IR 05000275/1979019
| ML16340A749 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/10/1979 |
| From: | Bishop T, Dodds R, Kleinsorg E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340A748 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-79-19, NUDOCS 8001100549 | |
| Download: ML16340A749 (8) | |
Text
Report No. 50-275/79-19 U ~ S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>MISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEtKKT
REGION V
Docket No.
License No CPPR-39 Safeguards Group Lfce )see Pacif ic Gas and Electri c Company 77 Beale Street
,San Francisco, California 94106 Diablo Canyon Unit
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis obispo County,.California Inspection conducted:
SePtember 17-19, 1979
.
~('nspectors:
/p s'
T.
W. Bisho
. Reactor Inspector E. A. Kleinsorg, Engineering Aide Date i ed l~
u 7~
. Date ig d
Date gne Approved By:
Summary:
R. T. Dodds,'Chief, Reactor Engineering Support Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Ins ection on Se tember 17-19, 1979 Re ort Ho. 50-275/79-19 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional. based inspectors of fire protection modifications identified in Supplement
to the SER.
The inspection involved 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> onsite by an inspector and an engineering aide.
Results:
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
RV Form 919(P)
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A l4
DETAILS
~
Persons Contacted a..
Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PGSE
- J. Arnold, Coordinating QC Engineer
- F. Russell, Civil Resident
- R. D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
- M. N. Norem, Startup Engineer
- C. M. Seward, QA Engineer
- M. E. Leppke, Resident Mechanical Engineer b.
Nuclear Re ulator Commission NRC
- Tolbert Young, Jr.,
Resident Inspector
- Denotes those attending the management interview.
2.
Fire Protection S stem Modifications The inspectors examined the fire protection modifications,, identified in Supplement 8 to the Safety Evaluation Report, and PGLE letters of December 19, 1978 and July 20, 1979 to verify modifications had been properly accomplished as follows:
a.
Installation of 2-HR barriers was verified for the following:
(1)
Protection of one train of electrical cables for diesel generator fuel transfer pumps located in fire zones 3-J-l, ll-D,10-A. B. C.,
and 1.2-A. B. C.
(2)
Protection of redundant trains of 4-KV HVAC system located in fire zones 4-A and 12-D.
b.
(3)
Protection of diesel generator and fuel transfer pump control circuitry in the diesel generator corridor located.
in fire zone. 11D.
Completed rerouting of one train of auxiliary feedwater cables to the 85 ft. elevation of penetration area.
c.
Sprinkler system installation for the following:
(1)
Fire zone 1-A.
Redundant safe shutdown cables in cable penetration area.
(2)
Fire zone 3-Q-1 and 3-Q-2.
Auxiliary feedwater pump.
room.
(3)
Fire zone 3-J.
Component cooling water pump are d.
e.
g.
h.
k.
(4)
Fire zone 8-B-3 and 8-B-4.
Control room ventilation equipment area.
(5)
Fire zone 4-A.
Lab area.
(6)
Fire zone 3-X.
Boric acid transfer pump area.
(7)
Fire zone 3-BB.
Cable penetration area outside con-tainment 100 ft. and 115 ft. elevations.
(8)
Fire zone 8-B-1 and 8-B-2.
Auxiliary building ventilation equipment room.
Installation of redundant class IE alarm systems to annunciate loss of battery room ventilation in the control room.
Electrical supervision'nd control room annunciation for key fire water valves (yard loop valves)
and verification that these valves were locked open.
Fire water supply to the hose reel station for fire zone 3-BB at the 100 ft. elevation was examined to verify all valves to the station were locked open.
Installation of l-l/2 hr..rated fire dampers in supply venti-lation ducting for the 4.16 KV switchgear room and,3 hr. rated dampers in the ventilation exhaust ducts.
Installation of smoke detectors and relocation of level trans-mitter Ho. LT-406 (20 ft. away from other transmitters)
inside the containment at the cable penetration area (tfire zone l-A).
Installation of flame traps in reactor coolant pump oil shield drain lines (one of four examined).
Installation of Halon 1310 fire protection system designed to discharge automatically into the safeguards room and safeguards cabinets (see paragraph below).
Upgrading of fire doors and frames to have the same fire
'rating as their adjacent barrier (three doors were examined, see paragraph below).
Installation of heat shields around pressurizer level and pressure sensing lines to protect these sensing lines from reactor coolant pump lube oil fires (see paragraph below).
Modifications identified in Paragraphs 2.a.
through 2.h.
above were found to have been properly accomplished.
Additional information was required to assess the acceptability of modifications identified in Paragraphs 2.i, 2.j, and 2.k, as addressed in paragraph below.
Examination of the licensee's actions to install a Halon system for the safeguards room, upgrading of three fire doors, and installation of pressurizer sensing line heat shields required further examination as follows:
'I
In-3-a.
The 1310 Halon system for the safeguards room is required to provide a minimum of 5/'Halon inside the cabinets and in the room itself following activation.
Testing to verify this condition can be achieved was conducted and a report is being prepared.
This report will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
(79-19/01)
b.
Two of the three fire doors which were upgraded contained a
sliding plexiglass window.
The upgrading consisted of replacing the plexiglass with wire reinforced glass.
The acceptability of this method of upgrading was questioned by the inspector and an inquiry submitted to the Diablo Canyon Licensing Project Nanager (NRR).
An assessment performed by NRR fire experts determined that this method of upgrading was acceptable in this particular case (for fire doors No.
519 and 264).
The
. inspector has no further questions on this matter.
c ~
Pressurizer level and pressure sensing line heat shielding was accomplished by wrapping the lines with two layers of a producted called Refrasil Insulation Cloth No. UC100-96.
The accept-ability of this material was questioned and an inquiry submitted to NRR.
The NRR fire experts response was that this material.
as installed, will not provide adequate heat shielding from lube oil fires as required.
Accordingly, this item will be examined during a subsequent inspection.
(79-19/02)
3.
Mana ement Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.
Subsequent to the inspection, on September 27, 1979, licensee representatives were advised by telephone that the Commission does not consider the heat shielding modification for the pressurizer sensing line to be acceptabl,
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