IR 05000285/1990001
| ML20011E351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1990 |
| From: | Stetka T, Wagner P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011E348 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.097, RTR-REGGD-1.097 50-285-90-01, 50-285-90-1, NUDOCS 9002130279 | |
| Download: ML20011E351 (17) | |
Text
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.,;-, . .... , , i-APPENDIX-B > , U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYiC0t911SSION
REGION IV
- EI NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/90-01-Operating License: 'DPR-40
- Docket
- 50-285 Licensee: OmahaPublicPowerDistrict(OPPD)
' 444 South 16th Street Mall' . Omaha, Nebraska-68102-2247 Facility Name: FortCalhounStation(FCS) Inspection At: FCS -Blair, Nebraska, and OPPD Offices, Omaha; Nebraska
Inspection Conducted: January 8-12, 1990 ' Inspectors: OGO O . P. Wagner, Reactor In]pector, Plant Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety (Team Leader) B. Marcus, NRR C. Paulk, Reactor Inspector, Plant Systems Section, Division of: Reactor Safety, RIV A. Udy, NRC Consultant, EG&G Approved: . /[3/ ho T. F.-Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems Section Date ' ' Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary Inspection' Conducted January 8-12, 1990 (Report 50-285/90-01) Areas Inspected: Routine, announced, team inspection of the implementation of commitments made relative to Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation." The inspection included the' review of design documents, physical inspection of instrumentation displays and an evaluation of instrument calibration procedures and records.
Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations of HRC requirements were identified. Two of the violations involved inadequate calibration of-instruments-utilizedforpostaccidentmonitoring(paragraphs 3.3.4and3.3.5); ' -the third violation involved inadequate environmental qualification of an instrumentchannel(paragraph 3.1.6).
The third violation was determined to meet certain NRC Enforcement Policy criteria and no citation is being issued.
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The inspectors identified numerous problems with the design documents which were reviewed. The inspectors also experienced significant difficulty in extracting required information from the provided design documents. Licensee personnel acknowledged these problems and indicated that in-house efforts had been initiated to improve the drawing quality and usefulness, and the computer data base content and accuracy.
The problems identified by the inspectors in the areas of instrument labeling and instrument calibration should be corrected through the licensee's continued implementation of ongoing programs. These are discussed in the appropriate sections of the report.
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' DETAILS ' 1.
PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 OPPD Personnel
- J. Chase, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs
- M. Core, Supervisor, Maintenance
- J. Geschwender, Licensing Engineer R. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineer
- J. Kecy, Supervisor, Systems Engineering
- L. Kusek, Manager, Nuclear Safety Review
- T. Mathews, Station Licensing Engineer
- R. Hehaffey(l&C)pervisor, Electrical and Instrumentation &
, Su Controls Engineering
- T. Mcivor, Manager, Nuclear Projects
- K. Morris, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
- G. Peterson, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
- R. Phelps, Manager, Design Engineer M. Prawl, 18C Engineer
- G. Schwartz, Manager, I&C Design Engineering
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- C, Simons, Station Licensing Engineer 1.2 NRC Personnel
- P. Harrell, Senior Resident inspector, FCS
- D. Kelley, Reactor Inspector, Region IV T. Reis, Resident Inspector, FCS
- T. Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems Section, Region IV
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview conducted on January 12, 1990.
The inspectors also contacted other plant and corporate office personnel during the course of the inspection.
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BACKGROUND By letter dated December 17, 1982 (Generic Letter 82-33), the NRC provided all reactor licensees and applicants with the " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability."
Included in these requirements was the application of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and following an Accident." The provisions for the instrumentation described in RG 1.97 were endorsed by the NRC to ensure that nuclear power plant operators would have sufficient and reliable information available for preventing and/or mitigating the consequences of a reactor accident. During this inspection, the inspectors evaluated the acceptability of the installed instrumentation at the FCS. The inspection was conducted in accordance with the NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual's Temporary Instruction 2515/87.
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_ __ _____ _-_ _ --- ...; - . - . .., . . -4-The inspectors reviewed the licensee submittals dated April 1, 1985, and October 21, 1986. The inspectors also reviewed the " Safety Evaluation Related to Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97," transmitted to the licensee by letter dated April 22', 1987, the FCS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Section 7.5, " Instrumentation Systems," and the FCS Technical Specifications (TSs) related to instrumentation systems. During the onsite inspection activities, the inspectors reviewed a revision to the RG 1.97 submittal which had been sent to the NRC by OPPD letter dated November 24, 1987.
' The inspectors compared the attributes of the instruments being utilized by the licensee to the provisions contained in Revision 2 of RG 1.97 to verify-conformance with the recommendations for range, power supply, environmental .' qualification, seismic qualification, and redundancy and to note any questions- . requiring a more detailed review (e.g., verify proper instrument range when the ' readout is specified as only 0-100 percent span). The inspectors also verified . ' that the operability and surveillance requirements for all of the Category 1 and seme of the Category 2. instruments were included in the TSs related to i Postaccident Monitoring Instrumentation - TS 2.21, and Table 3-3.
The { calibration requirements for selected Category 2 instruments which were not included in the TSs were verified to be consistent with the requirements of those which were included in the TSs.
The inspectors selected for detailed review the instruments utilized for all 12 of the Type A variables; these were all designed as Categnry 1 instruments. An
additional sample-of two Category 1 and three Category 2 instruments were also l selected. The sampled instruments are listed in Table 1.
The design and qualification criteria for Categories 1, 2, and 3 instrumentation is provided in Regulatory Position 1.3 of RG 1.97, Revision 2, dated December 1980. A
brief comparison of these criteria is included in Table 2.
Category 3 instruments provide backup-type of information and were not included in this j inspection effort. The instrumentation related to meteorological and
radiological parameters that are included in RG 1.97 are inspected in accordance with separate guidance contained in Temporary Instructions 2500/18 and 2515/65, respectively, and were also not included in this inspection.
During the onsite inspection conducted January 8-12, 1990, the inspectors , -reviewed selected piping and instrumentation diagrams to verify that all but two of the parameters were being detected by direct sensing. The indirect sensing of the reactor vessel level was accomplished through the use of a heated junction thermocouple system and the reactor coolant systems subcooling was determined by calculations within the qualified safety parameter display system (QSPDS). These indirect sensing methods had been previously approved by the NRC.
The inspectors reviewed the listing of equipment required to be environmentally qualified to verify that the appropriate RG 1.97 instruments were included.
The inspectors also verified that all of the selected instruments were included in the~ licensee's quality assurance program by reviewing the "Q" list.
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' The Linspectors reviewed the verious schematic, loop,.and connection wiring' diagrams to identify the power supply, electrical separation, and isolation devices utilized for each of the selected instruments and for the QSPDS..The' - ' diagrams were reviewed'to ensure-that-redundant instruments were energized from separate sources, that system interconnections were properly isolated from each '- other, and that the systems contained the necessary components. The inspectors falso verified the proper range of level instruments by reviewing the related . scaling documentation end comparing the )rocess inputs to the installation "f p schematics and the elevations shown on; tie instrun;entation isometric drawings.
Thecinspectors also verified.that the required indications and monitors ~were p ~ .. ' available-in the control room and in the technical support center (TSC). The-inspectors checked the QSPDS in the control room and observed that the selected Category I'and Category 2 parameters were being monitored. The inspectors also-verified the installation of the required strip charts recorders in the control room for the. Category 1 parameters.
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, ' !y. 7,1 - /i j <[..h. ' . , , , ', - ( - . e . " ,...p-6-e- , TABLE 1: _ POSTACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSPECTED 'I - q CATEGORY 1 INSTRUMENTS Neutron ~ Flux.~ Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Water Temperature.
ReactorL Coolant System Cold Leg Water Temperature Reactor Vessel. Level
- Core Exit Tem)erature~
l o ' ' . Degrees of-Su) cooling Pressurizer Level.
.l , Pressurizer Pressure - = Steam Generator Level'(Wide Range) ' ' Steam Generator Pressure- . P Containment;WaterLevel(WideRange) ContainmentRadiationMonitor(WideRange) Containment Hydrogen Concentration Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank Level ' CATEGORY 2 INSTRUMENTS I ' Containment Sump' Temperature.
o , Status of Standby Power ., ~ Auxiliary Feedwater Flow TABLE 2 i COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENTS CATEGORY 1 CATECORY:2 a Environmental Qualification Yes As Appropriate _.
Seismic Qualification Yes As Appropriate ~ - Single Failure Yes No Power Supply Emergency Reliable ~ . Standby
- Indication
Immediate Demand Recording-Yes As Required QA' Requirements.
10 CFR 50, As Appropriate ~ App. B-Testability Yes Yes .
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INSPECTION FINDINGS 3.1. Review of Design' Documentation The inspectors reviewed various design documents and drawings for the selected instruments to ensure that the RG 1.97 guidance, as committed to by 0 PPD, had been implemented. A listing of the pertinent drawings that were reviewed is contained in Attachment 1.
The inspectors made the following observations during~the review of the design documents: 3.1.1-Pressurizer Pressure Different model numbers were indicated for the pressurizer pressure transmitter (LT-101X) on the Computerized History and Maintenance Program System (CHAMPS) -data sheet and Drawing 161F561 SH. 27, Interconnection-Diagram. The CHAMPS data sheet indicated that the model was E13DH, whereas_the drawing indicated the model was.E13DM. Drawing 11405-EM-101 Sh. 2, Instrument and control
Equipment List, agreed with the Interconnection Diagram.
' The review of the design documents also disclosed a lack of consistency in the ' a , use of engineering units (psi, psig, and psia) used to specify pressurizer
pressure. Section'5.1.2 of the submittal indicated that the range for the o pressurizer pressure instrument would be in psia, Table 1 of the submittal . l stated that the range would be in psig; Drawing 161F561 Sh. 21 indicated that the range units were psig, but Sh. 21A indicated psia; CHAMPS indicated the range was psi for one set of instruments (PT-105 and PT-115) and psig f.or_the other set (A/PT-120 and B/PT-120).
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The inspectors discussed these inconsistencies with licensee personnel and were informed that OPPD was initiating an effort to upgrade.the facility drawings and to improve and verify the correctness of the information in CHAMPS.
l 3.1.2 Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank (EFWST) Level . The licensee identified a problem with the electrical separation between the redundant channels of EFWST level instrumentation. The problem was basically a cable routing issue that occurred when the second instrument was added to fulfill.the redundancy requirements for automatic initiation of EFW, The instrument was not required, at that time, to be fully safety-related.. The separation between the two channels became problem when the instrument was L utilized to fulfill the RG'1.97 redundancy commitment. When OPPD personnel discovered this error, an item was added to the design basis document open items-list and a modification request (MR-FC-79-?05) was initiated to correct ' the problem. The inspectors will evaluate the corrective actions to provide separation between the redundant channels of EFWST level indication as a part of an inspector followup item.
L Inspector Followup Item (285/9001-01): Review licensee corrective actions to provide separation between redundant EFWST level indication channels.
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-8-3.1 '. 3 EFW Flow The licensee also found the EFW flow orifices to be installed backward. The . inspectors-verified that the licensee has scheduled maintenance to correct this problem during the upcoming refueling outage scheduled for February 1990.
Since the EFW flow indication would only be utilized te verify that flow existed (without a specific accuracy limit) and since the reversed flow orifices would add only a 15 percent inaccuracy, the inspectors found the licensee actions to be acceptable.
3.1.4 Neutron Flux In response to an environmental qualification problem identified by the cable manufacturer and reported to the NRC in acccrdance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21, OPPD determined that the neutron flux instruments were not properly qualified. OPPD personnel informed the inspectors that repairs to two of the four channels would be impicmented during the upcoming refueling outage and that the RG 1.97 submittal would be revised to indicate that only two channels were required.
The problems with the cable assemblies had been previously identified and the OPPD corrective actions were being followed by HRC inspectors as part of Open item 285/8846-04.
3.1.5 ContainmentHighRangeRadiationMonitor(HRRM) The inspectors identified inconsistencies with the indicated power supplies for the recorder utilized for HRRM displays. The. dual pen records displayed both the Channel A and-the Channel B (RE-091A and RE-091B) HRRM loops and, therefore, required isolation of these signal paths. The inspectors noted that Drawing D-4562, Load Study Distribution Diagram, indicated that the o)tical isolatorforChannelA'(RMY-091A)waspoweredfromPanelAI-40Aand'tlat Drawing D-4566' indicated that RMY 0918 was powered from-Al-40B. However, Drawing D-4569 indicated that both RMY-091A and RMY-091B were powered from panel AI-42A.
, The resolution of this type.of apparent-drawing inconsistency hindered the completion of the inspection effort and was discussed with licensee personnel.
The inspectors were informed that these types of problems would also be corrected as the drawings are updated during the impicmentation of the program discussed above.
The specific problems with the llRRM power supplies were, however, resolved subsequent to the inspection. The inspectors were provided a copy of Drawing 161F561, sheet 134, Interconnection Diagram RM-091A&B, which clarified that the Class 1E portions of Channel A were powered from AI-40A and Channel B from AI-40B, and that the non-Class 1E portions of both channels were powered from AI-42A.
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.. . .,,.m., . , . , -9-3.1.6 Containnent Sump Temperature The inspectors found the design of the containment sump temperature instrumentation to be acceptable except for a licensee identified problem. The sump temperature instrument had been included as an RG 1.97, Category)2-instrument in the OPPD listings.
The environmental qualification (EQ - regulation,10 CFR Part 50.49, required all RG 1.97 Category 1 and Category 2 _. instruments to be appropriately qualified. OPPD personnel identified an EQ problem with the electrical penetration assembly (EPA) utilized for the sump temperature sensor. The inspectors reviewed an internal OPPD memorandum dated December 4,1989, which discussed the problem and its effects, and found the
OPPD position to be acceptable.
! However, since the regulation (10 CFR 50.49) required this RG 1.97 Category 2 instrument to be qualified, the failure to ensure that it was properly qualified was a violation. But, the licensee had identified the problem and was evaluating steps to correct the situation..In addition, the failure of the
containment sump temperature instrumentation would have limited safety ' significance. Therefore, the inspectors determined that, in accordance with' Section V.G.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, a Notice of Violation for this j problem need not be' issued. The inspectors will evaluate the completion of the i . licensee's corrective actions as an inspector followup item.
j < InspectorFollowupItem(285/9001-02): Review licensee corrective actions to l correct EQ problem with containment sump temperature EPA.
j 3.2 Inspection of Instrumentation Displays The inspectors observed the instrumentation displays in the control room, auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP), and technical support center (TSC) to ensure i that the provided indicating devices were consistent with RG 1.97 guidance and i OPPD commitments. The following specific obsa m tions were made during the ! inspectors' walkdowns.
3.2.1' Pressurizer Pressure ! The walkdown of the ASP identified an additional example of the scale
inconsistencies discussed in the design documentation review discussed above.- ' The identification tags for the pressurizer pressure instruments indicated that the scale was in psia units; the meter scales were, however, in percentage ! - (0-100 percent).
3.2.2 Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank (EFHST) Level , The inspectors observed that the two displays (meters) for the redundant level
indicators utilized different scales. On one panel, one instrument's range was ' displayed as 0 to 100 percent while the redundant channel's display was-0 to 160 inches of water; at the other location, both channels had a display of 0 to 20 (with no units).
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..The types of. problems discussed in the above two paragraphs were also observed for other parameters-(the. ranges of containment pressure, the tagging of containment.sumplevel,etc.). All of the problems that were identified with
ranges, power supplies, and instrument tag numbers were discussed with licensee personnel. The inspectors were informed that the types of problems that were identified had also been recognized by OPPD and that actions to correct those problems were to be implemented during the 1990 refueling outage.
The actions to uniquely designate the RG 1.97 instruments had been deferred to be part of the detailed control room design review (DCRDR) upgrading effort.
' The OPPD commitment to complete the identified human engineering discrepancy (HED) resolutions from the DCRDR, along with the other identified problems and , labeling upgrades, was provided in a letter to the NRC dated November 15, 1989.
The inspectors will evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's actions to correct and improve instrument labeling and displays as part of an inspector followup ' item.
InspectorFollowupItem(285/9001-03): Review the licensee's corrective actions to correct instrument labeling and display inconsistencies.
3.3 Inspection of Instrumentation Calibration The inspectors reviewed the procedures used to calibrate the selected instruments and verified that the calibrations had been conducted within the required time periods by reviewing the calibration records. The inspectors experienced longer than usual delays in obtaining the requested information even though the licensee was informed prior to the inspection that these procedures and records would be required. Some records and procedures were not provided until after the onsite portion of the inspection. A listing of the calibration procedures / records that were' reviewed is provided in Attachment 2.
3.3.1 Pressurizer Pressure The inspectors' review of the calibration procedures for the pressurizer pressure instrumentation (CP-120A and CP-1208) showed that the engineering units of psig and psia were apparently used interchangeably.
For example, the procedure indicated that the emergency response facility (ERF) and the qualified safety parameter disalay system (QSPDS) outputs were in psig when they were actually in psia. Tie inspector also noted that the procedures did not require independent verification of the valve line-up when placing the instrument back into service.
3.3.2 Pressurizer Level-The inspectors noted that the CHAMPS data sheets for two pressurizer level instruments (LT-101X and LT-101Y) listed the calibration ranges as 93.7 to 220.7 inches water column (IHWC) and 0 to 850 INWC, respectively. The calibration procedures for these instruments specified that both be calibrated to a range of 93.7 to 220.7 INHC.
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fully revised:to reflect a modification. The revised tag numbers were utilized-in Section II of the procedure, but the old, superseded tag numbers remained in Section IV.. The inspectors-also observed that neither calibration procedure for the~ pressurizer level instruments required QC verification of valve or electrical lead manipulations.
3.3.3 ' Emergency: Feedwater Storage Tank (EFWST) Level The inspectors noted that the calibration procedures for the EFWST level instruments lacked detailed instructions-for per. forming the various manipulation and adjustments and did not require-independent verification of those actions.
The types of procedural shortcomings discussed in the above sections have been recognized by both the NRC and OPPD.
In response to previous NRC inspection findings, OPPD initiated a safety-related procedures upgrade program. This program has been presented to the NRC and was found.to provide acceptable corrective actions.for previously identified problems. The inspectors reviewed-the upgraded procedure for.the calibration of the EFWST level instrumentation which had been approved on November 30, 1989. The inspectors found this new procedure, and the other upgraded procedures that they reviewed, to be acceptable in resolving the noted concerns.
3.3.4 Containment Sump Level The inspectors reviewed the calibration procedures for the narrow range containmentsumpwaterlevelinstruments(LT-599andLT-600)anddetermined that no provisions for ensuring the proper calibration of the level transmitter (sensor) were included. The inspectors also observed that Technical Specification (TS) 3.1, " Instrumentation and Control," required the calibration of these instruments at a refueling frequency by "known signals applied to sensors." The licensee was unable to provide any evidence-that the appropriate calibration had been performed since the requirement had been incorporated into the.TS through the issuance of License Amendment 82 on August 2, 1984.
The licensee had initiated an upgrade of containment sump level calibration procedures as part of the program discussed above. A draft of the upgraded procedure for one instrument was reviewed by the inspectors and found to include the required sensor calibration provisions. The inspectors determined that while the-licensee recognized this problem with this procedure, the condition existed for an' inordinate time (i.e., since August 2, 1984).
In addition, 10 CFR 50.73 requires the issuance of a licensee event report (LER) whenever an event.causes channels in a single system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident to be inoperable. The failure to properly calibrate these instruments resulted in an inoperable status. This inoperable status was not reported as required.
As-the result of this determination, the failure to comply with TS 3.1 and calibrate the containment sump level instruments is considered to be an apparent violation.
Violation (285/9001-04): Failure to calibrate the containment sump level
- instruments as required by TS 3.1.
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p . "... . , , . -12-3.3.5 Status of Standby Power ! - The inspectors experienced considerable delays in this portion of the ! inspection. The instruments on which OPPD was relying for postaccident i monitoring indication of electrical power supplies were not explicitly defined , ' in'the submittals and some confusion existed on which were the appropriate i instruments. When the design documents were provided, a number of iterations j " were required to cover all of the instruments that were involved. The .I calibration records and procedures for a number of instruments were not
provided until_after the exit meeting at the conclusion of the onsite inspection.
_ The inspectors completed the. review of the provided calibration records in the l ' NRC offices. The inspectors noted that contrary to the program discussed with ' the inspectors, a number of the instruments appeared to have intervals of over 3 years between calibrations. Since the involved instruments were not required to be calibrated at the normally specified interval of approximately 18 months,
" and since a longer period of time for these types of instruments is normally ' acceptable, the inspectors did not pursue this issue. The inspectors also i noted that no calibration procedures or records were provided for the 480VAC j bus voltage or amperage instruments located on the main control board (MCB).
l The licensee acknowledged that the 480VAC bus instruments were not included in the calibration program and stated that this condition had been recognized.
Subsequent to the inspection, licensee personnel provided a copy of a new calibration procedure, MS-CP-07-0002, " Calibration of Type 180 Indicating.
Instrument," to the inspectors for review. The inspectors reviewed the draft procedure dated January 12, 1990, and found it to be acceptable.
However, since the instruments utilized for postaccident monitoring were . required to be calibrated in accordance with OPPD's RG 1.97 program, and since the 480VAC bus instruments are required for operator verification during the performance of emergency and abnormal operating procedures, the inspectors considered the failure to calibrate the 480VAC bus instruments to be a violation of the FCS TS that requires procedures be established and implemented.
Violation (285/9001-05): Failure to calibrate instrumentation that is used for plant' operations as required by TS 5.8.1.
3.4 Conclusions With the exception of the specific violations and followup items discussed above, the inspectors determined that OPPD had implemented a program which fulfilled the commitments made for conformance to the provisions of RG 1.97.
, l The inspectors experienced frequent difficulties in obtaining detailed information on most aspects of the program. The inspectors attributed the difficulties to a lack of specified responsibility for the implementation of the RG 1.97 program. The inspectors informed licensee personnel that the apparent lack of responsibility was a concern because future modifications could adversely effect the RG 1.97 instrumentation commitment p-r:; g +; ;.._ -' . jt . f 41. '.. , .q .. r.
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EXIT INTERVIEW- _The inspectors _ sumarized the scope _ and findings of the inspection during the' " exit interview on January 12, 1990, with the personnel identified in.
paragraph 1. : Although some proprietary documents were reviewed by the' - , . inspectors, no proprietary documents were removed from the facility, and no. "
- proprietary information.is contained in this-report.
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.. , .x...:,, . -. ATTACHMENT 1 L_IST OF DRAWINGS REVIEWED-Number Revision-Title 11405-E-3
Electrical One Line Diagram I - 11405-E-4-
Electrical One Line Diagram-11405-E-5
Electrical One Line Diagram ' ' 11405-E-6 4~ Electrical One Line Diagram 11405-E-7
Electrical:One Line Diagram.
11405-E-8.
Electrical One Line Diagram-11405-E-9,-Sh. 1l
Electrical One Line Diagram 11405-E-9, Sh. 2'& 3
Electrical One Line Diagram 11405-E-180, 23564
Electrical Penetration Wiring Data 11405-E-180, 23565 1-Electrical Penetration Wiring Data 11405-EM-001/010, Sh. 2
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-091
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-101, Sh. 1-
Instrument and Control Equipment List , 11405-EM-101, Sh. 2
Instrument and Control. Equipment List ! 11405-EM-101, Sh. 3
Instrument and Control Equipment List i 11405-EM-101, Sh. 4
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405 EM-101, Sh. 5
Instrument and Control Equipment List- ! 11405-EM-113
Instrument and Contr01 Equipment List i 11405-EM-105, Sh. 1
Instrument and Control' Equipment List ! 11405-EM-115, Sh. 1= 12~ Instrument and Control' Equipment List 11405-EM-116 .
Instrument and Control Equipment List .11405-EM-120, Sh. 1 & 2
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-123
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-387
Instrument and Control Equipment List 13405-EM-388.
Instrument and Control Equipment List.
11405-EM-599
Instrument and Control Equipment List-11405-EM-600
Instrument and Control Equipment List-11405-EM-601. O Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-783/786 l
Instrument and Control Equipment List i 11405-EM-911/914, Sh. 1-6
Instrument and Control Equipment List-11405-EM-1109/1110
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-1183
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-EM-1191
Instrument and Control Equipment List 11405-M-54, Sh. 32
Instrument Detail No. 8D .11405-M-54, Sh. 33
Instrument Detail No. 8E 11405-M-120
CEDM Seal Water and Leakage Piping 111405-N-254
Condensate System P&ID 136B2331, Sh. 47, 47B & 130B Instrument Loop Diagrams 161F561, Sh. 9
Interconnection Diagrams - 161F561, Sh. 10
Interconnection Diagrams .161F561, Sh. 10A
Interconnection Diagrams .. - .-- . .
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( 3 - -2- - ~f^ ' Number Revision Title ' , -
- 161F561, Sh. 21.
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Interconnection Diagrams 161F561,'Sh; 21A
-Interconnection' Diagrams " 161F561', Sh. 27'
Interconnection Diagrams " 161F561,'Sh. 131 ^10/9/87 Interconnection Diagrams . . _ 161F561','Sh. 132 10/9/87-- Interconnection Diagrams , - ., -- 161F561, Sh. 174
- 8/3/89-Interconnection Diagrams-
--161F561 - Sh.175 = ~8/3/89 Interconnection Diagrams ' Foxboro CD-009A~
Connection Diagram-Loop'A/P-120 , Foxboro CD-010D
Connection Diagram Loop P-786 Foxboro CD-0110
Connection Diagram Loop D/P-120 E-4043
Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation > E-4044 - 2-Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation - E-4095
Wiring Diagram E-00000-422-224, Sh. 1 ~' QSPDS Schematic
E-15381 -165-051,, S h. 1
Wiring Diagram E-23866-210-110
RCS P&l0 CD-9C
' Loop Diagram - CD-10C
Loop Diagram.' D-4562, Sh. 3 0-Load Study _ Distribution Diagram .0-4566, Sh. 5
Load Study-Distribution Diagram-D-4567,'Sh. 3
Load Study Distribution Diagram D-4568, Sh.-2-
Load Study Distribution Diagram D-4569, Sh; 3
Load Study Distribution Diagram D-4573, Sh. 1 & 3
Load _ Study Distribution Diagram PWR-1D-~
Rack Power Wiring Diagram-i PWR-2D,:Sh.=1 & 2
TB Wiring Diagram , ,
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. LIST OF PROCEDURES REVIEWED- ,
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\\ CP-101X- ' -22-Pressurizer Level ' F CP-101Y .
Pressurizer Level ,
CP-105/123'
Pressurizer Pressure' > CP-A/112C: RCS Cold Leg Temperature: q - CPLB/112C RCS Cold Leg Temperature ,j ,. _ ' L ' CP-A/112H RCS Hot Leg Temperature ' ~ R.
CP-B/112H. RCS' Hot Leg. Temperatures - i
" CP-113/115
Pressurizer Pressure ",7 > CP-120A-
Pressurizer Pressure . , CP-120B
Pressurizer Pressure
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. , > CP-A/122C RCS Cold Leg Temperature-- ., CP-B/122C RCS Cold Leg Temperature ' 7CP-A/122H RCS Hot Leg Temperature ' .CP-B/122H RCS Hot; Leg-Temperature CP-599
Containment Sump Level
-.. CPL 783.
' Containment Sump Level' CP-600-
4 . , containment. Pressure ' '
- .CP-784 , Containment; Pressure ' , . _ CP-785 Containment Pressure- , n R ..CP-A/911 , Containment. Pressure ' i CP-786- , Steam Generator Level - CP-B/911 Steam Generator Level ' ' ^i CP-A/912 Steam GeneratoriLevel
e CP-B/912 Steam Generator' Level
CP-A/913 Steam Generator Pressure CP-B/913-Steam Generator Pressure, , CP-A/914' Steam Generator Pressure CP-B/914: ~ Steam Generator Pressure CP-DG-1/ Metering
~ Diesel Ge.ncrator No. 1 - Metering ' ! - CP.-DG-2/ Metering.
Diesel: Generator No. 2 - Metering . .. t CP-TIA1/TIA2-1
Metering CP-TIA3/TIA4-1
Metering p L 'CP-3283A.
125VDC Bus 1 Volts , 1-CP-3283B '
125VDC Bus 2 Volts CP-320?A
Battery Charger 1 Amps ' CP-32848
Battery Charger 2 Amps l
- CP-32840
Battery Charger 3 Amps R ' CP-3285A
Static Inverter A Amps ." .
~ Static Inverter B Amps " CP-3285B- ' CP-32850-
Static Inverter C Amps , '
Static Inverter D Amps-CP-3285D-
~ CP-3286A :
Static Inverter A Volts .. . > + .-t a.
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fGe . 'CP-3286B? 4-Statis Inverter B' Volts'. N' ' Static,InverterC' Volts-l CP-3286Cc 4i - ' - . s
- CP-3286D 4-Static. Inverter D Volts'
,, ,. PA3 .) CP-SCMM-A' Subcooling Margin Monitor; l ~CP-SCM-B.
Subcooling Margin Monitor- -i I, MS-CP-07-0002 Draft 480VAC. Instruments > <
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