IR 05000282/1980006
| ML19318C938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1980 |
| From: | Boyd D, Feierabend C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318C930 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-80-06, 50-282-80-6, 50-306-80-07, 50-306-80-7, IEB-78-05, NUDOCS 8007070061 | |
| Download: ML19318C938 (7) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-282/80-06, 50-306/80-07
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Docket No.
50-282; 50-306 License No. DPR-42; DPR-60 Licensee: Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At: Red Wing, MN Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1980
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Inspector:
. D. Feierabend
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ApprovedB:/,,,D.
oyd, Chief,
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y Keactor Projects Section 3-1 Inspection Summary Inspection on April 1-30, 1980 (Report No. 50-282/80-06; 50-306/80-07)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operation, maintenance, surveillance, security, radiation protection, followup of licensee reported events, followup of IE Bulletin and independent verifications of operability of safety-related systems. The inspection involved 105 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified. Of the eight areas inspected, no deviations were identified in seven areas. One deviation from a commitment was identified in one area - failure to complete inspections required by IE Bulletin 78-05.
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted
- F.- Tierney, Plant Manager J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance-E. Watzl, Plant Superintendent, Plant Engineering and
. Radiation Protection
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance
- J. Hoffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering J. Ruether, Engineer G. Miller, Engineer R. Hanson, Engineer D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
'*K. Albrecht, Senior Quality R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Plant Services R. Warren, Office Supervisor L. Brunner, Plant Administrative Specialist G. Edon, Shift Supervisor M. Balk, Shift Supervisor J. Meath, Shift Supervisor D. Walker, Shift Supervisor CAttended exit interview.
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2.
Operational Safety Verification (71709)
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
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logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
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the month of April. The inspector verified the operability of selected. emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks,~and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance
requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical-security' plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed. plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
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verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of April,-the inspector walked down the accessible portions off selected safeguards buses and the containment spray system to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling. These reviews and observations were conducted to f
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verify that facility operations were in conformance with the require-ments established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and admin-istrative procedures.
3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Maintenance activities of safety related systems listed below were reviewed to ascertain that they were comi :ted in accordance with approved procedures, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limit-ing conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initia-ting the work; and functional testing was performed prior to return-ing systems to service. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system perfo rmance.
The following maintenance activity was observed:
Preventive maintenance performed on the D1 Diesel Generator (DG)
Following completion of maintenance on the D1 Diesel Generator, the inspector verified that the system had been returned to service properly.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed portions of Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the D2 Diesel Generator performed prior to removing the D1 Diesel Generator from service and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that test results con-formed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, and that no deficiencies were identified during the testing. The inspector also witnessed test activities associated with determining the cause of unexplained trips of the overspeed trip valves for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The test confirmed that the most probable cause was the technique used for resetting the trip mechanism.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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P-RO-79-06 Unit 1 - Pressurizer Level Setpoint Drift
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P-RO-80-08 Unit 2 - Steam Flow Transmitter c.
P-RO-80-09 Unit 1 - Nuclear Power Range Channel Inoperable The inspector did not concur with the cause code, equipment
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failure, as the voltage spike was caused by a momentary ground of the instrument bus resulting from maintenance being performed on a radiation monitor. The licensee will submit a revised report.
(Open)
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P-RO-80-10 Unit 1 - Setpoint Drift, Containment Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve e.
P-RO-80-11 Unit 2 - Inoperability of Two Changing Pumps f.
P-RO-79-29 - No. 22 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
Pump Overspeed (0/S) Trip Valve The licensee was not able to determine the cause of the 0/S trip valves to be found in the tripped conditions, so initiated additional surveillance by adding a requirement that the auxili-ary building operator verify that the 0/S trip valve was in the correct reset position every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Additionally, a design change was initiated to add an alarm to monitor trip valve and reset positions.
The surveillance was continuing without further problems until April 11, when a workman accidently tripped the overspeed mechanism. The valve was immediately reset by an assistant plant equipment operator (APEO). However, it tripped moments later, was again reset, but again found tripped on the next surveillance inspection.
The systems engineer investigated the event and determined that depending on the technique used, the trip mechanism could be reset without being firmly latched, subject to tripping from vibration or other disturbance. The Resident Inspector wit-nessed a test demonostration of the AFW pump 0/S trip and reset by several operators on April 17, to demonstrate the proper technique for resetting the trip mechanism. The testing showed that the mechanism would remain latched if firmly seated as demonstrated.
The licensee conducted special training for operators and supervisors to insure that the trip valves remain operable.
The licensee has expedited the design change that will annunci-ate the trip condition and expects to have it installed during May, 1980.
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E The licensee will report the event occurring on April 11, in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
6.
Containment Purging The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for purging contain-ment and verified that administrative controls prohibit purging via the containment purge and in-service purge systems when reactor coolant temperature is above 200 F.
The licensee has recently furnished NRR ad ic il information concerning containment purge and vent system 7.
IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
For the IE Bulletins listed belt,w, the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate action commit-ments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representa-tives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response, except as indicated.
a.
IE Bulletin 80-01 - Loss of Charcoal from Adsorber Cells b.
IE Bulletin 78-05 - Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism The inspector reviewed records for completion of the special inspections performed on the licensee's responses 2 h auxiliary contacts as described in
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On a sampling basis, the inspector selected several safety related motor starters to verify that the inspections had been performed.
Three of a sample of twelve selected had not been inspected.
The inspector discussed the findings with the cognizant engineer and with supervisory personnel to determine the reason that the contacts had not been inspected. The cause was that the associ-ated motor operated valves had been incorrectly identified as
" Class III" in the motor list. The motor list includes QA classification of each motor, associated breakers, and auxiliary equipment.
Failure to complete the special inspections of the NEMA size 1 starters that are used in safety-related systems is considered 1_/ NSP letter to NER, Subject: Additional Information Concerning Containment Purge and Vent System, dated March 17, 1980 2_/ NSP letter to RIII dated May 30, 1978 3/ NSP letter to RIII dated August 22, 1979 i-5-i l
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to be a~ deviation from the commitment made in the response /
Further discussions with staff QA and management personnel determined that the motors and associated breakers had been reviewed and classified by a "Q List Committee" (a subcommittee
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of the Operations Committee) in 1977, but that the actual classification had not been fully implemented, i.e. the'mainten-ance records had remained Class I, so all work on any components would have been controlled with WRA's for safety related equip-ment.
The licensee is taking actions to complete the inspections and will address the apparent discrepancies identified in the "Q" list.
c.
IE Bulletin 79-25 - Westinghouse (W) BFD Relays Theinspectorreviewedthestatusofreplacementofrgpayswith the current recommendations. The licensee's response-described previous experience and the schedule for replacements.
Subsequent to receiving the first shipment of NBFD replacement relays tha licensee received another Westinghouse (W) Technical Bulletin Number NDS-TB-05 dated August 14, 1979, which recommended that all 8 pole and 12 pole relays be checked to confirm adequate overtravel. Of the 129 NBFD relays already on hand, 79 passed the test. The 50 that failed the test were rejected and were placed in " hold" in the warehouse. The licensee received an additional shipment of four NBFD 84S relays to complete the initial installation of NBFD relays in Unit 2 reactor protection logic during the recent refueling outage.
The inspector reviewed the records for replacement of the relays in Unit 2 train "B" reactor protection system. The replacement was completed via a Work Request Authorization (WRA), with independent verification of each wire termination by the cognizant electrical engineer and was further confirmed by successful performance of the system surveillance test.
Replacement of the relays in the Unit I reactor protection system is scheduled for the next refueling outage and the safeguardslogictrainsdurigpsubsequentrefuelingsasindica-ted in the licensee response-to the bulletin.
4/ Ibid 5/ NSP Letter to RIII to IEB 75-25, dated 12/20/79 6/ Ibid-6-
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The inspector verified that the NBFD relays that failed the overtravel test had been returned to the warehouse " Hold" area awaiting disposition. The licensee had not yet received disposi-tion instructions from Westinghouse.
Two items of concern were identified during review of the bulletin.
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Identification and Inspection of Affected Spares The licensee had not addressed identification of spare BFD relays in the warehouse for applicability of the bulletin.
This item will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
2.
Control of Safety Related Material The licensee's procedure provides that issue of spare parts be documented on a " Spare Parts Record Card" by recording date issued and a work request (WR) or work request authorization (WRA) number.
Issue of items other than spare parts was not addressed in a procedure or documented in the warehouse.
The licensee had recognized that this deficiency in material control existed and was in the process of revising the appropriate procedure. The inspector reviewed a drait ;f ACD 8.2, Rev. 2, Inventory Control, which provides that all material leaving the warehouse will have identification tags and be documented on an issue slip.
This item will again be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
8.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and after conclusion of the inspection, on May 8, 1980, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledge the finding and stated that for the inspections of auxiliary contacts (paragraph 7.b) the "Q" list committee recommendations that had been made were apparently in error and would be re-evaluated. The licensee stated that work requests had been initiated to complete the inspections of the auxiliary contacts and that the work was in progress. The licensee stated that the revised procedure for material controls were being reviewed and will be impleraented af ter evaluation by the operations committee.
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