IR 05000282/1980013
| ML19332B210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1980 |
| From: | Burgess B, Feierabend C, Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332B208 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-80-13, 50-306-80-13, NUDOCS 8009260271 | |
| Download: ML19332B210 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
T Report No.:
50-282/80-13; 50-306/80-13
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Docket No.:
50-282; 50-306 License No.:
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Licensee:
Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401 Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Mn. 55066 Inspection Conducted:
June 1 - uly 31, 1980 Inspectors:
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g C.D.Feierabend B.L. Burgess [Jd-
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Approved By: W.S.Little, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2
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Inspection Summary Inspection on June 1 - July 31, 1980 (Report No. 50-282/80-13; 50-306/80-13)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operation, maintenance, surveillance, security, radiation protection, followup of licensee reported events, followup on IE Bulletins, preparation for refueling, preparation of irradiated specimen for shipment, quality control and training. The inspection involved 175 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified. One item concerning quality control remains unresolved.
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DETAILS
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1.
Personnel Contacted
- F. Tierney, Plant Manager
- J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
- E. Watzl, Plant Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection
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Hunstad, Staff Engineer
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R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering D. Mendele, Superintendent, Operations Engineering D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer M. Sellman, Senior Nuclear Engineer R. Pearson, Engineer D. Brown, Engineer G. Miller, Engineer G. Lenertz, Engineer K. Albrecht, Superintendent, Quality Assurance Engineering D. Cragoe, Shift Supervisor G. Edon, Shif t Supervisor P. Ryan Shif t Supervisor M. Balk, Shif t Supervisor D. Walker, Shift Supervisor P. Valtakis, Shif t Supervisor
- Denotes those attending exit interview 2.
Operational Safe':y Verification A.
General
Unit 2 was shut down on June 3-6 to return the main transformer (2M)
to service after inspection and to balance the turbine. Unit I was J
shut down July 1-21 to repair a steam generator tube leak. The lic-ensee utilized the unscheduled outage to ccmplete the steam generator inspection scheduled for the next refueling outage. A severe thunder-storm on July 15 caused a Unit 2 trip and partial loss of offsite power.
The licensee has broken ground for expansion of the administration building. Completion is scheduled in 1981.
B.
Control Room Observations
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The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators and observed shif t turnovers. The inspector verified the operability of selected
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emergency systems, reviewed equipment control records, and verified proper return to service of af fected components.
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C.
Tours
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Tours of the auxilliary, turbine and shield buildings and external areas, were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.T By observation and direct interview, the inspector verified that seEurity procedures were being implemented in accordance with the plant security plan,
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m The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. This included observing radiation surveys of containment.
Tours of the Unit 1 containment and shield building were conducted during the unscheduled outage and during fill and vent operations in preparation for restart.
D.
Independent Verification The inspectors performed walk downs of the accessible portions of the safety injection, residual heat removal, containment spray, and the chemical and volume control systems. This included confirmation of selected portions of the licensee's procedures, checklists, and plant drawings, inspection of condition of components and piping supports, inspection of breakers and cabinets, verification of selected instruments for proper valving, equipment control locks or tags and comparison of remote and local indication.
The inspector also performed independent verification of the D2 diesel generator and of the No.11 auxilliary feedwater pump af ter return to service following completion of maintenance and monthly surveillance tests.
E.
Containment Isolation The inspector inspected a selected portion of containment isolation lineup, including valve position, valve operability, installation of caps, and locks, and condition of piping and accessible penetrations.
This included independent verification of portions of the licensee's startup checklist C1.1.19-1 Containment Integrity, Unit 1.
F.
Verification of Plant Conditions The inspectors independently verified the status of plant and equip-ment conditions to confirm fulfillment of Technical Specifications (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) requirements. The follow-
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ing LCO's were verified:
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TS 3.1.B Heatup and Cooldown
TS 3.1.F Minimum Conditions for Criticality TS 3.1.G Minimum Conditions for RCS Temperature Less Than MPT TS 3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System TS 3.3.A Safety Injection and Residual Heat Remeval System TS 3.3.D Cooling Water System e
TS 3.7 Auxiliary Electrical Systems
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G.
Bypass Control The inspectors audited the licensee's bypass controls to verify installation and control of selected jumpers, bypasses and lifted wires.
3.
Operating Events A.
Steam Generator Tube Leak On June 29 a small primary-to-secondary leak was identified by trace readings of xenon gas in the air ejector discharge and by radiochemical analysis of secondary water samples. The leak was initially quantified at approximately 0.004 gpm, when the unit was at 50% power for turbine stop valve testing, but increased to approximately 0.3 gpm as the unit was returned to power. The licensee shut down the unit on July 1 to complete repairs. The leak was found to be in a tube in the hot leg of the No. 12 steam generator in the tube sheet. The leaking tube was plugged. The licensee completed eddy current examination of steam generator tubes scheduled for the next scheduled refueling outage.
No other tubes required plugging. The licensee reported the event in ancordance with Technical Specification requirements.
B.
Lo's of Offsite Power 01 July 15, with Unit 2 at full power and Unit i shut down for steam generator repairs, a severe thunderstorm caused a reactor trip and partial loss of offsite power. Shortly af terward lightning strikes tripped other breakers in the switchyard reducing offsite power to one source. The diesel generators started as designed and automatically closed breakers to supply power to the safeguards buses. Natural cir-culation was established and sucessfully cooled the core until power was restored, about one hour later. All safeguards systems responded l
normally and the plant was restarted on July 16.
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The licensee will report the event in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
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4.
Maintenance
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A.
Review of Work Requests (WR's) and Work Request Authorizations (WRA's)
The inspector selected and reviewed several WR's and WRA's to determine the status of safety related systems, to verify that proper priorities
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were given and to verify that design changes were initiated where appropriate.
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B.
Observations The inspector observed portions of safety related maintenance activities to determine that the activities did not violate limiting conditions for operation (LOC's), that administrative approvalsYand equipment control tags were completed prior to initiating the Work, that approved procedures were used (or activity was within the " skills of the s
trade"), and that the procedures used were adequate to control the
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activity.
The inspectors witnessed maintenance activities during investigation and repair of the No.12 steam generator, during preventive mainten-ance completed on the No.11 auxiliary feedwater pump and restoration to service, and during repairs to the No. 121 fire pump discharge test line isolation valve.
5.
Surveillance The inspectors witnessed portions of surveillance testing of safety related systems and components. Witnessing included verifying that the tests were scheduled and performed within Technical Specification requk ements, observing that procedures were being followed, that LOC's were not violated and that system restoration was completed.
Tests witnessed included test No. SP 1083-Unit 1, Response to the Safeguards Signal Test.
(The integrated response test of all safe-guards action initiated by SI signal with coincident loss of offsite Turbine power.) The inspector also witnessed test No. SP 1102-No.113 Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test that was performed to demonstrate operability following annual preventive maintenance.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to deter-mine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
A.
P-RO-80-14 Setpoint Drift, Unit 1 Overpower Delta T.
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P-RO-80-16 No.22 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Trip Actuated During Instrument Calibration C.
P-RO-80-18 Tube Leak Identified in Unit 1 Steam Generator 7.
1.E. Bulletins
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's written response to the following bulletins, verified that the response included the required information
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and confirmed that the information in the response was accurate.
A.
I.E.Bulletin 79-27 Loss of Non-Class-1-E Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation (Closed)
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B.
I.E.Bulletin 79-28 Possible Malfunction of NAMCO EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures (Closed)
C.
I.E.Bulletin 80-16 Rosemount Inc. Models 1151 and 1152 Pressure Transmitters (Closed)
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D.
I.E.Bulletin 80-15 Possible Loss of Emergency Notification
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Systems with Loss of Offsite Power (Open)
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8.
Preparation for Refueling A.
New Fuel Receipt The inspector confirmed that procedure D9, Fuel Receipt had not been revised since the last inspection 1/ of preparation for refueling. The inspectors observed portions of new fuel handling activities including positioning and unloading containers, removing fuel elements from shipping containers, inspection of the fuel and placing fuel elements in storage locations.
B.
Refueling Procedures The inspector reviewed changes to refueling procedures since the previous refueling.
1.
D2 Draining the Reactor Coolant System - Rev.1 2.
D3 Reactor Vessel Head Removal - Rev.2 3.
D4 Reactor Internals Removal - Rev.1 4.
D6 Reactor Internals Replacement - Rev.1 5.
D7 Reactor Vessel Closure - Rev.1 6.
D8 Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System - Rev.2 9.
Training The inspector observed licensee training activities associated with use of respiratory devices and partidhated in mask tests for use in the plant.
The licensee was informed that the three senior reactor operator candidates were successful. They had received their SRO licenses.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had responded to NRR letter to all licensecs, dated March 28, 1980, concerning license applications for licensee training staff members.
- 10. Irradiation Specimen Cutting and Shipping
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The inspector reviewed licensee procedure D40-Irradiation Specimen Cutting and Shipping, and witnessed associated activities.
A.
Receipt of Shipping Cask 1/ IE Inspection Report No.50-282/79-30
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The shipping cask arrived via an exclusive use vehicle scheduled
to return the cask and specimen to the NSSS vendor. Surveys of the cask found contamination in excess of DOT requirements but within the allowable limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The licensee notified the shipper and the carrier to assure that DOT reporting requirements would be addressed.
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Irradiation Sample Handling
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The inspector witnessed cutting and placing the specimen into the shipping cask. The operation required minor changes to the proced-ure, which were completed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
C.
Cask Handling The inspector witnessed movement of the cask into the spent fuel pool, operations performed during cask loading and removal of the cask from the pool. The inspector observed portions of the decon-tamination activities and preparations for shipping.
11. Quality control - St.g Work Order On July 18, 1980, the licensee's Superintendent of Quality Engineering issued a stop work order for Design Change 78YO68, - Instrument Inverter Replacement.
A.
Background Design change No.78Y068 was initiated in January 1979 to replace the instrument inverters with improved inverters that will auto-matica11y transfer to an alternate source of power. The replacement for inverter No.13 was received on site and was released to the instrument shop for receipt inspection and testing.
B.
Identification of the Problems When Unit I went into the unscheduled outage on July 1, the decision was made to install the new No.13 inverter during the outage. Several work requests were initiated to implement the design change.
These included:
WR D3473-EE-Q Install Cable WR D3474-EE-Q Terminate Cable WR D3477-EE-Q Engrave Annunciator WR D3478-EE-Q Modify Inverter Pad
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WR D3602-RP-Q Replace Inverter No.13 WR D3721-EE-Q Place No.13 Inverter in Service WR D3722-EE-Q Preop-test No.13 Inverter
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The work was started on July 8,1980, with Unit 1 at cold shutdown
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for steam generator tube repair. Work was essentially complete on
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July 14 when a Quality Assurance review of WR D3478-EE-Q identified a deficiency in that the QA review had not been completed prior to initiation of the work. Additional reviews indicated.that seismic t
qualification of the mountings had not been addresse{ in the design change.
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A " verbal hold" was placed on release of WR D3602-RP-Q while investe igation continued. This was followed by the formal Stop Work Order on July 18, 1980, when the new No.13 inverter was tagged out of service and the inverter load (Bus 113) was energized by Panel 117, the alternate source.
C.
Operational Requirements Unit I was at cold shutdown from July 1-20, so the reactor protection instrument AC buses were not required to be supplied by inverters.
When the plant was restarted on July 21, Bus 113 was supplied by Panel 117, as allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.A.7.
D.
Resolution The licensee has identified several actions that must be finished prior to completion of the modification. This will include amendment of the design change to include all of the seismic requirements.
This will also include detailed installation procedures and docu-mentation of qualification of the mounting materials. Discussions with licensee personnel confirmed that the licensee plans to report the event in accordance with Technical Specification 6.7.B2.(c).
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This item is considered unresolved pending completion of the analyses and work necessary to provide a properly completed design change.
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12. Exit Interviews
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The inspector attended an exit interview conducted by RIII inspector K. Ward on July 10, 1980.
The inspectors conducted interim exit interviews during the inspection period and met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspectors discussed the scope and the results of the inspection and stated tha t one item identified by quality assurance remains unresolved.
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