IR 05000282/1981019
| ML20039A094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1981 |
| From: | Burgess B, Feierabend C, Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039A087 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.2.1, TASK-1.C.5, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-2.E.4.1, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.G.1, TASK-2.K.3.09, TASK-TM 50-282-81-19, 50-306-81-21, NUDOCS 8112160220 | |
| Download: ML20039A094 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCIEAR REGULATORY COeilSSION
.0FFICE OF-INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No:.50-282/81-19; 50-306/81-21 Docket No: 50-282; 50-306 License No: DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Prairie. Island Site, Red Wing, MN 55066 Inspec* n Conducted: October 1-31, 1981 Inspectors:
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J C. D. Feietabend
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B. L. Burgess
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Approved By:
W. S. Li tie, Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 2C Inspection Summary
, Inspection on October 1-31, 1981 (Report No. 50-282/81-19; 50-306/81-21)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operation, mainten-ance, surveillance, security, radiation protection, Unit I refueling and maintenance activities, inservice inspection, reportable events, local leak rate testing, startup testing af ter refueling, and followup on TMI items. The inspection invcived a total of 203 inspector hours onsite by 2 NRC inspectors including 51 inspector hours onsite during off-shif ts.
Results:
No' items of noncompliance were identified.
8112160220 011125 PDR ADOCK 05000282 G
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DETAILS 1. pg sonnel Contacted'-
F 'Tierney,-Plant Manager J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations - and Maintenance E. Watz1, Plant Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection D. Mendele, Superintendent Operations Engineering D. Schuelke, - Superintendent, Radiation Protection R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations R.f Stenroos, Assistant Radiation Protection Superintendent.
J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman,-Superintendent, Technical Engineering-A. Hunstad, Staf f Engineer A. Smith, Senior Schedeling Engineer S. Northard, Nuclear Engineer J. Curtis, Engineer D. Brown, Engineer D. Haugland, Engineer B. Frazer, Engineer G. Lenertz, Engineer M. Gruber, Engineer G. Miller, Engineer T. Thomas, Engineer B. Stephens, Engineer K. Beadell, EngJneer D. Cragoe, Shif t Supervisor P. Ryan, Shift Supervisor M. Balk, Shif t Supervisor T. Coctsch. Shif t Supervisor
D. Walker, Shif t Supervisor P. Valtakis, Shif t Supervisor R. Held, Shif t Supervisor
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2. Licensco' Action on Trevious Inspection Findings The inspectors have reviewed previous inspection reports to determine whether items previously identified have been addressed. Some of these items may have been addressed during subsequent inspections but had not
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been identified as " Closed" in inspection reports, a.
(Closed) Noncompliance (50-282/73-11; 50-306/78-12)
Related to procedures for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR
21.
Corrective action was verified during tentlyomittedfromtheinspectionreport.jpecemacr1978,inadver-
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[1 IE Inspection Reports No. 50-282/78-23; 50-306/78-23
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. (Closed). Unresolved Item i(50-282/7812; 50-306/78-13).
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?Related to storage procedures, storage facilities and access.. con-trol for quality assurance records..This area has been subsequently
- addressed during quality assurance inspections and~during a main-
'tenance inspection.
-Areas of coyge3n and. noncompliance were Iden-
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'tified-in the inspection reports cnd further inspection will
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. address the followup ' of items as identified in those reports.
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(Closed) ~ Unresolved Item '(50-282/81-02; 50-306/81-03)
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b Related to deconstrating acceptable flows.for control room venti-l lating system af ter modification.
l The inspector had. confirmed that the flow verification was comple-
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ted in bruary, 1981,. inadvertently omitted from the inspection report.
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3.' Operational Safety Verification
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a.
General
Unit i refueling was completed and the unit was back on line on:
October 29th. The unit had been synchronized on October 27th but
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L indication of moisture in the generator-on October 28th required'
F that'the generator be taken off line until the moisture problem
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Unit 2 operated at power until October 29th, when it was shut down because the containment purge. supply valves failed a semiannual local. leak rate test (LLRT). ' Test frequency was increased to semi-annually after the valves had not passed the LLRT in December 1975.
Valve seat adjustment and retesting was completed and the unit was back on line on' October 31st. The licensee will submit an event report.
b.
Control Room Observations i
i The inspector observed control room operations,-reviewed applicable logs,' conducted discussions with control room operators, and observ-ed shift turnovers. The inspector verified -the operability of selec-ted emergency systems, reviewed. equipment control records, and ver-ified the proper return to service.of affected components.
/2 IE Inspection Reports No. ' 50-282/79-21; 50-306/79-18
][I IE Inspection Reports No. 50-282/81-01; 50-306/81-01
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/4 IE Inspection Reports No. 50-282/81-10;.50-306/81-11
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]]i IE ; Inspection Reports No. 50-282/81-04; 50-306/81-04
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' Tou rs Tours of'the auxiliary, turbine, and containment buildings and ex-ternal areas were. conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,:
including' potential fire _ hazards, and to verify that. maintenance =
work requests had' beenlinitiated. for equipment in need-of mainten-ance. The inspectors made several tours of Unit I containment to
. follow the progress of maintenance and refueling activities.
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.d. _ Independent Verification The inspector performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of
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- the component cooling water and ventilation systems. Observations included confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's pro-cedures, checklists, plant-drawings, verification of correct valve
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' and pcwer supply breaker positions to insure that plant equipment
and instrumentation;are-properly ' aligned, and -review of control
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room and local system. indication :to insure proper operation within
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prescribed limits.
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e.
Observations-
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The inspeccors observed portions of the Emergency Communicationi Notification Test'and the Emergency Plan Drills conducted during the month of October. The test and the drills were conducted for training.
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The inspector also observed portions of reactor startups performed
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by personnel in training for an operators license.
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4. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Items
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The inspector reviewed the status of several licensee actions in re-f sponse to NRC requirements las clarified by NUREG-0737. Paragraph identification relates to those paragraphs of NUREG-0737.
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Upgrading of R0 and SRO Training and Qualifications.
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I. A. 2.1.4. B I
The inspector has previously reviewed _the training
requirement and has periodically monitored SRO and.
technical staff training sessions. The training
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program will be reviewed and evaluated during the next detailed review of the licensee's training program.
(Open)
b.
I.C.5 Provisions for Feedback of Operating Experience ' to -
Plant Staff.
j-The inspectors have furnished input for the Safety Evaluation Report. The report has not yet been
issued.
(Open)
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I.C.6.
Procedures for Verifying Correct Performance of
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Operating Activities.
The inspectors have furnished input for the Safety Evaluation Report. The report has not yet been issued.
(Open)
d.
II.B.4.2.A-Training for Mitigating Core Damage.
III.B.4.2.B The inspector has observed portions of licensee training sassions for mitigation of core damage and has observed and reviewed installation of instru-mentation for monitoring systems status. Training has been completed for all non-shift personnel (e.g.
The licensee has revised-gd shif t technical advisors).
supervisors, engineers,y
- the schedule for comple-tion of initial training to now be completed by Decem-ber 1, 1981. This will be reviewed and evaluated dur-ing the next detailed review of the licensee's train-ing program.
(0 pen)
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II.D.3.1 Direct Indication of Relief and Safety Valve Position.
The status of comp)9 tion was discussed in a previous inspection report.-- The licensee completed in-sta11ation of quapgfied limit switches, as committed in their response-- to the IEB 79-01 SER, during the recently completed Unit i refueling outage. The in-spector confirmed that the licensee's actions were completed.
(Closed)
f. II.E.1.2.1.B.2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System II.E.1.2.2.C.2 The licensee completed system review a evaluati.ons as described in one of their responses to TMI-2 action plan requirements. The evaluation determined that the system design met the requirements as clari-fled in NUREG-0737, for both initiation (II.E.1.2.1 b.2)
and flow indication (II.E.1.2.2.c.2) (Closed)
[6 NSP Letter to NRR Subject: Revised Schedule for Completion of Initial Training to Mitigate Core Damage, lated August 21, 1981.
f 7, IE Inepection Report Nos. 50-282/80-19; 50-306/80-19.
/8, NSP Letter to NRR Subject: Response to IE Bulletin 79-01B, Safety Evaluation Report, f9 NSP Letter to NRC Subject: Post TMI Requirements, dated December 30, 1980.
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II.E.4.1.2.
Dedicated Hydrogen Penetration.
Plant designs included a hydrogen purge' system:that met this ryggirement. This was addressed in'the NRR evaluatioi.
of licensee compliance with category
"A" Li* ems of NRC recommendations resulting from TMI-2 lessons learned. No ffurtherl actions are required.
(Closed)
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II.E.4.2.(1-4) Containment Isolation Dependability.
The licensee' completed evaluation of the containment isolation design.and furnished the requested informa-tion to NRR in several responses to requests for in-
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formation. The inspectors have confirmed status of containment isolation periodically during implemen-tation of the independent verification program. The tion valves-during a = previous inspection.yygl isola-inspector confirmed ' licensee control of ma Subsequently, during surveillance testing being performed to demonstrate that the design conformed-
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to the NRC staff position expressed in II.E.4.2.(4),
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the licensee discovered that the containment purge
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and vent isolation circuitry did ggt meet the staff j
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position. The licensee reported this to NRR and-committed that the purging would not' be resumed until
logic modifications have been completed and found acceptable by the NRC-staff.
The inspector has confirmed that the licensee main-tains containment purge valves locked closed when'
containment integrity is required, and independently-
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verifies this periodically during routine plant
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inspections.
(Closed)
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II.E.4. 2.5. B Minimum Containment Pressure Setpoint.
The licensee yyaluation of the setpoint is included j
in a letter providing additional information re-
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lating to NUREG-0737. The licensee evaluation deter-mined that no further actier. is required.
(Closed)
/10 NRR Letter to NSP Forwarding the Evaluation, dated April 18, 1980.
/11 IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-782/80-09; 50-306/80-10.
/12 NSP Letter to NRR - Subject: Containment Pur2e and Vent System Isola-tion Logic, dated November 7, 1980.
f.13 NSP Letter to NRR Subject: Additional Information for Resolutions of NUREG-0737.
Item II.E.4.2. Position 5, Minimum Containment Pressure Setpoint, dated August 26, 1981.
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II.E.4;2.7-Radiation Signal on Purge Valves.
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. The original -plant design.provided that all' purge
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valves close on.a -radiation signal. This had been verified and testing confirmed during followup of _the licensee's actions in responsc to IEB 79-06A.
(Closed)
lk..II.G.1'1.
Power Supplies for - Pressurizer Relief Valves, Block '
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-Valves'and Level-Indicators.
The power supplies for these components were described in earlier licensee responses cnd we determined to be acceptable in the NRR_ evaluation.yg4 (Closed)
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II.K.3.9.-
Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) Controller.
The PID controller derivative setpoint was changed to zero when the safety injection logic was. changed in response to IEB 79-06A. The logic verifiedduringapreviousinspection.pggngewas (Closed)-
5. Surveillance The inspectors witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety re-lated system and components. The inspection included verifying that.
the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requirements, observing;that procedures were being followed by quali-fied operators, that LCO's were not violated, that system and equip-ment restoration was completed, and that test results were acceptable to test and Technical Specification requirements.
Tests witnessed included:
a.
SP-1072 Local Leak Rate Test.
The inspector observed portions of type B and C testing on various containmaat penetrations. Pene-trations that were identified cs having leak rates-above test requirements had work requests issued for repair, b. -SP-2037 Turbine Overspeed Protection Trip Test.
Test was satisfactory.
c.
SP-1054 Turbine Control Valves Test.
Test was satisfactory.
/14 NRR Letter to NSP Forwarding the Evaluation, dated April 18, 1980.
/15~ IF Inspection Report Nos. 50-282/79-13; 50-306/79-10.
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SP-1136-2 Nulumetric Check of.the Maintenance Airlock.
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Test.was. satisfactory.
d. Maintenance-a.- Review of Work Request (WR's) and Work Request Authorization (WRA's).
i The' inspectors selected and reviewed several~WR's and WRA's.to'de-
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- termine _ the status of safety related systems, to verify that proper.
priorities were given and to verify that design changes were.initi-
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'ated where appropriate.
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Observations-The inspectors observed portions of safety related maintenance.
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activities to determine that the activities did not, violate limit-
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ing conditions for operations. (LCO's), that administrative -approvals
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and equipment control tags were completed. prior to initiating the-y' -
work, that approved procedures were used.(or activity wasLwithin the " skills of.the trade"), that the procedures used were-adequate
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to control the activity, ' and.that proper-QA/AC controls !were used.
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(1) The inspectors observed portions of the installation and test ~
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ing of: the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system per design change..
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80Y129.- The design change package converted No.11: steam driven AFW steam inlet control valve from AC to DC contro1 ' power. Dur-
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. ing the testing of the AFW system a procedural change.was re-quired'to test the lube oil system for the No.11LAFW pump.
'A change to the procedure using the proper drawings and reviews was gpproved and the procedure completed satisfactorily.
(2) Repair and testing of a previously identified leak was com-pleted durin,g the Unit 1 outage.. The' instrument port conoseal-
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was liquid penetrant tested and eight. indications. were found..
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The indications were repaired and the primary system raised up i
j; to 350# to pressure test the repair. The test identified an-
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other leak on.the conoseal which required reducing primary sys--
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l tem pressure and draining down to, the reactor. vessel flange to -
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I repair.~ A weld repair was successfully completed and primary -
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system refilled and' pressurized without further indications i -
of leakage.
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. /16 IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-282/81-15;'50-306/81-1% and 50-282/81-17; l
50-306/81-19.
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- 7.[ Licensee Event Report Followup
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hrough direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and'
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' review of records,.the following event reports were -reviewed to deter-:
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mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate correc-l
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- tive action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recur-
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'rence had been accomplished in accordance'with Technical Specifications.
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a.
P-RO-81-07 Unit 2 Shield Building Airlock Doors Found Open.
-inspection report.ygy were discussed in a previous-Details of this ev (Closed)
b.
P-RO-81-08
' Failure of the No.21'RCP Shaft.
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The licensee submitted an updated report on October 12, 1981 which provided additional details, includ-
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ing the results of the vendor examination and~ anal-ysis.
(Closed)
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c.
-P-RO-81-09
. Unit 1 Operation With One Offsite Source of' Power.
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The report accurately describes the event cause.
i Review of trip logic is not yet completed. _(Open)
d.
P-RO-81-10 Failure of One Unit 1 RDI Channel.
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The control rod position indicating (RPI) channel
.vas replaced during the September maintenance out-l age.
(Closed)
e.
P-RO-81-11-Inoperability of D2 Diesel Generator While D1 was Out of Service for Preventive Maintenance.
The report accurately describes the event. The in-spector confirmed that corrective actions were com-i pleted.
(Closed)
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P-RO-81-12 Failure of One-Unit 1 Low Pressurizer Pressure j
Bistable.
Detailsoftheevenpggeredescribedinaprevious inspection report.
(Closed)
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/17 IE Inspection Report Nos. -50-282/81-13; 50-306/81-15.
/18 IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-282/81-18; 50-306/81-20.
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P-RO-81-13 Unit 1 Operations Outside of Flux Difference Target Band.
Details ygre discussed in a previous '.nspection report.j (Closed)
h.
P-RO-81-14 Foreign Material-in Loop Seal.
The licensee submitted a prompt report, notifying RIII that rags had been found in a pressurizer safe-ty valve loop seal This was discussed in a previous inspection report./20 The licensee completed eval-uation of the event and determined that it was not reportable in that the rags did not make the valve -
inoperable. Thus the report number P-RO-81-14 is classified as "not used".
The subject was diecussed during a management meeting in the corporate offices
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on October 8th. The licensee agreed to provide an informational report providing the basis for the evaluation.
(0 pen)
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P-R0-81-15 Inoperability of One Unit 1 Steam Generator Safety Valve.
During initial testing the valve did not open with-in the range of the hydroset, so actuation of the-valve could not be confirmed, The licensae conduct-ed a cold bench test prior to repairs, and the valve did func tion.
The inspectore verified that the licensee retested the valve hot during plant startup, and that the test was satisfactory.
(Closed)
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P-RO-81-16 Inoperability of No.22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump.
The licensee is considering a design change that would better-indicate loss of control power.
(0 pen)
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P-RO-81-17 One Unit 2 Safeguards Actuation Logic Setpoint Found Out of Specification.
Detailsoftheevepggwere described in a previous inspection report.
(Closed)
f13 Ibid.
/20 Ibid.
/21 Ibid-10-
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P-RO-81-18 Tube Degradation in No.21 Steam Generator.
The inspector followed progress of the licensee's steam generator inspection and observed portions of the testing in progress. The report accurately de-scribes the results.
(Closed)
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P-RO-81-19 Missed Operability Test of Fire Pump.
The inspector observed a supervisor identify the problem and initiate the corrective action.
(Closed)
8. Startup Testing Af ter Refueling The inspector observed portions of Unit 1 low pcwer physics testing.
The inspection included a review of test procedures, verification of nrocedural compliance, observation of test measurements, and compari-son of test results with test specifications.
Tests observed included:
a.
SCP-1543 Rod Position Indication Calibration.
b.
D-30 Control Rod Worth Measurement.
c.
D-32 Isothermal Temperature Coef ficient Measurement.
d.
D-34 Boron End Point Measurement.
After the test results were reviewed and turbine generator testing completed, reactor power was raised to 20% for a flux map.
The 20%
flux map indicated a slight flux tilt. A backup flux map at 35% power was started when a plant nuclear engineer discovered a problem with the incore detector drive units. A containment entry was made and the incore detector drive units reconnected properly. The 20% flux map was reviewed to determine how the improper hookup of the incore detec-tors could effect the flux map results. Another computer run and flux map was completed and reviewed by a plant nuclear engineer. Prior to exceeding 50% reactor pcwer the 20% flux map was approved by the plant Operations Committee as required by plant procedures.
9. Response to Fire Alarm On the morning of October 27th the inspector heard the plant page sys-tem notifying the turbine building operator that there was a fire alarm annunciated in the turbine building. This was very shortly followed by an announcemert to all plant personnel that there was a fire in the ground level of the turbine building near the chemistry laboratory.
The inspectors observed fire brigade members and plant management per-sonnel respond to the alarm and noted an acrid smoke in the area. There was no visible fire, and the smoke was originating from a waste drum, apparently containing laboratory waste.
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The licensee called the city fire department before the source of the smoke was identified. The fire department responded, and did come in-to the piant to observe the status and to assure that assistance was not required. The licensee repo* red the event via the red phone in accordance with thei procedure.
Unit 2 was operating at 1007. power. Unit 1 was at hot standby, pre-paring for startup af ter refueling. There was no affect on operation other than providing ventilation to clear smoke from the area.
(Closed)
10. Management Meeting A meeting between NRC and licensee management representatives was held in the licensee's corporate offices on October 8,1981. The meeting was held to discuss the results of the NRC performance appraisal of licensed activities. The results of the appraisal will be discussed in a separate report.
The licensee airo discussed finding of rags in the pressurizer safety valve locp seal (Paragraph 7.h) and the results of the licensee's eval-uation. The licensee committed to furnishing an infonnational report of the event.
11. Exit Interviews The inspectors conducted interim interviews during the inspection period and met with Messrs. Tierney, Watz1 and Hunstad at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspectors discussed the scope and results of the in-spection.
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