IR 05000289/1986002

Insp Rept 50-289/86-02 on 860207-0307.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Power Operations,Including Clow Corp Valves,Nuclear Svcs Pump Seal Repair,Fire Doors & Condenser Offgas Monitor Inoperability

ML20198E588
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	05/13/1986
From:	Blough A, Conte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198E584	List: IR 05000289/1986002 ML20198E578
References
50-289-86-02, 50-289-86-2, NUDOCS 8605280070
Download: ML20198E588 (22)

Text

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i . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

j REGION I

i Report N /86-02 I

Docket N i l License N DPR-50 Priority -- Category C

i Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation

Post Office Box 480

! Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 i

Facility At: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 ,

j Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania

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l Inspection Conducted: February 7, 1986 - March 7, 1986

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j Inspectors: W. Baunack, Project Engineer, Region I i R. Conte, Senior Resident Inspector (TMI-1)

j R. Urban, Reactor Engineer, Region I

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A. Weadock, Radiation Specialist, Region I F. Young, Resident Inspector (TMI-1), Region I Reporting Inspector: _

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R. Conte,4enior Resident Inspector (TMI-1) Date ;

Approved By: 5 -/J - fl, i A. BlougV, Chief Date '

j Reactor Projects Section No. IA

! Division of Reactor Projects

Inspection Summary:

Resident and region-based NRC staff conducted routine safety inspections (273

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hours) of power operations, focusing on plant and personnel performance. Speci-i fically, items reviewed in detail in the operation and maintenance area were:

a Clow Corporation valves; nuclear services pump seal repair; f. ire doors; con-

denser offgas monitor inoperability; and reactor protection system trip breaker malfunction. Special focus occurred on radiological events and radiological

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control technician training. Other review items included: reactor building ,

spray system walkdown; new fuel receipt, 1982 welding allegations; and, licensee actions on previous inspection finding Inspection Results:

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The inspectors continued to observe examples of the licensee's application of positive control over various operational and work activities which contribute i to avoidance of plant trips and challenges to safety systems. The operational problems that did occur resulted in a display of effective licensee self-iden-

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tification and reviews to effect appropriate action. The radiological events l were not unusual considering the extensive preventive and corrective maintenance I

activities being implemented, but indicated a need to enhance performance in '

{ certain areas. The radiological controls department continued to provide good support to operations personnel.

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~ 8605280070 860514 PDR ADOCK 05000289 '

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Safety systems reviewed were found to be properly maintained, tested, and aligned for standby status. New fuel receipt activities were adequate, and they included quality assurance department coverag The licensee took appro-priate action on previous inspection findings, a

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DETAILS

1. Introduction and Overview 1.1 NRC Staff Activities The overall purpose of this inspection was to assess licensee activi-ties for the power operation mode as they related to reactor safety

and worker radiation protection. Within each area, the inspectors 1 documented the specific purpose of the area under review, scope of j inspection activities and findings, along with appropriate con-

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clusions. The inspector made this assessment by reviewing infor-mation on a sampling basis through actual observation of licensee l activities, interviews with licensee personnel, measurement of f radiation levels, or independent calculation and selective review j of listed applicable documents, j 1.2 Licensee Activities

! During this period the licensee operated the plant at full powe ! There were no plant trips or significant plant transients. Routina -

) operations, maintenance, and surveillance were conducted. The ,

j reactor protection system trip breaker failure and the inoperable condenser offgas monitor are discussed in more detail in paragraph ;

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2. Plant Operations i

j 2.1 Scope of Review

] The NRC resident inspectors periodically inspected the facility to determine the licensee's compliance with the general operating requirements of Section 6 of the Technical Specifications (TS) in j the following areas:

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review of selected plant parameters for abnormal trends; 3 --

plant status from a maintenance / modification viewpoint, includ- '

ing plant housekeeping and fire protection measures; i

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control of ongoing and special evolutions, including control room personnel awareness of these evolutions; i

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control of documents, including logkeeping practices;

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implementation of radiological controls; and, i l

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implementation of the security plan, including access control, j boundary integrity, and badging practice I I

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j i Because of additional resident office coverage at this facility, i

more detailed and frequent reviews of operating personnel perfor-mance were conducted to determine that:

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operators are attentive and responsive to plant parameters and- ,

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plant evolutions and testing are planned and properly authorized; i

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procedures are used and followed as required by plant policy; l

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equipment status changes are appropriately documented and j communicated to appropriate shift personnel; j --

the operating conditions of plant equipment are effectively J monitored and appropriate corrective action is initiated when 1 required;

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- , backup instrumentation, measurement, and readings are used as . L appropriate when normal instrumentation is found to be defec-l tive or out of tolerance; I --

logkeeping is timely, accurate, and adequately reflects plant l activities and status; i

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operators follow good operating practices in conducting plant

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operator actions are consistent with performance-oriented

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The inspectors focused additional attention on the areas listed below.

j General / Operations -

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Control room operations during regular and backshift hours,

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including frequent observation of activities in progress, and

] periodic reviews of selected sections of the shift foreman's

log and control room operator's log and other control room

, daily logs

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Followup items on activities that could affect plant safety or impact on plant operations

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Areas outside the control room i

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Selected licensee planning meetings

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Fire barrier integrity

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Condenser offgas radiation process monitor operations Maintenance

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Work planning meetings

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Storage of flammable gases in work areas

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Nuclear service pump mechanical seal repair

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Reactor Protection System breaker contact pin alignment

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Radiochemistry lab drain trap leak

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CA-V2 packing leak repair

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CA-V25C body-to-bonnet leak repair Radiological Controls

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Locked high radiation doors

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Radiation Work Permit posting

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Survey maps Surveillance

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Reactor Protection System breaker undervoltage and shunt trip tests

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Nuclear service pump post-maintenance inservice test As a result of this review, the inspectors reviewed specific events in more detail as described in the sections that follo .2 Findings 2. General During this period, licensee management continued their presence and involvement in daily activities. While the plant remained at full power, the licensee continued to work selected modifications to support required modifica-tions. Overall, the licensee exhibited positive control and involvement to ensure that the work did not have an adverse effect on plant operation __

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2. Clow Corporation Valves On September 23, 1982, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation reported to the NRC Region 1 a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e)

deficiency concerning the heat treatment of valves manu-factured by Clow Corporation. On searching their purchas-ing files and records, licensee personnel have determined that the licensee has not purchased valves for TMI-1 from

, the Clow Corporation. The inspector has no further questions on this item.

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2. Nuclear Service Pump Maintenance The inspector witnessed portions of a mechanical seal repair activity on the IB nuclear service pum Specific items witnessed included the followin The overall maintenance was controlled by Job Ticket CI 76 The job ticket was verified to have been properly completed, the work approved, and the equipment formally released for maintenanc Technical specification requirements for equipment gerabilitywereme The equipment was properly tagged out of servic Maintenance procedures were present at the work location. These procedures included (1) Procedure 1410-Y-11, " Repair and Installation Mechanical Seals;" (2) Procedure 1410-Y-18, " Motor Shaft Connec-tion (Coupling);" and, (3) Procedure 1410-Y-72,

" Bolt / Nut Torquing and Sequence."

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QA documentation existed for replacement part Torquing of nuts and bolts was in accordance with procedural requirement Coupling dial indicator readings were observed to be within procedural acceptance criteria and were properly recorde Successful post-maintenance testing was conducte The work area was restored to its initial state of cleanliness following completion of the repai The foreman in charge of the activity had received training in mechanical seal installation / repai ____- _ _ _ _

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No violations or conditions adverse to safety were note . Licensee Identification of a Fire Barrier Removal 5 During the routine performance of his duties on February 18, 1986, an auxiliary operator noticed that radwaste personnel had removed a hatch which provides access to the

"B" reactor building spray system vault in the auxiliary building. This access hatch is also a fire barrier.

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The radwaste personnel were in the process of decontami-nating the floor around the access hatch and also the "B" building spray vault. The radwaste personnel did not recognize the hatch as being part of a fire barrier and removed the hatch to facilitate its decontamination. The

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hatch was removed sometime between 12:00 noon and 3:00 p.m. The auxiliary operator noted the condition at 4:20 p.m. at which time a continuous fire watch was estab-11shed. The hatch was reinstalled at 7:21 p.m. A licensee representative stated he believed the area was never unattended while the hatch was remove The breech of the fire barrier resulted from the radwaste personnel not recognizing the hatch as being part of a fire barrier. To preclude a repetition of this occur-rence, the licensee labeled and numbered the hatch as being a fire doo They will also review the decon procedure to assure it addresses technical specification items and instruct all group radiological control supervi-sors (GRCS) of their responsibility to notify the control

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room prior to removing any similar barriers.

The hatches are a part of a daily fire door inspection surveillance procedur Consequently, had the condition not been promptly noted by an auxiliary operator, it would have been identified during the performance of the daily surveillance. The inspector had no further questions relative to this matte . Condenser Offgas Monitor About 1:25 a.m., February 28, 1986, the licensee found that a condenser offgas radiation monitor, RM-A5, had been inoperable for the previous seven hours. It had been left isolated after the sample line trip was blown down (routinely performed once a shift) the previous shift. A backup monitor was operable, but it indicated locally onl Review of its chart recorder indicated that no abnormal release occurred while the primary monitor was out of servic _- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ --

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The licensee review of the event determined that the isolation of RM-A5 for a period of seven hours violated limiting condition for operation in that activity monitor

, indication was not continuously available to the operators during this time as required by Technical Specifications 3.21.2. Their review also determined the event to be reportable by the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7 The inspector independently reviewed the event to verify

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the information presented by the license The operational characteristics of the control rooms indicator were also reviewed to determine if the inoperable monitor could have i

been detected more quickly by operator observance of CR indication. The inspectors concluded that even though the detector was valved out operator observance would not de-tect any significant changes or trends for several hours j due to a slow decay of activity at ,the detector. This was 1 verified by examining the strip chart recording for the period and comparing it with a normal operating perio ! The inspector concurred with the licensee's assessment of the facts and cause of the isolation of the radiation

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monitor. Review of the strip chart associated with the

second local monitor RM-A13 indicated a normal discharge

reading for this period, i

j The inspector discussed the event and corrective action j with plant managers and selected licensed operators. The j inspector noted the licensee had restated to plant per-

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sonnel the importance of the detector and the associated j technical specification. Discussions with selected auxili-1 ary operators and licensea operators not involved with the j event indicated that information concerning it had been

properly disseminated. In addition, licensee representa-

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tives indicated that during the next refueling outage, a permanent readout for RM-A13 would be installed in the ..

I control room.

I The inspector also concurred with the characterization j that the licensee had violated Technical Specifications.

The inspector noted this to be an apparent violation. The l violation was licensee-identified, and timely corrective

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action was taken. Also, the violation did not adversely effect plant safety during the period when the RM-A5 was not operable. Accordingly no citation will be issued by NR The Itcensee determined that the event was reportable. Therefore, this area is unresolved pending receipt of the licensee event report (289/86-LO-05),

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t 2. Reactor Protection System Breaker Failure i

i At 10:30 a.m. on February 26, 1986, during weekly reactor protection system testing, one of the four d.c. reactor trip breakers (CB-2) failed to open when the shunt trip circuitry was tested. Just prior to this, the breaker's

, undervoltage (UV) trip had been tested successfully. The licensee immediately tested the other three d.c. and two

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a.c. trip breakers and found them functional. The CB-2

, failure was isolated to misaligned electrical contacts f

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that provided control power to the shunt trip device mounted in the breaker cubicle. The shunt trip circuit

! contact mounting board was realigned and the breaker i tested satisfactorily. The licensee declared the breaker l

operable the same day.

l This event involved a partial failure of one breake i Since the UV trip was functional, the breaker would have functioned on demand. Loss of protection would occur only if both trip features (shunt and UV) failed on both a j breaker and the corresponding a.c. breaker, i

The licensee indicated that during the next outage ("5M"),

l all of the RPS br3akers and their contact boards will be j realigned to standardized specifications. Therefore, i contact alignment will be the same for each breaker even if it is moved to another position.

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Visual inspection by the inspector of other breakers in the cabinet disclosed varying alignments but they did not appear to have the potential to adversely affect breaker performance. The inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective action will alleviate future breaker alignment

] problems. The inspector had no further questions in this l are .3 Conclusion

The licensee exhibited positive control over the various opera-tional, maintenance, surveillance, and modification work activitie They continued to implement an ambitious preventive maintenance progra Extreme care was exercised for work activities, especially those involving modifications, to not adversely affect plant opera-tions. The nuclear service pump seal repair job had essential -

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quality assurance elements of equipment control measures, procure-ment control, and procedure implementation, i

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Equipment malfunctions occurred and personnel errors were mad l However, self identification of these problems was characteristic of l these events. Appropriate reporting occurred and adequate correc-

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i tive actions were either taken or planne i

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3. Radiological Events 3.1 Introduction and Overview 4 The inspector reviewed the details and circumstances associated with four radiological events that occurred during this inspection period to determine:

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the cause of the events and.the events' chronology;

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compliance of licensee actions with NRC license and procedural requirements; and,

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licensee actions to correct the cause of the events.

The inspector's review of these incidents included discussions with 1, cognizant licensee personnel and review of the following documents

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applicable system drawings; l

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applicable CR0 and SF logs;

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critique meeting minutes;

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radiological files containing various data, calculations, and strip charts; i

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applicable Radiation Work Permits (RWPs); and,

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applicable switching and tagging orders.

3.2 Radiochemistry Laboratory Noble Gas Release

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On February 13, 1986, a maintenance worker entered the i

Radiochemistry Laboratory on a " standing" RWP to fix a ,

leaking drain trap on a laboratory sink. Upon opening the drain piping system, responses were obtained on various

) portable radiation monitors in the room and on the perma-a nent installation radiation monitor, RM-8G. The system j was reclosed and the worker exited the rocn 3. Licensee Review / Findings The licensee determined that the release lasted from l

7:49 a.m. to 7:55 a.m. on February 13, 1986 A total of 1.5 curies were released to the environment. The composi-l tion of the noble gas was determined to be 87.7% Xe 133,

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10.8% Xe 135, and 1.4% Kr 85M. The related site boundary

]' dose calculation was well within regulatory limit No one was contaminated by the event.

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The licensee determined that there were two contributing causes to this event. The first was opening a contami-nated system and removing the water seal from a drain tra The second cause was maintenance and radcon personnel did not fully appreciate the potential for a radioactive gas release for the work involved opening the particular drain syste Corrective action by the licensee consisted of informing all radcon technicians and maintenance personnel that opening drain trap is considered opening a contaminated system and it cannot be done under a standing RW . NRC Findings The inspector determined that licensee immediate and followup corrective actions were appropriate. The inspec-tor confirmed that the licensee's calculations and esti-mate of activity released were correc No personnel needed to be decontaminated and offsite releases were well below the release limits specified in technical specification Licensee personnel improperly used a standing RWP to perform this maintenance task. This was repetitive of an event in December of 1985, where a standing RWP was used

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to open a radioactive system. This particular maintenance job was not understood by radcon and maintenance personnel to be a system opening type task. This area will continue to be routinely reviewed and closely monitored by the NRC resident office staf No conditions adverse to regulatory requirements were identified in this area and the inspector had no further question .3 Apparent TMI-2 Worker Contamination 3. Incident Circumstances A contractor employee for TMI-2 reported on site on February 17, 1986. The individual could not be whole body counted that day because it was a holiday; therefore, his work was confined to non-radiological areas. The next morning the individual was whole body counted and was determined to have a slight uptake (13 nano curies) of Cesium 137. Initial speculation was that a gaseous release from Unit 1 could have caused the uptake by the individua I

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3. NRC Review / Findings The inspector reviewed strip charts from ventilation radiation monitors RM-A4, RM-A6 and RM-A8 between February 16-18, 1986. The charts indicated that no abnormal releases occurred during this time frame. However, a primary sample was taken on that day; and, because of ventilation draw from Unit 2, some noble gas migrated from Unit I to Unit 2 and apparently resulted in slight contam-

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ination in Unit 2 with short-lived daughter products from noble gas contamination. But this would not explain the

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whole body burden of the individua Subsequent to the end of this inspection, the licensee determined that the uptake was not related to TMI- Instead, the individual had eaten meat of animals from Arctic regions having trace contamination of cesiu .4 Noble Gas Release from Leaking Valve 3. Event Chronology On February 23, 1986, at 11:59 p.m., CA-V2, RCS Sampling (Outside Contair. ment) Isolation Valve, was stroked open as part of a surveillance tes Various plant ventilation radiation monitors alarmed indicating a release of noble gases. However, other valves were being exercised at the same time so licensee personnel were not sure which valve

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caused the monitors to alarm. The_ licensee recycled CA-V2 at 1:30 a.m. and 3:08 a.m. to determine which valve was leaking. After the 3:08 stroke, the licensee determined that CA-V2 was the leaking valv A minor maintenance job ticket was written to repair the packing in the valve. As expected during the maintenance task, more noble gas was released. After the work was completed, the valve was tested and found to be leak tigh . Licensee Review / Findings The licensee determined that the noble gas releases occurred at two separate times._ The first release occurred between 11:59 p.m. , February 23, 1986, and 4:00 a.m., February 24, 198 The second release occurred during maintenance between 11:08 a.m. and 12:10 p.m. on February 24, 1986. During the first release,11.6 Ci exited the plant stack, mostly Xe-133. During the second .

release, a total of 2.8 Ci exited the stack; also mostly l Xe-133. No one was contaminated by this even J

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3. NRC Findings No conditions adverse to regulatory requirements were identified in this area. Review of licensee data and calculations revealed no discrepancies. No personnel were contaminated and the release to the environment was well within the release limits specified in the technical specifications. The release was primarily due to an equipment malfunction on CA-V The inspector had no further questions in this are .5 Contamination Event Due to Valve Maintenance 3. Event Chronology On February 26, 1986, a maintenance worker entered the Nuclear Sample Room to repair three leaking valves. RWP No. 31558 was used and the individual was fully dressed in a wet suit and breathing apparatus. The system had been tagged out in accordance with Tagging Order No.86-296. A plastic bag was placed under CA-V25C, RCS Sample Return Isolation Valve, to catch any leakage. The individual began to disassemble the valve when he was sprayed on the head with less than one gallon of radioactive water.

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There was a small opening between his face mask and hood and the side of his face was slightly contaminate . Licensee Review / Findings The licensee determined that the individual had received 5 mrad skin contamination. He was decontaminated and released. No releases to the environment occrrre At the conclusion of this inspection report period, the licensee had not completed their review; however, prelimi-nary information inaicates that two causes contributed to this event. First, the system was press'acized when the valve was disassemble Second, the worker did not use an effective technique to avoid being sprayed, since the worker used a bag underneath the valve instead of around the valv . NRC Findings Based on preliminary information, the inspector agreed

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with both causes proposed by the licensee. After review-ing the tagging order and the system diagram, the inspector concluded that the tagging order (86-296) did not

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provide for draining or depressurizing the piping such that draining would have prevented this personnel contamination even In addition, the inspector noted that the tagging order specified single valve isolation, although double isola-tion was practical in this cas The licensee agreed with the inspector's conclusion and stated that they would examine this area. The use of single valve isolation did not actually impact this even Based on this preliminary information, the inspector concluded that there were no violations of regulatory requirement However, this item will remain unresolved pending review of licensee corrective action (289/86-02-01).

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The noble gas release events and contamination events are not unusual considering that this licensee is implementing an extensive corrective and preventive maintenance program. No overexposures or significant contaminations resulted and the offsite releases were well within regulatory limit The events do point out the need to correct ventilation system imbalances. The licensee is attempting to correct the ventilation problem. Also, they point out a need for better job planning for maintenance work dealing with contaminated systems and for individuals to be more careful in using techniques to prevent spread of contaminatio No violations were identified and NRC staff will review licensee corrective actions for the contamination event addressed in para-graph . Radiation Protection The inspector observed a radiological controls technician perform a radiation and contamination survey of the compactor area in the auxiliary building on February 12, 1986. Both the technician's performance and the completed survey were found to be adequate in identifying general radio-logical conditions. Additionally, the technician performing the survey was questioned concerning HP staff responses to hypothetical radiological emergency conditions in an effort to evaluate the extent of technician training. The technician properly identified appropriate immediate and 1 corrective action l

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The inspector reviewed several licensee documents relating to radio-

logical controls technical training and qualification, including the TMI-1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the Unit I technical specifications, the TMI-1 Radiological Field Operations Training Program, and procedure

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9000-ADM-2622.01, " Radiological Field Operations Personnel." It was noted that all of the above documents consistently require a biennial requali-fication for radiological control technicians except for the FSAR, Section

11.5.8.4e. This section suggests an annual requalification for radio-logical control technicians. The licensee indicated a change from a "~~

annual to a biennial requalification requirement had occurred with the adoption of the TMI-1 Radiological Field Operations Training program. The

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licensee also indicated Section 11.5.8.43 of the FSAR will be updated to remove the inconsistency during the next revision cycle to the FSAR. The inspector had no outstanding questions on this matte In a related matter, the licensee's letter (Series No.85-629), dated October 14, 1985, indicated that the licensee adopted a practice of identifying and controlling high radiation areas based on dose rate measured at one foot from source. The licensee's proposed change has been reviewed by NRC regional staff and was found to be in accordance'

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with the applicable regulations in 10 CFR 20. This proposed change will lead to a revision in the following licensee procedures:

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9100-ADM-4000.08, Definitions Used in Radiological Control Proce-

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9100-ADM-4110.01, Establishing and Posting Areas; I --

9200-ADM-4220.06, Control of Locked High Radiation Areas; and,

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3000-IMP-4400.01, Control and Tagging of Radioactive Materia These procedures are currently under revision and the-licensee intends to

have the revised procedures in place prior to the start of the outage (scheduled for March 21, 1986). This area will continue to be routinely reviewed by the NRC Resident Office.

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The inspector assessed the operability of the reactor building spray ,

system based on a review of licensee maintenance (preventive and correc- 1 tive) and surveillance activities to verify that:

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procedures required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.2.2 and 4.5.3.la are being properly implemented;

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applicable procedures have the proper format and technical content in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Subsection IWP and applicable sections of ANSI N18.7-1976; I l

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surveillances and preventive maintenance (PM) were conducted at the proper frequency; and,

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machinery history records and related surveillance and preventive maintenance records were retrievabl ,

In addition to discussions with cognizant licensee personnel (in the maintenance, operations, and engineering areas), the inspector reviewed selected portions of the following licensee documents and records:

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Surveillance Procedure (SP) 1303-8.4, " Reactor Building Spray System Compressed Air Test," Revision 7, dated January 24, 1986;

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SP 1303-11.10, " Engineered Safeguards System Emergency Sequence and Power Transfer Test," Revision 15, dated July 26, 1986;

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SP 1300-3A A/B, " Reactor Building Spray Pump Functional Test Recir-culation Mode and Reactor Building Spray System," Revision 14, dated June 13, 1985;

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Operating Procedure 1104-5, " Reactor Building Spray System," Revi-sion 23, dated September 23, 198 Machinery history, surveillance procedures documenting work activities associated with this system were reviewed. Information from job ticket records were available either in microfiche or hard copy. Discussions with plant personnel demonstrated surveillance and preventive maintenance was being performed on this system. A walkdown of the system was per-formed to determine the actual condition of components of the system and to check the current valve lineup. The walkdown revealed no major problems and the system lineun was accurate with respect to the plant condition Review of corrective maintanance indicated that the PM and surveillance tasting was being performed on the system. No significant system problem has been noted. The inspector concluded that maintenance and testing provide adequate reliability such that the building spray system should operate when called upo . New Fuel. Receipt New fuel was shipped to the site by truck in special shipping cortainer Nine shipments consisting of 104 elements were received during October and November 1985. During this inspection, the steps taken by the licensee for receipt, inspection and control of the new fuel were re-viewed. New fuel on site was controlled in accordance with Unit 1 Refueling Procedure 1503-1, " Receipt of New Fuel and Control Components."

This procedure provided for the inspection of the new fuel. This inspec-tion consisted of (1) a check for evidence of damage to the shipping containers; (2) a check for evidence of damage to assemblies after the _

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shipping container covers are removed; and, (3) a visual examination of the assemblies prior to inserting assemblies into storage. The procedure also provided the limits and precautions to be observed during the handling of the new fue Results of all receipt inspections were recorded on appropriate inspec-tion data sheets. The following completed data sheets were reviewed:

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Fuel Handling Building Checklist, which includes a refueling equip-ment checkout, cleanliness inspection, radiation monitor setup, security measures, and a personnel briefing;

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Fuel Shipment Receipt Inspection, which includes a fuel container inspection;

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Container / Fuel Assembly Inspection Report, which included review of the B&W QA maps sent with each fuel assembly, fuel element upper and lower end fitting inspections, upper and lower skirt inspections, spacer grid inspections, and a visual check of the entire length of each fuel assembly from four views;

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Quality Control Receiving Inspection Reports;

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assembly verifications, which included independent assembly verifi-cation and orientatio spent fuel pool "ZZ" tape verification;

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assembly location verification dry fuel storage;

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assembly location verification "A" pool; The quality control (QC) inspectors performing the new fuel inspections had been trained to perform these inspections at Babcock & Wilcox (B&W).

No inspector concerns were identifie . Allegation on Welding at TMI 7.1 Background Allegations concerning several issues dealing with welding were made by members of the National Transient Division of the Boilermakers Union in April of 198 These issues related to the existince of potentially bad welds in the TMI Unit 2 main condenser and'the Unit 1 fuel pool and fuel transfer canal and the pcssible existence of welders from the Boilermakers Union who were Gnqualitked and doing work at the site in the late 1970' ,

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These issues became a matter of public record as a result of hear-ings conducted by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources during 1982, 1983, and 1984. NRC Region III, in reviewing similar allegations, referred the transcripts to Region I on matters con-cerning TMI. The allegations were familiar to Region I because those allegations were reviewed during NRC Region I Inspections 50-289/83-24 and 50-320/83-13. The purpose of the new review was to assure that the referenced inspection reports fully addressed the issues related to TMI in the subject hearing transcrip .2 Review In an inspection conducted during July and August of 1983 and documented in combined Inspection Reports 50-289/83-24 and 50-320/83-13, the validity of these issues was evaluated. It was determined in this inspection report that there were no problems or safety concerns that existed as a result of the allegation Inspections were conducted on the Unit 1 fuel pool and transfer canal tell-tale drains and the Unit 2 main condenser, and a review of welder qualification records was accomplished. The only issue raised was the lack of an adequate criteria for leakage coming from the respective drains for the fuel pool telltale drains. This concern was resolved in a subsequent inspection report

, (50-289/84-17).

Additionally, the Commission, as part of the TMI-1 restart hearings, raised this allegation as one of several " integrity issues" in a document issued on January 20, 1984, titled " list of Integrity Issues in Restart Proceeding," An NRC staff response to this inquiry in a filing dated February 21, 1984, determined that, in the staff's view, the allegations were properly resolved. The inspector verified no new informatior, was provided by the transcripts referred by Region II \

7.3 Conclusion

, As a result of the above referenced documentation, the inspector

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concluded that all concerns raised as a result of the subject allegations related to TMI have been addressed and satisfactorily

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resolve t Licensee Action on Previous Infpection Findings The inspector reviewed licensee action, if applicable, on previous inspection findings to ensure that the licensee took appropriate action in response to the findings or by self-initiative and that the licensee's action was timel .

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8.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (289/85-19-02): NRC Region I to interview a former licensee engineer who worked on the TMI-1 replica simulator. Region I staff reviewed the concerns described in a letter, dated April 5,1985, fro,n Mrs. Marjorie M. Aamodt to the Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, regarding alleged design problems with the training simulator (TMI-1 Replica Simulator) being installed at TMI-1. The letter indicated that the capabilities of the simulator have beer undermined as a result of some decisions by GPUN management in opposition to the advice of engineers assigned to the proftet. The letter also stated that Mrs. Aamodt had the name of an engineer who resigned because of these decision ' - -

In May 1985, NRC Region I staff made telephone contact with the wife of the engineer and she indicated that her husband was unavailable due to travel. Because of TMI-1 Restart Staff activities, NRC followup on this item was delayed until this inspection period. On February 12, 1986, between 8:45 p.m. and 9:05 p.m., the senior resident inspector discussed this matter with the subject engineer by telephone. The engineer stated that, during his employment with the licensee, he spent most of his time in a licensing class preparing for a senior reactor operator (SRO) license and instructor certification. Simultaneously, he was involved with the licensee's

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simulator development program. He had been an instructor for another nuclear utility prior to employment with GPU The inspector asked to comment on the following paraphrased state-ments of his wife (based on Region I's previous conversation with her in May 1985).

(1) Her husband's decision to leave GPUN employment was totally for personal reason (2) Her husband's feeling was that GPUN was doing a good job on the simulator projec (3) ane believes the contrasting information may have come from a neighbo The engineer confirmed item (1). Regarding item (2), he confirmed it and amplified the point with additional information. He felt that the licensee was doing a "better than good" job on the simula- 1 tor. He indicated that the licensee was factoring into the design i lessons learned from previous designs and putting in the latest equipment upgrades. He added that the basic principles trainer (BPT) )

was also an excellent training aid. Regarding item (3) above, the i engineer surmised that the neighbor, who provided Mrs. Aamodt with information, probably misinterpreted comments from his wife in reference to her husband's unusual working hours and desire to go l back home to the west coast. Neither he nor his wife regarded those I comments as a necative reflection on the GPUN operatio l l

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The inspector asked the engineer to comment on the below listed paraphrased statements that were attributed to him in the April 5, 1985, lette (4) GPUN is an unimpressive operatio (5) The simulator project was undermined so much that it was not usefu .

(6) The plant was so unsafe that they were movin (During Region I's previous conversation with the engineer's wife, she essentially denied having made those statements.)

The engineer denied making those similar statements. He reiterated that he had been essentially satisfied working for GPUN and was extremely pleased with TMI-1 replica simulator; and, again, he left f

for personal reason .2 (Closed) Violation (289/85-19-03): Failure to implement a written procedur This violation was acknowledged and immediately correct-ed upon identification and adequate measures to prevent recurrence initiated prior to completion of the inspectio No licensee written response was required. The inspector verified the addition of Appendix B, RCP seal leak off " bucket check" to Operating Procedure 1103-6, " Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," and the addition of both the high and low range seal flow indications to the CR0 lo These actions were taken as a result of the licensee's review and were considered to be the corrective actions to prevent recurrenc .3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (289/85-21-02): Licensee to revise emer-gency procedures to incorporate the loss of Integrated Control System (ICS) Hex, Hey, and Aux power supplies. The licensee has revised the emergency procedures to incorporate loss of all ICS power supplies. The inspector reviewed and verified the changes to Emergency Procedures 1202-40, 1202-41, and 1202-43. The inspector considers this issue resolve .4 (Closed Unresolved Item (289/85-21-04): Proper labeling for indica-tion of loss of non-nuclear instrumentation in the control roo The licensee has reviewed and identified labeling requirements that are needed to be in place for each NNI/ICS instrument in the control room. The inspector reviewed the additional labeling and found it

to properly address the unresolved issue. The inspector considered this item resolve l b _

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8.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item (289/85-22-04: Licensee to make procedural changes to assure a positive local check of a.c. and d.c. reactor trip breaker closur The licensee has reviewed their j startup/ operating procedures to assure a positive local check for reactor trip breaker closur'e is included. The inspector verified steps have been added, to locally verify reactor trip breaker closure, to Operating Procedures 1105-9, " Control Rod Drive System,"

and 1102-1, " Plant Heatup to 525 F."

8.6 (Closed) Unresolved Item (289/85-22-05): Reactor Protection System (RPS) Circuit Breaker Failures. On September 23, 1985, a RPS breaker failed to close properly. The licensee and the NRC per-formed a detailed examination and evaluation of the failed breaker in order to identify the reason for the failur Vendor representa-tives also took part in the examination process. Mechanical binding resulting from wear was identified as the cause of the failur Additionally the failed breaker and another breaker that had indica-tions of wear were sent to General Electric, the breaker vendor, for further evaluation. This item was left unresolved pending the licensee's review of the General Electric repor On January 17, 1986, the vendor issued a final report of the circuit breaker failure. The vendor reported he was unable to further determine the root cause of the malfunction. The report did postu-late a number of possible causes. The licensee has reviewed this-report and has determined no additional efforts are necessary other than to continue the preventive maintenance activities and the monitoring of operations and preventive maintenance results to attempt to determine possible failure / wear cause . Exit Interview The inspectors discussed the inspection scope and findings with the licensee management at a final exit interview conducted March 7, 198 Senior licensee personnel attending the final exit meeting included the following:

J. Colitz, Plant Engineering Director, TMI-1 H. Hukill, Director and Vice President, TMI-1 C. Smyth, TMI-1 Licensing Manager, Technical Functions R. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director, TMI-1 A representative from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Ajit Bhattacharyya, also attended the meetin j The inspection results, as discussed at the meeting, are summarized in the cover page of the inspection report. Licensee representatives i indicated that none of the subjects discussed contained proprietary of safeguards informatio j l

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Unresolved Items are matters about which information is required in-order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or devia-tions. Unresolved it'em(s) discussed during the exit meeting are docu-mented in paragraphs 3.4.3 and 8.

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