IR 05000305/2002002

IR 05000305/2002-002, for Nuclear Management Co. Conducted on 03/31/2002. No Violations Were Identified

ML021080855
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	04/17/2002
From:	Lanksbury R NRC/RGN-III
To:	Warner M Nuclear Management Co
References
IR-02-002
Download: ML021080855 (22)

Text

April 17, 2002

SUBJECT:

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-305/02-02

Dear Mr. Warner:

On March 31, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.

The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 4, 2002, with you, Mr. F. Cayia, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-305 License No. DPR-43

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-305/02-02 See Attached Distribution

DOCUMENT: G:\\kewa\\kew 02-2002 drp.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII RIII NAME MCastanedo:dtp MKunowski RLanksbury DATE 04/16/02 04/17/02 04/17/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

REGION III==

Docket No:

50-305 License No:

DPR-43 Report No:

50-305/02-02 Licensee:

Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility:

Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Location:

N 490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216 Dates:

February 22 through March 31, 2002 Inspectors:

J. Lara, Senior Resident Inspector Z. Dunham, Resident Inspector D. Nelson, Radiation Specialist P. Lougheed, Reactor Engineer Approved By:

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

Summary of Findings IR 05000305-02-02, on 02/22-03/31/2002, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. Resident Inspector, Engineering Inspector, and Radiation Specialist Integrated Report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional engineering inspector, and a regional radiation specialist. There were no findings identified during this inspection. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

A.

Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.

B.

Licensee-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.

Report Details Summary of Plant Status

The plant was operated at 100 percent power for most of the period except for a brief reductions in power to facilitate quarterly scheduled main turbine stop and control valve testing and to facilitate the repair of an off-site power transmission line.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Walkdown and Inspection of the Component Cooling Water System a.

Inspection Scope During the week of March 4, 2002, the inspectors conducted a semi-annual walkdown of a risk significant system. The inspectors inspected the component cooling water system because the system was ranked one of the ten most important systems for risk at the facility and because of recent design issues which had been identified by the licensee (reference Inspection Report 50-305/01-17, Section 4OA3.1). To verify the proper system lineup, the inspectors reviewed operations procedures, including the system lineup checklist and normal and abnormal procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), system drawings, and vendor manuals.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed current temporary design changes, operator workarounds, and the licensee corrective action program database to determine if there were any outstanding system deficiencies which could prevent the system from performing its design function. Using the system lineup checklist, the inspectors walked down system components to verify that valves were correctly positioned, electrical power was correctly aligned, and that support systems were operational. During the walkdown, the inspectors also checked equipment labeling, checked hangers and support structures for proper installation, and evaluated the overall material condition of the system. The inspectors also conducted a general review of the licensees corrective action database records to determine whether the licensee was adequately identifying equipment alignment problems for other risk significant systems at an appropriate threshold.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Partial Walkdown of B Internal Containment Spray System a.

Inspection Scope On March 13, 2002, the inspectors conducted a partial walkdown of Train B of the internal containment spray system while Train A was out-of-service due to testing.

The inspectors reviewed the system lineup checklists, normal operating procedures, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, and system drawings to verify the correct system lineup. Valve positions and electrical power availability were examined to verify that valve and electrical breaker positions were consistent with, and in accordance with, the licensees procedures and design documentation. The material condition of the equipment was also inspected.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Partial Walkdown of B Train of Safety-Related 4160-Volts Alternating Current (VAC)

and 480-VAC Electrical Distribution Systems a.

Inspection Scope On March 22, 2002, the inspectors conducted a partial walkdown of Train B of the 4160- and 480-VAC electrical distribution systems while undervoltage relay testing was performed on Train A of the safety-related 4160-VAC electrical distribution system.

The inspectors walked down electrical breakers to verify that the breakers were properly positioned to provide power to the loads they supplied. Additionally, the inspectors conducted a brief walkdown of the Train B emergency diesel generator, which supplied emergency electrical power. The inspectors also conducted reviews to verify that there were no other plant activities which could impact Train B safety-related electrical buses.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Fire Zone Inspections a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

Relay Room - Zone AX-30, March 8, 2002

Containment Spray Pump Area - Zone AX-23A, March 8, 2002

Fuel Handling Rooms - Zone AX-24, March 26, 2002

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to mitigate fire damage or propagation.

Additionally, fire hoses, sprinklers, portable fire extinguishers, and fire detection devices were inspected to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. Passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and fire zone penetration seals were also inspected to verify that they were in satisfactory condition and capable of providing an adequate fire barrier.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

.1 Biennial Review of Heat Sink Performance a.

Inspection Scope A specialist inspector reviewed documents associated with the emergency diesel generator B heat exchanger, the component cooling water (CCW) B heat exchanger, and both the A & B residual heat removal (RHR) pump pit fan coil units. These heat exchangers were chosen for review based on their high risk assessment worth in the licensees probabilistic safety analysis. While on site, the inspector reviewed completed surveillance tests and associated calculations, and performed independent calculations to verify that these activities adequately ensured proper heat transfer. The inspector reviewed the documentation to confirm that the test or inspection methodology was consistent with accepted industry and scientific practices, based on review of heat transfer texts and an Electrical Power Research Institute standard (EPRI TRI-107397, Service Water Heat Exchanger Testing Guidelines). The inspector also reviewed documentation to verify that acceptance criteria were consistent with design basis values, as outlined in the USAR and technical specifications. The inspector witnessed a demonstration of the instrumentation used to obtain air temperature and flow measurements for the fan coil units and reviewed documentation to verify that the instruments were within calibration. The inspector reviewed documentation to verify that the licensee took appropriate actions to verify physical integrity of the heat exchangers.

The inspector also reviewed documentation to verify that the licensee had appropriate controls in place to verify availability of the ultimate heat sink under adverse conditions.

The inspector reviewed Kewaunee Assessment Process (KAP, the corrective action process) documents concerning heat exchanger or heat sink performance issues to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues. The inspector also evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for identified issues, including the engineering justification for operability, if applicable.

The documents that were reviewed are listed at the end of the report.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, for the components listed below. The inspectors reviewed recent maintenance rule evaluations to assess: (1) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of system, structure, and component (SSC) failures; (3) SSC safety significance classification; (4) 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSCs; and (5) performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors also interviewed licensee staff and evaluated the licensees monitoring and trending of performance data.

Specific components evaluated were:

Auxiliary Building Basement Fan Coil Units

Auxiliary Building Fan Floor Fan Coil Units

Auxiliary Building Mezzanine Fan Coil Units b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation and assessment of plant risk, scheduling, and configuration control during the planned and emergent work activities listed below. In particular, the licensees planning and management of maintenance was evaluated to verify that on-line risk was acceptable and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Additionally, the inspectors compared the assessed risk configuration against the actual plant conditions and any in-progress evolutions or external events to verify that the assessment was accurate, complete, and appropriate. Licensee actions to address increased on-line risk during these periods were also inspected to verify that actions were in accordance with approved administrative procedures.

• Diesel Generator B Failed Air Start Motor Solenoid Valve - March 14, 2002

Performance of Component Cooling Special Operating Procedure, SOP-CC-31-18, CC [Component Cooling] Flow Measurement Thru Both RHR Hxs [Heat Exchangers] With CC-302 Full Open - March 21, 2002

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Non-Routine Evolutions (71111.14)

.1 Power Reduction to Perform Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Tests a.

Inspection Scope On March 9, 2002, the licensee reduced reactor power to approximately 93 percent of full power to facilitate auxiliary feedwater (AFW) inservice testing (IST). The inspectors observed the reduction to verify that communications, procedure use and adherence, and command and control by shift management was in accordance with the facilitys policies and procedures.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (71111.16)

.1 Operator Rounds a.

Inspection Scope On March 25, 2002, the inspectors accompanied a Nuclear Auxiliary Operator during routine equipment rounds to determine whether there were any unidentified or proceduralized OWAs which had not been captured in the licensees OWA process.

Specifically, the inspectors observed whether there were any equipment issues which required additional operator contingency actions that could have impacted emergency operations.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

.1 Diesel Generator B Failed Air Start Motor Bank No. 1 Solenoid Valve a.

Inspection Scope On March 15, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance testing associated with the replacement of the B diesel generator air start motor bank No. 1 and associated solenoid valve which had failed. During a diesel generator start the previous day, the solenoid valve failed to subsequently close after opening to admit air to the air start motor bank No. 1. This condition resulted in bank No. 1 remaining engaged to the diesel generator flywheel, which, as the diesel increased in speed, caused the air start

motor bank to overspeed. The licensee secured the diesel generator and subsequently replaced the solenoid valve and the air start motor bank. The licensee then conducted a partial surveillance test procedure as an operational retest of the diesel generator. The inspectors reviewed the scope of the replacement work to ensure that the post-maintenance test was adequate for the scope of the work and demonstrated operational readiness.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Diesel Generator B Fuel Injector Adjustments a.

Inspection Scope On March 18, 2002, the inspectors reviewed post-maintenance activities associated with maintenance performed on the B diesel generator which had taken place previously on March 15. The maintenance consisted of making adjustments to the fuel injectors on cylinders No. 9 and No. 20. The exhaust temperatures of these cylinders had been running respectively hotter and colder as compared to the other cylinders exhaust temperatures, and the difference in temperature between the two cylinders had been approaching an operational limit for the diesel generator. The inspectors reviewed the work order to verify that the scope of the work which had been performed was accurate and that the associated post-maintenance test was adequate to demonstrate operational readiness of the diesel generator. The inspectors also reviewed the test results and conducted a brief walkdown of the diesel generator following the completion of the maintenance to verify that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment to verify that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety function and that the surveillance tests satisfied the requirements contained in Technical Specifications and the licensees procedures, and that the equipment was capable of meeting its design function. During the surveillance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test to verify that it was adequate to demonstrate operational readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents, and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear. Portions of the test were observed to verify that the test was performed as written, that all testing prerequisites were satisfied, and that the test data were complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. Following the completion of the test,

where applicable, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the affected equipment to verify that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

The inspectors observed and reviewed the performance of the following surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment:

SP 05B-283A, Motor Driven AFW Pump A Full Flow Test - IST, Original Revision, March 9, 2002

SP 05B-283B, Motor Driven AFW Pump B Full Flow Test - IST, Original Revision, March 9, 2002

SP 34-099, RHR Pump and Valve Test - IST, Revision AR, March26, 2002 b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

2.

RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

.1 Plant Walkdowns and Radiological Boundary Verification a.

Inspection Scope The inspector conducted walkdowns of selected radiologically controlled areas within the plant to verify the adequacy of radiological boundaries and postings. Specifically, the inspector walked down several radiologically significant work area boundaries (high and locked high radiation areas) in the auxiliary building. The inspector performed confirmatory radiation measurements to verify that these areas and selected radiation areas were properly posted and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20, licensee procedures, and Technical Specifications.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Access Controls a.

Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees procedures, practices and associated documentation for the control of access to radiologically significant areas (high, locked high, and very high radiation areas) and assessed compliance with Technical Specifications, procedures, and the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1601 and 20.1602. In particular, the inspector reviewed the licensees practices and records for the control of keys to locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs), the

use of access control guards to control entry into such areas, and the licensees methods for independently verifying proper closure and latching of LHRA and VHRA doors upon area egress. Additionally, radiological postings were reviewed, and access control boundaries were challenged by the inspector throughout the plant to verify that high, locked high, and very high radiation areas were properly controlled.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Review of Radiologically Significant Work a.

Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the radiation work permit (RWP) and attended the pre-job ALARA brief for the testing of the flow of the CCW through both of the RHR heat exchangers. The inspector also reviewed the RWP used for the monthly containment inspections, at power. These inspection activities were performed to verify the adequacy of surveys, access controls, and postings to assess the exchange of work area radiological information and to evaluate radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance. The inspector also evaluated the licensees procedure and practices for dosimetry placement and use of multiple dosimetry in high radiation areas having significant dose gradients for compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201 and applicable Regulatory Guides.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Control of Non-Fuel Materials Stored in the Spent Fuel Pools a.

Inspection Scope Even though there were no highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel)

currently being stored within the spent fuel pool or other storage pools, the inspector reviewed the licensees controls for the storage of these materials. Members of the radiation protection (RP) staff and management were interviewed and a walkdown of the refuel floor was conducted. The inspector assessed the adequacy of the administrative and physical controls for the underwater storage of non-fuel materials to verify consistency with the licensees procedures and with Regulatory Guide 8.38, Information Notice 90-33, and applicable Health Physics Positions in NUREG/CR-5569.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

2OS2 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71121.02)

.1 Radiological Work Planning a.

Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed selected ALARA post-job debriefs generated during the September 24 to December 5, 2002, steam generator replacement and refueling outage. The inspector conducted the reviews to determine if the debriefs had been conducted in accordance with procedure HP-04.001, ALARA Plan, and if identified problems had been entered into the corrective action program.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Job Site Inspections and ALARA Control a.

Inspection Scope The inspector evaluated the use of ALARA controls during the testing of CCW flow through both of the RHR heat exchangers. The inspector reviewed the adequacy of radiological surveys performed for the job, evaluated the radiological work controls, and assessed worker performance and RP staff oversight. The inspector also observed and questioned both the RP staff that provided job coverage for these activities and the radiation workers (radworkers) involved in selected work to verify that they had adequate knowledge of radiological work conditions and ALARA controls.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Identification and Resolution of Problems a.

Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees KAP documents related to the radiological access control and ALARA programs that were generated during 2001 and the first 2 months of 2002. The review was conducted to assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program to identify problems and to develop corrective actions. Selected KAPs were discussed with RP staff and management to determine if problem characterization was accurate and to verify that extent of condition reviews were adequately completed or were in the process of being performed.

The inspector reviewed a 2002 focus area self-assessment of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) ALARA Program and a Nuclear Oversight Observation Report of the ALARA Program to evaluate the effectiveness of the self-assessment process to identify, characterize, and prioritize problems with the ALARA program. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions to address problems in the ALARA program proposed in

the KNPP Strategic Plan for Radiation Dose Reduction 2002-2007. The inspector also attended a meeting of the Radiological Performance Committee to identify if the members of the committee and management were aware of the problems in the ALARA program and supported the corrective actions proposed in the Strategic Plan.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees PI data collection process from the second quarter through the fourth quarter of 2001 to verify the accuracy of collected and submitted data. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed control room logs, primary leak rate surveillance test results, and radiochemistry analysis results to independently verify the data that the licensee had collected. The following PIs were evaluated:

RCS Leakrate

RCS Specific Activity b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 Classification of Fire Zone TU-95B Not in Accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R On October 13, 2001, the licensee identified that fire zone TU-95B, which contained the B and turbine-driven AFW pump and B train 480-VAC electrical buses, was classified improperly with respect to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979." Specifically, Zone TU-95B had been improperly classified as meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2., which did not require a suppression system where redundant trains were either not located within the same fire area or were protected by a rated 3-hour fire barrier. The licensee identified that Zone TU-95B should have been classified as an area requiring alternative shutdown to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.Section III.G.2 required the installation of a fixed suppression system. Contrary to this requirement, there was no fixed fire suppression equipment installed in Zone TU-95B which contained cables of redundant trains of equipment required for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown. The safety significance of this issue is yet to be determined. Accordingly, an Unresolved Item (URI 050-305/02-02-01, Appendix R Classification of the Fire Zone TU-95B) was

opened pending the NRCs review of the licensees completed risk significance evaluation. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as KAP Work Order (WO) 01-016753.

4OA6 Management Meetings Exit Meeting Summary On April 4, 2002, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Warner, Mr. F. Cayia, and other members of the Nuclear Management Company staff. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.

No proprietary information was identified.

Interim Exit Meetings Summary Senior Official at Exit:

Mr. F. Cayia Date:

March 8, 2002 Proprietary:

No Subject:

Heat Sink Biennial Inspection Change to Inspection Findings:

No Senior Official at Exit:

Mr. T. Coutu Date:

March 22, 2002 Proprietary:

No Subject:

Radiation Protection Change to Inspection Findings:

No

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Nuclear Management Company, LLC S. Baker, Manager, Radiation Protection F. Cayia, Kewaunee-Point Beach Operations Director T. Coutu, Plant Manager, Kewaunee Site R. Farrell, Manager, Planning and Scheduling M. Fencl, Manager, Security G. Harrington, Licensing Leader K. Hull, Supervisor, Engineering M. Kwitek, Manager, Maintenance J. McCarthy, Manager, Operations R. Pulec, Manager, Site Assessment S. Putman, Kewaunee-Point Beach Engineering Manager A. Rahn, Mechanical Design Engineer (Technical Contact)

R. Repshas, Manager, Site Services J. Schweitzer, Manager, Engineering Systems J. Stoeger, Assistant Manager, Operations M. Warner, Kewaunee-Point Beach Vice President T. Webb, Kewaunee-Point Beach Licensing Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission - RIII R. Lanksbury, Branch Chief, DRP, Branch 5

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-305/02-02-01 URI Appendix R Classification of the Fire Zone TU-95B (Section 4OA5)

Closed None Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable AFW Auxiliary Feed Water CCW Component Cooling Water CFR Code of Federal Regulations DRP Division of Reactor Projects, Region III EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EOP Emergency Operating Procedure FCU Fan Coil Unit HRA High Radiation Area IST Inservice Testing KAP Kewaunee Assessment Process KNPP Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant LER Licensee Event Report LHRA Locked High Radiation Area NCV Non-Cited Violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OWA Operator Workaround PI Performance Indicator RHR Residual Heat Removal RP Radiation Protection RWP Radiation Work Permit SSC System, Structure, and Component URI Unresolved Item USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report VAC Volts Alternating Current VHRA Very High Radiation Area WO Work Order

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignment N-ICS-23-CL Containment Spray System Prestartup Checklist Revision AA OPERM-217 Flow Diagram-Internal Containment Spray System Revision AK DCR 2379 Install ICS Full Flow Test Line USAR, Section 9 Auxiliary and Emergency Systems Revision 16 N-CC-31 Component Cooling System Operation Revision U A-CC-31 Abnormal Conditions in the Component Cooling System Revision 0 A-CC-31B Leakage into Component Cooling System Revision I E-CC-31 Loss of Component Cooling Revision L N-CC-31-CL Component Cooling System Prestartup Checklist Revision W OPER XK100-20 Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Coolant System Revision T OPER XK100-19 Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Coolant System Revision AD SP 31-168 Component Cooling Pump and Valve Test - IST Revision AH SP 31-248 Component Cooling Water System Pressure Test, Revision F Night Order, Component Cooling Leakage February 1, 2002 TCR 02-01 Install Mechanical Stop on Valve CC302 January 25, 2002 OWA 02-01 Pump Overheating Concerns Associated with Component Cooling Pumps 1R05 Fire Protection FPP 08-07 Control of Ignition Sources Revision D FPP 08-08 Control of Transient Combustibles Revision A FPP 08-09 Barrier Control Revision C N-FP-08-CL Fire Protection System Checklist Revision AL Appendix R Design Description December 14, 2000 Kewaunee Fire Protection Program Plan Revision 4

1R07 Heat Sink Performance Action Request CAP003539 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Design Basis Information Documentation March 7, 2002 Action Request CAP003541 Unclear Basis or Values Used in Calculation C1150 on Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Design Heat Removal Capacity March 7, 2002 Action Request CAP003542 Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Proto-HX Model Design Discrepancy March 8, 2002 Action Request CAP003543 Area Safeguards Fan Coil Unit, Fan Heat Input Calculation March 8, 2002 Calculation C11037 Residual Heat Removal Pump Pits Fan Coil Units Performance Evaluations November 19, 1998 Calculation C11150 Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Design Heat Removal Capacity May 5, 2000 Calculation C11195 Maximum Pressure Drop on Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers February 19, 2001 Calculation C11340 Fan Coil Unit and Diesel Generator Operability Curves Based on Service Water Inlet Temperature and Flow November 24, 2001 Calculation C11343 2001 Service Water Flow Test Analysis November 27, 2001 Calculation C11344 2001 Service Water Flow Test November 24, 2001 Calculation C11357 Evaluate the Ability of a Lower Lake Temperature to Compensate for Reduced Component Cooling Water Flow to a Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger January 25, 2002 Calibration ICP-2-26 Service Water Fan Coil Unit Temperature Indicators Calibration (Temperature Indicator TI-12309 )

February 7, 2001 Calibration ICP-2-26 Service Water Fan Coil Unit Temperature Indicators Calibration (Temperature Indicator TI-12299 and Temperature Elements TE 14154 and 14155)

July 27, 2001 Calibration ICP-2-26 Service Water Fan Coil Unit Temperature Indicators Calibration (Channels 1 (14174) and 3 (14176)

October 28, 2001 Calibration ICP-10-10 DGM - Diesel Generator B Temperature Indicators Calibration (Temperature Indicators TI-55102 and 55109)

October 21, 2001 Calibration ICP-82B-113 ICE - Digital Thermometers Calibration (Thermometer 91454)

August 10, 2001

Calibration ICP-82B-113 ICE - Digital Thermometers Calibration (Thermometers 91379, 91380, 91407, 91422 & 91427)

December 5, 2001 Calibration ICP-82B-144 ICE - Digital Hand Held Humidity and Temperature Indicators (91494, 91494A)

August 8, 2001 Drawing 4-107-13-040-001 ITT 13040 CPK Bundle Assembly March 9, 2000 Drawing 5-046-13-040-001 ITT 13040 CPK Exchanger, 2 Pass Revision 5 Drawing NEN-15748 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Shell Channel and Support Details Revision B Drawing NEN-B-15748 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Tube Sheet, Bundle, and Layout Revision A Engineering Services Report 91-16 Slime and Silting Control in the Service Water System May 4, 1993 Inspection CMP-31-02 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Hydro-laser Cleaning May 4, 2000 Inspection CMP-31-02 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Tube Cleaning September 13, 2001 KAP 97-001163-000 Evaluate Acceptability of Reduced Service Water Flow to the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger May 27, 1997 KAP 98-001693-000 Determine and Document the Input Parameters for Computer Program Proto-HX for the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers April 25, 1998 KAP 98-002220-000 Evaluate Tube Plugging Limit on a Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger October 28, 1998 KAP 99-002650-000 Service Water Temperature Instruments Not Calibrated February 12, 1999 KAP 99-003158-000 Increase Component Cooling Water Flow to 1B Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger to 1750 Gallons per Minute June 16, 1999 KAP 99-003736-000 Maximum Flow to Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger December 3, 1999 KAP 00-001836-000 Error in KAP 1136 July 10, 2000 KAP 00-002511-000 KAP1136 Didnt Consider Maximum Pressure Drop When Arriving at Tube Plug Limit July 17, 2000 KAP 00-002621-000 SSDI Questions - Control of Design Basis Information July 26, 2000

KAP 00-004024-000 Questionable Data Following Change to Performance Monitoring Method November 16, 2000 Procedure CMP-31-02 (CC) Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Tube Cleaning (QA-1)

Revision G Procedure E-CW-04 Loss of Circulating Water Revision T Procedure PMP-04-01 Circulating Water - Inlet Structure Inspection Revision J Procedure PMP-10-11 DGM - Diesel Generator Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring (QA-1)

Revision A Procedure PMP-17-02 ACA - QA-1 Fan Coil Units, Inspection and Cleaning Revision T Procedure PMP-17-15 ACA - RHR Pump Pit Fan Coil Unit 1b Performance Monitoring (QA-1)

Revision B Procedure RC-C-46K Service Water Dead Leg Chemical Treatment Revision 0 Procedure RCC-046 Circulating Water Sodium Hypochlorite Injection Revision G Procedure RC-046G Service Water Chemical Injection Procedure Revision J Procedure TLA-27 Circulating Water Inlet Temperature High Revision B Report NMC-KN1-02 Eddy Current Inspection Report - Diesel Generator B Coolers October 20, 2001 Test PMP-10-11 DGM - Diesel Generator Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring (QA-1)

Completed August 16, 2001 Test PMP-10-11 DGM - Diesel Generator Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring (QA-1)

Completed February 14, 2002 Test PMP-17-15 ACA - RHR Pump Pit Fan Coil Unit 1b Performance Monitoring (QA-1)

Completed February 8, 2001 Test PMP-17-15 ACA - RHR Pump Pit Fan Coil Unit 1b Performance Monitoring (QA-1)

Completed September 7, 2001 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation KAP WR 02-0931 Continuous Venting from SV-33839, Auxiliary Basement FCU Control Valve Action Request 02-3539 Auxiliary Building FCU Service Water Control Valve Failed

KAP WR 01-8366 Auxiliary Building Fan Floor Fan Coil Unit (FCU) 1B has Broken Belt Action Request 02-0026 Fan Floor FCU Drive Belt Failed KAP WR 01-8311 Auxiliary Building Basement FCU B has Broken Belt Action Request 01-22108 Broken Belt on Auxiliary Building FCU Action Request 02-0205 Drive Belts on FCUs Run Hot Action Request 02-1184 Auxiliary Building Basement and Fan Floor FCU Run Hot 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation GNP 08.21.01 Risk Assessment for Plant Configurations Revision A Individual Plant Examination, Section 5 Core Damage Frequency Quantification 1R14 Non-Routine Evolutions N-0-03 Plant Operation Greater Than 35% Power Revision AL N-CVC-35B Charging and Volume Control Revision AE GNP 03.17.10 Reactivity Management Revision A 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing WO 02-4551 Engine Exhaust Temperatures Trending Upwards SP 42-312B Diesel Generator B Availability Test Revision P USAR, Section 8.2.3 Emergency Power Revision 16 TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems WO 02-4564 Solenoid Failed Causing Air Start Motors to not Disengage E-1621 Integrated Logic Diagram - Diesel Generator Mechanical System Revision AK

1R22 Surveillance Testing SP 05B-283A Motor Driven AFW Pump A Full Flow Test - IST Original Revision SOP AFW-05B-14 Auxiliary FW Pump A Casing Flush Original Revision SP 34099 RHR Pump and Valve Test - IST Revision AR Kewaunee Pump and Valves IST Plan Revision O USAR, Section 6.2 Safety Injections Systems Revision 16 OPER XK-100-18 Flow Diagram - Auxiliary Coolant System Revision AK SP 05B-283B Motor Driven AFW Pump B Full Flow Test - IST Original Revision 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Reactor Operator Logs June 1-December 31,2001 NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Revision 1 Kewaunee Barrier Cornerstone Data Sheets, 3rd and 4th Quarter 20S1 Access Controls For Radiologically Significant Areas Technical Specification 6.13 High Radiation Areas Amendment 122 Procedure RE-24 Special Nuclear Materials Control Revision K Procedure SOP-CC-31-18 CC Flow Measurement Thru Both RHR HXs With CC-302 Full Open Revision Orig RWP 17 Monthly Containment Inspections Revision 0 2002-001-2-006 Nuclear Oversight Observation Report, Key Control February 5, 2002 RWP 36 Install Flow Limiter on CC-302 and Place UFM on CC Piping. Also to Include Component Cooling Flow Test Revision 1 ACE 000572 Postings on Some Doors did not Meet Requirements of HP-01.019 May 24, 2001

2OS2 As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls HP-04.001 ALARA Plan Revision D Post-Job ALARA Review Checklists

1. 01-052, RCS Severance, Welding, and Associated Activities November 6 & 24, 2001 KAP 000001 Determine Whether SS Key Cabinet Control Complies with our Legal Requirements January 10, 2000 KAP 000409 Dose Reduction is the Responsibility of the Entire Plant Organization January 28, 2002 KAP 000412 Formally Integrate ALARA Planning into Work Planning January 28, 2002 KAP 000740 To Document Suggestions for Improvement/Lessons Learned from the NRC Inspection November 5, 2001 KAP 003051 Key Control Shortfalls February 6, 2002 KAP 003238 Beta Source Fixture #2 Found Unattended February 25, 2002 Post-Job ALARA Review Checklists

1. 01-053, Install and Remove Temporary RCS & RCP Restraints and Lower Support Feet November 17 & 24, 2001 Post-Job ALARA Review Checklists

1. 01-062, Containment Structural Modifications November 14 & 24, 2001 Post-Job ALARA Review Checklist

1. 01-060/51/63/54/56/57/70, Various Tasks Relating to SGRP November 17, 2001 Post-Job ALARA Review Checklist

1. 01-0001, Refueling Operations December 2, 2001 Kewaunee Steam Generator Replacement Project, Radiation Protection Plan Revision 0 Radiation Protection Work Instruction for Pipe End Decontamination Revision 0

2002-001-2-037 Nuclear Oversight Observation Report, The ALARA Program Review March 18, 2002 KSA-RP-02-01 Self-Assessment of the KNPPs ALARA Program January 31, 2002 Kewaunee Nuclear Plant Steam Generator RP/ALARA Report (Draft)

Radiological Performance Committee Agenda March 19, 2002