IR 05000305/2002006
| ML20112J513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/2020 |
| From: | Christopher Hunter NRC/RES/DRA/PRB |
| To: | |
| Hunter C (301) 415-1394 | |
| References | |
| IR 2002006 | |
| Download: ML20112J513 (12) | |
Text
SEITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Final Precursor Analysis nspection Report 50-305/02-06 Accident Sequence Precursor Program --- Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Kewaunee Failure to provide a fixed fire suppression system for the fire area TU-95B could result in a postulated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump lube oil fir Inspection Report Date Inspection Report CDP = [
October 30, 2002 50-305/02-06 July 1, 2004 Condition Summary Description. The inspection report 50-305/02-06 (Ref. 1) described the failure to provide a fixed fire suppression system in fire area TU-95B which could result in a postulated fire that initiates in the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump B (AFWMDPB) and rapidly propagates throughout the fire area causing loss of control cables in both safe shutdown trains. Appendix R requirements for fixed suppression in areas containing safe shutdown equipment and requiring alternative or dedicated safe shutdown systems was not met.
Duration. Due to the fire suppression capability being ineffective for more than one year, the maximum time of one year is used for the duration in a conditional assessment.
Cause. The cause of this condition is a design deficiency for failure to provide a fixed fire suppression system.
Recovery opportunity. A postulated fire in fire area TU-95B is assumed to cause loss of AFWMDPB and control power to both trains of safe shutdown pumps, including the auxiliary feedwater turbine-driven pump C (AFWTDPC), and other pumps in the residual heat removal (RHR), component cooling water (CCW), high pressure injection (HPI), and essential service water (SWS) systems. Recovery of one train of safe shutdown equipment is assumed to be accomplished using the alternate safe shutdown system (ASSS). However, recovery for the AFWTDPC is not credited due to assumed smoke in the AFWTDPC plant area.
Analysis Results
! Importance The risk significance of portions of equipment and cable trains is determined by performing a conditional assessment using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) Model for Kewaunee Revision 3 (Ref. 2) where the both the point estimate mean increase in core damage probability (CDP) are 1.0x10- SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSUR Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 The Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program acceptance threshold is an importance (CDP) of 1 x 10-6.
! Uncertainty The uncertainty about the mean is: 5% bound, 4.1 x 10-6 and 95% bound, 2.0 x 10-5.
! Dominant Sequence The fire event tree (IE-FIRE) dominating sequence is Transient Sequence 17 (See Figure 1). The events and important component failures for Transient Sequence 17 include:
- Reactor trips successfully during transient
- Failure of AFW system
- Failure of main feedwater system during transient
- Failure of feed and bleed Modeling Assumptions
! Assessment summary Assumptions The fire is assumed to initiate in the AFWMDP lube oil and rapidly propagate to the trains of pump control cables in fire area TU-95B. Recovery of one train of safe shutdown equipment using the ASSS was credited. The AFW turbine-driven pump was not affected by the fire, but the pump control cables were in the fire zone. Therefore, the pump lost function and not recoverable due to smoke in the pump roo Fire-induced analysis methodology The fire-induced analysis is based on the component AFWMDPB fire frequency, coupled with the severity factor for the spill of lube oil. The product of the initiating component fire frequency, the severity factor, and the probability of nonsuppression are multiplied to determine the IE-Fire frequency that replaces the IE-TRANS frequency for this analysi Initiating Fire Frequency - The initiating fire frequency (FAFWMDP) was developed from NRC fire database (1987-2001) for AFWMDP lube oil fires (Ref. 3). The component fire frequency is 3.9 x 10-4 per reactor-year of power operation based on the following:
FAFWMDP = (No. Of AFWMDP Fires + Jeffreys Prior)
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 (Average No. Of AFWMDPs per plant x Power Operation Reactor-Years)
FAFWMDP = (0 + 0.5) = 3.9 x 10-4/reactor-year of power operation (1.5 x 852)
- Severity Factor - The severity factor (0.2) is based on the estimated probability of a lube oil spill (from NRC SERP Worksheet, Ref. 5).
- Probability of nonsuppression The postulated AFWMDPB lube oil fire is assumed to propagated rapidly (less than one minute) throughout the entire fire area without suppression. Therefore, the probability of nonsuppression = IE-FIRE = Fafwmdp x severity factor x probability of nonsuppression
= 3.9 x 10-4 x 0.2 x 1.0 = 7.8 x 10-5 NOTE:
No other initiating fire sources were considered significant, as there were insufficient combustibles to affect other equipment in the fire area.
! Modifications to fault trees The use of the alternate safe shutdown system for recovery of train A safe shutdown equipment was modeled by adding base event SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN to each of the following fault trees: AFW-MDP1A, CCW, HPI-MDP1A, RHR-MDP1A, SWS-MDP1A1, and SWS-MDP1A2 (See Figures 2 through 5).
! Basic event probability changes Table 4 provides the basic events that were modified to reflect the event condition being analyzed. The bases for these changes are as follows:
- AFW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (AFW-MDP-FR-1B). The value was set to TRU AFW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (AFW-MDP-FS-1B). The value was set to TRU Operator fails to recover AFW MDPB (Fails to Start) (AFW-XHE-XL-MDPFSB). The value was set to TRU AFWTDP 1C Fails to Run (AFW-TDP-FR-1C). This value was set to TRU AFWTDP 1C Fails to Start (AFW-TDP-FS-1C). This value was set to TRU Operator Fails to Recover AFWTDP 1C (AFW-XHE-XL-TDPFR). This value was set to TRU SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
- CCW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (CCW-MDP-FR-1B). The value was set to TRU CCW Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (CCW-MDP-FS-1B). The value was set to TRU Diesel Generator 1B Fails to Run (EPS-DGN-FR-1B). The value was set to TRU Diesel Generator 1B Fails to Start (EPS-DGN-FS-1B). The value was set to TRU RHR Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (RHR-MDP-FR-1B). The value was set to TRU RHR Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (RHR-MDP-FS-1B). The value was set to TRUE
- Operator Fails to Restore RHR MDPB (Fails to Run) (RHR-XHE-XR-1B). The value was set to TRU HPI Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Run (HPI-MDP-FR-1B). This value was set to TRU HPI Motor-Driven Pump 1B Fails to Start (HPI-MDP-FS-1B). This value was set to TRU Operator fails to restore HPI MDP-1B (HPI-XHE-XR-1B). This value was set to TRU SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B1 Fails to Run (SWS-MDP-FR-1B1). This value was set to TRU SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B2 Fails to Run (SWS-MDP-FR-1B2). This value was set to TRU SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B1 Fails to Start (SWS-MDP-FS-1B1). This value was set to TRU SWS Motor-Driven Pump 1B2 Fails to Start (SWS-MDP-FS-1B2). This value was set to TRU Failure to Align Alternate Safe Shutdown System (SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN).
This value was set to 1.0E-00 Transient Initiating Event (IE-TRANS). This value was set to same value as the AFWMDP component fire frequency x severity factor = 7.8E-5 (also referred to as IE-FIRE).
All other initiating events were set to zero.
! Model update Recovery of one train of safe shutdown equipment (train A) was modeled using the ASSS in the Rev. 3 SPAR mode SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 References EA-02-204, dated October 30, 2002, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant - NRC Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 and Preliminary White Finding (ADAMS Accession N ML023090310). James K. Knudsen and Scott T. Beck, Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for Kewaunee (ASP PWR B), Revision 3 Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, October 2003. J. R. Houghton and D. M. Rasmuson, NRC Report RES/OERAB/S02-01, Fire Events Update of U.S. Operating Experience. 1986-1999, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC, January 2002 and database update 2000-2001. Engineering Evaluation Number 2002-0008, dated 3/7/02, SDP Fire Risk Evaluation for Kewaunee Safeguards Alley Without Suppression, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Engineering Evaluation (for Kewaunee). SERP Worksheet for Kewaunee: Failure to Provide a Fixed Fire Suppression System for Safeguards Alley Fire Area TU-95B (Ref. EA-02-04), SERP Date: September 27, 2002 EA-02-204, dated December 2, 2002, Final Significance Determination For a WHITE Finding and Notice of Violation, NRC Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 (DRS) (Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant)(ADAMS Accession No. ML023380666).
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 Table 1. Conditional Probabilities Associated with Highest Probability Sequences (Importance Conditional core Event tree Sequence damage probability name Number (CCDP)
TRANS 17 9.8E-006 Total (all sequences) 1.0E-005 Table 2a. Event Tree Sequence Logic for Dominant Sequence Event tree Sequence Logic name n (/ denotes success; see Table 4b for top event names)
TRANS 17 /RT, AFW, MFW, FAB Table Conditional cut sets for Dominant TRANS Sequence
/RT REACTOR Trips Successfully During Transient AFW No or Insufficient AFW Flow MFW Main Feedwater System is Unavailable FAB Feed and Bleed Cooling is Unavailable NOTES: See Table 4 for definitions and probabilities for the basic events. Total CCDP includes all cut sets (including those not shown in this table)
Table Definitions and probabilities for modified and dominant basic events Probabil Event name Description ity/Freq Modifi ed uency AFW-MDP-FR-1B AFW MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN FAILURE PROBABILITY TRUE YES1 AFW-MDP-FS-1B AFW MDP 1B FAILS TO START FAILURE PROBABILITY TRUE YES1 AFW-xHE-XE- OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER AFW MDP B TRUE YES1 MDPFSB AFW-TDP-FR-1C AFW TDP 1C FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 AFW-TDP-FS-1C AFW TDP 1C FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 AFW-XHE-XL-TDPFR OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER TDP 1C TRUE YES1
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SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 Prob./ Modifi Event Name Description Fre u ed CCW-MDP-FR-1B CCW MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 CCW-MDP-FS-1B CCW MDP 1B FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 EPS-DGN-FR-1B DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 EPS-DGN-FS-1B DIESEL GENERATOR B FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 HPI-MDP-FR-1B HPI MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 HPI-MDP-FS-1B HPI MDP 1B FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 HPI-XHE-XR-1B OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER HPI MDP 1B TRUE YES1 RHR-MDP-FR-1B RHR MDP 1B FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 RHR-MDP-FS-1B RHR MDP 1B FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 MFW-SYS-UNAVAIL MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE TRUE YES1 MFW-XHE-NOREC OPERATOR FAILS TO RECOVER MAIN FEEDWATER TRUE YES1 SWS-XHE-XE-FR- SWS MDP 1B1 FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 1B1 SWS-XHE-XE-FR- SWS MDP 1B2 FAILS TO RUN TRUE YES1 1B2 SWS-XHE-XE-FS- SWS MDP 1B1 FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 1B1 SWS-XHE-XE-FS- SWS MDP 1B2 FAILS TO START TRUE YES1 1B2 IE-LDCA Loss of DC POWER BUS 1A INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-LLOCA LARGE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIAT. EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-LOCCW LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER INITIAT. EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-LOSWS LOSS OF SERVICE WATER INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-LOOP LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-MLOCA MEDIUM LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIAT. EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-RHR-CL-V RHR DISCHARGE TO COLD LEG B ISLOCA OCCURS 0.00 YES4 IE-RHR-RV-V RHR DISCHARGE TO REACTOR VESSEL ISLOCA OCCURS 0.00 YES4 IE-RHR-SUC-V RHR SUCTION ISLOCA INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-SGTR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 IE-SI-CLDIS-V SI COLD LEG ISLOCA OCCURS 0.00 YES4 IE-SI-RVDISCA-V SI REACTOR VESSEL INLET A ISLOCA 0.00 YES4 IE-SI-RVDISCB-V SI REACTOR VESSEL INLET B ISLOCA 0.00 YES4 IE-SLOCA SMALL LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT INITIATING EVENT 0.00 YES4 Notes: Base events set to TRUE reflect the failed position, if applicable, for this analysis. The probability was determined from human factors work sheets. Transient initiating event frequency revised to reflect the product of the initiating fire frequency and the severity factor. Initiating event frequencies set to zero for this analysis. Identifies dominant sequence cutset base events that were not revise SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
FIRE REACTOR EMERGENCY MAIN PORV/SRVs RCP HIGH FEED HPR TRANSIENT TRIP FEEDWATER FEEDWATER ARE CLOSED SEALS PRESSURE AND PRESSURE SYSTEM SURVIVE INJECTION BLEED RECIRCULATION IE-FIRE RP S AFW MFW PORV RC PSL HPI FAB HP R # END-STATE 1 OK 2 OK 3 CD 4 CD SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 5 OK 6 CD 7 CD 8 OK 9 OK 10 CD 11 CD 12 OK Inspection Report 50-305/02-06
13 CD 14 CD 15 OK 16 CD 17 CD 18 T ATWS Figure 1 Transient Sequence 17
AFW MOTOR DRIVEN PUMP 1A FAILURES AFW -MDP1A 125 VDC VITAL BUS AFW MDP 1 ADISCHARGE AFW MDP 1A AFW MDP 1A UNAVAILABL E FAILURE OF WATER AFW MDP 1 A TURBINE BLDG AFW COMMON CAUSE BRA- 104 FAILS CHECK VAL VE FAILS TO FAILS TO START DUE TO TEST AND SOURCE TO AFW FAILS TO RUN MDPA RM COOLING FAILURES OF AFW OPEN MAINTENANCE MDP 1A FAILS FAILS MDPs TO RUN DCP -BRA 104 AFW -CKV-CC-1A AFW -MDP1A-F S-F AFW -MDP-TM-1A AFW -MDP1A-SUC AFW -MDP1A-F R-F T BLDG -TBAF WA AFW -MDP-CF-M RUN AFW MOTOR-DRIVEN 416 0 VAC SAFETY BUS AFW M DP 1A FAIL S OPERATOR FAILS TO AFW MDP 1AFAIL S OPERATOR FAILS TO AFW MDP 1A DISCHARGE COMMON CAUSE 1A PUMP UNIT ONLY 5 FAILS TO START RECOVER AFW MDP TO RUN RECOVER AFW MDP AOV 2 AFAIL S TO FAILURES OF AFW FAILS TO RUN ( FAILS TO START) (FAILS TO RUN) REM AIN OPEN MDPs TO START SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AF W-PMP-FR-MD1 A ACP -BU S5 AF W-M DP-F S-1A AFW-X HE-XL-M DPF S A FW-M DP-F R-1A AF W-XHE-XL-MD PF R AF W-AOV-OC-2A AF W-M DP-CF -MSTRT WATER SOURCE FROM FAIL URE OF ALT WATER CONDENSATE STORAGE SOURCE TO AFW TANKS TO MDP 1A FAILS MDP 1A FAILS AFW- MP1A-CST-F AF W-MD P1A -SU C1 AFW CONDENSATE AFW MDP 1A SUCTION FAILURE OF ALT WATER FAILURE TO ALIGN STORAGE TANK FAILS CONDENSATE STORAG E CHECK VALVE 311A CCF OF AFW PUMP STATION BLACKOUT TANK DISCHARGE CHECK SUCTIO N CHECK HAS OCCURRED SOURCE TO AFW AL TERNATE SAFE TO PROVIDE WATER VAL VE FAILS FAILS TO OPEN VALVES MDP 1A FAILS SHUTDOWN POWER SUPPLIES AF W-TNK -FC-CST 1 AF W-CK V-CC-301 AF W-CKV-CC -3 11A AF W-CKV-CF -PM PS /SBO A FW-M DP1 A-S UC2 SS S-XHE-X E-ALIGN CONDENSOR MAKEUP CONDENSOR MAKEUP FAILURE OF ALT WATER OPERATOR FAILS TO VALVEM U-3B FAILS VALVE MU-3 A FAILS SOURCE TO AFW ALIG N SWS/xtie RM ST OPEN OPEN MDP 1A FAILS TO AFW SYSTEM
AFW -AOV-CO-MU3B AFW -AO V-CO-M U3A AFW -MDP1A-SUC3 A FW - XHE -XA-S UCT WATER SOURCE BACKUP WATER FROM SWS TO SOURCE FROM RMWST MDP 1A FAILS FAILS Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 AFW -M P1A-S UC4 A FW - MDPA-SUC5 FAIL URE OF SERVICE SWS ISOLATION MOV 416 0 VAC SAFETY BUS CCF OF SW S REACTOR M/U WATER RMWST MANUAL WATER SYSTEM 6 01A TO AFW MDP 1A 5 FAILS ISOLATION MOVS TO STO RAGE TANK FAILS VALVE DW- 20 FAILS HEADER A FAILS AFW SYSTEM TO PROVIDEW ATER TO CL OSE SWS-HDRA AFW -MOV-CC-SWS1A ACP-BUS5 AFW-M OV-CF-SWPMP AF W-T NK-F C-R MWST AFW-XVM-OC-DW 20 Figure 2 AFW
COMPONENT COOLING WATER TRAIN A FAIL S CCW-A FAILURE TO ALIGN CCW HEAT FAILURES OF ALTERNATE SA FE CCW MDP 1 A EXCHANGER 1A SHUTDOWN POWER SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE FAILS SUPPL IES CCW-A1 S SS-XHE-XE-A LIGN CCW -A2 CCW MDP 1A FAILS 4 160 VAC SAFETY BUS CCW MDP 1 A CCW HE AT CCW HEAT EXCHANGER 1A NO OR INSUFFUCIENT TO RUN 5 FAILS FAILS TO S TART EXCHANGER 1A FAILS OUTLET MOV 6A FAILS TO FLOW TO SWS DURING LOOP REMAIN OPEN HEADER A CCW-MDP-FR-1A ACP-BUS5 CCW-A3 CCW -HTX-P G-1A CCW-MOV-OC-6A S WS-HDRA FAILURE OF COMPONENT HOUSE EVENT: LOSS COOLING WATER OF OFFS ITE POWER MDP 1A TO START HAS OCCURED
CCW-A4 LOOP Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 125 VDC VITAL BUS CCW MDP 1A FAILS CCW MDP 1A DISCHARGE CCF OF CCW CCF OF CCW MDP BRA-104 FAILS TO START CHECK VALV E CC-3A FAILS MDP' s TO DISCHARGE CKVs TO TO OPEN START OPEN DCP-BRA104 CCW-MDP-FS-1A CCW-CKV-CC-3A CCW-MDP-CF-STRT CCW-CKV-CF-DISMDP Figure 3 CCW
F AILURES OF HPI MDP 1S (SO UTH)
H PI-MDP1A SENSITIVE - NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 125 VDC VIT AL BUS 41 60 VAC SAF ET Y BUS HPI MDP 1A F AILS T O OP FAILS T O HPI PUMP COMMON H PI PUMP CO MMON BRA-104 FAILS 5 F AILS RUN RESTO RE HPI M DP 1A CAUSE FAILURES T O CAUSE F AILURES TO AFT ER T &M ST ART run D CP-BRA104 ACP-BU S5 H PI-MDP- FR- 1A HPI-XH E-XR-1A HPI-MD P-CF -STR T H PI-MDP- CF- RUN NO OR INSUFFUCIEN T CO MPONENT HPI MDP 1A FAILS T O HPI MDP 1A UNAVAILABL E HPI MDP 1A DISCHARGE C CF O F HPI M DP FLO W TO SWS COO LING WAT ER ST ART DUE T O TEST AND CHECK VALVE 6A F AILS TO DISCHARGE CH ECK HEADER A SYSTEM FAILS MAINTENANCE OPEN VALVES SW S-HD RA CC W HPI-MD P-FS- 1A HPI-MDP- TM-1A HPI-CKV-CC -6A HPI-CKV-CF-PMPS 11 F AILURE T O ALIGN ALT ERNAT E SAFE SH UTDOW N POW ER SUPPLIES Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 SSS-XHE- XE- ALIGN Figure 4 HPI
FAILURE O F SERVICE WATER SYST EM MD P 1A1 SWS-MDP1A1 FAILUR E TO ALIGN FAIL URES O F SWW MDP 1A1 FAILU RE OF 4160 VAC SAFE TY BUS SW S MDP 1A1 FAIL S AL TERNATE SAFE SWS M DP 1A1 DISCHARGE S TRAINER TRA VELING W ATER 5 FAILS T O R UN SHUT DOWN POWER DURING LO OP F AILS SCRE ENS TO M DP 1A1 SU PPLIE S E
SSS-XHE-XE-ALIGN SWS-MDP1A1-L SWS-STR-PG-1A1 ACP-BUS5 SWS-MDP1A1-TSC-F SWS-MDP-FR-1A1 SWS MDP 1A1 HOUSE E VENT : LOSS FAIL URE OF FAILURE OF FAILS DURING OF O FFSIT E POWER TRAV ELING WATER T RA VELING W AT ER LO OP F LAG S CREEN 1A1 SCRE EN 1A2 SWS-MDP1A1S-L LOOP-A SWS-MP1A1-TSCA1-F SWS-MP1A1-TSCA2-F SW S M DP 1A1 FAIL S 125 VDC V ITAL BUS SWS MDP 1A1 S WS TRA VELING F AILURE OF T RAV ELING SWS T RA VELING F AILURE O F T RAVELING T O ST ART BRA-104 F AILS DISCHARGE CKV SCR EE N 1A1 PL UGS SCREEN 1A 1 SCREE N 1A2 PLUG S SCREEN 1A2 FAILS TO OP EN DEBRIS R EMOVAL DEBRIS REM OVAL 12 SWS-MDP-FS-1A1 DCP-BRA104 SWS-CKV-CC-1A1 SWS-SCR-PG-1A1 SWS-MP1A1-TSA1R-F SWS-SCR-PG-1A2 SWS-MP1A1-TSA2R-F Inspection Report 50-305/02-06 SWS T RAVELING SWS TRAVELING SW S TRAV EL ING SWS TRAVE LING SCREEN 1A1 FAILS T O SCR EEN M OV 20 2A1 S CREEN 1A2 F AILS TO S CREEN MOV 2 02A2 FUNCT ION F AILS TO O PEN FU NCTION F AILS T O O PEN SWS-SCR-FC-1A1 SWS-MOV-CC-SCRA1 SWS-SCR-FC-1A2 SWS-MOV-CC-SCRA2 Figure 5 SWS