IR 05000305/2002006
| ML20112J513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/2020 |
| From: | Christopher Hunter NRC/RES/DRA/PRB |
| To: | |
| Hunter C (301) 415-1394 | |
| References | |
| IR 2002006 | |
| Download: ML20112J513 (12) | |
Text
SEITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE nspection Report 50-305/02-06
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Final Precursor Analysis Accident Sequence Precursor Program --- Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Kewaunee Failure to provide a fixed fire suppression system for the fire area TU-95B could result in a postulated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lube oil fire.
Inspection Report Date October 30, 2002
Inspection Report
50-305/02-06
CDP = [
July 1, 2004
Condition Summary
Descriptio The inspection report 50-305/02-06 (Ref. 1) described the failure to provide a
fixed fire suppression system in fire area TU-95B which could result in a postulated fire that
initiates in the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump B (AFWMDPB) and rapidly propagates
throughout the fire area causing loss of control cables in both safe shutdown train Appendix
R requirements for fixed suppression in areas containing safe shutdown equipment and
requiring alternative or dedicated safe shutdown systems was not me Duratio Due to the fire suppression capability being ineffective for more than one year, the
maximum time of one year is used for the duration in a conditional assessmen Caus The cause of this condition is a design deficiency for failure to provide a fixed fire
suppression system.
Recovery opportunit A postulated fire in fire area TU-95B is assumed to cause loss of
AFWMDPB and control power to both trains of safe shutdown pumps, including the auxiliary
feedwater turbine-driven pump C (AFWTDPC), and other pumps in the residual heat removal
(RHR), component cooling water (CCW), high pressure injection (HPI), and essential service
water (SWS) system Recovery of one train of safe shutdown equipment is assumed to be
accomplished using the alternate safe shutdown system (ASSS). However, recovery for the
AFWTDPC is not credited due to assumed smoke in the AFWTDPC plant area.
Analysis Results
!
Importance
The risk significance of portions of equipment and cable trains is determined by
performing a conditional assessment using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk
(SPAR) Model for Kewaunee Revision 3 (Ref. 2) where the both the point estimate
mean increase in core damage probability (CDP) are 1.0x10- SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUR
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
The Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program acceptance threshold is an
importance (CDP) of 1 x 10- !
Uncertainty
The uncertainty about the mean is: 5% bound, 4.1 x 10-6 and 95% bound, 2.0 x 10-5.
!
Dominant Sequence
The fire event tree (IE-FIRE) dominating sequence is Transient Sequence 17 (See
Figure 1). The events and important component failures for Transient Sequence 17
include:
-
Reactor trips successfully during transient
-
Failure of AFW system
-
Failure of main feedwater system during transient
-
Failure of feed and bleed
Modeling Assumptions
!
Assessment summary
Assumptions
The fire is assumed to initiate in the AFWMDP lube oil and rapidly propagate to the
trains of pump control cables in fire area TU-95 Recovery of one train of safe
shutdown equipment using the ASSS was credite The AFW turbine-driven pump was
not affected by the fire, but the pump control cables were in the fire zon Therefore,
the pump lost function and not recoverable due to smoke in the pump room.
Fire-induced analysis methodology
The fire-induced analysis is based on the component AFWMDPB fire frequency,
coupled with the severity factor for the spill of lube oil. The product of the initiating
component fire frequency, the severity factor, and the probability of nonsuppression are
multiplied to determine the IE-Fire frequency that replaces the IE-TRANS frequency for
this analysi Initiating Fire Frequency - The initiating fire frequency (FAFWMDP) was developed
from NRC fire database (1987-2001) for AFWMDP lube oil fires (Ref. 3). The
component fire frequency is 3.9 x 10-4 per reactor-year of power operation based
on the following:
FAFWMDP =
(No. Of AFWMDP Fires + Jeffreys Prior)
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
(Average No. Of AFWMDPs per plant x Power Operation Reactor-
Years)
FAFWMDP =
(0 + 0.5) = 3.9 x 10-4/reactor-year of power operation
(1.5 x 852)
-
Severity Factor - The severity factor (0.2) is based on the estimated probability
of a lube oil spill (from NRC SERP Worksheet, Ref. 5).
-
Probability of nonsuppression
The postulated AFWMDPB lube oil fire is assumed to propagated rapidly (less
than one minute) throughout the entire fire area without suppressio Therefore,
the probability of nonsuppression = IE-FIRE = Fafwmdp x severity factor x probability of nonsuppression
= 3.9 x 10-4 x 0.2 x 1.0 = 7.8 x 10-5
NOTE:
No other initiating fire sources were considered significant, as there were insufficient
combustibles to affect other equipment in the fire area.
!
Modifications to fault trees
The use of the alternate safe shutdown system for recovery of train A safe shutdown
equipment was modeled by adding base event SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN to each of the
following fault trees: AFW-MDP1A, CCW, HPI-MDP1A, RHR-MDP1A, SWS-MDP1A1,
and SWS-MDP1A2 (See Figures 2 through 5).
!
Basic event probability changes
Table 4 provides the basic events that were modified to reflect the event condition being
analyze The bases for these changes are as follows:
-
AFW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (AFW-MDP-FR-1B). The value was
set to TRUE.
-
AFW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (AFW-MDP-FS-1B). The value
was set to TRUE.
-
Operator fails to recover AFW MDPB (Fails to Start) (AFW-XHE-XL-
MDPFSB). The value was set to TRUE.
-
AFWTDP 1C Fails to Run (AFW-TDP-FR-1C). This value was set to TRUE.
-
AFWTDP 1C Fails to Start (AFW-TDP-FS-1C). This value was set to TRUE.
-
Operator Fails to Recover AFWTDP 1C (AFW-XHE-XL-TDPFR). This value
was set to TRU SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
-
CCW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (CCW-MDP-FR-1B). The value
was set to TRUE.
-
CCW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (CCW-MDP-FS-1B). The value
was set to TRUE.
-
Diesel Generator 1B Fails to Run (EPS-DGN-FR-1B). The value was set to
TRUE.
-
Diesel Generator 1B Fails to Start (EPS-DGN-FS-1B). The value was set to
TRUE.
-
RHR Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (RHR-MDP-FR-1B). The value was
set to TRUE.
-
RHR Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (RHR-MDP-FS-1B). The value was
set to TRUE
-
Operator Fails to Restore RHR MDPB (Fails to Run) (RHR-XHE-XR-1B). The
value was set to TRUE.
-
HPI Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (HPI-MDP-FR-1B). This value was
set to TRUE.
-
HPI Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (HPI-MDP-FS-1B). This value was
set to TRUE.
-
Operator fails to restore HPI MDP-1B (HPI-XHE-XR-1B). This value was set
to TRUE.
-
SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B1 Fails to Run (SWS-MDP-FR-1B1). This value
was set to TRUE.
-
SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B2 Fails to Run (SWS-MDP-FR-1B2). This value
was set to TRUE.
-
SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B1 Fails to Start (SWS-MDP-FS-1B1). This value
was set to TRUE.
-
SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B2 Fails to Start (SWS-MDP-FS-1B2). This value
was set to TRUE.
-
Failure to Align Alternate Safe Shutdown System (SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN).
This value was set to 1.0E-001.
-
Transient Initiating Event (IE-TRANS). This value was set to same value as
the AFWMDP component fire frequency x severity factor = 7.8E-5 (also referred
to as IE-FIRE).
All other initiating events were set to zero.
!
Model update
Recovery of one train of safe shutdown equipment (train A) was modeled using the
ASSS in the Rev. 3 SPAR mode SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
References
1.
EA-02-204, dated October 30, 2002, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant - NRC Inspection
Report 50-305/02-06 and Preliminary White Finding (ADAMS Accession No.
2.
James K. Knudsen and Scott T. Beck, Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for
Kewaunee (ASP PWR B), Revision 3 Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory, October 2003.
3.
J. R. Houghton and D. M. Rasmuson, NRC Report RES/OERAB/S02-01, Fire Events
Update of U.S. Operating Experience. 1986-1999, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington DC, January 2002 and database update 2000-2001.
4.
Engineering Evaluation Number 2002-0008, dated 3/7/02, SDP Fire Risk Evaluation for
Kewaunee Safeguards Alley Without Suppression, Point Beach Nuclear Plant
Engineering Evaluation (for Kewaunee).
5.
SERP Worksheet for Kewaunee: Failure to Provide a Fixed Fire Suppression System for
Safeguards Alley Fire Area TU-95B (Ref. EA-02-04), SERP Date: September 27, 2002
6.
EA-02-204, dated December 2, 2002, Final Significance Determination For a WHITE
Finding and Notice of Violation, NRC Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 (DRS) (Kewaunee
Nuclear Power Plant)(ADAMS Accession No. ML023380666).
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Table Conditional Probabilities Associated with Highest
Probability Sequences (Importance
Event tree
name
Sequence
Number
Conditional core
damage probability
(CCDP)
TRANS
9.8E-006
Total (all sequences)
1.0E-005
Table 2 Event Tree Sequence Logic for Dominant Sequence
Event tree
name
Sequence
no.
Logic
(/ denotes success; see Table 4b for top event names)
TRANS
Table Conditional cut sets for Dominant TRANS Sequence
/RT
REACTOR Trips Successfully During Transient
No or Insufficient AFW Flow
Main Feedwater System is Unavailable
FAB
Feed and Bleed Cooling is Unavailable
NOTES:
1.
See Table 4 for definitions and probabilities for the basic events.
2.
Total CCDP includes all cut sets (including those not shown in this table)
Table Definitions and probabilities for modified and dominant
basic events
Event name
Description
Probabil
ity/Freq
uency
Modifi
ed
AFW-MDP-FR-1B
AFW MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN FAILURE PROBABILITY
TRUE
YES1
AFW-MDP-FS-1B
AFW MDP 1B FAILS TO START FAILURE PROBABILITY
TRUE
YES1
AFW-xHE-XE-
MDPFSB
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER AFW MDP B
TRUE
YES1
AFW-TDP-FR-1C
AFW TDP 1C FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
AFW-TDP-FS-1C
AFW TDP 1C FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
AFW-XHE-XL-TDPFR
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER TDP 1C
TRUE
YES1
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
Event Name
Description
Prob./
Freq.
u
Modifi
ed
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
CCW-MDP-FR-1B
CCW MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
CCW-MDP-FS-1B
CCW MDP 1B FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
EPS-DGN-FR-1B
DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
EPS-DGN-FS-1B
DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
HPI-MDP-FR-1B
HPI MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
HPI-MDP-FS-1B
HPI MDP 1B FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
HPI-XHE-XR-1B
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER HPI MDP 1B
TRUE
YES1
RHR-MDP-FR-1B
RHR MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
RHR-MDP-FS-1B
RHR MDP 1B FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
MFW-SYS-UNAVAIL
MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE
TRUE
YES1
MFW-XHE-NOREC
OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER MAIN FEEDWATER
TRUE
YES1
SWS-XHE-XE-FR-
1B1
SWS MDP 1B1 FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
SWS-XHE-XE-FR-
1B2
SWS MDP 1B2 FAILS TO RUN
TRUE
YES1
SWS-XHE-XE-FS-
1B1
SWS MDP 1B1 FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
SWS-XHE-XE-FS-
1B2
SWS MDP 1B2 FAILS TO START
TRUE
YES1
IE-LDCA
Loss of DC POWER BUS 1A INITIATING EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-LLOCA
LARGE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIAT. EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-LOCCW
LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER INITIAT. EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-LOSWS
LOSS OF SERVICE WATER INITIATING EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-LOOP
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-MLOCA
MEDIUM LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIAT. EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-RHR-CL-V
RHR DISCHARGE TO COLD LEG B ISLOCA OCCURS
0.00
YES4
IE-RHR-RV-V
RHR DISCHARGE TO REACTOR VESSEL ISLOCA OCCURS
0.00
YES4
IE-RHR-SUC-V
RHR SUCTION ISLOCA INITIATING EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-SGTR
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT
0.00
YES4
IE-SI-CLDIS-V
0.00
YES4
IE-SI-RVDISCA-V
SI REACTOR VESSEL INLET A ISLOCA
0.00
YES4
IE-SI-RVDISCB-V
SI REACTOR VESSEL INLET B ISLOCA
0.00
YES4
IE-SLOCA
SMALL LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIATING EVENT
0.00
YES4
Notes:
1.
Base events set to TRUE reflect the failed position, if applicable, for this
analysis.
2.
The probability was determined from human factors work sheets.
3.
Transient initiating event frequency revised to reflect the product of the
initiating fire frequency and the severity factor.
4.
Initiating event frequencies set to zero for this analysis.
5.
Identifies dominant sequence cutset base events that were not revise HPR
HPR
PRESSURE
RECIRCULATION
FAB
FEED
AND
BLEED
HIGH
PRESSURE
INJECTION
RCPSL
SEALS
SURVIVE
PORV/SRVs
ARE CLOSED
MAIN
SYSTEM
EMERGENCY
REACTOR
TRIP
IE-FIRE
FIRE
END-STATE
OK
OK
CD
CD
OK
CD
CD
OK
OK
CD
CD
OK
CD
CD
OK
CD
CD
18 T
Figure 1 Transient Sequence 17
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
AFW -MDP1A
DCP-BRA104
AFW -CKV-CC-1A
AFW-MDP-F S-1A
AFW-MDP-FR-1A
AFW -MDP-TM-1A
AFW -MDP1A-FS-F
AFW -MDP1A-FR-F
AFW-XHE-XL-MDPFS
AFW-XHE-XL-MD PF R
AFW -MDP-CF-MRUN
AFW-AOV-OC-2A
AFW -MDP1A-SUC
AFW-MP1A-CST-F
AFW -MP1A-SUC4
AFW-CKV-CC-301
AFW-CKV-CC -3 11A
AFW-CKV-CF-PMPS
AFW-TNK-FC-CST1
AFW -MOV-CC-SWS1A
AFW-MOV-CF-SWPMP
SWS-HDRA
AFW -XHE-XA-SUCT
TBLDG -TBAF WA
AFW-PMP-FR-MD1 A
ACP-BUS5
ACP-BU S5
/SBO
AFW-MDP1 A-SUC2
AFW -MDP1A-SUC3
AFW -AO V-CO-MU3A
AFW -AOV-CO-MU3B
AF W-TNK-F C-R MWST
AFW-XVM-OC-DW 20
AFW -MDPA-SUC5
AF W-MDP-CF-MSTRT
SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN
AFW MOTOR DRIVEN
PUMP 1A FAILURES
125 VDC VITAL BUS
BRA-104 FAILS
AFW MDP 1A UNAVAILABLE
DUE TO TEST AND
MAINTENANCE
AFW MDP 1A FAILS
TO RUN
AFW MDP 1A FAILS
TO START
AFW MDP 1A DISCHARGE
CHECK VALVE FAILS TO
OPEN
AFW MDP 1A
FAILS TO START
AFW MDP 1A
FAILS TO RUN
OPERATOR FAILS TO
RECOVER AFW MDP
(FAILS TO START)
OPERATOR FAILS TO
RECOVER AFW MDP
(FAILS TO RUN)
COMMON CAUSE
FAILURES OF AFW
MDPs TO RUN
AFW MDP 1A DISCHARGE
AOV 2A FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
FAILURE OF WATER
SOURCE TO AFW
MDP 1A FAILS
WATER SOURCE FROM
CONDENSATE STORAGE
TANKS TO MDP 1A FAILS
WATER SOURCE
FROM SWS TO
MDP 1A FAILS
AFW CONDENSATE
STORAGE TANK FAILS
TO PROVIDE WATER
AFW MDP 1A SUCTION
CHECK VALVE 311A
FAILS TO OPEN
CONDENSATE STORAG E
TANK DISCHARGE CHECK
VALVE FAILS
SUCTIO N CHECK
VALVES
FAILURE OF SERVICE
WATER SYSTEM
HEADER A
601A TO AFW MDP 1A
FAILS
ISOLATION MOVS TO
AFW SYSTEM
OPERATOR FAILS TO
ALIGN SWS/xtie RMST
TO AFW SYSTEM
TURBINE BLDG AFW
MDP A RM COOLING
FAILS
AFW MOTOR-DRIVEN
1A PUMP UNIT ONLY
FAILS TO RUN
4160 VAC SAFETY BUS
5 FAILS
4160 VAC SAFETY BUS
5 FAILS
STATION BLACKOUT
HAS OCCURRED
FAILURE OF ALT WATER
SOURCE TO AFW
MDP 1A FAILS
FAILURE OF ALT WATER
SOURCE TO AFW
MDP 1A FAILS
FAILURE OF ALT WATER
SOURCE TO AFW
MDP 1A FAILS
CONDENSOR MAKEUP
VALVE MU-3A FAILS
OPEN
CONDENSOR MAKEUP
VALVE MU-3B FAILS
OPEN
REACTOR M/U WATER
STO RAGE TANK FAILS
TO PROVIDE W ATER
RMWST MANUAL
VALVE DW-20 FAILS
TO CLOSE
BACKUP WATER
SOURCE FROM RMWST
FAILS
COMMON CAUSE
FAILURES OF AFW
MDPs TO START
FAILURE TO ALIGN
ALTERNATE SAFE
SHUTDOWN POWER
SUPPLIES
Figure 2 AFW
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
CCW-A
CCW-A1
CCW-MDP-FR-1A
CCW-MDP-FS-1A
CCW-CKV-CC-3A
CCW-MDP-CF-STRT
DCP-BRA104
CCW-CKV-CF-DISMDP
CCW-A3
CCW-A4
CCW-A2
CCW -HTX-PG-1A
CCW-MOV-OC-6A
SWS-HDRA
ACP-BUS5
SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN
FAILURES OF
CCW MDP 1A
COMPONENT
COOLING WATER
TRAIN A FAILS
125 VDC VITAL BUS
BRA-104 FAILS
MDP's TO
START
CCW MDP 1A DISCHARGE
CHECK VALVE CC-3A FAILS
TO OPEN
CCW MDP 1A FAILS
TO START
CCW MDP 1A FAILS
TO RUN
DISCHARGE CKVs TO
OPEN
HOUSE EVENT: LOSS
OF OFFSITE POWER
HAS OCCURED
CCW MDP 1A
FAILS TO START
DURING LOOP
FAILURE OF COMPONENT
COOLING WATER
MDP 1A TO START
CCW HEAT
EXCHANGER 1A
FAILS
CCW HEAT
EXCHANGER 1A FAILS
CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 1A
OUTLET MOV 6A FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN
NO OR INSUFFUCIENT
FLOW TO SWS
HEADER A
4160 VAC SAFETY BUS
5 FAILS
FAILURE TO ALIGN
ALTERNATE SAFE
SHUTDOWN POWER
SUPPLIES
Figure 3 CCW
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
HPI-MDP1A
HPI-MDP-FS-1A
HPI-MDP-FR-1A
HPI-MDP-TM-1A
HPI-XHE-XR-1A
HPI-CKV-CC-6A
ACP-BUS5
HPI-MDP-CF-STRT
HPI-CKV-CF-PMPS
SW S-HDRA
DCP-BRA104
HPI-MDP-CF-RUN
SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN
FAILURES OF
HPI MDP 1S
(SOUTH)
COMPONENT
COO LING WATER
SYSTEM FAILS
HPI MDP 1A DISCHARGE
CHECK VALVE 6A FAILS TO
OPEN
OP FAILS TO
RESTO RE HPI MDP 1A
AFTER T&M
HPI MDP 1A UNAVAILABL E
DUE TO TEST AND
MAINTENANCE
HPI MDP 1A FAILS TO
RUN
41 60 VAC SAFETY BUS
5 FAILS
HPI MDP 1A FAILS TO
START
HPI PUMP COMMON
CAUSE FAILURES TO
START
DISCHARGE CH ECK
VALVES
NO OR INSUFFUCIEN T
FLO W TO SWS
HEADER A
125 VDC VITAL BUS
BRA-104 FAILS
H PI PUMP CO MMON
CAUSE FAILURES TO
run
FAILURE TO ALIGN
ALTERNATE SAFE
SH UTDOW N POW ER
SUPPLIES
Figure 4 HPI
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
SWS-MDP1A1
SWS-MDP-FS-1A1
DCP-BRA104
SWS-CKV-CC-1A1
SWS-STR-PG-1A1
SWS-MDP-FR-1A1
ACP-BUS5
SWS-MDP1A1-TSC-F
SWS-MP1A1-TSCA1-F
SWS-MP1A1-TSCA2-F
SWS-SCR-PG-1A1
SWS-SCR-PG-1A2
SWS-MP1A1-TSA1R-F
SWS-MP1A1-TSA2R-F
SWS-SCR-FC-1A1
SWS-MOV-CC-SCRA2
SWS-MOV-CC-SCRA1
SWS-SCR-FC-1A2
SWS-MDP1A1-L
SWS-MDP1A1S-L
LOOP-A
SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN
SWS MDP 1A1
DISCHARGE CKV
FAILS TO OP EN 125 VDC V ITAL BUS
BRA-104 FAILS
SWW MDP 1A1
DISCHARGE S TRAINER
F AILS
SW S MDP 1A1 FAIL S
TO START
FAILURE O F SERVICE
WATER SYSTEM
MD P 1A1
SW S MDP 1A1 FAIL S
TO R UN
4160 VAC SAFE TY BUS
5 FAILS
FAILU RE OF
TRA VELING W ATER
FAIL URE OF
TRAV ELING WATER
S CREEN 1A1
FAILURE OF
TRA VELING W ATER
SCRE EN 1A2
S WS TRA VELING
SCR EE N 1A1 PL UGS
SWS TRA VELING
SCREE N 1A2 PLUG S
FAILURE OF TRAV ELING
SCREEN 1A 1
DEBRIS R EMOVAL
FAILURE O F TRAVELING
SCREEN 1A2
DEBRIS REMOVAL
SWS T RAVELING
SCREEN 1A1 FAILS TO
FUNCTION
SWS TRAVELING
FAILS TO O PEN
SW S TRAV EL ING
S CREEN 1A2 FAILS TO
FU NCTION
SWS TRAVE LING
S CREEN MOV 2 02A2
FAILS TO O PEN
HOUSE E VENT: LOSS
OF OFFSITE POWER
FLAG
FAIL URES OF
SWS MDP 1A1
DURING LO OP
SWS MDP 1A1
FAILS DURING
FAILUR E TO ALIGN
AL TERNATE SAFE
SHUT DOWN POWER
SU PPLIE S
Figure 5 SWS
E
Inspection Report 50-305/02-06