IR 05000309/1982023
| ML20028F107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1983 |
| From: | Crocker H, Rich Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028F106 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-82-23, NUDOCS 8301310157 | |
| Download: ML20028F107 (6) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-309/82-23 Docket No. 50-309 License No. DPR-36 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Facility Name:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station Inspection At:
Wiscasset, Maine Inspection Conducted:
December 10-12, 1982
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Inspectors:
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u H.' Smitfi,le~ain Le~ader, EPS, RI esyne D. P. Higby, Battelle, PNL E. Kelly, RPS, RI C.A. Rowe, FRPS, RI T. K. Thompson, ERPS, RI
/J-/Q Approved By:
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H. W."Crocker B h'ief, Emergency Preparedness (ate sfgned Section, DETP Inspection Summary:
I_nspection on December 10-12, 1982 (Report No. 50-309/82-23)
Areas Inspected:
Special announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on December 11, 1982. The inspection involved 137 inspector-hours by a team of five NRC Region I and NRC contractor personnel.
Results: No violations were identified.
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PDR ADOCK 05000309
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on December 12, 1982:
B. Bickford, Assistant Operations Department Head, MY P. Casey, Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD)
E. Darois, YNSD G. Doucette, YNSD S. D. Evans, Radiological Program Coordinator, MY
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C. Frizzle, Manager of Operations, MY J. Garrity, Senior Director, Nuclear Engineering & Licensing, MY
D. C. Holsinger, YNSD j
M. A. Kralian, YNSD l
J. Kwasnik, Public Service Company of New Hampshire l
J. MacDonald, YNSD F. F. McWilliams, University of Lowell J. Perling, YNSD J. B. Randazza, Vice President, MY D. A. Rice, YNSD J. G. Robinson, YNSD i
G. Stratton, YNSD l
R. Strickland, Public Service Company of New Hampshire D. Sturniolo, Assistant Technical Support, MY
M. Swartz, Senior Operator Instructor, MY J. M. Temple, Security Supervisor, MY
C. D. Thomas, Jr., YNSD E. Wood, Plant Manager, MY l
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The team cbserved and interviewed several licensee emergency response I
personnel, controllars and evaluators as they performed their. assigned functions during the exercise.
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2.
Emergency Exercise i
The Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant fe'.i scale exercise was conducted on December 11, 1982, from 6:45 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.
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Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives had
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telephone discussions with licensee representatives to review the
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scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, revisions were made by the licensee to plant and dose assessment data sheets,
additional events were included in the scenario, and portions of the exercise were clarified.
In addition, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing for licensee
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controllers and observers on December 10, 1982, and participated in i
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the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in activities to prevent disturbing normal plant operations.
The licensee scenario included a fuel cladding failure confirmed by coolant sampling; a' series of mechanical / electrical valve failures within the letdown system; and valve problems associated with the Volume Control Tank, Primary Drain Tank, and Waste Gas Surge Tank (WGST), resulting in a noble gas release through the WGST loop seal to the primary vent stack. The scenario included conditions for the licensee to exercise the onsite facilities; the corporate support organization; notification / communications with offsite agencies regarding upgrading and downgrading of emergency classifications; and the offsite response of ambulance and medical support. The noble gas release permitted the state and counties to implement their planned exercise objectives for their facilities and response of offsite groups.
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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's exercise appeared to be acceptable, b.
Exercise Observation
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During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, 5 NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of emergency response facilities; and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
(1) Detection, classification, and assessment of the events making up the scenario; (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of
pertinent information; (4) Communications /information flow, and record keeping; (5) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions; (6) Provision of in plant radiation protection; (7) Performance of offsite and in plant radiological surveys; (8) Maintenance of site security and access control;
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(9) Performance of technical support; (10) Performance of repair and corrective actions; and (11) Performance of first aid activities.
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The NRC Team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the emergency response facilities; and actions and use of the facilities were generally
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consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team observed the following actions implemented by members of the emergency organization that were indicative of their ability to cope with abnormal conditions.
HP/ Chem Techs considered maintaining exposures as low as reasonably achievable during assignments.
The dose rates encountered by plant workers were routinely communicated to the Operational Support Center for maintaining accumulated dose records.
The Operations Department Head briefed individuals on potential hazards prior to and during their work assignments and also took corrective actions based on direct dose rates of coolant samples rather than waiting for analytical results.
The corrective measures taken by key individuals assigned to the emergency facilities were based on consideration of plant conditions and systems that were or might be affected by
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scenario conditions; other actions by these individuals in general, indicated their competency in performing their assigned function.
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The NRC team findings in areas for licensee improvement are discussed below.
(The licensee also identified most of these areas in their critique of the exercise).
Status boards for posting emergency and plant conditions were not maintained in the Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), or the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
There was no formal system of record keeping in the emergency facilities.
The dose rate instruments provided in the offsite survey kits did not have a detection level high enough for the estimated offsite radiation levels and the vehicles were not equipped with 4-wheel drive for adverse weather conditions.
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The system of nomograms used for evaluating offsite thyroid dose were cumbersome and there was a 70 minute waiting period for confirmatory field measurements of iodine.
The taking of a primary coolant sample was simulated although this activity was not on the list of exercise events for simulation.
There was a lack of expected radiation practices during the contaminated injury event, ie., contamination information was not requested and no surveys made; the dosimeters were not.
removed from the patient prior to transport; potential cross-contamination during transport to ambulance and during issuance of paper coveralls and gloves; and no followup evaluations for other members of work party for dose, contamination, or uptakes.
The CR did not communicate with the EOF in a timely manner as emergency conditions changed.
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There was confusion in the EOF regarding the protective action recommendations that were or should be communicated to the state and these were not in a written form. There were also difficulties in being able to contact the appropriate offsite agencies by direct line.
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There were no periodic briefings to the EOF staff by the Emergency Coordinator on the status of conditions and the paging system could not be heard at all locations in the Information Building.
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The observers could not determine at all times during the exercise what position in the emergency organization was in command of the emergency response.
Some of the emergency response members were not issued dosimeters within the EOF.
There were no written message forms for communication between agencies and functions within the EOF.
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Exercise Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on December 12, 1982, during which key licensee controllers and observers discussed their observations of the exercise. The licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate action take.
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3.
Exit Meeting and NRC Critique Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1.
The team leader summarized the observations, made during the exercise and discussed the areas described in Section 2.b.
The team leader also recommended that the licensee evaluate the findings associated with the contaminated injury and emphasize the corrective measures through their radiological training program.
It was also noted that the exercise activities and the licensee's critique were indicative of the adequate number of controllers and observers.
The licensee was informed that no violations were observed and although there were areas identified for improvement, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appropriate action would be taken regarding the identified improvement areas.
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