IR 05000275/1979026
| ML17083A272 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1980 |
| From: | Dodds R, Kirsh D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17083A271 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-79-26, 50-323-79-13, NUDOCS 8003070007 | |
| Download: ML17083A272 (20) | |
Text
0 Report No.
50-275/79-26 50-323 79-13 U ~
S ~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Docket No.
-3 License No.
C R-3 PPR-69 Paci fic Gas and': Electri c Company 77 Beale Street San Francisco, California
'94106 Faci1ity Name, Diabl o Canyon Units
and
Safeguards Group Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California and Cor orate Office December 3-13, 1979 Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
D.
F. Kirsch, Reactor Inspector r-l$'-P Date Signed Approved By:
Summary:
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Engineering Section, Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Ins ection'durin eriod of December 3-13, 1979 Re or t los.
50-275/79-26.and'50-323/79-13)
J Areas Ins ection:
Routine, unannounced inspection by regional based
)nspector, o
construction activities including:
licensee action on previous inspection findings and 50.55(e)
items; investigation of a11eged faulty concrete construction; investigation of alleged off-center drilling of pipe rupture restraint coupling sleeves; and non-conformance report review.
The inspection involved 52 inspector hours by one NRC inspector.
Resu'its:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
RV Form 2'19 (2)
8008070 g e
DETAILS a.
Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PG8E M. A. Raymond, guality Assurance Director
>;J.
B. 'Hoch, Project Engineer
R.
D. Etzler, Project Superintendent D. A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical Engineer C. L. Braff, Mechanical Supervisor G. L. Johnson, Civil Group Leader C.
M. Seward, Acting equality Assurance Supervisor
J. Arnold, Coordinating gC Engineer D. L. Polley, Assistant to Project Engineer M. V. Hilliamson, Project Licensing Engineer D. Kourumalos, Civil Engineer I. Sokoloff, Civil Engineer Chung Li, Civil Engineer Charles Li, Civil Engineer S.
E. Traisman, Mechanical Engineer Various Mechanical and Electrical inspectors onsite b.
H.
P.
Foie Com an
~
~
V. Tenneyson, guality Assurance Manager c.
Pullman Power Products PPP H.
M. Karner, quality Assurance Manager 2.
Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Enforcement Items a.
(Closed)
(275/79-12-02 Infraction:
Im ro er se aration and suo ort o non-c ass racewa s.
See a so IE Ins ection e orts 0-2
9-an 50-2 5 79-3 The licensee issued Engineering Change Order DC-O-E-E-406, Revisions 4 and 5, specifying support details S611 and S612 to-support nonvital trays and conduit crossing vital conduit in the K115 area.
The inspector examined the installation of support detail S611 and the fabrication activties for support detail S612..
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
~ ~
The licensee's gC department had examined approximately 1180 raceway supports to verify the adequacy of previous inspection/
review corrective actions and the adequacy of the original inspection program.
The corrective actions were included as resolution to NCR No. DC1-79-RE-008, which had been evaluated and approved by the affected engineering department disciplines and quality assurance.
- denotes exit interview attendees
(0 en (275/?9-06-02 and 323 79-04-02 Ins ection:
Failure to trans ate racewa su ort des'
bases 1nto instructi ons, rocedures and drawsn s.
See also IE Ins ection Re orts 0-7 / 9-13 and 50-275 79-17 The licensee's Engi'neering Department had completed its review of all raceway support details to determine which support details were acceptable and/or conditionally acceptable for installation in the various areas of Unit 1.
The licensee's review showed that approximately 56 support details required area and/or loading installation limits.
Engineering had annotated on the support details those areas of the plant where the support may be used and had included on the details, as applic'able, any limiting conditions necessary if that support were to be installed in a particular area.
The site had received 38 revised support detail drawings and had inspected 2056 individual supports for conformance to those revised detail drawings.
The inspection showed that 56 separate supports required modification and work requests were in the process of preparation to require Foley to perform the required modifications in accordance with Foley procedures.
The inspector examined the Foley gC procedure for "l4ork Request Raceway Support Rework" (gCP-16).
The procedure appeared satisfactory to accomplish the specified rework.
The licensee had issued separate NCR's for Unit 1 and Unit 2 to assure that raceway supports conform to installation requirements.
A program was effected to inspect all Unit 2 raceway supports, on an area-by-area basis, to document support locations and assure that the supports conformed to design details.
The inspector examined the Raceway Support Inspection Sheet utilized to document the inspector results and observed that the sheet contained extensive inspection criteria identification.
The inspector examined a sample of the completed Unit 2 Raceway Support Inspection Sheets and found that one particular licensee inspector had not completed all the checkoffs required by the form.
The'licensee contacted that particular inspector who stated that the required inspections.
had been performed and that the missing check marks was an oversight.
The licensee stated that the noted situation would be resolved by changing the form to require responsible engineer review and the performance of a support sample audit and inspection program on these supports completed by that inspecto c.
(Closed)
(275/79-22-01 Deviation:
Excessive weld reinforcement on interior welds of Volume Control Tan
.
The licensee responded to the identified deviation by letter of December 28, 1979 and stated that the areas of excessive
'einforcement v>ould be ground to code requirements and radiographed.
L The licensee was in the process of grinding the excessive reinforcement in the Unit
volume control tank.
The inspector examined the ground areas and controls initiated to assure code compliance.
The licensee stated the PGSE gC would provide independent verification by audit that the grinding and subsequent nondestructive testing activities assure tank compliance with code requirements.
3.
Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Followu Items 4,
Closed 275/79-19-01 Followu Item; Halon concentration ins>de t e safe uar s room cab>nets.
The inspector reviewed a report of the Halon 1301 safeguards room
. concentration test, performed by a contractor on August 29, 1979, to verify that a
5% minimum Halon concentration was attained inside the cabinets and safeguards room.
The contractor utilized two different test points, at different levels an'd walls, inside the room and one test point inside of the input cabinet for safeguards channel 4.
All air conditioning dampers'in the room were closed at the time of the design Halon discharge (47 lbs) and readings of Halon concentration were taken at five second intervals at all test point locations.
The test verified that a concentration of at least 5% Halon was attained inside the cabinet monitored and in the room and that this concentration minimum was maintained from the time of attainment throughout the test duration of approximately
minutes.
The licensee stated that Halon system modifications were scheduled to be performed. in the future to discharge 56 lbs. of Halon inside the safeguards room, 9 lbs in excess of design.
L'icensee Action on 50.55 e
Items
.
a.
Closed)
Dia onal racewa su ort desi n detail S6 deficienc The licensee reported, by telephone on June 25, 1979 and by letter of July 13, 1979, that the angular orientation of the end preparations for raceway support diagonal S6 had been inadequately specified on detail drawings.
r%
I F
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j e
The inspector examined the licensee resolution and corrective actions and found them to be as stated in the letter of July 13, 1979.
The hanger inspection program accomplished for Unit
had provided verification and/or resolution to assure that the angular orientation of S6 braces conformed to Engineering Department 'specified requirements.
S6 brace tolerances are included as inspection criteria on the Unit 2 Raceway Support Inspection Sheets being used for the Unit 2 raceway support inspection program.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed Out-of-Tolerance Barton transmitters in narrow ran e
steam enerator water level control s stem.
See also IE Ins ection Re ort No. 50-275/ 9-The affected Barton transmitters had been returned from the manufacturer and bench tested by the licensee.
The inspector sampled the bench test data and examined the llestinghouse certification that the transmitters meet contract requirements.
The installation of transmitters was scheduled to be performed in accordance with previ'ously established licensee procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
This item is closed.
c.
0 en Crackin in heav ru ture restraint weldments.
See also IE Ins ection Re orts 50-275 9-13, 79-17 and 79-22 The inspector examined a sample of process sheets for non-destructive examination (NDE), grinding and/or thermal cutting of Unit 2 rupture restaint welds, NDE records and "as-built" documentation.
The pullman sugary sheet appears to adequately reflect the status of the weld sample examined.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Alle ation of Fault Concrete Construction At the request of IE:Hg, IE:RV initiated investigative action to
.
address an allegation of faulty concrete construction at Diablo Canyon.
The IE:Hg request was apparently initiated in response.to questions received from the California Governor's Office and an attorney for intervenors.
The particulars of.the allegation are contained in paragraph VIII of Case No.
51676 filed with this Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Luis Obispo and is quoted below.
The name of the alleger has been delete Alle ation:
"On or about January 25, 1979, plaintiff (alleger)
was ordered to drill holes in the concrete slab foundation under Turbine Unit hl Building for use in connection with affixing earthquake restraints.
The said order was to drill the holes 4'" deep.
Pursuant thereto, plaintiff drilled a hole 45.5" deep which completely penetrated the
. 'thickness of the'-said concrete slab.
According to specifications, plaintiff was informed and believed that said concrete seat was to be 6'hick, and that a restraint hole of 4'" would not so penetrate.
Upon informing his general Foreman of.the deficiency in the thickness of'he said concrete slab, plaintiff was instructed by agents of defendants not to mention the said deficiency to anybody."
NRC Investi ative Findin s:
The allegation was not substantiated.
On December 14, 1979, a
Region Y inspector contacted an attorney for the plaintiff and unrequested the telephone number of alleger..
The inspector explained that the purpose of this contact request was to determine if the alleger had any other specific complaints regarding nuclear safety related structures or components and to advise the alleger of the NRC investigative findings related to paragraph VIII of the above complaint.
The attorney would not provide the inspector with a means of contact for the alleger and stated that arrangements would be made for IE:RV to appraise the alleger of those findings by telephone in early January 1980.
The inspector had received, in April or Nay of 1979, an inquiry, concerning this complaint, from a representative of the San Luis-Obispo news media.
The inspector at that time determined that the holes in question were specified and drilled for the installation of seismic restraint modifications to the Component Cooling Mater Heat Exchangers.
The inspector examined the circumstances of the complaint and determined that the turbine building basemat, in the locations where the holes completely penetrated the basemat, conformed to design specifications. 'he examinations and conclusions were documented in paragraph 7 of IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-275/79-13 and 50-323/79-08.
The current Region V investigative effort consisted of establishing (a) the reason that the hol.es were required to be drilled into the Unit 1 Turbine Building concret'e slab foundation, (b) which holes had completely penetrated the concrete slab, (c) the design concrete thickness in the areas of hole penetration, and (d) determining the location of the suspect holes by actual onsite measurement to verify locations on design drawing The inspector met with representatives of the licensee's Project Engineering and Engineering Department staffs on December 3 and 5, 1979, and interviewed those personnel responsible for the design of the Component Cooling Mater (CC'M) Heat Exchanger restraint modifications.
Discussions with those Engineering Department personnel established that the assigned engineer erroneously assumed that the concrete basemat was 6 feet thick, since he had seen areas of 6 foot thickness
- ,on drawings, and
- had, therefore, conservatively specified 5'"
long rock bolts.
Examinations of'asemat profile drawings established that while some areas of'he basemat were specified to be 6 feet thick, other areas were specified to be of lesser thickness.
Therefore the turbine building basemat was not designed to be uniformly 6 feet thick.
I On February 1, 1979, the licensee had documented a telephone call to the responsible engineer from the site identifying that while core drilling holes for equipment anchor modifications, holes had been drilled through concrete in the areas located on the east side of the east and west Unit
CCM heat exchangers and the site had requested engineering resolution.
The licensee's Design Engineering Department issued, on February 1,
1979, the resolution to drill holes to a depth of 3 feet and modify rock anchor bolts to a length of 3'0" and documented this resolution by approval of Design Change Request No. DC-1-G-C-865.
The inspecto>
examined the locations of the east side of the east and west Unit
CCl< heat exchanger supports on Drawing 2864-T-V-3-39B (Turbine Building Lift-T39B) and determined that the design basemat thickness on the east side of the west CWW heat exchanger (No. 1-1) was four feet and the design thickness on the east side of the east CCll heat exchanger (No. 1-2)
was three feet.
The inspector examined the engineer's calculation sheets to determine the minimum required anchor bolt embedment requirements.
The engineer's calculations had been performed in September 1978, and had been checked and verified as required by the gA program.
The engineers calculations determined the minimum anchor bolt embedment to be 1'".
The engineer stated that the 3'0" anchor bolt was specified to attain additional conservation in the support design and installation.
The inspector established by measurement the exact locations of those holes, on the east side of the east and west CC'll heat exchangers,.
which had completely penetrated the basemat foundation.
These
.
locations were laid out on Drawing 2864-T-V-3-39B (Turbine Building-Lift-T39B) using an architects scale, and projected to the turbine building basemat profile layout in the area of interest.
The locations and design basemat thicknesses were verified to be those stated abov.
The inspector was unable to verify by discussions with licensee personnel onsite that the alleger had been instructed not to mention the alleged deficiency to anybody.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
This item is closed.
Alle ation of i e ru ture restraint cou lin sleeves havinq been
'ddri le o-center.
On October 18, 1979 a postcard was received by IE:RV containing tlie allegation that inaccurate parts for Diablo Canyon had been manufactured by a machine shop.
The allegation stated that "no effort was made to properly line up parts in the lathe before they were drilled, bored and tapped."
No reference was made in the allegation specifically identifying the function of the part.
Investigative efforts by IE:RV established that the parts manufactured under subcontract by the machine shop were threaded coupling sleeves for pipe rupture restraint bars.
The alleger was interviewed at the IE:RV Office on October 31, 1979 and supplied the following information:
a.
The billets for the coupling sleeves had not been accurately centered in the lathe chuck prior to drilling.
b.
The alleger did not remember what tolerance requirements were specified.
c.
Threading of the sleeve hole was performed but each sleeve was not checked by the manufacturer with gauges.
Toward the end of the contract, thread gauges were used on one or two sleeve
,sizes.
d.
The threading taps were in good shape.
e.
Approximately 200-300 sleeves of various sizes were manufactured.
f.
The drilling offset from the center of the sleeve was estimated by the alleger to be at most 1/4 inch.
g.
The machine shop had no gC department and made no formal inspectiqns of the parts.
NRC Investi ation Findin s
Discussions with the licensee's engineering staff regarding the allegations were held on December 3 and 5, 1979.
The licensee stated that Bostrom-Bergen (the major contractor)
had inspected 100/ of the couplings for thread diameter and pitch..
Examination of a sample of the inspection documentation appeared to verify this assertio The coupling is, by design, in tension under load and the licensee's engineers stated that so long as the hole was drilled straight through the coupling any eccentricity in the drilled hole would be inconsequential.
The licensee stated that the AISC standard for heavy hex nuts was used to determine sleeve diameter specification to meet the AISC -specified minimum sleeve material thicknesses.
The licensee further noted that the couplings have 3-5 times the minimum AISC specified nut depth and use about 4 times the minimum specified AISC thread engagement.
These assertions were verified as factual.
A tabulation of coupling lengths and diameters was established and using the AISC specified minimum edge distances for heavy hex nuts (Tm),
a minimum material thickness was established for each coupling diameter and hole size.
It was observed that the coupling diameters and hole sizes specified provided a sufficient conservative margin to assure that a 1/4 inch offset in drilling would not, in most cases, encroach upon the minimum AISC speci ied edge distance.
The inspector examined 106 couplings of the various sizes installed in Unit 1 and 2 for compliance with the minimum AISC specif'ied material thickness. requirements for heavy hex nuts; Evidence was observed on a few couplings that the holes had been drilled off-center, however, no evidence was observed to corroborate the allegation of 1/4 inch offset.
The few offsets observed were significantly less than 1/4 inch.
All coupling sleeves examined exceeded the AISC specified minimum edge distance criteria.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Nonconformance Re ort Review The inspector examined 13 mechanical and electrical related non-conformance reports.
The nonconformances appeared to have been evaluated and resolved as required by the gA program.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the end of the inspection December 13, 1979 and summarized the inspection scope and finding The coupling is, by design, in tension under load and the licensee's engineers stated that so long as the hole was drilled straight through the coupling any eccentricity in the drilled hole would be inconsequential.
The licensee stated that the AISC standard for heavy hex nuts was used to determine sleeve diameter specification to meet the, AISC specified minimum sleeve material thicknesses.
The licensee further noted that the couplings have 3-5 times the minimum AISC specified nut depth and use about 4 times'the minimum specified AISC thread engagement.
These assertions were verified as factual.
A tabulation of coupling lengths and diameters was established and using the AISC specified minimum edge distances for heavy hex nuts (Tm),
a minimum material thickness was established for each coupling diameter and hole size.
It was observed that the coupling diameters and hole sizes specified provided a sufficient conservative margin to assure that a 1/4 inch offset in drilling would not, in most cases, encroach upon the minimum AISC specified edge distance.
The inspector examined 106 couplings of the various sizes installed in Unit 1 and 2 for compliance with the minimum AISC speci, fied material thickness requirements f'r heavy hex nuts.
Evidence was observed on a few couplings that the holes had been drilled off-center, however, no evidence was observed to corroborate the allegation of 1/4 inch offset.
The few offsets observed i~ere significantly less than 1/4 inch.
All coupling sleeves examined exceeded the AISC specified minimum edge. distance criteria.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Nonconformance Re ort Review The inspector examined 13 mechanical and electrical related non-conformance. reports.
The nonconformances appeared to have been evaluated and resolved as required by the gA program.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the end of the inspection December 13, 1979 and summarized the inspection scope and finding ~
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