IR 05000282/1990008

Insp Repts 50-282/90-08 & 50-306/90-08 on 900515-18.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise Involving Observations of Key Functions & Locations During Exercise

ML20043E629
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	06/04/1990
From:	Foster J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20043E627	List: IR 05000282/1990008 ML20043E626
References
50-282-90-08, 50-282-90-8, 50-306-90-08, 50-306-90-8, NUDOCS 9006130213
Download: ML20043E629 (47)

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n U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION c

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REGION III

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Report No. 50-282/90008(DRSS); 50-306/90008(DRSS)

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' Docket No.- 50-282;50-306 Licenses No. DPR-42;,DPR-60^

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Licensee:

Northern' States Power Company

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414 Nicollet Hall

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Facility Name:

Prairie Is1and Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1~and 2:

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Inspection Ati Praibie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota

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-Inspection Conducted: May 15-18, 1990

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Accompanying Personnel: '

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ApprovedBy;,/RadiologIcalControls

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and Emergency Preparedness Section e

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I'nspection Summary

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50-282/90008(DRSS);

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Inspection on May 15-18', 1990'(Report No.

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,50-306/90008(DRSS))

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' ; Areas Inspected:

Routine;; announced iiispection of,the Prairie Island Nuclear

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' Generating Plant annual emergency,preparednessfexercisesinvolving observations

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by six NRC representatives of key; functions and locations during the 9xercise L,, ' '

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(IP 82301).. Scenario review (IP 82302).

Also, review of'the offsite

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radiation dose. assessment program'(IP:82207).

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~ 'Results:.No' violations, deficiencies;or deviationsiwere identified.

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p licensee demonstrat'ed a very good response to a challenging' and complex,.

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• hypothetical scenario involving multiple equipment. failures and a largs

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radiological release. =This was a two day" exercise, with day two being an.

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i 1 ; ingestion pathway exercise for offsite authorities.--The licensee's exercise

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Jperformance on ' day 'one.was considered very good.'

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NRC'0EserversandAreasObserved<

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.J. Foster, Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center'(TSC), -

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Operations Support, Center (OSC), Emergency Operations < Facility (EOF)

s T. Ploski, Technical Support Center (TSC)

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~G. Stoetzel, Emergency-Operations Facility (EOF)

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1i P. Moore, Operations' Support Centert(OSC)

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1" P. Hartman, Simulator Control Room-

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' Northern States-Power Company e

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nf4 E; Watz1,' Plant Manager

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D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection

M. Laddf Administrator, Emergency Preparedness

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M. Agen, Lead Production Engineer

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y M. Pfeffer, Senior Radiation Protection Specialist

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,0. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering & Radiation Protection.

a M. Daum,. Lead Production F,gineer

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J M. Hall, Senior Technical Instructor

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T. Beard, Senior. Plant Health Physicist

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H. Aadahl, Operations Instructori y

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0._ Nelson,; Production Engineer

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'J. Callahant Technical Instructor a

M.~Wadley, Shift Manager i

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-J. Lemmerman, Radiation Protection Specialist'

'L. Anderson, Shift Manager

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.J.3 Goldsmith, General Superintendent, Nuclear Technical Services

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F. Fey, Manager, Nuclear Radiological Services

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.L. Finholm,' Nuclear Training Administrator

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j T. Amundson, General Superintendent, Nuclear Training Center

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D. Cragoe, Senior Operations Specialist

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All of the above personnel attended the NRC exit interview held on.

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The ' inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the

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course of the inspection.-

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General

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'A An exercise of the Prairie-Island Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Plan:

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was conductediat..the' Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant site on

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May 15-16;.1990.

The exercise ~ tested the licensee's and offsite" agencies' emergency support organizations' capabilities to respond to a

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simulated accident scenario resulting in. a major release of radioactive

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' effluent.. This was a " full participation" ". ingestion pathway" exercise.

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The States of' Minnesota and Wisconsin and local counties participated

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fully.

Day.two'of the exercise was an ingestion pathway exercise, i

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,i evaluated only by representatives of the Federal Emergency Management

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Agency (FEMA).

FEMA will' provide their findings in a separate report,

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p Attachment I describes the licensee's Scope and Objectives for the

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exercise and Attachment 2 describes'the exercise scenario.

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General Observations-

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This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,""-

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Appendix ~ E requirements using the Prairie, Island Nuclear Generating

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CN Plant Emergency Plan and. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure's!4 g '>

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States and. local agencies utilized their Emergency Plans.:

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Coordination ~,-

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The licensee's' response was coordinated, orderly an'd imely.

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scenario events'had been real, the actions taken by the licensee

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--would have been sufficient to permit the States and local

authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's,

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health and safety.

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Observers

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The' licensee's observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along with six NRC observers.

Offsite actions by the States and' counties were observed by a' team of over thirty FEMA' observers.

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de NRC Exercise Critique / Exit Interview A critique was held with the licensee and NRC representatives on May 17, 1990; two days after the exercise.

The NRC discussed the observed strengths and weaknesses during this exit interview.

5.

Specific Observations (IP 82301)

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Control Room (CR)

The licensee again utilized the near site control room simulator to

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provide exercise conditions to reactor operators and to " drive" the remainder of the exercise.

Use of the simulator greatly enhanced the realism of the exercise for all players, but requires greater efforts in scenario generation and overall coordination.

The simulator functioned well, with only a very minor discrepancy in the' display,of pressurizer level observed.

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Control Room personnel performed well, rap' idly identifying'the scenario conditions aisplayed on the simulator, performing,

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mitigating actions and properly' classifying accident situations per,~4

prescribed procedures.

Procedures were well utililed throughout the'.

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exercise and procedure knowledge was' evident.. '

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An individual playing the part of the unaffected unit's Shift +-

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<y Supervisort assisted with emergency response activities; per licensee

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procedures.

This arrengement worked wel.1,'as'he uns able to take on.

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some of the miscellaneous burdens (such as notifications) and. free

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the staff of the affected unit to concentrate on mitigating actions.

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He was also able to perform reviews'of the Emergency Action Levels

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(EALs) and provide opinions as to the need for further event classifications.

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That conditions existed requiring an Alert emergency classificatio'n

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was determined at approximately 0810 hours0.00938 days <br />0.225 hours <br />0.00134 weeks <br />3.08205e-4 months <br />.

Control Room personne1~

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properly interpreted the EAL related to a loss of coolant accident in containment to also pertain to a loss of coolant accident in the

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plant annulus.

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Notifications to county, State and NRC officials were made Qt within timeframe goals.

Performance in this area indicated an.

improvement since the last evaluated exercise.

The NRC Duty Officer

asked a series of questions regarding the (scenario) status of the reactor and received detailed answers.

After receiving a briefing on initiating events and re' viewing

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ongoing actions, the Plant Manager lef t the Control Room Simulator to take the lead position in the Technical Support Center (TSC).<

Control Room personnel displayed excellent exercise roleplaying, actively attempting to cope with' multiple system failures and perform mitigating actions, Control Room decorum was very good, and noise levels were low.

Plant status update briefings by the Shift-h.

Supervisor and Shift Manager were of apprcpriate frequency and

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detail,

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Communication between the Control Room and the Technical Support f

Center (TSC) was good, including discussions of tasks needed to restore coolant to the reactor and the priority of such tasks,

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Based upon the above findings, this portion of the' licensee's program was acceptable,

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Technical' Support Center (TSC)

The TSC wa's fully operational within 30 minutes of the Alert declaration.

The Emergency Director. (ED) kept his staff adequately informed of the activation status of the other emergency response-s facilities and the status of additional field survey teams coming

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from the Monticello Plant. 'An orderly. transfer of lead

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place'at a'pproximately 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />.l By that time..TSC communicators'

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'had completed adequately detailed,rinitial notification messages to

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appropriate State and bounty officials within 15 minutes of the :

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iAlert t.ad the Site Area Emergency declarations.>'

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Radiological Emergency Coordinator D EC) to have a team dispatched;"

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to determine radiation and temperature;1evels at'an annulus entrys

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This. mission was'promptly cancelled shortly before.0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />' "

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when the ED was informed that the annulus sump ha~d begun to run,,

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continuously _ and that annulus' temperature had r'isen to algost 200

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,TSC staff closely monitored the EALs, changes to~ plant parameter "

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' values,;and plant" equipment operability.

The ED correctly declared'

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a Site Area Emergency at 0910 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.46255e-4 months <br /> due to the small break LOCA and

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'the kss of safety injection capability.

The ED andcthe EAL-r n

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Min ar also realized that this declaration was warranted if ~the

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accountability war Merptly begun after the Site Area Emergency,'and.

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s was completed withe 4 minutes of the soundingJof the plant siren.

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' and the-associated' PA announcement.

PA announcements were also made--

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onsite.after every emergency declaration.

Reasons for the' Alert and.

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the Site Area'En tgency declarations were also announced on the l

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plant'f PA system.

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Incore thermocouple and reactor vessel level data were closely

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' monitored following the Site Area Emergency declaration.

Emergency Operating Procedures.(E0Ps) were reviewed regarding loss of containment and LOCA outside containment.

A' recommendation was.made to the Emergency Operations Facility-(E0F) by 0945 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.595725e-4 months <br /> to declare-1 a General Emergency for the loss of fission product barriers 1when.it j

became apparent that vessel level could not be maintained and incore

- thermocouple readings were rapidly trending upwards.

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i The ED conducted concise update-briefings.at approximately 20 minute

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intervals..These briefings were usually begun by the plant _,

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parameter status board plotter who read the board's current data to

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better ensure that all key staff were aware.of the latest' changes.

This status board and another board used to' display the latest--

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inplant radiation level data were very well maintained.*

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<y In contrast,'sevecal other status. boards were not"kept completely,,

updated. The emergency organization status board had provisions.for listing the current: emergency classification'and the-times that site;

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accountability was initiated and completed.

Although the Site: Area

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Emergency was' declared'at 0910 hours0.0105 days <br />0.253 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.46255e-4 months <br />, the classification listedeon,

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this board remained the Alert until the General Emergency'was A

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announced shortly before 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />.

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this statusjboard.

This board also had provisions for listing major.

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.. tasks in progress and current' concerns., ; However, such information 4

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with release, dose projection, and weather'information.; Although

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fL exposure control were wel1' demonstrated through establishment'of4

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i contamination boundaries, step-off' pads,~ and by. dosimeter;and

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continuous air monitors were observed to betin op'eration..it' ors.a

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thermoluminescent dosimeter issuance.. Area'padiation mon

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The REC and.his staff did.a very good jobIintinter'facind withiE0F0

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also closely monitored current wind data, and~p'romptly recognized;,

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that a' wind shift during the simulated releasefwould adversely '

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nonessential plant staff, whose evacuation from the Protected Area-

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had earlier been simulated,

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jieavy reliance was placed on discussions betwee'n-v'arious'TSC group

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7 leaders to, keep-each other informed on the' status and priorities of

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inplant' teams' activities and the teams' results! The TSClacks a.

J status: board to' effectively summarize such information,_to'better j

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same time.

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A status. board would.have helped TSC staff to' maintain a common.

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a understanding of certain.inplant teams' assignments, priorities ~ and l

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status to avoid ~ apparent confusion on'several occasions.

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example,.some TSC group' leaders were uncertain whether the 12'RHR valve'RH-10-1 welding team had: returned to the job site after

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Uncertainty about the

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completion status:of this task again' arose when an Auxiliary.

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EBuilding evacuation was-ordered after a rapid rise in' containment j

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. radiation level.

There was also some uncertainty. expressed'

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re'garding what was the electrical problem found in the Motor Control y

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' problem had been more clearly understood.

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Another benefit to using a: status' board to list important,

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information on inplant team activities would be to reduce TSC noise

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levels by, reducing;the necessity'for the many one-on-one update

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l conversations that persisted between various group leaders during the periodic update briefings.

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following~ a 24-hour time jump in the scenario, the ED:1ed his staff.

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in compiling a list;of about-20'short and longer' term actioniitems.

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The: issue of. continued operation of. Unit 2'was addressed, as well'as

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site and-Auxiliary Building access for contractor and~ plant staffs.

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.However, the needs to interface with.onsite NRC Site) Team and'

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Incident Investigation Team personnel were not mentioned during this-

-initial onsite' recovery planning discussion.

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8ased on the above findings, this portion _of the licensee's program was acceptable;- however, the following items should be considered c

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Theemergency?organizationandradiationprotectionstatus

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. boards should be kept complete and current,

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,An"inplant' team status board should be utilized ii)betterensurethata

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the assignments,~ priorities, status, and results'obtained by=

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inplant teams.

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Operational Support-Center (050)

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. AL number of; Improvements have be$n recently made. jn' theiOSC,!!, Noise-r

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ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) system', ~and ' instal,lation,o(fi VjY levels 1have been greatly reduced by install'ation of.a:new heating'

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a quieter, air pump _ on' the continuous air monitorf(CAM)( > A teain-

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trackingstatusboardhasbeendeveloped,,anpsas'inuse;

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determine the readings of the incore thermocouples, because"they hada e

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gone,offscale=on the Emergency Response Computer' System (ERCIS), i

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The work' request.did not contain'enough'information-describing the reason fort performing th.is task...When the:I&C, technicians' reported

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the readings, which wereivery high, thy were uncertain whether the m

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TSC believed the readings.

There could have been additiona'l:, efforts-

'l by the'I&C: technicians =to verify these important readings.or/to add R

'

.

a greater; level of confidence, but this.was(not pursued.'

'

+

,

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l There wasivery good response to the changing radiological conditions _

-

.-

within the OSC.

The-step-off pad and frisker were relocated when.

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y radiation " shine" began tto affect the frisker,

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c The guarifs performed very well during the accountability procedure at the' assembly point:,'They tried to assure that the red light on

the-accountability-card. reader (indicating that the-identification

'

card had been,successfully read) came on for each individual carding.

a'.

in to the readers. -The assembly area was very noisy and it was next

E to. impossible to understand either the plant page or directions

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provided'via megaphone.- Consideration should be given to moving the N?

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-assembly area to another area or building.

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The auxiliary operators awaiting assignment in the OSC were not a

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'always kept informed of changing plant conditions.

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The Radiation Protection Coordinator (RPC) evacuated the north half of the OSC due to shine from the conditions.

The RPC did not inform-

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the Maintenance Supervisor or.this action, and the latter later

. ondered where his people went.~

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Them0SC could use~an ERCIS terminal for obtaining Area Radiationi

Monitor readings.

OSC supervisors are responsible for sending teams

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out to perform work. -The lack of up to date radiation readings from

);

,

. specific areas of the plant is a potential. hazard.

There is also a need for easier access to plant drawings / schematics to" facilitate 1 t1

k; troubleshooting activities that are performed-in the'.0SC and at the

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work areas.

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Use of the simulator control room in an exercise causes a

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significant " exercise artifact" in that the actual Control Room =is

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" adjacent to the 0SC,. aiding effective communications ' The

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simulator / control room " disconnect" caused problems duritig this

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cxercise ' The disconnect effect was exacerbated by the tie up'

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of phone lines between the simulator and the OSC.':Also,' exercise i

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M controllers were not always sure who was responsible for giving some

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of the messages:to the participants,

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-Inability'to recognize that the Safety Injection System was not s

pumping,into the core, while ignoring the availability of the RHR-

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withithe reactor at low pressure, suggests" too much focus on a small'

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portion of the scenario.

There is a need to stop and step back

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occasionally'and review the situation versus'the availability of equipment,

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While'the new status board depicting in plant teams was useful in

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understandingtin plant team progress, additional improvement-can be

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made.

Status boards depicting available OSC manpower by discipline,,

. tasks / task priority (assigned by.the TSC), and team composition /

~

,

mission / priority / status (and relevant comments) would enhance the

,

'

operation of the OSC. -In11ts'.present format, the OSC does.not have

,

sufficient room for these status' boards without compromising access to emergency supply lockers-However, licensee personnel indicated that other building construction would allow changes to the OSC layout in the_near future which would facilitate such status board refinements.

-

' '

J Based upon the above findiAgs, this portion of the licensee's

>

,

program was acceptable; however, the following item should~be

,

considered for improvement:

Status boards depicting available~0SC manpower by' discipline, tasks / task. priority,,and team composition, mission, and priority / status should be developed for the OSC.

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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

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The interim Emergency Manager (EM) an_d'the EM" conducted thorougi

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briefings"atia minimum of at least once per half-hour.

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. briefings _ included verbal updates from the Technical Support:

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Supervisor,vthe Radiation Protection Support Supervisor l(RPSS), and H

h ithe EOF Coordinator.

EOF staff were-kept well' informed'on the J

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f accident conditions.

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The Radiation Protection group performed timely' dose calculations

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using the Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System

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(MIDAS), and aggressively pursued verification of the 10E-4-r

radioiodine'to noble gas ratio by performing; isotopic analysis;on av, l

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field air. sample.

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The RPSS formulated timely"'and accurate Protective Actibn

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Recommendations (PARS).. The RPSS discussed PARS with the statesiof.

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Minnesota'and Wisconsin 'ia a conference call prior to the formal'

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issuance of. PARS;to the states.. Therefore, the states were well

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The dose assessment / field team group had information'about the' '

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potential;windshift based on forecast meteorologica1' data obtained.,

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c, at approximately_0900 hours.

Based on this information, the Field t

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Team Coordinator should have considered positioning one of thelfour j

field teams in.the area of the predicted windshift (on the Wisconsin

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" side of.the river).

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J, i.The Field Team Communicator recorded all field team read Wgs on a

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' log as he received them;from the field.

On several occasions he

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,3 repeated.theoreadings received but did not record them..A status

O board operator recorded this information on;a status board; however,.

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entries were, periodically 1 erased due to the limited size of:the

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board.

Therefore, it is'possible that some readings'could be lost.

'

-

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.

..

-

L Near the conclusion of the^onsitetexercise,'the licensee demonstrated

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it's capabilities for initial Recovery planning following an' accident.

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y As a part of this demonstration, a? Recovery Organization was, developed, and a comprehensive listing of items / issues;which would have'to'be

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addressed in the short and long term was created.1-Transition.from'

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V ithe General Emergency classification to the' Recovery mode.was not, f

made, as review indicated that the plant was not sufficiently stable

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to allow declaration of Recovery..The emergency! classification was

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.

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I sthen " downgraded" to an Alert.

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Current NRC philosophy is that lower emerhency classifications

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,

-(Unusual Event and Alert) should be terminated when the'coriditions

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E requiring such classifications are noolonger present. ~For the.

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higher emergency classifications (Site Area Emergency or. Genera 11 B

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' Emergency), entry into a Recovery Phase should be declared.

This

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L follows the_ philosophy that emergency classifications are' intended

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-to put predesignated plans.and organizations _into motion, but not to discontinue such plans'or organizations.

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' Additional * ppocedural guidance' is needed as to entry into, Recovery, W

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_and the' general configuration'which a' Recovery Organization should; V

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have for this utility.

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N Based uponithe ab6ve' findings, this portion of the licensee's

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program was acceptable ~;- however, }he following item is recommended Y

J fon improvementt

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'O Additional guidance should be developed for the' termination of a

emergency classifications and entry (into'a Recovery Phase,~whileL

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w the Recovery organization itself should be;better defined.

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ei iField Monitoring Teams

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'FieldteamsfromPrairieh.landandMontIcellopar$ticipatedinthis

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exercise.

Field monitoring team performance was good. =The teamsg C

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knewwhat~theirmissionwas,'andtookthe(initiative'severaltimes,

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providing sugg'estions as to actions they;should take.. They were

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frequently' reminded to' read,their dosimeters, and were provided q

plant status-updates.

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Thelobserved' team" corrected the. communicator when the term Rem"was

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l utilized versus the approved term millirem.- Radio communicationsa 3.,

-were generallyTdistinct and concis'eh sWhile the team was provided

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A with plant status updates, the obse'rved team wasinot aware of.the.

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declaration of-the General Emergency until' 1132(hour;s.

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Dissemination of potassiumiiodide'(KI)-was not observed.

Later

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-discussion with licensee. personnel indicated that procedures' req'uire.

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consideration ~of recommended KI issuance'on' projected thyroid doses W-

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rVe in~ excess'of 25 Rem, and exposure was controlled so that doses did t

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not approach,this figure.

It wastalso noted that/the(team' kits'do-

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not'contain KI, and,that teams would have to return to the EOF if'KI q

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F was determined necessary.

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'The ' observed team 'did not close theLvehicle ventilation vents, which e p

could have hastened,the contamination of the interior of the

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vehicle. This:was considered.as a minor problem; as it is assumed

.

that' the vehicles,will eventually become contaminated from air-

inleakage and. entering /exiti_ng the vehicle to, perform monitoring.

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Through a scenario' problem, at one point there was a thirty minute'

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.jumpcin offsite dose-information, and one or.more; teams foundi themselves suddenly. immersed in a high1.9 radioactive plume.

,

Based'upon the..above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was' acceptable; however, the following item should be

'

considered for improvement:

Consideration should be given to.

including KI tablets in -the field' monitoring teams' kits so that

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l they could' rapidly ingest KI if necessary.

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f/l V f 6.1 Exercise Scenario and' Control'

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.Thellicensee'sscenariowascomplexDandchallenging,forafull

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lp'articipation exercise,-and included: multiple equipment failures,,large

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L g radioactive releases,:and assembly / accountability.

The degree of :

challenge in an exercise scenario is considered when assessing observed -

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,,

exercise weaknesses.

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Overall, exerciseicontr'oliwas considered adequate, No major problems.or

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.T instances of controller prompting were observed.

Controller actions to preserve the integMiy o' the scenario timeline were required at several.

'

points', including ha'ittng'the initial. declaration of' a General Emergency.

.

.

Based upon the' above' findi$gs, this portion of the lice'nsee's program was

+

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acceptable.

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.

'

7." -Licensee Critiques =

c The licensee' held facility critiques immediately af ter the exercise, in-l

>

each facility,;and a: Controller exercise critique followed the facility -

.

critiques,# A final critique was held in conjunction with the NRC Exit j

interview conducted May 17, 1990.

NRC personne1' attended these

'

~

critiques, and? determined'that many NRC identified exercise concerns had

,

also been' identified by(licensee personnel.

.

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.

" Based: upon1the' a'bove' findings, 'this portion.of the licensee's program was

.

acceptable.

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8.-

Scenario Reviewt(IP 82302)

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Thelicen'ee. pro [idedadvance' copies 40ftheexercisescopeandobjectives-s p

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forTreview'inENRC Region III A scenario. package.was-also' submitted'for 4;j yreview.

It is recommended that future exercise scenario * packages.

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contain a general narrative summary of the scenario;to' faci.11 tate'NRC

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reviews.

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.The licensee's scenario was considered very challe'ng'ing, with :aInumbert of. '1,[ d.'

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(complex system" failures required 1to produce theLc'omplete lack?o,fl reactor

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. Based upon the above findings, this_ portion of'the, licensee's program wa's [ 9 3,

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9.7 Review ofithe Dose Assessment Program (IP 82207)

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.A review oflthe dose, assessment capability at Prairie? Island Nuclear

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-Plant was performed.

Source term and the-dose assessment portions of the licensee's program were reviewed. cMeteorological instrumentation was not

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reviewed,,as1this was done in a. previous inspection.

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Source Term I

Source terms-for-monitored release pathways are discussed in EPIP F3-20:

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.(Revi 8), EPIP F3-20.1 (Rev.el)L and EPIP F3-20;2 (Rev.~ =2).'

Radiation

. monitors used forgdetermining the source term for' emergency dose W

' calculations include: the' shield building vent gas monitors A (1R-22 and

2R-22), the ' aux building' vent gas monitors B (1R-30 and 2R-30), the high'

,7

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' range stack gas-monitors (IR-50 and 2R-50),. Loop A steam-line monitors ~

ii (1R-51 and 2R-51),;and Loop B steam line monitors (1R-52 and 2R-52).

The.

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.

EPIPs p'rovide appropriate conversion. factors and flow rates for

'

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converting monitor readings to release rates,

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Primary calibrations are performed on gas monitors every three to five.

'

' ~ ~q years ~In addition, the licensee performs a. monthly source test per o

1SP 1028 (Rev. 23), a quarterly functional test per SP 1229 (Rev. 7), and

'

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J a refueling calibration per SP 1027 (Rev. 10) on all the radiation

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monitors involved in source term determination.

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A recent primary calibration of the shield building vent gas monitors

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(IR-22'and 2R-22) resulted in a change in the calibration curve.

This

.

j change was documented in TM-90-45 (5/10/90) and attached,to_EPIP F3-20.

n The change in the calibration curve requires that the conversion factors-

'

>

,

fin. MIDAS be changed so that counts per minute.on the moni. tors are,

-converted to the. appropriate, concentration based on the new calibration.

LThis.had not been,done'and discussions with. plant staff indicated that:no one:had this responsibility.

>

The licensee's' method for determining'a sourceLterm for.'unmonitordd V'

release pathways'is found in EPIP F3-8-(Rev. 8).

This method allows the'

conversion of containment dome monitor readings to containment act'ivity

,

'in Xe-133 equivalent based ontime after reactor: shutdown,and approximate e

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core damage (e.g., 1% fuel defect, 20% gap release,'100% gap release).

,',

The containment activity is..then assumed to be released _to the

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+

..

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' environment at an appropriate leak rate for,the accident type.

The licensee did not have a formally documented method for determining a-source term based on field rea' dings such as back-calculating a field team -

, reading at an offsite location to a release rate using MIDAS.

Dose Assessment The licensee's primary dose assessment method is MIDAS (Meteor 61ogical I

'

Information and Dose Assessment System) developed by Pickard, Lowe and

< Garrick, Inc.

Canberra has performed some modifications to MIDAS for the-licensee which dealt with output displays and not the calculational,

'

method.

MIDAS has been developed to run on two independent VAX computersi

,

_ each with an uninterrupted power supply (battery backup) making it highly

' unlikely that MIDAS.would ever be, lost during an emergency.

MIDASL terminals are available in the control room, TSC, EOF, and corporate i:n headquarters.

In addition, a manual calculation backup method, based on

"

MIDAS parameters and documented in EPIP F3-13.3 (Rev. 1), is available.

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i'S The licensee runs' MIDAS using a straigh't-line Gaussian'at'mospherici

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.' dispersion model for. emergency calculations per EPIP'F3-13.1 (Rev. 3)?

'

The licensee's, version of MIDAS.also.has a particle dispersion model-

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which 'the licensee is in the process of; implementation:into'their

' program." Licensee-staff. indicated that'the particle dispersion'model

?

-

would'likely be used for developing: plume plots and ground deposition

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pl.ots'later in.the emergency (due to the time it takes to run the'

,

model).

The straight-line model would remain the primary dose assessment.

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method.i

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' MIDAS has the capability of inputting meteorological and radiation

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monitor data automatically or manually.

The automated method uses

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~ default! flow rates. for all release points. - Monitor: release rates are d

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expressedinterms.gfXe-133equivalentwithadefaultvaluefor

'

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radioiodines'of 10 of the Xe-133Tequivalent release rate._ MIDAS ~ allows

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.

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the' user to input. isotopic u lcase ratesifor a variety of radionuclides

'

L (noble' gases, radioiodines, and other fission products such_as Cs-134 and*.

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Cs-137).

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.

~

'

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l The licensee.has performed a comparison of MIDAS with the model-thel'

,

States of Minnesota and Wisconsin use.

Both States use'the same modified

,

J version of;IRDAM.Differenceschave been documented and-discussed with i

.t the States'.'.' Discussions'with licensee staff indicated they have a good

'

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working relationship with the States and periodically meet to discuss q

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dose assessment activities.

Currently'the States are considering the-i

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.i ' adoption of the NRC RASCAL dose assessment program and the licensee has; k

been involvedLin this process.

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.

.

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IThe licensee has nevsr formally documented any ' comparison made between

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MIDAS and,their manual calculation method.

Such aicomparison should.be

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performed and a discussion of any differences.found should be included as l

L part of the training for.the dose assessment. staff.

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Validation and verification studies 'for2 MIDAS were made available'.

The i

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l-contents of these studies were reviewed and found to'bel adequate,,

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.however, a detailed review of the studies was,not performe,d.

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The licensee has recently implemented a'new software control system for,,

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MIDAS'.

RPIP. 5500, Rev. 2 entitled " Radiation Release Dose Assessment

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Computer Software; Control" and RPIP 6840, Rev. O entitled," Prairie: Island

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MIDAS Software Test" provide the basis forithis system! The, system will

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? require that all. changes be appropriately documented and that-the model

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isl tested afte'r-the changes are made, to assure it is functioning

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properly.

No changes had been made since ; implementation of,the new

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O, system.

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Based upon the above findings,.this' portion of the licensee's.-program was l4

..

'

'

,

4.y adequate. ' However, the following items 'are> recommended for. improvement:

,

ym.

Assure that any changes in the conversion factors for effluentN

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monitors used in MIDAS, which convert monitor readings to 1

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concentrations in Xe-133 equivalent, are incorporatedsint6 the' model.

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field-readings such as~_back-calculating a field = team reading at an

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.offsite location to a release. rate-using MIDAS.

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Ls 4 1.'- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating; Plant 1990 Exercise Scop'e and Objectives

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Attachment i l

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

• -

'*.

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I y

1990

.

EXFRCISE OMECTIVES AND GUIDELINES Northern States Power Company (NSP), in conjunction with state, county and city agencies, will exercise its Emergency Response Plan on May 15 and 16,1990.

The

~'"

Exercise' will include mobilization of the organizations named below ~ such that the

'i i

capability to adequately respond to a simulated accident at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be verified.

't J

Objectives and guidelines have been developed for the conduct of this Exercise. NSP's

)

objectives and guidelines are contained in the text of this section.

Exercise participants will include the following organizations:

A. Northern States Power Comoany 1. Onsite Emergency Response Organlaation a. Control Room l

b. Technical Support Center c. Operations Support Center

<

L

.

2. Corporate Emergency Response Organization i

Emergency Operations Facility a.

N b. IIcadquarters Emergency Center c. Joint Public Information Center B. Dakota. Goodhue/ City of Red Wing, and Pierce Countlet and supporting local agencies, as-identified in their Emergency Response Plans for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, will participate in a full-scale capacity.

C. State of Minnesota Division of Emergency Management and supporting

-

agencies, as identified in the Minnesota Emergency Response Plan for nuclear power plants, will participate in a full-scale capacity.

D. State of Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government and supporting

.

-

agencies, as identified in the Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological -Emergency Response Plan for nuclear power plants, will participate in a full-scale capacity.

Active participation in the Exercise will only be required of the above ~ listed organizations.

-If the Exercise scenario requires that any other organizations and/or officials be contacted, they shall be contacted only for the purpose of checking communications.

,

Each objective is followed by guideline statements which define the " extent of play" by the participants.

Plant and Corporate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures e

5.

(EPIPs), which may be used to support the objective, are also listed for each objective.

pitc/E-Plan Page 2 of 30 SECTION II u

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT l:

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I 1990

'

O P

DRILL OBJECTIVES FOR THE NSP (LICENSED)

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION p

I. ANNUAL FLEMENM t

Objective #1.0: Arcidont noiserinn ond A euccinoni Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and the NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate detection and assessment of plant operational parameters and operational data.

Guidelines:

I 1.1 Plant systems and effluents (non-radiological) will be monitored and assessed in the Control Room, TSC, EOF, and HOEC for off-normal and accident conditions.

1.2 Radiological assessment will include initici and continuing assessment of the accident through evaluation process and area radiation monitors.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objectives stated above:

PINGP F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies PINGP F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC.

PINGP F3-7 Activation and Operation of OSC

,

'

PINGP F3-8-Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions L

PINGP F3-13 Offsite Dose Calculations ~

!

PINGP F3-17 Core Damage Assessment PINGP F3-20 Manual Determination of Radioactive

Release Concentrations PINGP F3-24 Recordkeeping During an Emergency PINGP F3-26.1 Operation of the TSC ERCS Display PINGP F3-26.2 Radiation Monitor Data on ERCS Corp EPIP 1.1.4 Emergency Organization Records and Forms L

Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of HQEC Corp EPIP 1.1.11 Accident Assessment O

, pitc/E-Plan Page 3 of 30 SECTION II i'

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.E PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

'

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1

"

1990 DV Objective #2.0:^ Fmorgoney rinccifientinn

-

Given simulated accident conditions, appropriate PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall correctly identify and classify the emergency as a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA or GENERAL EMERGENCi' as.

specified in the Prairie Island EPIP F3-2.

i Guidelines:

2.1

~ When given initiating conditions of an emergency action level, the j

Emergency Director / Emergency Manager will classify the emergency j

consistent with the PINOP's emergency. classification scheme. The postulated plant conditions will necessitate classifications beginning J

at an ALERT and escalating to the General Emergency.

2.2 The responsible person will find the initiating conditions of the accident scenario in F3-2 " Classifications of Emergency".

The following EPIP will be used to support the objective stated above:

PINGP F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies l-

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Pitc/E-Plan Page 4 of 30 SECTION II

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,j PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT I

.

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE

' Rev.1 i

1990 g

Objective #3.0: Natifienrinn nf nnciro and offeito Fmorgonev Rocnnndors

,

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP or NSP Corporate personnel, as appropriate, shall promptly complete accident notifications to the appropriate State

-

and County / City agencies (15 minutes), the NRC (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />), PINGP personnel'and NSP Corporate Emergency Response Organization (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).

Guidelines:

L

-

Notifications of emergency classifications to the States of Minnesota and 3.1

.

Wisconsin, Dakota, Pierce and Goodhue/ City of Red Wing will be com-l g-pleted within 15 minutes. Initially, these notifications will be made by the l

'

B Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) at the plant. Offsite communicators at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will assume these responsi-

-

bilities as it becomes operational.

.

3.2 The SEC and NSP System Operation will notify and mobilize NSP Emergency Response personnel at the ALERTlevel of classification.

3.3 The SEC or EOF Communicator will notify state and local organizations.

-

using the plant or EOF Notification Report form.

,

3.4 The Control Room staff or SEC will notify the PINOP personnel of an emergency classification and changing emergency conditions via the plant page as necessary.

_

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINGP F3-3 Responsibilities During a NUE

-

- PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency PINGP F3-5 Emergency Notifications PINOP F3-5.1 Switchboard Operator Duties Corp EPIP 1.1.2 Notifications

'

Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of the EOF

_

,

_

MM iP tc/E-Plan

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Page 5 of 30 SECTION II i

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT a.

'

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev I

>

^ * *

1990 g

A Objective #4.0: rnmmuntentinn c l'

Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and NSP Corporate personnel l

shall initiate and maintain communication links with the NSP Emergency

'

Response Organization, and state and local Emergency Response Organizations.

Guidelines:

4.1 The following communications will be used:

4.1.1 24-hour communication links for notification and activation of state and local EROS, and if appropriate, their alternates.

,

4.1.2 All other communications links to state / local EROS.

4.1.3 Communication links to Federal Emergency Response

!

'

Organizations as appropriate.

4.1.4 Communications links among the plant and the EOF, HQEC, Radiation survey teams and JPIC.

4.1.5 Communications links that activate the various emergency

'

-

organizations.

4.1.6 Communications links with the NRC Region III and NRC Headquarters and the EOF.,

OTEh~]

The following objective woldd normally be demon-

strated during the annual Emergency Medical Exercise.

'

4.2 The communications link between the plant and the fixed or mobile -

medical support facilities will not be demonstrated.

4.3 Emergency Notification Followup Message form will be generated on a periodic basis from either the TSC or EOF, depending on what organization is in charge of communications with State EROS.

4.4 Procedures to alert, notify and mobilize the NSP Emergency Response

',

- Organization will be demonstrated.

,

pitc/E-Plan Page 6 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

..

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1 i

1990 g

Objective #4.0: rnmmuntentinn e 4.5 NSP will demonstrate prompt communications to state / local emergency

~

'

organizations, recommendations for protective actions to the general public within the 10-mile EPZ regarding changes in protective action i

recommendations.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

"

PINGP F3-5 -

Notifications

'I PINGP F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC PINGP F3-7 Activation and Operation of OSC PINOP F3-8 Recommendatio' s for Offsite Protective -

n Actions -

PINOP F3-8.1 Recommendations for Offsite Protective

-

Actions for the On-Shift Emergency Director / Shift Supervisor PIN GP F3-15 Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne

,

g'

Release PINGP F3-16 Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Liquid Release PINGP. F4

- Medical Support and Casualty Care

-

Corp EPIP 1.1.2 Notifications Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of the EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.8 Communication Equipment and

.

Corp EPIP 1.1.10 Information

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Corp EPIP.1.1.11 Offsite Surveys-Dose Assessment and Protective Action i

Recommendations l

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' pitc/E-Plan Page 7 of 30 SECTION II J

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.s PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

".

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1

'

1990-Objective #5.0: Rodininolen! Frnncuro ('nntral l

Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and NSP Corporate personnel shall initiate and maintain a program of emergency radiological exposure control.

Guidelines:

5.1 Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action t will be considered for undertaking corrective actions, performing assess.

actions, and performing personnel decontamination.

~ 5.2 Procedures for authorizing doses in access of 10CFR 20 shall be s ert:d, as appropriate.

5.3 Dosimetry shall be issued and read and recorded at appropriate intervals in~

the various emergency centers.

'

5.4 Decontamination action levels shall be considered and appropriate decontamination completed.

5.5 Radiological monitoring of personnel evacuated from the site s1UI be (

considered as appropriate, but a site evacuation is not expected'for this s

Drill.

5.6 The need for respiratory protection, protective clothing'and radioprotective

'j

. drugs shall be considered as appropriate.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency PINGP F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC-l

'PINGP F3-7 Activation and Operation of OSC PINOP F3-9 Emergency Evacuation PINGP F3-11 Seach and Rescue PINOP F3-12 Emergency Exposure Control PINOP F3-18 Thyroid Blocking Agent PINGP F3-19 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination PINGP F3-21 Establishment of a Secondary' Access Control PINGP F3-24 Reentry O

pitc/E-Plan -

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' PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT-

-

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1

)

1990-Objective #5.0: Rndininolen! Finncuro rnntrni n

.

' -

Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.13'

Protective Guidelines for EOF Personnel and Evacuation

-

Corp EPIP 1.1.16 ~

Offsite Personnel and Vehicle Monitoring Corp EPIP 1.1.17 Personnel Monitoring at the EOF-Corp EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the EOF

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Pitc/E-Plan Page 9 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT l

'

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.1

,

1990 t

..-

h-i u

Objective #6.0: Erntortlw Actinn Roenmmondorinnc l

'Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and NSP Corporate personnel shall develop and promptly communicate protective action recommendations for the protection of the health and safety of the public.

,

Guidelines:

6.1 Recommended protective actions for the general public offsite will be -

formulated and communicated to the appropriate state agencies with regards-to the plume exposure pathway.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated'above:

PINGP F3-1 Onsite Emergency Organization 14 N OP F3-5 Emergency Notifications

'

PINOP F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions PINGP F3-8.1

, Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions for the On-Shift Emergency-Director / Shift Supervisor

.

PINGP F3-13 Offsite Dose Calculations q

Corp EPIP 1.1.1 Corporate Emergency Response Organization Corp EPIP 1.1.5

.Startup and Operation of EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.11 Dose Assessment and Protective Action-Recommendations -

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pitc/E-Plan Page 10 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

..

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.I 1990 g

-

Objective #7.0: Staf Augmentatinn

-

Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and NSP Corporate personnel

-

shall promptly activate and maintain emergency organization staffing requirements as required by the Prairie Island and Corporate Emergency Plans.

E

-

Guidelines:

7.1 Concepts of operation in the NSP and emergency operating centers

-.

(EOC() will be tested.

7.2 24-baur coverage for all emergency organizations will be considered.

E 7.3 Tae Emergency Operating Facility (EOF), Headquarters Emergency

-

Center (HQEC) and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) will be staffed to augment the plant staff.

7.4 Augmentation of contractor services will be simulated.

g g

The following objective would normally be demon-strated during the annual Emergency Medical Exercise.

• 7.5 Demonstration of agreements with local police, fire ambulance and hospital support for a medical emergency will not be demonstrated.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

-

PINGP F3-1 Onsite Emergency Organization PINGP F ' -6 Activation and Operation of TSC PINGP F-7 Activation and Operation of OSC

_

Corp EPlP 1.1.1 Corporate Emergency Response Organization Corp EPIP 1.1.3 Public Information Corp EPlP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of the EOF

_

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Corp EPIP 1.1.6 Emergency Organization Shift Turnover

-

Corp EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of the HQEC Corp EPIP 1.1.9 Emergency Processing of Purchase Orders Corp EPIP 1.1.14 Vendor and Consultant Services

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P tc/E-Plan Page 11 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

,,

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1

"

1990 N

g

'

Objective #8.0: ShiftXiofhg Givea simulated accident conditions, PINGP and NSP Corporate personnel shall

,

demonstrate normal shift staffing as stated in the appropriate Emergency Plan.

Guidelines:

i

,

8.1 Normal staff personnel will demonstrate adequate shift staffing of emergency

,

organization positions, 8.2 The Interim Emergency Director position and his associated responsibilities

!

will be demonstrated.

8.3 Turnover from the Interim Emergency Director to the designated Emergency

'

Director will be demonstrated.

8.4

. Specified positions in the Emergency Plan as stated in the Participant

'

section will demonstrate their assigned duties.

~

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

I G

PINGP F3-1 Onsite Emergency Organization

-

V PINGP F3-3 Responsibilities during a-Notification of

,

'

Unusual Event

'

PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency Corp EPIP 1.1.1 Corporate Emergency Response-

!

Organization Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of the EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of the HOEC

!

pite/E-Plan Page 12 of 30 SECTION II

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8.

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Re 1990 II. Qtf1NQIIFNNIAL RI.KMENTE Objective #9.0: Nf Hnun hpIng Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate off hours shift staffing..

Guidelines:

9.1 Off hours staffing will not be demonstrated.

. The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:-

PINGP F3-1-Onsite Emergency Organization

,

PINOP. F3-3 Responsibilities During a Notification of Unusual Event PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency.

-

Corp EPIP 1.1.1 Corporate Emergency Response gI Organization Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of the EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of the HQEC

.I i

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR' GENERATING PLANT

"

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.1

.

1990 O

Objective #I0.0: Arrivattan af fmorgonev uswx contor

,

Given simulated accident conditions. NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate staffing of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC).

Guidelines:

'

j 10.1 Designated space for the news media will be demonstrated at the JPIC.

10.2 The duties of the Executive spokesperson and Communications representative will be implemented which include a process for l

information exchange within NSP.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objectives stated above:

Corp EPIP 1.1.3 Public Information -

t Corp EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of the HQEC

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.

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1990

_

Objective #11.0: !!" nf Firo rnntrni Tonmc

_

.

g Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate staffing i

of the Fire Brigade in response to a simulated fire.

[

Guidelines:

11.1 The scenario will not demonstrate staffing or implementation of fire control teams.

-

-

11.2 Use of trained fire brigade personnel will not be demonstrated.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

-

PINGP F5 Fire Fighting

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

,.

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I

..-

g 1990 i

,

Objective #12.0: 11w nf First Aid nndinr Rotm Tonme Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate first aid capability. -

Guidelines:

Nkydhl? WO)G&

These objectives would normally be Q@tyggNOTEs%; 34Q demonstrated during the annual Emergency

'^n sW2%$ty)%'

Medical Exercise.

,

12,1 Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides will not be demonstrated for removal of an injured person, providing first aid and medical treatment and providing ambulance service because the

- scenario does not involve an injured person.

i 12.2 Implementation of procedures for authorizing doses in access of 10CFR 20 to support a contaminated injured person will not be demonstrated.

12.3 O

The issuance and control of dosimetry to support a contaminated injured

,

person will not be demonstrated.

12.4 Decontamination procedures for support of a contaminated injured person will not be demonstrated.

12.5 Onsite first aid capability will not be demonstrated.

12.6 Use of trained first responders /EMTs for support of a contaminated injured person will not be demonstrated.

.The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINOP F3-4 Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area

,

or General Emergency PINOP F3-9 Emergency Evacuation PINOP F3-11 Search and Rescue PINGP F3-12 Emergency Exposure Control PINGP F3-18 Thyroid Blocking Agent PINOP F3-19 Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination PINGP F3-21 Establishment of a Secondary Access Control PINGP F3-24 Reentry PIN OP F4 Medical Support and Casualty Care q%/

pitc/E-Plan Page 16 of 30 SECTION II u

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/.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT i

.-

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1 l

g 1990

,

i Objective #13.0: 11v af Modleni hnnart Pormnnel

'

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate the capability of treating a contaminated injured person.

Guidelines:

i llL Y$$i%

These objectives would normally be

%g@ }Q MNOTEs'f% g @T

i demonstrated during the annual Emergency L ~ & y fwQpFQf" Medical Exercise.

13.1 A medical emergency drill will not be conducted.

13.2 Arrangements for local and back-up hospital and medical services for the treatment of a contaminated injured person will not be demonstrated.

i 13.3 Arrangements for the transport of a contaminated injured person will not i

be demonstrated.

13.4 The use of trained first responders /EMTs to a simulated contaminated injured person will not be demonstrated.

'

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PIN GP F4 Medical Support and Casualty _ Care O

iP tc/E-Plan Page 17 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I

..

1990

,

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Objective #14.0; Tho nf Hondnunrton %.n.nnrt Ponnnnel Given simulated accident conditions, Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the capability of activation and staffing of the Headquarters Emergency Center i

(HQEC).

'

,

Guidelines:

14.1 The staffing and activation of the HQEC will be demonstrated.

i I

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

Corp EPIP 1.1.1 Corporate Emergency Response Organization

.

Corp EPIP 1.1.7 Startup and Operation of the HQEC

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'pitc/E-PlP.a Page 18 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISI AND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. -

1990

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_

Objective #15.0: Ut* nf brurity PortnncLta,ernvido Prnmpt Arrotsjm Fmorgonev fnuinment and knnars

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP security personnel shaU demonstrate the capability of providing emergency equipment and prompt access for emergency

[

support vehicles (e.g., fire and ambulance).

-

Guidelines:

9 ' SQM,i Jh > 1 %

These objectku would normally be smy' NOTEtl1

demonstrated during the annual Em.:rgency

~

_

K. a J

Medical Exercise.

..

u 15.1 PINOP security personnel will not demonstrate the capability of providing access for emergency personnel and vehicies.

p 15.2 PINGP security personnel will not demonstrate support of a medical emergency.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

g B.

PINGP F4 Medical Support and Casualty Care PINGP F5 Fire Fighting E

E.

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Page 19 of 30 SECTION 11

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.1

,,

1990

.

O Objective #16.0: Hu nl nkup t%mmuninrinnn

,

Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the capability of providing backup communications in the event of a failure of primary communications links.

Guidellnes:

16.1

'Ihe use of backup communicaticas equipment will be demonstrated if the primary means of communication fails to operate.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINGP F3-5 Notifications PINGP F3-6 Activation and Operation of TSC PINOP F3-7 Activation and Operation of OSC PINOP F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions PINOP F3-8.1 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions for the On-Shift Emergency Director / Shift Supervisor

.

PINOP F3-15 Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release PINGP F4 Medical Support and Casualty Care Corp EPIP 1.1.2 Notifications Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of the EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.3 Communication Equipment and Information Corp EPIP 1.1.10 Offsite Surveys Corp EPIP 1.1.11 Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations

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I pitc/E-Plan Page 20 of 30 SECTION 11

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.

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l'

1990 i

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l Objective #11.0: Rmnr rnntral Given simulated accident conditions, Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the

!

capability of providing rumor control.

l Culdelines:

l 17.1 The Media Liaisons in the HOEC and JPIC shall ensure that the rumor I

control procedures specified in the Nuclear Emergency Communications l

Program are implemented.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

Corp EPIP 1.1.3 Public Information

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

.

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 1

-..

1990

.-

A Objective #I8.0: Hu nf Fmngnq Pnwr Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP and Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the capability of continued operation of the affected emergency center (s) in the event of a failure of primary power.

Guidelines:

18.1 ihe use I emergency sources in the various emergency centers will not

?e der *.,nstrated, l

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

.,

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I 1990

,

Objective #19.0: Rentuarinn nf Fmoroonev R*cnnnco Fnriifrioc iF):.LLand Roinenrinn in Rnrkun FRFc

,

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the capability of evacuation of and relocation to a backup ERF.

-

Guidelines:

19.1 Evacuation of ERFs will not be demonstrated.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.1 l

1990 O

Objective #20.0: Inpulnn Poth*av

"

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall support the demonstration by State and Local Government Ingestion Pathway requirements.

Guidelines:

20.1 NSP organizations shall demonstrate support of state and local authorities in the capability of determining relocation and ingestion plume exposure through the use of scenario data and controller

actions.

,

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

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Corp EPIP 1.1.11 Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations O

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

• ~

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev i

1990

i

!

Objective #21.0: Firm Mnnhnrin:

l Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall

!

demonstrate monitoring of offsite radiological releases through a program of

!

surveying, sampling and analyzing.

.

Guidelines:

21.1 Field Monitoring teams from Prairie Island and Monticello will be dispatched.

,

l 21.2 Monitoring of the release will include the collection and/or analysis of l

beta / gamma surveys, contamination surveys and air samples as required.

!

21.3 Monitoring of water, soil, and air will be demonstrated or simulated as appropriate.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey g

'

PINGP F3-15 Teams During a Radioactive Airborne Release Corp EPIP 1.1.5 Startup and Operation of EOF Corp EPIP 1.1.10 Offsite Surveys Corp EPIP 1.1.18 Control of Radioactive Materials at the P

EOF

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

!

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I 1990

.

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Objective 22.0: kwr Tnm AnalytLt Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the capability for determining the magnitude and impact of a tadioactive release.

Guidelines:

>

22.1 The Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS)

will be used to estimate the total amount of activity released.

,

22.2 MIDAS will be used to determine projected doses under varying meteorological conditions.

22.3 Manual dose projections will not be demonstrated in this Drill.

22.4 The Radiation Monitoring teams will be dispatched to verify the dose projections.

22,5 Iodine sampling will be completed as appropriate by the field survey

/

teams.

22.6 Dose projections from MIDAS or actual field data will be used to

,

determine protective action recommendations.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINGP F3-4 Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency PINGP F3-8 Recommendations for Offsite Protective Actions PINGP F3-13 Offsite Dose Calculations

,

PINOP F3-15 Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey Teams During a Radioactive Liquid Release Corp EPIP 1.1.10 Offsite Surveys Corp EPIP 1.1.11 Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations l

pitc/E-Plan Page 26 of 30 SECTION II

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4 s PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Re g

'

1990

,

Objective 23.0: Nr-AreMear Amanne

'

.

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze various inplant liquid and air-type samples.

,

Guidelines:

23.1 Inplant post-accident sampling will include sample analysis of reactor coolant, containment atmosphere and Shield Building vent as appropriate within three (3) hours of sampling, The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

i PINGP F3-20 Determination of Radioactive Release Concentrations

PIN GP F3-23 Emergency Sampling

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

!

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.. "

FMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.1

'

1990 l

Objective #24.0: Parnerium indih l

Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate persotmel shall demonstrate the ability to distribute potassium iodide.

,

Guidelines:

24.1 The need for use of Potassium Iodide may be considered for personnel in the Emergency Response Organization.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINGP F3-18 Thyroid Iodine Blocking Agent

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

'

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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev.I 1990

i Objective #25.0: A mmh 1;' and Avenunrohillrv Given simulated accident conditions, PINOP personnel shall demonstrate a plant l

evacuation and perform personnel accountability within 30 minutes following a

'

plant evacuation.

Guidelines:

25.1 Upon declaration of a plant evacuation, personnel accountability will be completed within 30 minutes.

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:

PINOP F3-9 Emergency Evacuation PINOP F3-10 Personnel Accountability PINGP F3-29 Emergency Security Procedures

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pite/E-Plan Page 29 of 30 SECTION II

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT

[

^

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., ',

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. I i

1990 O

.

Objective #26.0: Roenwrv and Roontrv Given simulated accident conditions, Corporate and PINGP personnel shall r

demonstrate recovery and reentry procedures.

Guidelines:

26.1 Activation of the Recovery Organization will be demonstrated by L

involving the Recovery Manager in staff planning and discussion with

'

the Emergency Manager and the Emergency Director.

'

The following EPIPs may be used to support the objectives stated above:

Corp EPIP 1.1.15 Transition to the Recovery Phase

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Attachment 2 s"

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT l

'

EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE Rev. 2 I

1990 s,

nmmmv m y mwww-wmm mmmy]

pi,TIMEF

,f

~~ 'c EVENT' SUMMARY 2

'

h aa m aaanad

,sammasua mas.ma 0710 Initial Conditions 1.

12 RHR manual valve RH-10-1 is being replaced due to crack in valve body. Welding is in progress and is approximately 50" complete, j

2.

12 charging pump out of service.

3.

Wind speed is 6 mph, wind direction 090'.

0730 System Condition '3" declared by System Control Center.

• 0745 Leak rate in the annulus started at 60 gpm.

0800 1,

ALERT EMERGENCY is declared due to primary coolant leak rate

.]

greater than 50 gpm.

2.

Commence orderly plant shutdown.

0815 1R50 Shield Building stack high range radiation monitor fails due to spiking.

.

0830 Motor Control Center (MCC) ILA1 fails due to overheating of wire caused by poor annection in the supply circuit breaker. This causes a loss of power to the following valves:

'

MV-32067, SI vessel injection (closed)

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MV-32070, SI cold leg injection Loop A (open)

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MV-32064,11 RHR vessel injection (closed)

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MV-32073, SI common cold leg injection isolation (open)

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0855 Break is increased to 100% (approximately 700 gpm) over next 25 minutes.

0900 1.

Manual reactor trip on low PZR level.

2.

Manual SI on low PZR level.

3.

MV-32069 SI vessel injection is mechanically stuck closed, causing the breaker to open on motor overload.

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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERA'.'1NG PLANT

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.

.4 EMERGENCY PLAN EXERC15E Rev. 2

'

1990 l'(

,

yp m F " y7 t~w4 pgp vp47 w mm mm w ewgwyym*y-~+g'*

'

TIME 0 ~ ~ <

EVENT SUMMARYF L.aAwanca 4.a w h uwa u aua. a uasu

-,

0905 SI pumps trip due to overcurrent.

0915 SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared due to Condition #3, " Loss of Coolant Accident with Leak Rate in Excess of Available Pump Capacity".

0945 1R50 returned to service.

1000 13 charging pump belt failure.

1000 RCP(s) shaft shears caused by high vibration.

1045 Core exit thermocouples increase to 1200*F.

1100 GENERAL EMERGENCY declared; loss of three FP barriers.

1100 - 1115 Welding is completed on RII-10-1, and 12 RIIR pump is started.

-

1200 Exercise stops for 24-hour time step:

'

1.

MCC ILA1 has been repaired.

2.

MV-32070, SI cold leg injection Loop A has been closed, isolating the leak.

1230 Exercise resumes.

1330 Recovery initiated.

1400 Exercise terminated.

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