IR 05000309/1982005
| ML20054M417 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1982 |
| From: | Gallo R, Gray E, Swetland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054M396 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-82-05, 50-309-82-5, NUDOCS 8207130167 | |
| Download: ML20054M417 (15) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ -
-_-_-_
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Docket No. 50309-820309 50309-820324 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50309-820325 50309-820326
REGION I
50309-820401 50309-820409 Report No. 82-05 Docket No.
50-309 License No. DPR-36
_ Priority
--
Category C
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Wiscasset, Maine Inspection conducted: March 23 - May 3, 1982 Inspector:
k fo(L f
2B/ 8'2_.
P. Swetland, Resident Inspector date signed
~
~
(--.
5/2.8l8't_
f E.H. Gray,Reactogspector date signed Approved by:
k 6) 2 B f 82_
R. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. lA, DPRP Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 23 - May 3, 1982 (Report No. 50-309/82-05)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspector and one Region I inspector (76 hours8.796296e-4 days <br />0.0211 hours <br />1.256614e-4 weeks <br />2.8918e-5 months <br />). Areas inspected included the Control Room, j
Turbine Building, Primary Auxiliary Building, Spray Building, Auxiliary Feed Pump Room and the Reactor Containment.
Activities / Records inspected included Plant Opera-tions, Radiation Protection, Physical Security, Maintenance, followup of previous inspection findings, followup on Licensee Event Reports and followup on events occurring during the inspection.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations were identified in four areas.
Violations, iricluding licensee identified violations, are discussed in the following paragraphs: Detail 2.b.; 3.g.; 9.a.; 9.b.; 9.c.; 9.d.; 9.e.
r207130167 820615 PDR ADOCK OEOO309
'
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _.
f
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Arsenault, Operations Department Head J. Brinkler, Technical Support Department Head R. Forrest, Fire Protection Coordinator J. Hebert, Director, Plant Engineering B. Hoyt, Security Supervisor R. Lawton, Director, Operational Quality Assurance W. Paine, Assistant to the Plant Manager R. Prouty, Maintenance Department Head E. Wood, Plant Manager The inspectors also interviewed several plant operators, technicians and members of the engineering and administrative staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Violation (309/81-13-02) Licensee to report main steam safety valve surveillance failure data. The licensee's corrective action for this item included issuance of Licensee Event Report (LER) 81-09 and modification of surveillance procedure 5-5, Main Steam Safety Valve Testing and Setting, Revision 5.
This revised procedure incorporates expanded acceptance criteria for separate determination of valve operability and adequacy of setpoint drift which was necessitated by the fact that the + 10 psi setpoint tolerance may be exceeded without exceeding the ASME code opera-bility requirement of 1055 psig. The inspector reviewed procedure 5-5-1, Revision 7, dated March 12, 1982 and the licensee's memo dated January 11, 1982, describing the safety valve operability criteria.
LER 81-09 was reviewed in Region I inspection report 50-309/81-14. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
.
b.
(0 pen) Violation (309/81-14-02) Failure to identify nonconforming status of Component Cooling Water seismic support. The licensee's response to this violation (FMY 81-138) dated September 11, 1981
.
_ _ _ _
-_
- __
-
-_______ __ ___
_______-__
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
stated that since a final inspection of the subject system had not been completed and the system had not been placed in service it could not be stated with certainty that the nonconformances would not have been identified and corrected. This response further stated that the nonconformances had been corrected (including removal of the temporary shim) and that the final inspection and system acceptance had been accomplished. Tne system has been in service since July 1981. On April 27, 1982 the inspector reviewed the installation of the subject support.
EDCR 80-45 had been revised to reflect the installed bolting material and the missing welds had been installed.
However the temporary shim was still in place allowing no gap between the pipe and support. The approved installation sketch (EDCR 80-45-13) requires a 1/16 inch clearance between the pipe and support.
The inspector brought this nonconformance to the attention of the plant cognizant engineer on April 27, 1982. He indicated that the installing contractor told him that the previously identified deficiencies had been corrected and that the system final inspection was not detailed enough to identify the continuing nonconformance of the support.
An engineering evaluation of the existing condition of the support
.
was performed by the licensee on April 28, 1982.
It was determined I
that the existing condition of the support did not adversely affect the seismic response of the system, however it was later decided to adjust the pipe gap by installation of permanent shims. The inspector will review documentation of this evaluation
,
and completion of corrective actions in a subsequent inspection (309/82-05-01).
10 CFR 50, Appendix B requires, in Criterion V, safety-related systems to be installed in accordance with approved drawings; and in Criterion XVI, nonconformances to be identified and corrected.
The Maine Yankee Quality Assurance Program endorses these criteria.
On April 30, 1982, the inspector informed the plant manager that the failure to correct the installation of this Secondary Component Cooling System pipe support as committed in the licensee's response to the NRC, dated September 11, 1981, was a violation.
(309/82-05-02)
The inspector stated that the licensee's response to the original violation was incorrect in that the temporary shim had not been removed.
The licensee stated that his response was based on the verbal information supplied by the contractor, to the plant cognizant engineer.
The inspector stated that the licensee is responsible for those fuc.ctions performed by licensee contractors and for verification and timely completion of corrective actions. Had the actual condition of this support been stated, the NRC would have required further justifi-cation to determine the operability of this system under all postulated conditions. The licensee's erroneous response constitutes a violation.
(309/82-05-03)
.
_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _. _. _ _ _. _. _
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
c.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (309/81-24-01) Licensee to perform seismic analysis of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger modification. The licensee forwarded the finalized calulations and documentation pertaining to this seismic analysis to NRC Region I.
The analysis was reviewed to verify the validity of the methodology and the accuracy of the calculation. The inspect.,r concluded that the integrity of the safety class 3 boundar;f has been maintained. No further inadequacies were identified.
d.
(Closed) Followup Item (309/82-01-03) Licensee to complete actions required by Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 82-12. The CAL resulted from the identification during maintenance of significant corrosion of steam generator primary side manway studs. The licensee replaced all the studs on the affected manway and removed and tested the studs on remaining manways.
Inspection of the manway flexitallic gaskets and the gasket retaining plates had shown that the retaining plate out-side diameter was greater than the inside diameter of the manway opening.
This created a metal-to-metal contact between the manway, the retaining plate and the steam generator. The gasket was not adequately compressed.
The licensee machined the replacement retaining plates to reestablish the specified gasket fit. The stud testing identified no evidence of cracking nor was there any indication of variation from the design mate-rial hardness. All the manways were reassembled. The measured manway cover gaps indicated adequate gasket compression. On March 26, 1982 the. inspector observed the operational pressure testing of the reactor coolant system.
No leakage was identified from any of the steam gener-ator manways. The inspector determined that.the licensee haa completed the actions required by CAL 82-12.
3.
Review of Plant Operations - Plant Inspections The inspector reviewed plant operation through direct observation through-out the reporting period. As noted below, conditions were found to be in compliance with the following licensee documents:
Maine Yankee Technical Specifications
--
--
Maine Yankee Technical Data Book
--
Maine Yankee Fire Protection Program
--
Maine Yankee Radiation Protection Program
.
--
Maine Yankee Tagging Rules Administrative and Operating Procedures
--
a.
Instrumentation Control room process instruments were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with Technical Specification requirements.
No unacceptable conditions were identifie.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
b.
Annunciator Alarms The inspector observed various alarm conditions which had been received and acknowledged.
These conditions were discussed with shift personnel who were knowledgeable of the alarms and actions required. Operator response was verified to be in accordance with procedure 2-100-1, Response to Panalarms, Revision 4, dated June 1979.
During plant inspections, the inspector observed the condition of equipment associated with various alarms. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
c.
Shift Manning The operating shifts were observed to be staffed to meet the opera-ting requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 5, both to the number of type of licenses.
Control room and shift manning were observed to be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.
d.
Radiation Protection Controls Radiation Protection control areas were inspected.
Radiation Work Permits in use were reviewed, and compliance with those documents, as to protective clothing and required monitoring instruments, was inspected.
Proper posting and control of radiation and high radia-tion. areas was reviewed in addition to verifying requirements for wearing of appropriate personnel monitoring devices. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
e.
Plant Housekeeping Controls Storage of material and components was observed with respect to prevention of fire and safety hazards.
Plant housekeeping was evaluated with respect to controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination. There were no unacceptable conditions identified.
f.
Fire Protection / Prevention The inspector examined the condition of selected pieces of fire fighting equipment. Combustible materials were being controlled and were not found near vital areas.
Selected cable penetrations were examined and fire barriers were found intact.
Cable trays were clear of debris.
No abnormal conditions were identified.
g.
Control of Equipment During plant inspections, selected equipment under safety tag control was examined.
Except as follows, equipment conditions were consistent with information in plant control logs.
-
. -
-
- -.
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
On April 16, 1982, the inspector reviewed tag control sheet LC0 82-321. The primary drain system and the boron recovery system were being modified to provide pipe stubs for connection of a temporary waste processing facility. These systems are described in the Final Safety Analysis Report drawings 9-7-2 and 9-2-1, respectively. The system alterations were performed as approved by maintenance request (MR) 872-82.
Licensee measures to control modifications to zhe facility and to insure compliance with 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B are included in the Maine Yankee Quality Assurance Manual.
Quality Assurance procedure 0-01-1 requires a plant alteration request (including a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59) to be approved prior to modification of any system that could result in the release of radioactive gas or liquid. Although MR 872-82 was reviewed by the Plant Engineering and Operational Quality Assurance Departments, no plant alteration request was generated and no 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed.
Subsequent to the completion of MR 872-82, a Plant Alteration (PA8-82) was drafted by the licensee, reviewed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and approved.
The inspector discussed the matter with the Assistant Operations Department Head and the Plant Senior Mechanical Engineer on April 19,1982 and with the Plant Manager on April 30, 1982. The inspector noted that failure to control modifications to the facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and the Maine Yankee Quality Assurance Manual is a violation.
(309/82-05-04) The inspector also noted that a similar violation occurred in April 1981. The previous violation is documented in Region I inspectinn report 50-309/81-12.
.
h.
Equipment Lineups The inspector verified by observation of the Main Control Board and by inspections in the Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feed Pump Rooms and in the Spray and Turbine Buildings that the major valve and switch positions were correct to insure operability of the Safety Injection System, the Safety Injection Accumulator, Containment Spray, Auxiliary Feedwater, and the Emergency Diesel Generators.
i.
Containment Inspection The inspector reviewed licensee preparations for entry into containment and accompanied licensee personnel on an inspection inside containment during an operational pressure / leak test on March 26, 1982. No abnormal conditions were identified.
4.
Review of Plant Operations - Logs and Records During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed operating logs and records covering the inspection time period against Technical Specifications and Administrative Procedure Requirements.
Included in the review were:
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
Control Room Log
- daily during control room surveillance Jumper and Lifted Leads Log
- all active entries Maintenance Requests and Job Orders - all active entries Safety Tag Log
- all active entries Plant Recorder Traces
- daily during control room surveillance Plant Process Computer Printed
- daily during control room surveillance Output Night Orders
- daily during control room surveillance The logs and records were reviewed to verify that entries are properly made and communicate equipment status / deficiencies; records are being reviewed by management; operating orders do not conflict with the Technical Specifications; logs detail no violations of Technical Specification or reporting requirements; logs and records are maintained in accordance with Technical Specification and Administrative Control Procedure requirements.
Several entries in these logs were the subject of additional review and discussions with licensee personnel.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
'
5.
Observation of Physical Security The resident inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified, during regular and off-shift hours, that the selected aspects of the security plan were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physical security plans and approved procedures including:
--
Maine Yankee Security Plan, dated October 1979
--
15-1, Security Organization and Responsibilities, Revision 6, April 1980
--
15-2, Security Force Duties, Revision 9, February 1981
--
15-3, Plant Personnel Security, Revision 9, February 1981
--
15-7, Access Authorization and Control, Revision 1, April 1981
--
15-8, Protected Area Entry / Exit Control, Revision 1, September 1980 a.
Physical Protection Security Organization
--
Observations and personnel interviews indicated that a full time member of the security organization with authority to
<
direct physical security actions was present, as required.
_ _
_
_
__
-
--
.
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
--
Manning of all three shifts on various days was observed to be as required.
b.
Physical Barriers Selected barriers in the protected area, access controlled area, and the vital areas were observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed. Observations of truck and car searches were made.
c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made:
--
Identification, authorization and badging Access control searches
--
--
Escorting Communications
--
--
Compensatory measures when required No violations were identified.
6.
Observation of Maintenance
.
The inspector observed various maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with applicable codes and standards; required QA/QC involvement; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment and use of jumpers; appropriate personnel qualifications; proper radiological controls for worker protection; adequate fire protection; and appropriate retest requirements. The inspector also ascertained reportability as required by Technical Specifications.
The following documents were reviewed:
--
Maintenance Procedure 5-14-1, Steam Generator Closure Removal and Installation, Revision 9
--
Maintenance Requests 82-0550, 0584, 0587, 0626, 0653-0655, steam Generator Manway Inspection and Repair
--
Confirmatory Action letter 82-12 dated March 19, 1982 The inspector reviewed the removal and refitting of steam generator a.
primary manways during March 1982.
Several of the manway studs were stuck in the steam generators.
During extraction of one of these studs the threads in the stud hole were damaged. An engineer-
.
-
-
_
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
ing evaluation of the nonconformance by Combustion Engineering documented the adequacy of the manway strength without the contribu-tion of one stud.
The licensee dispositioned the nonconformance for interim operation pending restoration of the full thread strength at the next refueling outage.
Review of the licensee's procedure fcer installation of stum generator manways identified the specification of a high temperature nuclear grade lubricant for use on the manway studs. Molybdenum disulfide compounds fit this specification, however, breakdown of ~
this lubricant may produce a sulfurous material which could cause stress corrosion cracking of the studs under certain conditions.
Removal of residual lubricant for this application was specified in Confirmatory Action Letter 82-12.
The licensee committed to revise the specified stud lubricant.
Incorporation of this change in procedure 5-14-1 will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection.
(309/82-05-05)
7.
Shipment of Radioactive Materials Shipment records: Solidified Waste Drums Shipment No. 0482-257-A dated April 21, 1981.
Maine Yankee Procedure 9.1.15'Rev 8, Shipment of Radioactive Material.
The inspe.ctor verified that the shipment met Department of Transportation requirements for placarding and external dose limits.
Records show that proper notifications were made in accordance with procedure 9.1.15.
No violations were identified.
8.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The inspector reviewed the following LERs received in the RI office to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the
-
accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action.
'
The inspector also determined whether further information was required
.
from the licensee, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted on-site followup. The following LER's were reviewed:
--
82-10 Composite Vent Stack Sample System Tagged Out
--
82-11 LD-T-5 Wiring Error 82-12 Loss of Containment Integrity (80-57 & 59 Open)
--
--
82-13 Inadvertant Pressurizer Drain to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) while Shutdown
,
--
82-14 Failure to Station the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
i f
-
.
..
,
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
82-15 VP-A-5 Failed Type C Leak Check
,
..
--
82-16 Anchor Nut Missing on Safety Injection Actuation Relay.
'
--
i 9.
On Site Followup of'LERs
-
.
.
s During the site followup, the inspector verified that' reporting require-l'i s
ments of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide ~1.16 had been met,
.'
that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required,-and that continued operation of the s
facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits. The review included disccssions'with licensee personnel, review of PORC meeting V
s minutes, and applic.able logs. The following LERs were reviewed.
,-
s x
-
a.
82-11 LD-T-5 Wiring Error
)
him
'
y
-
On March 24, 1982, with the plant in cold shutdown for maintenance,
- ~. 5 :
the licensee identifled a wiring error while, troubleshooting a re-C;
-
ported malfunction of letdown isolation valve LD-T-5 LD-T-5 closes L
on actuation of the safety injection system, to dsolate letdown flow i
<
,
'^"
from the reactor coolant system.
In response,to NRC'IE Bulletin
@Q 80-06 the circuitry for LD-T-5 had nodified and tested in July 1981 to prevent this valve from r y upon reset of the safety T
injection signal.
During the Marc., M82 outage an unrelated modifi-
cation (Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) 82-08) was. installed-(.
and tested.
The installation drawings for EDCR 82-08 included s
drawing FE3DAC.
This drawing requ' ired modif,ication as a Eesult of n~
.
changes to the LD-T-5 circuitry installed.in July 1981.
Dr3Wngs J4 used by the licensee's engineering > support organ.ization fo M DCP s
.,
t 82-08 had not yet been updated to reflect the Bulletin 80-06 changes.
\\
Consequently, the drawings indicated spare tern'inbls where leads had been landed by the Bulletin 80-06 valve reset modification. During, s
~
the installation of EDCR 82-08, leads wer2/ landed on two tebniqals -
N
.
already in use and the installers did not determine the adequacy of installing multipla leads when instructions indicated a single lead f termination. Thisnonconformancewithdesignfrawingswa'snotf i
s i
identified by quality control inspections. The operatilna'l fes[ of EDCR 82-08 indicated the correct functional response. However,;
sinceEDCR82-08didnotreflectany[nterfacewithLD-T-5,thij valve was not tested. The effect of the wiring error was to ne' gate the anti-reset feature of LD-T-5. -The valve'would have closed on a e
safeguards signal and a redundant valve in the letdown path remained
'
fully operational during the entire period..The licensee subsequently corrected both the as-built wiring condition and the working drawings.
s s
-
,
The failure to use as-built drawings for safety related mcdifi
"
i cations and the failure to adequately evaluateN and disposition <
'
identified installation instruction discrepancies are licensee y
s identified violations of the Quality Assurance frogram.
The
~ ~
inspector will review the 1mplementation of the licensee's correc-tive action in a future inspection.
(309/82-05-06)
i
-
,
,
.,.
.
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
b.
82-12 Loss of Containment Integrity On March 26, 1982, during a plant heatup with reactor coolant temperature about 340'F, the licensee found that both isolation valves for the steam generator blowdown containment penetration were open. These valves, BD-57 and BD-59, are required to be locked closed to meet the containment integrity requirement of Technical Specification (TS) 3.11, whenever there is fuel in the reactor and coolant temperature is gr(ater than 210'F. The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding this event and ascertained the following:
Coritainment Integrity was established by valve lineup in
--
accordance with procedure 1-12-5, Establishment of Contain-ment Integrity, Revision 13. This line-up was performed over the period March 24-26, 1982.
BD-57 & 59 were checked closed sometime prior to 7:00 p.m. on March 24, 1982.
At 7:20 p.m., March 24, 1982, with reactor coolant temperature
--
less than 210'F, #3 Steam Generator (SG) was lined up to drain in accordance with procedure 1-19-5, Steam Generator Pumpdown,
'
Revision 2.
BD-57 and 59 were opened at this time. The proce-dure did not caution against opening containment isolation valves.
--
At 7:00 a.m., March 25, 1982, the licensee secured draining #3 SG but did not completely secure the line-up as provided in procedure 1-19-5.
As a result 8057 and BD59 remained open.
The working copy of the procedure was turned over to the on-coming shift for completion but was subsequently misplaced.
Plant heatup proceeded based on the March 24 verification.of
--
containment integrity and coolant temperature exceeded 210'F from 3:21 - 6:43 p.m. on March 25, and from 1:00 a.m. - 7:00 p.m.
on March 26, before the open containment penetration was identi-fied and closed.
The licensee identified and closed 80-57 at 7:00 p.m. March 26,
--
and at 8:00 p.m. identified and. closed BD-59. A complete reverification of containment integrity was completed by 2:00 a.m.,
March 27, 1982.
The resident inspector and NRC Operations center were notified
--
of the violation of containment integrity at 9:00 p.m.
March 26, 1982.
,
Other than valve locks, the licensee does not provide admini-
--
strative controls to insure that the line-up is maintained after the initial position check.
--
Operators routinely unlock and operate locked valves during shutdown conditions as directed by operating proceduras.
.
,
,I<
.
'
'
~>
,
.
.
r
'
.
('
{
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company'
' 1.2 b 'I
,
,
'
On April 2, 1982 the licens e fssued a memorandum to operating
'
personnel emphasizing the importance of adherance to operating.1
,
procedures. The inspector stated that the need for administrative
'
^
' controls for the manipulation of locked valves, especially during
>
, the establishment of conditions for which the valves are locked l
-
; would be unresolved pending the licensee's review.
(309/82-05-07)
i
,
The failure to comply with TS 3.11 is a licensee identified violation.
,
,
l-(3,09/82-05-11)
~
!
c."' 82-13 Inadvertent Pressurizer Drain to RWST While Shutdown d
r
,
j
,
On March 25, 19d2, the licensee reported that 5,000 gallons of reactor coolant had been inadvertantly drained from the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).
- The occurrence took place at 10:00 p.m. March 24, 1982.,During preparations for start-up with RCS temperatura and pressure at<!40'F r
and 280 psig, respectively, the licensee attempted to recirculate the safety injection piping.in order to equalize the boron concentra-
'
tion in these lines.
Because,the residual heat removal, (RHR) jystem had not yet been secured, a path was established to pump from the
-
RCS directly to the RWST; this resulted in the draining of the
~'
pressurizer and the depressurization of the RCS. Upon identification of the event, immediate corrective actions were taken to isolate the
-
RCS.
Inventory and pressure control were restored by 10:36 p.m.
Radiation levels around the RWST were measured and found to be s
within acceptable limits.
Since the plant had been shut down for 28
'
.
days and degassed there were no detectable radioactive gases in the
'
discharged coolant. The inspector reviewed the circumstances sur-
. rounding the event and determined the following:
,
Operating Procedure (0P) 1-1, Plant Heatup, Revision 21, pre-
--
scribes a sequence of evolutions to accomplish plant startup in accordance with indivudually referenced procedures. Step 4.7 l
,reauires RHR to be shut down in accordance with OP 1-13-2 and Step'.4.9 requires recirculation of safety injection (LPSI)
lines in accordance with OP 1-11-7.
OP 1-1 does not specify step-by-step completion nor does it caution against recircula-tirg LPSI prior to securing the RHR system.
l
/
-
OP 1,-13-2 RHR Shutdown, Revision 12, describes in steps 4.1 -
--
4.9, the process for shutdown of the RHR system.
Step'4-10 directs the LPSI lines to be recirculated in accordance with OP 1-11-7.
OP 1-11-7, Safety Injection Tank, Fill, Vent, and Pressurize,
--
Revision 11, does not require RHR to be shut down as a prere-quisite for LPSI line recirculation.
--
Operations Department Night Orders dated March 22, 1982 sche-duled start-up operations and included a separate check-list of
..
.
_ _
_ _ _ _ _
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
evolutions to be completed in accordance with plant operating procedures. These night orders schedule LPSI recirculation prior to the check-off for securing the RHR system.
With several concurrent evolutions in progress the plant opera-
--
tors did not analyze the overlapping effects of these evolutions and relied too heavily on the night order checklist.
Conse-quently, the LPSI lines were recirculated without securing the RHR system, thus providing the path for draining the RCS. The procedures involved were not specific enough to prevent this occurrence, absent guidance to require step-by-step conformance with OP 1-1.
No guidance of this type is provided by the licensee.
Prior to leaving the site the Shift Supervisor drafted an
--
" Unusual Event" report describing the occurrence and immediate corrective actions. He did not notify licensee management or the NRC.
The Operations Department Head, after reading the Unusual Event
--
report the next day, notified the resident inspector and the NRC Operations Center at about 2:00 p.m., March 25, 1982.
The licensee issued a memorandum to operating personnel on Apri.1 2, 1982 reemphasizing the need for procedural adherence and differentiating the guidance and planning information contained in the Night Orders from the required actions included in operating procedures.
Procedures 1-1 and 1-11-7 were amended to require RHR shutdown prior to LPSI recirculation. These changes have been incorporated in a subsequent procedure revision.
The failure to notify the NRC within one hour of the occurrence of an event which results in a nuclear power plant not being in a controlled or expected condition is in violation to 10 CFR 50.72. A similar violation was cited in Region I Inspection Report 50-309/
81-20.
(309/82-05-08)
d.
82-14 Failure to Station the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
The licensee reported that the STA was not stationed from 1:00 a.m.
to 8:00 a.m. on March 26, 1982 during a plant start-up. Technical Specification 5.2g requires the STA to be stationed any time the plant is not in a cold shutdown condition. The inspector reviewed, plant logs and determined that the plant was not in cold shutdown
(i.e., reactor coolant system temperature c210'F) from 3:21 p.m. to 6:43 p.m. on March 25, 1982 and from 1:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on March 26, 1982. The STA was not stationed because shift personnel interpreted the requirement for stationing the STA to be when primary system temperature is greater than 210'F and pressure is greater
than 400 psig. The LER reported that STA's had been notified by written memorandum of the correct requirement for stationing the l
_
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
STA. Additionally, Operating Procedure 1-1, Plant Heatup, Revision 22, was revised to provide, as an initial condition for plant heat-up, the availability of the STA.
This event constitutes a licensee identified violation of Technical Specification 5.2g.
(309/82-05-12)
e.
82-16 Anchor Nut Missing on Safety Injection Actuation Relay On April 16, 1982, during an inspection of the safety injection actuation system, the inspector observed the wire connection to terminal 13 of the B train high containment pressure relay (HCPY) to be unfastened by the required anchor nut. The eyelet termination was over the lug and appeared to be making contact. The inspector brought this deficiency to the attention of the shift supervisor and the senior plant electrical engineer.
The termination deficiency was corrected. The safety injection circuit had been modified in accordance with Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) 7-82, in March 1982, to correct an identified deficiency with respect to single failure criteria. As a result of this modification the failure of the HCPY relay to function because of the unsecured wire would not result in a failure to actuate at least one train of safety injection even after postulating the worst additional single failure. The installa-tion instructions for PDCR 7-82 did not detail termination acceptance criteria nor did any written inspection criteria call for the verifi-cation of anchor nut placement.
The licensee stated that these criteria fall under the scope of good engineering practice, however 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V and the Maine Yankee Operational Quality Assurance Program require acceptance criteria for safety-related activities sufficient enough to determine the satisfactory completion of the activity. The criteria specified in PDCR 7-82 were not sufficient to detect the missing anchor nut and were there-fore in violation of the quality assurance program.
(309/ 82-05-09)
10.
Followup of Events Occurring During the Inspection On April 1,1982 the plant was tripped from full power when the secondary component cooling (SCC) isolation valves inadvertently tripped during manual shifting of the SCC pumps.
SCC supplies essential cooling water to the main turbine generator as well as one train of emergency cooling.
In March 1982 the SCC pump electric circuits were modified to block the low suction pressure cut-out for 10 seconds when the standby pump automati-cally starts.
Pressure surges during this condition would cause spurious trips of the non-safety-related cooling system isolation valves. These spurious trips would isolate cooling water to the main turbine and cause a plant shutdown. The purpose of the design change was to prevent the spurious trips by blocking the valve trip signal during the period after the SCC pumps automatically shift.
The pressure surge effects of manual pump shift combinations, however, were not considered. When the SCC pumps were manually shif ted on April 1st, similar pressure surges were -
experienced and the SCC valves tripped.
The SCC trip valves were disabled pending design modifications to alleviate inadvertant plant trips. The inspector will review the corrective action in a subsequent inspection.
(309/82-05-10)
_ _ - _ _ - _ _
l
.
.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
11. Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable items or items of noncom-pliance. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 9B.
12. Exit Interviews
!
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
s
..
.
__
. _ _ _
.-