computer Sciences Krause, I8C Production Control Sampson, Superintendent, S8A Yount, Office Administration Supervisor Cleaves, Document Control Supervisor Barker, equality Assurance Hovath, Site guality Assurance Supervisor McElligott, equality Assurance Wyckoff, I8C Production Control Toth, Nuclear Safety and Licensing AEPSC Powell, Maintenance Training Coordinator Wizner, Maintenance Production Control Wiederwax, Supervisor, guality Control West, Shift Technical Advisor Brennan, Document Control Bolinger, NPRDS Coordinator Baker, Superintendent, Operations Brown, Computer Sciences 2.
- Denotes those persons attending exit interview.
TI 2515/64RI (Closed, TI 2515/91 Closed a ~
E ui ment Classification The inspector selected four components from the reactor trip system (RTS) and ten components from the containment spray system (CS) for examination during this inspection.
The components selected were:
RTS CS Reactor Trip Breaker I-52-RTA Manual Trip Switch Gripper Assembly Power Supply Trip Relays CS Pump I-PP-9E CS Pump Motor CS Pump Motor Breaker Valve IMO-202
Valve IMO-222 Checkvalve CTS-103W Level Switch ILS-201 Flow Transmitter IF-220 Valve IMO-210 For the selected components, the inspector performed the following reviews:
(2)
(3)
(4)
The Cook plant is replacing their hard copy safety-related component list (N-LIST) with a computerized data base listing of plant components.
The inspector reviewed AEPSC procedure GP 2.7 "D.C. Cook Plant Facility Data Base".
The procedure assigns responsibilities for'activities affecting the data base, provides for classification of components, systems and structures and controls 'access to the data base.
Each component selected by the inspector was properly classified in the data base.
In addition, the inspector reviewed job orders, maintenance and test procedures, surveillance procedures, modification packages, drawings and procurement procedures to determine whether activities involving safety-related components were properly classified as safety-related activities.
No improperly classified activities were identified for those components included in the review.
To determine the level of plant management oversight the inspector reviewed plant procedures controlling maintenance, modifications, procurement and issue, inspection and testing of safety-related items, quality assurance procedures, audits and surveillance activities, and AEPSC level procedures for activities impacting safety-related structures, systems and components.
Equipment classification is controlled by AEPSC procedure GP 3.2
"Control and Maintenance of the D.C.
Cook Nuclear Plant N-LIST" and GP 2.7 "D.C. Cook Plant Facility Data Base".
These procedures establish the responsibilities for the determination of safety classifications for plant structures, systems and components.
The inspector reviewed approved procedures issued.by corporate and plant management for procurement, maintenance, modifications, inspection, testing and surveillance. activities affecting safety-related structures, systems and components.
The inspector reviewed procedures established to control the tr aining and indoctrination of personnel performing activities affecting safety-related equipment.
Included in the review were procedures for training maintenance and 18C personnel, staff engineers, and quality personnel.
In addition, the
inspector reviewed personnel training and indoctrination records to verify that the required training was being accomplished.
(6)
The inspector reviewed 15 audit reports and 22 surveillance inspection reports documenting guality Assurance activities involving safety-related structures, systems and components.
The (}uality Assurance organization maintains a schedule of planned audits and surveillances for safety-related activities at the facility.
(7)
. The corrective action program for safety-related equipment is described in the guality Assurance procedures.
The inspector's review of corrective action for audit and surveillance inspection findings revealed that the corrective actions for those findings were timely and adequate.
(8)
Review and evaluation of information concerning malfunctioning of equipment is controlled by the licensee's nonconformance and deficiency control program.
Equipment malfunctions are reviewed by management and engineering to determine whether an identical replacement could be expected to perform reliably.
(9)
The inspector reviewed seven modifications involving the reactor trip system and the containment spray system.
The modification packages, job orders, and drawings were clearly identified as to their safety classification.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Vendor Interface The inspector reviewed the licensee's corporate and in-plant procedures established to assure that vendor information for safety-related components is current and complete.
Although procedures are in place and controls over vendor information has been established, less than half of the 6400 manuals identified by the licensee have been reviewed according to the licensee's procedures.
This area will be examined during a future inspection
.after the licensee's vendor information controls have been fully implemented (50-315/88013-01; 50-316/88015-01).
The inspector reviewed vendor recommended modifications on the RTS breakers.
The modifications were the modification to automatically activate the shunt trip and the modification to ensure that on-line functional testing of the reactor trip system can be performed.
Post modification test results indicated that the modifications functioned according to design requirements.
The licensee's procedures controlling maintenance, modifications, and the document control procedures pertaining to vendor technical information were reviewed.
The procedures were determined to be adequate to control replacement of equipment in situations where
.a vendor goes out of business or will not supply adequate information to the plan The licensee is participating in the INPO Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS)
and Nuclear Utility Task Action Cormittee (NUTAC).
The inspector determined that procedures were in place to require periodic survei llances of safety-related vendors.
Reporting of deficiencies has been proceduralized and during the inspection, the licensee initiated procedure revisions to enhance the controls relative to NPRDS and SEE-IN participation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Post Maintenance Testin The inspector selected two RTS breakers, one containment spray pump and two valves for review to verify that the licensee was implementing a post maintenance test program.
For the selected components, the inspector determined the following:
( 1)
The licensee has procedures and checklists controlling post maintenance testing and surveillances.
The inspector reviewed completed job orders involving preventive or corrective maintenance that demonstrated that the required post maintenance testing, surveillance testing or component functional testing was being performed.
(2)
Criteria and responsibilities for maintenance approval for designating maintenance activities as safety-related have been established in job order initiation procedures and modification.
procedures.
Post maintenance test inspection is controlled by quality procedures and established inspection hold points.
(3)
Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance of safety-related components have been developed and are delineated in published technical staff procedures, operator surveillance procedures, and I&C and maintenance surveillance procedures.
(4)
The inspector reviewed completed job orders and supporting documentation retrieved from the document control system.
The documentation contained approvals of job orders, the identity of the persons who performed the activity and the identities of persons who performed the inspections and reviews.
(5)
The inspector verified that the licensee was performing survei llances of the shunt trip attachment by review of completed surveillance procedures and surveillance inspection reports for both RTS trains.
(6)
Yerification that the licensee was independently testing the ability to manually trip the RTS breakers through the use of either the undervoltage trip attachment or the shunt trip
- attachment was accomplished by reviewing completed surveillance procedure/checklists and surveillance inspection reports.
No violations or deviations were identifie d.
Reactor Tri S stem Reliabilit The inspector verified that the licensee has established a preventive maintenance and surveillance program for the reactor trip breakers.
Procedure 12MHP5021.082.023,
"Maintenance Inspection and Repair Procedure for Westinghouse Type DB-50 Air Circuit Breakers Installed as Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers",
includes periodic maintenance, lubrication, UVTA and shunt trip force measurements, housekeeping and other activities recommended by the manufacturer.
Monthly functional testing performed on each reactor trip breaker using procedures TMP430STP410/411 tests trip'logic and breaker trip response time.
Manual trips are tested at each refueling outage.
The inspector's review of trend reports verified that the required trending was being performed.
The licensee has established a program for replacement of reactor trip breaker components based on life cycle testing performed by the manufacturer.
Both the undervoltage trip attachment and the shunt trip attachment are to be replaced at 1250 cycles of operation.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted under Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection and suomarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.