IR 05000282/1990019

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Discusses Safety Insp Repts 50-282/90-19 & 50-306/90-20 & Investigation Rept 3-91-001 on 901120-910114 & Forwards Notice of Violation.Deliberate Violations May Undermine Util Ability to Ensure Compliance W/Regulations
ML20045D820
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1993
From: Martin J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Antony D
NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
Shared Package
ML20045D821 List:
References
EA-92-096, EA-92-96, NUDOCS 9306300095
Preceding documents:
Download: ML20045D820 (4)


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June 25, 1993 Dockets No.

50-282 and 50-306 Licenses No.

DPR-42 and DPR-60 EA 92-096 Northern States Power Company ATTN:

Mr. Douglas Antony Vice President Nuclear Generation

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414 Nicollet Mall

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Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Dear Mr. Antony:

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/90019; 50-306/90020)

(NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT 3-91-001)

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted from November 20, 1990, to January 14, 1991, and a subsequent investigation by the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.

The report documenting the inspection was mailed to Northern States Power Company (NSP)

by letter, dated January 28, 1991, and a summary of the OI report was sent to NSP on December 23, 1992.

The inspection and investigation identified significant violations of NRC requirements and an enforcement conference was held on February 3, 1993, in the Region III office.

The report of the enforcement conference was mailed to NSP on February 12, 1993.

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The NRC inspection and subsequent investigation were initiated as result of an NSP letter dated November 20, 1990, notifying the a

NRC that a compliance audit had identified a potential violation

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of NRC requirements (10 CFR Part 26) in the background screening program implemented by the Prairie Island security contractor.

The audit found that an individual with a documented history of alcohol abuse, and who had failed to complete a substance abuse rehabilitation program, was granted unescorted access as an armed security guard at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.

The violations arising out of this matter are fully described in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and include:

(a) failure to make a management and medical determination of the fitness for duty of the individual who had been subject to a treatment program for alcohol abuse prior to granting him

unescorted access to the plant; and (b) permitting the same

individual to act as an armed guard at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, even though he had an established medical CERTIFIED MAIL

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RETURN RECEIPT REOUESTED

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Northern States Power Company - 2 -

history of habitual alcoholism and could not demonstrate that he had successfully completed a rehabilitation program.

The violations continued for several months before you identified them, notwithstanding several opportunities between May 15, 1990, and October 22, 1990, to either prevent the violations or identify them after they occurred.

These opportunities included initial receipt of the individual's Form DD-214, both long and short form, discussions among contractor and licensee employees, and a report concerning the individual's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.

As a result of the investigation, the NRC concluded that the violations were caused by the deliberate failure of the regional manager of American Protective Services (APS), the contractor responsible for conducting background investigations of new employees, to report potentially disqualifying information about the individual to the NSP fitness-for-duty coordinator.

This contributed to the failure to evaluate the information prior to granting access and/or assigning him to duties as an armed security officer.

The NRC recognizes that once the violations were identified and understood by the NSP staff, the NRC was promptly notified, the matter was immediately investigated, and corrective actions were prompt and extensive.

Nevertheless, licensees are held responsible for the actions of their contractors.

Therefore, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"

(Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990), the violations are collectively categorized at Severity Level III.

Deliberate violations, whether by NSP employees or contractors, are significant and may undermine NSP's ability to ensure compliance.

Therefore, consideration was given to increasing the severity level because of the deliberate nature of the violation.

However, the severity level was not changed in this case principally because the information was reported to one member of the licensee's security management, although he was not aware that the fitness-for-duty coordinator had not been notified, because there did not appear to be any deliberateness on the part of the licensee, and because the violation was reported to the NRC even though there was no requirement to do so.

A civil penalty was also considered for the violations comprising the Severity Level III problem in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

However, after consultation with the Commission and after considering your corrective actions following your identification of the violations, your voluntary reporting of the matter, and the time that has passed since you notified the NRC of the access issue, a civil penalty will not be proposed for the violations.

Finally, apart from the enforcement action against you, it should be noted that had this event occurred after September 1991, the effective date of the Commission's regulations concerning deliberate minconduct by individuals, this enforcement action may

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Northern States Power Company - 3 -

have included action directly against the contractor's regional manager.

Northern States Power Company is required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.

In your response, you should address not only the failure to consider the potentially disqualifying information available before granting the individual's access authorization but also why subsequent information relating to his arrest did not cause a i

reconsideration of the access decision.

After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will i

determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to

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ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice,"

a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your responses will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of

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Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Public Law No.96-511.

Sincerely,

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Joh B.

Martin Regional Administrator Enclosure:

Notice of Violation cc w/enclo:

DCD/DCB (RIDS)

E.

L.

Watzl, Site Manager M.

Wadley, Plant Manager Resident Inspectors, Monticello and Prairie Island John W.

Ferman, Ph.D.

Nuclear Engineer, MPCA State Liaison Officer State of Minnesota Prairie Island LPM, NRR l

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3 Northern States Power Company DISTRIBUTION SECY CA JSniezek, DEDR JLieberman, OE LChandler, OGC JGoldberg, OGC TMurley, NRR JPartlow, NRR Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII, RIV, RV FIngram, GPA/PA DWilliams, OIG BHayes, OI EPawlik, OI:RIII EJordan, AEOD DFunk, RIII DRosano, OE Day File EA File (2)

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