IR 05000313/1979010
| ML19249B317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1979 |
| From: | Johnson W, Spangler R, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19249B297 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-79-10, 50-368-79-10, NUDOCS 7909040263 | |
| Download: ML19249B317 (13) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report Nos.
50-313/79-10 50-368/79-10 Docket NO.
50-313 License No. DPR-51 50-36S NPF-6 Licensee:
Arkansas Power and Light Company P.O. Box 551 Little Rock, Arkansas 72203 Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted : May 14-June 17, 1979 Inspectors:
_ __
7e[tu[A
/h
7f N
D. Johnson, Reactor Inspect 6r Date
_
yrh h
/Yf 1., G. Spangler, Reactor Inspector b }Yd dl
&~
7f' 7f
/
G. H. Verduzco, Reactor Inspe'c ar Date
-
U _'
'
hb
_ =
-
E. A. cupp, Reactor in pector Date
--
}fLL 7h
?
-
T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Date Section 79c9 040 M OU'E
2.
Approved by j e /< o d 7[r/7f_
T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor projects Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection conducted during period of May 14-June 17, 1979 (Report No. 50-313/79-10)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of previously identified inspection items, licensee actions in response to IE Bulletins, design changes, system testing, and physical barriers.
The inspection involved 266 inspector-hours on-site by five (5) NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the five areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was identified (inf raction physical barrier, paragraph 12).
Inspection conducted during period of May 14-June 17, 1979 JReportNo. 50-368/79-10
-
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of previously identified inspection items, licensee actions in response to IE Bulletins, and physical barriers.
The inspection involved 79 inspector-hours on-site by three (3)
NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the three areas inspected Lwo items of noncompliance identified (infraction - failure to adhere to procedare, paragraphs were 2 and 10; and inf raction physical barrier, paragraph 12).
Od1. O[{,']
3.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Arkansas Power & Light,_Compnay Employees J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO General Manager G. H. Miller, Engineering & Technical Support Manager L. Alexander, QC Engineer B. A. Baker, Operations Superintendent T. N. Cogburn, Nuclear Engineer E. C. Ewing, Plant Engineering Superintendent P. Jones, Maintenance Superintendent B. A. Terwilliger, Operations and Maintenance Manager Robertson, ANO-1 Operations Supervisor s.
S. Petzel, Licer ing Engineer F. Foster, Plan +. Administrative Manager M. Stroud, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent R. Elde;, I & C Supervisor R. Tucker, Electrical Engineer J. McWilliams, Planning & Scheduling Supervisor R. Beta, QA Engineer J. Vandergrift, Training Supervisor T. Green, Training Coordinator D. Trimble, Licensing Mariger F. Boswell, Safety and Fire Prevention Coordinator C. Shively, Plant Performance Engineer C. IIalbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor J. Ray, QC Inspector J. Albers, Planning and Scheduling Coordinator The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians and administrative personnel.
2.
Foilowup on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (368/79-09-02) - February, 1979, test data for 2104.05, Supplement 3, could not be located.
<- -; -,.o 7 o 6 / \\ } ie.,. M f u t
4.
The licensee has determined that this data was not rettined.
OP 1004.12B requires that surveillance test data sheets be maintained in the plant records.
Technical Specification 6.10.1.d states.that records of surveill nce activities required by the technical specifi-cations be retained for ai Icast five years.
Thus the failure to retain the ::bove data sheet constitutea an item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
(Closed) Open Item (313/79-07-07) - Discrepancies in operating procedures.
All of the discrepancies listed undor this open item have been corrected through procedure changes.
(Closed) ^ pen Item (313/79-07-01) - Fire extinguisher inspection.
The fire extinguisher in question (/!24) had been inspected by the Universal Fire Equipment Company as required in March, April and May, 1979.
(Closed) Open Item (313/79-09-03) - Addition of valves installed under DCR 589 to Attachment B and C valve lineup sheets of 1104.29.
The new valves have been added to a new Attachment F of OP 1104.29, Rev. 4, PC4.
(Closed) Open Item (313/79-09-04) - Revision of job order form.
F.evision 2 of OP 1004.14 included as new job order form which provides for specification of all pre-maintenance and post-maintenance requirements and for verification that these requirements are met.
(Closed) Open Item (313/79-09-09) Emergency Feedwater Operating Procedure OP 1106.06 has been revised to satisfy the concern of this open item.
.
(Closed) Open Item (313/79-09-12) Startup Procedure OP 1102.02 has been revised (Rev 6, PC-2) to include veri fication that the hydrogen purge system is ali ;ned.
f (Closed) Open Item (313/79-09-15) - Closing pump room doors when the recirculation phase of post-LOCA cooling is initiated.
Revision 4, PC-1 and PC-2 added the necessary steps to emergency procedure 1202.06.
i e
-
5.
(Open) Open Item (368/79-09-04) - Same as above item 313/79-09-15.
The corresponding Unit 2 procedure, 2202.06, has not yet been re-vised to include this step at the appropriate time.
3.
Continued Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Eatletin 79-05A(Unit 1)
_
On-site Inspection of Engineered Safety F_eatures a.
The inspector examined piping and instrument diagrams of the following systems, identifying valves in critical flow paths:
Reactor Building Cooling System Penetration Room Ventilation System Ilydrogen Purge System Emergency Feedwater IIPI LPI Core Flooding Service Water Diesel G_nerator Fuel Oil Reactor Building Spray Diesel Generator Air Start The position of valves in these critical flow paths was determined by direct inspection.
Further, the position of electrical breakers serving valves and inunps in critic,1 flow paths wr; determined.
At this time, valves and circuit breakers were positioned consistent with the plants mode of operation (cold shutdown, decay heat removal system in operation.)
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
I.
b.
Emergency Procedure Walkthrough The inspector walked through the steps of the following emergency procedures:
Procedure #
Title 1202.05 Degraded Power 1202.06 Loss of RC or RC Pressure 1202.14 Loss of RCS flow 1202.26 Loss of OTSG Feed 1202.23 OTSG Tube Rupture I
1106.06 Emergency FW Pump Operation T'
t, c,:y,..,,-
U N r% cl Q &
6.
As a result of the above the inspector identified the following open items:
(1)
In procedure 1202.23 step 3.7 delete the reference to Valve CV-6671 (313/79-10-01).
'
(2) To procedure 1106.06 (valve lineup attachment), add the requirement tha'. the turbine governer valve be manually latched. The licensee made the required procedure change during the period of this inspection.
c.
Audit of Unit 1 Operators An audit of the Unit 1 Operators was conducted by a team made up of one I & E Inspector and one NRR Operator Licensing Branch person to determine the adequacy of the ANO training program following the TMI event.
A total of 9 licensed personnel were audited.
Four of these were oeniot II r-ad a,~'r.-tar and five were licensed operators.
The:se ope * ators were selected at randum and all were regularly assigned shif t personnel with the exception of one staf f supervisor.
The craas of the audit included the fc] lowing:
..
TMI Accident Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident
.. TMI Related Design Changes
.
. TMI Related Procedure Changes
. Operation of the Emergency Feedwater System The audit was conducted by oial questioning and by walk through on May 22, 1979.
Approximately 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> were spent with ca. i operator.
The results of this audit indicated that two licensed operators were deficient in the areas of design changes and procedure changes.
It was indicated that both of these individuals had been on days of f just prior to the audit and therefore had been given minimum time to review ongoing procedure and design changes.
Also neitner of these individuals had reraived the TMI simulator t ra in ing.
Each of these operators has s..cc received additional TMI training, including a trip to the B & W simulator, and has ruccessrully passed a licensee administered written exam with a grade of greater than 90 per cent.
The effectiveness of the licensee's training program will continue OOl'CCy
7.
to be observed by the I & E resident inspector.
No further audits of licensed operators are planned prior to Unit 1 start-up.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Review of Design Changes Associated with the Commission Order of May 17, 1979 (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed the following documents associated with items a and c of part IV of the Commission order to AP&L dated May 17, 1979, and with enclosure one of AP&L's letter to H.
Denton, Director NRR, dated May 11, 1979.
AIDCR l-79-19 Autostart of P7B
- BWR 1-79-176 Installation of the circuit for IDCR l-79-19
- JO 5448c I&C IDCR 1-79-22 P7B autostart alarm IDCR 1-79-15 Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip or Main FW Pumps Tripped EWR 1-79-175 Circuit Inutallation for IDCR 1-79-15 JO 7310 I & C functional tests circuit utilizing test approved in IDCR 1-79-15H.
DCR 79-1023 Installation of orifice plates and flow instrumentation for EFW.
BhR 1-79-80 Test of EFW flow transmitters and indication utilizing test apprcved as DCR 79-1025H.
At the inspector's request the licensee performed additional testing to verify the override of an autostart signal if the P7B handswitch is in pull-to-lock.
No other items of concern were identified and the above design changes appear to have been properly implemented and teri d.
5.
Operabi!ity_ Test of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Motor Driven
_
Pup from Vital Power (Unit I)
The inspector observed tests conducted on May 20, 1979, to demon-strate the capability of being able to make the manual alignment of the EFW motor driven pump to vital power within 5 minutes.
The tests were conducted in accordance with Work Plan Number 75 which incorporated the normal actual procedural steps.
VIDCR Interium Design Change Request
- BWR Bechtel Work Request
- JO Job Order c,,,,, e..,.
s> 'b % * / Ca g,
8.
Two tests were made.
The results of the first st were in-complete due to a feature built into the new automatic start design of the EFW motor driven pump which required an additional manual switching operation not previously included in the emer-gency procedure. The second test run was completed in 2 minutes and 36 seconds.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Feed iater Pump Turbine Overspeed Trip Test (Unit I)
The inspector witnessed portions of the overspeed test of the EFWP Turbine which was conducted on June 1, 1979, and verified that the minimue crew requirements were met, that test prerequisites were completed, tcat the tachometer used was in calibration, that the required data was recorded and that the test procedure (OP 1106.06 Supplement 5, Revision 3, PC-3) was available and in use by test personnel.
The inspector also verified the qual-ifications of two of the test personnel and reviewed the test results.
No items of noncompliance were identified, but the inspector made the following observations:
The procedure requires that one steam trap bypass valve be a.
opened (MS-20D).
The operator used an additional steam trap bypass valve also.
The procedure should be revised to include the use of both bypass valves if such is desirable.
(0 pen Item 313/79-10-02).
b.
Yellow and magenta tape was observed to be on the floor around the emergency feedwater pumps.
Its meaning was not clear since there were no step off pads or signs an1 personnel freely crossed the line. (0 pen Item 313/79-10-03).
c.
When one of the steam trap bypass valves is opened, steam enters the P711 motor, especially when the room cooler is not operating. (Open item 313/79-10-04).
d.
The support for the P7B discharge line appeared to be in-operable.
(0 pen item 313/79-10-05).
c s.mo eJ \\ a i%.
E
9.
7.
Operating Procedure 1203.12 (Unit I)
This procedure, which provides operator guidance for response to annunciators was found to be outdated for Annunciator K-11, Panel A-1, SLBIC Trouble.
The inspector expressed concern that
<ther portions of this procedure may also need revision, in view of the recent design changes involving annunciators.
(0 pen Item 313/79-10-06).
8.
Apparent Drawing Error (Unit 1)
The inspector pointed out to the Plant Engineering Superintendent that drawings M402 sheet 3 of 4, Rev 7 and M204, Rev 20c appear to be outdated with respect to the handswitches which contro!
CV-2813 and CV-2814 Corrective action was initiated.
(0 pen item 313/79-10-07).
9.
Followup on Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletin 79-05B (Unit 1)
a.
IE Bulletin 79-05B, Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island-Supplement, was issued to operators of nuclear plants with Babcock and Wilcox pressurized water reactors on April 21, 1979.
AP&L's response to this bulletin was provided in a letter dated May 4, 1979.
The inspectors reviewed this response upon receipt to confirm the validity of the licensee's review of the bulletin.
b.
The inspectors performed on site observations and inspections to verify the implementation of the licensee's commitments in his letter of May 4, 1979.
Specific points verified included the following:
(1) The licensta's emergency procedures have been revised to include detailed methods for establishing and maintaining natural circulation flow.
(2) The licensee has added appropriate caution notes to the emergency procedures concerning overriding cagineered safeguards features (ESF).
(3) Emergency procedures have been revised to specify the conditions under which High Pressure Injection (IIPI)
may be secured.
o uw(? 'z r\\
rvi:
~
10.
(4) The licensee has developed a procedure to aid in recognizing a spurious actuation of ESF and to provide for its orderly termination.
(5) The licensee's emergency procedures have been revised to address the problem of a decreasing pressurizer level if cold water is injected into the steam generators to raise the level prior to initiating r.atural circulation.
(6) The licensee's emergency proceduras have been revised to give consideration to +.he loss of all feedwater flow while in the natural circulation mode.
(7) The licensee's procedures consider the reactor vessel pressure / temperature limitations as a limiting factor for continued HPI operation.
(8) While in cold shutdown, the licensee changed the elec-tromatic relief valve setpoint from 2255 to 2450 psig and changed the high pressure reactor trip setpoint from 2355 to 2300 psig.
(9) The licensee's procedures provide guidance and anti-cipated instrument response and annunciation for:
a.
loss of main feedwater b.
turbine trip c.
Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure d.
low steam generator level f.
low pressurizer level (10) The licensee has installed a control grade reactor trip which will actuate upon loss of main feedwater pumps or up,n a turbine tcip.
(11) Emergency procedures have been revised to require a man'.:
'
reactor trip upon the closure of a MSIV.
(12) The license. has not incorporated a procedural requirement for a reactor trip upon a loss of offsite power.
Od$[0
.
11.
(13) Emergency procedures require that the reactor be tripped if steam generator level falls to 15 inches.
(14) The licensee has not incorporated a procedural require-ment for a reactor trip upon low pressurizer level, unless pressurizer level continues to fall, exhibiting loss of coolant accident conditions.
(15) The licensee has made the necessary procedure changes to provide for early NRC notification of serious events.
Standing Order number 36 provides for a continuous com-munication channel with the NRC.
(16) The licensee provided a proposed design for safety grade anticipatory reactor trips on loss of main feedwater and/or on turbine trip by letter dated May 21, 1979.
(17)
In response to this bulletin, the licensee submitted Technical Specification change proposals on 4/24, 6/6, and 6/8/79.
(18) The licensee has provided operator training in the revised procedures.
Through discussions with operators, the inspector confirmed that they had been instructed in the new/ revised procedures and that they understand the available techniques for determining the margin to saturation.
10.
Review of Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletin 79-06H (Unit 2)
a.
Emergency Procedure Review
.he inspector reviewed selected emergency proce '
to verify compliance with IEB 79-06B.
The followin-rocedures were reviewed:
OP 220'.01, PC-2, Rev 0 5/17/79 Load Rejection OP 2202.02, PC-2, Rev 0 5/17/79 Blackout OP 2202.03, PC-3, Rev 0 5/17/79 Turbine Trip OP 2202.04, PC-3, Rev 0 5/30/79 Reactor Turbine Trip OP 2202.05, PC-1, Rev 1 5/17/79 Degraded Power OP 2202.06, PC-9, Rev 0 5/30/79 Loss of Reactor Coolant OP 2202.08,(draft) Rev 1 5/1/79 Inadvertent SIAS OP 2202.23, PC-4, Rev 0 5/30/79 Steam Generator Tube Rupture OP 2202.26, PC-2, Rev 0 5/30/79 Loss of S/G Feed OdMO lf,
.
12.
The inspector noted that procedure number OP 2202.06 (Case I)
was deficient in the following areas:
1.
Case I description should read, rupture greater than HPSI capacity (vice greater than charging capacity).
2.
Procedure step 3.1 should require that 1 RCP/ Loop remain in operation until LPSI is established.
3.
A step should be added requiring operator to monitor margin to saturation and maintain at least 50 F subcooling.
4.
Procedure step 3.2 should require that operator use pressurizer pressure in addition to pressurizer level in his decision to secure IIPSI.
A licensee representative indicated that the above changes would be incorporated into OP 2202.06. (0 pen Item 368/79-10-01)
Of those procedures reviewed, no other deficiencies were noted.
B.
Verification of ESF Valve Lineups On February 27, 1979, the inspector completed the verification of valve lineups for the SIAS and Reactor Building Spray system.
The Unit was in !! ode 3 and engaged in setting the t!ain Steam Safety Relief Valves.
During this verification the inspector found valve 2SI-5091-3, LPSI Header CV Bypass, to be unlocked and closed.
Prior to entering t! ode 3, procedure 2102.01, Plant Startup, PC-12 step 8.12 requires that the LPSI system be aligned per attachment H to 2104.40 and per the category E valve alignment sheet at.tached to procedure 2102.01.
Procedure step 2102.03 and the valve alignment sheets had all been initialed indicating that valve 2SI-5091-3 was in the locked closed position.
The shift supervisor could determine no reason for the <>ff-normal valve alignment and the valve was then positioned to the locked open position as required by procedures. The inspector determined that despite the above misatigned valve there was an operable flow path for LPSI at all times.
From discussions with operations management personnel it appears that despite the initialed pro-cedure steps valve 2SI-5091-3 was never properly positioned according to procedures upon entering ?! ode 3.
Technical Specifi-cation 6.8.1.a through Rcgulatory Guide 1.33 requires that pro-cedures for aligning emergency core cooling systems be implemented and folloved.
The failure to properly position valve 2SI-5091-3
<.3.
m n n
$sJ
13.
according to procedures prior to entering ttode 3 on February 26, 1979, constitutes en item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
During the review of this incident the inspector found that no consistent method for filing completed system valve lineups exists.
Completed valve lineup sheets may be filed with the startup procedure in the administrative office area or they may be left in a notebook in the Shift Supervisors Offict depending on the individuals involved.
This leads to out-of-date valve line-ups filed in the control room area.
The assistant operations Super-intendent agreed to review and resolve the above. Toward the end of this inspection period, a revised standing order concerning valve liaeups was issued.
Its implementation C 11 be reviewed during a future inspection.
(open item (368/79-10-02).
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Exit Meetings Exit meetint;s were conducted at the end of various segments of this inspection with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (General flanager) and other members of the AP&L staf f.
c.s
<> U) <.l. t, x a
.-
.< n