IR 05000272/1993016

Combined Insp Repts 50-272/93-16,50-311/93-16 & 50-354/93-13 on 930524-28 & 0601-04.No Violations Noted. Three Weaknesses Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program

ML18100A448
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	06/25/1993
From:	Bettenhausen L, Bissett P, Conte R, Florek D, Meyer G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18100A444	List: IR 05000272/1993016 ML18100A442
References
50-272-93-16, 50-311-93-16, 50-354-93-13, NUDOCS 9307060034
Download: ML18100A448 (16)

Text

DOCKET NO REPORT NO LICENSE N LICENSEE:

FACILITIES:

DATES:

INSPECTORS:

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

COMBINED INSPECTION REPORT 50-272, 50-311, and 50-354 50-272/93-16, 50-311/93-16, and 50-354/93-13 DPR-70, DPR-75, and NPF-57 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08308 Salem Units 1 & 2 and Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Stations May 24 - 28, 1993, and June 1 - 4, 1993 D. F!or~k, Senio! Operations Engineer P. Bissett, Senior Operations Engineer C. Sisco, Operations Engineer J. Stewart, Operations Engineer LEAD INSPECTORS:

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REVIEWED BY:

• APPROVED BY:

9307060034 930625 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G

PDR P. Bissett, Sr. Operations Engineer PWR Section, Operations Branch, DRS

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. Florek, Sr. Operations Engineer BWR Section, Operations Branch, DRS

Richard f Conte, ef, BWR Section Operations Branch, DRS e~ W. Meyer, Chief, P Operations Branch, DRS Lee H. Bettefillausen, C!tlef Operations Branch, DRS 6'/d~

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INSPECTION SUMMARY: Inspection conducted May 24 - 28 and June 1 - 4. 1993 (Combined Inspection Reports Nos. 50-27~/93-16~ 50-311/93-16 and 50.:.354/93-13 An announced safety inspection of the licensed operator requalification training program was performed to ascertain whether the facility (Public Service Electric and Gas) was effectively performing those activities necessary to evaluate and ensure an adequate level of competency for licensed operators who operate the Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station It was determined that the Salem and Hope Creek requalification training programs are being implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CPR 55.59 for the areas reviewed..

• No violations or specific program strengths were identified. However, some program weaknesses were identifie At Salem, it was determined that the JPMs, as written, were adequate; however, as observed by the NRC insi>ectors, the performance and subsequent evaluation of these JPMs were inconsistently administered (Section 3.2).

Three weaknesses were identified at Hope Creek. The weak linkage of the simulator scenario objectives and plant procedures to the specific simulator conditions leads to not providing the evaluators with objective standards to evaluate operator performance (Section 4.1).

The development and administration of the 1993 examination is being controlled by a draft administrative procedure (Section 4.4). The administrative procedures do not specify the control for simulator scenario examination use among examination weeks and simulator scenario examination similarity with that used in the most recent training segments (Section 4.5).

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DETAILS

• BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.

An NRC Tempofary Instruction (TI) 2515/ 117, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation," has been developed because of proposed rulemaking that would delete the requirement that the NRC staff examine* each licensed operator for the purpose of license renewal. The purpose of this TI wa8 to evaluate the acceptability of licensed operator requalification training programs through a performance-based irispection in the areas of licensee evaluation process and, to some extent, the area of licensee program revision as a *

result of the evaluation process. This was done in lieu of an NRC staff requalification examinatioIJ. of licensed operators, the results of which were used in the past to perform a program evaluatio The inspection involved many of the aspects normally associated with NRC staff *

administered requalification examinations. This included a review of the written examination and operating tests from the facility licensee's licensed operator requalification examination and observation of crew/individual performance during the conduct of simulator scenarios and job performance measures. Not ordinarily involved in the requalification examination process was the conduct of interviews with licensed operators, training instructors and supervisory personnel. Associated documentation involved with the ongoing training program were also reviewe.0 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS Based upon the results of this inspection, it was determined that both the Salem and Hope Creek requalification training programs are being implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59 in the areas reviewed. No violations or specific program strengths were identified. However, some weaknesses were identifie.1 Salem Specific Weakn~

The performance and subsequent evalu.ation of the Job Performance Measures (JPMs) was inconsistently administered (Section 3.2). Representatives of the training staff are fully aware of the weakness and agreed that it is an area that warrants additional attentio.2 Hope Creek Specific Weakn~

The inspection identified three weaknesses. The weak linkage of the simulator scenario objectives and plant procedures to the specific simulator conditions lead ~ not providing the evaluators with objective standards to evaluate operator performance (Section 4.1). The development and administration of the 1993 examination is being controlled by a diaft administrative procedure (Section 4.4). The administrative procedures do not specify the control of simulator scenarios for use among examination weeks and simulator scenario examination similarity with that used in.the most recent training segments (Section 4.5).

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4 SALEM INSPECTION DETAILS Salem Simulator Requalification Examination The inspectors observed the dynamic simulator requalification examinations for Salem operations crew V. Four operators were examined during the conduct of each scenario, two reactor operators and two senior reactor operators, *using rotation of crew members to ensure that each individual participated in two scenarios with each SRO serving as shift supervisor (directs the board operators) for one scenario. The inspectors observed the examination both in the simulator control room and in the simulator control booth. Licensee staff communications during the scenarios Wt(re as planned in the scenarios and as expected during the administration of requalification examination At the completion of each scenario, facility licensee evaluators reviewed the crew actions and documented the results for both crew and individual evaluations using Salem procedure, HCSP-306, "Evaluator Guidance on the use of Simulator Scenario Examination Guidelines."

The process requires the completion of worksheets taken from the Examiner Standards, ES-604"-2 for crew evaluation, completed by the lead evaluator at the completion of each scenario, and ES-303-3 and ES-303-4 for individual reactor operator and senior reactor operator evaluations respectivel No crew critical tasks were missed by any of the crews and all individuals passed the dynamic simulator portion of the examination. However, various weaknesses were identified by the evaluators and remediation sheets, detailing the identified weaknesses were prepared by the examiners at the completion of each scenario, as applicable. One crew weakness was identified for one scenario and four individual weaknesses were identified during the facility licensee evaluation Following the dynamic simulator examination, the inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluations of crew performanc Com~ents on crew and individual performance were detailed and provided a complete summary of the performance of the individuals in the examination. Management involvement in the examination process was evident as the examinations were observed by the senior training department manager and the acting operations manager. Also, the acting operations manager served as the lead evaluator for the dynamic* simulator examinations. NRC staff evaluations paralleled those evaluations of the facility licensee personne No simulator fidelity issues were identified by the NRC inspectors. A review of previously NRC staff-identified simulator fidelity issues indicated that all but one had been correcte Details are contained in Attachment *

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3.1.2 Salem Job Performance Measures RequaHncation Examination Five job performance measures (JPMs) were provided for evaluating both reactor operators and senior reactor operators of Salem crew V.' The inspectors reviewed the JPMs using Examiner. Standards Form ES-603-1, "Job Performance Measure Quality Checklist," and found that all applieable quality attributes specified in ES-603 were met. None of the JPMs in the set were time critical and none were alternate path JPMs. * Successful completion criteria for each JPM. were specified, and included:

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e All critical steps completed;

All sequential steps completed in order; and,

JPM completed within a validated time. (It is noted that completion time*may exceed the validated time if satisfactory progress is being made.)

The inspectors further observed approximately sixty percent of the JPMs administered to crew V and made the following observations ill the area consistency of administration: Use of the JPM validated completion time was inconsistent from one facility evaluator to another. In some cases, the operator was marked unsatisfactory for a JPM after exceeding approximately two times the validated completion time. In another case, the evaluator intervened after one validated time interval during the JPM by informing the operator of being in the wrong location in the plant. The evaluator then provided a computer printout of valve lotations to the operator, who subsequently completed the JP.

Laminated copies of applicable procedures were provided by the evaluators to. the operators during the conduct of the JPMs. In some cases, the operators marked the laminated copies during performance of the JPM and the markings were not always removed by the evaluators prior to reuse of the laminated procedure by another operator. In one case, the operator was required to determine the current revision to the procedure being used to complete the JPM. After determination that revision 2 tO the procedure had been issued, the evaluator provided the operator a revision 1 version of the procedure. for the licensee to use in completing the JPM. Other evaluators did not require licensees to determine the correct revision for procedures being used and revision 1 was provided to the licensees in these instance.

• In a number of.instances, JPMs were completed (simulated) on Unit 1, using a Unit 2 procedure and a Unit 2 JPM. This is contrary to normal operating and training practices. Over the past several years, much effort has gone into differentiating between the two units, such as color coding plant equipment, procedures, walkways,

etc. This *effort of work was done to preclude future occurrences of inadvertent reactor trips, which had been the case on several occasions in the past, when personnel had. mistaken one unit for the <?the.

Some evaluators interacted and questioned the operators during the performance of a JPM; other evaluators did not interact with the operator during JPM administratio.

JPMs used in the examination were not provided to the evaluators until the day of the examination and no time for JPM review or dry-run was allotted. The training department stated that this is the only way to ensure examination integrity,* since many of the instructors conduct scheduled trainirig sessions up until the day they become involved in the examination process. One JPM was revised on the.day of the examination by training department personnel after it was determined that the validated completion time might not be adequate for completion of the simulator JP.

Documentation of JPM performance was not completely done in all cases. In a couple of instances, only the cover page denoting that the individual had passed had been completed. The body of the JPM, which lists expected actions and denotes critical steps, was found unmarke.

Although all operators passed the JPM portion of the examination, several operators did so marginally. It was determined that little, if any, self-training or practice by licensed operators is done in this area. Also, scheduled training is conducted in groups, with as many as six licensed operators per grou The inspectors reviewed the apparent inconsistencies in JPM administration with licensee training department management. Salem requalification program administration is controlled by procedure SH.TO-TC.ZZ-0305, "NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Program,"

which specifies that the walk-through examination be evaluated in accordance with NUREG-1021, ES-603. Training department procedure, 300H-OOO.OO-SIM01-00, "Guidelines for LO Requal Evaluators," includes instructions for JPM administration, but has not been updated or revised since March 1991 and is not applicable to the current examination standards. The licensee intends to review the administrative controls for iPM administration with the intent of standardizing the conduct and evaluation of this part of the requalification process as they have for the other two segments of the examination process. The inspectors ooncluded that this area was a program weaknes.3 Salem Written Requalification Examination Preparation and administration of the requalification written examination was reviewed by ~e inspectors. Examiner Standards Form ES-602-1, "NRC Checklist for Open Reference Test Items," was used to evaluate the test items included in the examination and all of the quality attributes were found to be appropriately implemented. Questions were at the comprehensio level or higher and an appropriate use of reference material for evaluation of operator skills

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was evident. Test items were in accordance with the facility examination sample plan with a mix of subjects, theory, and practical skills. In summary, 'preparation and conduct of the written requalification examination reflected* a rigorous implementation of the related standards in this are.4 Salem Program Findings The licensed operator requalification program at Salem is controlled by S~em procedure SH.TQ-TC.ZZ-0305(Z), NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Revision 1 The inspectors reviewed the procedure and performed checks of compliance of requalificatfon training and evaluation with the procedural requirement Attendance of Salem operators at scheduled training appeared to be adequately controlled to ensure that all operators attend training sessions either as scheduled or in makeup session Off-shift licensed operators attend requalification training with selected operating crews and detailed attendance logs are maintained by the facility ensuring that all training is utilized by all licensed operators. Salem training segments for each operation crew consist of a two week, eight session-ten hour day training period each shift cycle. :Each segment includes a mix of classroom lectures, -simulator sessions, in-plant walkdowns, and independent stud Periodic quizzes are performed to ensure adequate level of training. The inspectors reviewed the content and results of a number of the interim quizzes and found the questions to be at the comprehension level or higher, traceable to learning objectives provided in the training, and appropriately graded and evaluated to ensure that training was effective. Poor performance on the interim quizzes was remediated by examination review or additional training as appropriate. Operator feedback on trainllig effectiveness is formal and used by the training department to improve training qualit The inspectors also reviewed the process by which the Salem training department incorporates current industry events, plant specific events and design modifications into classroom trainingand testing activities. Several Unit 1 and Unit 2 licensee eventreports (LERs) were reviewed by the inspectors* for the past couple of years. From this LER review, the training department was asked to provide lesson plans, procedural upgrades, etc.,

for which they determined that additional training was warranted. Industry event training classes are held during each training segment to discuss events at other sites that could be relevant to operations at the Salem units. For those instances where informa~on needs to be disseminated to the crews in a timely fashion, Information Directives are utilized as required reading material for operations personne.5 Salem Examination Security Control Measures Examination security measures are detailed in procedure NTC TQ-IP.ZZ-0017(Z),

"Examination Security. " The inspectors determined from. their observation of the annual operating examination for crew V that adequate measures were taken in order to prevent. any possibility of examination compromise. In some instances, the security measures take!l

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actually hampered the proficiency of the examination process in that* adequate preparation by the training department evaluators was less than desired, i:e., not receiving the JPMs until the day they are administered. The training department representatives acknowledged that this has been an ongoing problem; however, they would still evaluate other alternatives in an effort to avoid this problem in examination preparation by the evaluators. Any changes that might be made would not, however, lessen the level of security measures presently in plac.0 HOPE CREEK INSPECTION DETAILS Hope Creek Simulator Requalification Examination The inspectors observed-the facility administered simulator examinations on June 2, 1993 to operating crew C. The crew consisted of four senior reactor operators and three reactor operators. When in the simulator, only five individuals are tested at a time, three senior reactor operators, one of which is performing as a shift technical advisor, and two reactor*

operator The NRC staff observed the simulator portion of the examination and observed the facility post-scenario evaluation process. Due to the number of senior reactor operators and the rotation practice used by the facility, three scenarios were administered. The facility used four evaiuators. The lead evaluator was the Operations Manager. The Principal Training Supervisor for Hope Creek and two independent contractors knowledgeable of Hope Creek.

were used. The facility routinely uses contractors during the examination process to obtain *

an independent assessment of the training program effectiveness. The facility evaluators properly evaluated licensed operator performance. When potential weaknesses were observed in the simulator, the facility licensee evaluators properly used followup question During two scenarios, the crews response clearly was satisfactory. During one scenario, the crew response was judged to be adequate but one of the SROs was observed to have some weaknesses linked to critical tasks that warranted more close scrutiny. The facility completed individual competency sheets for the individual and concluded that the individual had passed, but required some remediation prior to returning to licensed-duties. The facility developed remediation plan was reviewed by the inspector and determined to be adequate to address the observed weaknesses. * All.other operators passed the simulator portion of the examination without a need for any remediation progra The simulator adequately supported, the examination process. No discrepancies were observed as noted on the simulator fidelity report (Attachment 3).

The inspectors reviewed the scenarios to be administered for each of the. five facility examination cycles. The simulator scenarios were grouped for use in the examinations based on the sample plan and assessment of the differences in crew critical tasks iii each scenari The scenarios were adequate to evaluate both crew and individual competencies with the complexity of the scenarios judged to be adequate in accordance with the NRC staff Examiner Standards. The facility used different simulator evaluation guides for the first*

three weeks of examination. Weeks four and five used one new scenario and ones from the prior weeks. Thirteen scenarios from the facility examination bank of twenty five scenarios were used for the examination The standards in the simulator scenarios identify tasks as critical that would not meet the criteria used in the NR.C staff examiner standards. For example, during a station blackout with no high pressure feed and a small leak, inhibiting the automatic depressurization system (ADS) was not a critical task since, if the operator did not perform the task, the plant response would be the same. The operator would not have the feedback on his inaction The facility representatives acknowledged the inspector's comment and agreed to review the tasks listed as critical in the scenario,

Some of the evaluation standards in the simulator portion of the examination were not sufficiently specific or objectively stated to assure a consistent evaluation of operator performance. Because the facility uses contractor personnel to perform simulator evaluations, the day before the examination scenario is administered, the facility and the contractor evaluators practice run the scenario. The facility uses the examination pre-scenario preparation to identify the actions necessary to assure the identified critical tasks are satisfactorily accomplished. During the post-scenario evaluation process for the one scenario that identified operator weakness, the facility evaluators discussed the critical task that was identified as follows, "Crew initiates actions to restore and maintain reactor water !evel above -161 inches using available ECCS and condensate." Because the standard does not establish what is meant by "initiate actions" and "available ECCS" for the specific simulator conditions the evaluators had to interpret what was meant by the standard.* The inspectors concluded that the facility licensee evaluators came to the appropriate evaluation decision for.. *

this specific case; but, because of the lack of objectivity in the standard, different evaluators could come to a different conclusion. This was not the only example of standards in scenario

. guides that are subject to interpretation. *

The inspectors concluded that the weak linkage of the simulator scenario objectives and plant procedures to the specific simulator conditions leads to not providing the evaluators with objective standards to evaluate operator performance. The simulator evaluation standards are not always objectively specified and this area is considered to be a program weaknes.2 Hope Creek Job Performance*.Measures Requalification Examinatfon The NRC staff observed the administration. of the JPM portion of the facility examinatio The facility administered five JPMs to each operator. Two were administered in the plant and three were administered in the plant reference simulator.. The facility used a facility evaluator for each JPM, thus allowing the same facility evaluator to administer the 8ame JPM to each operator. This enabled the facility evaluator to observe operator consistency in performing the JPM task, as well as any deficiencies in the JPM or plant procedure. The evaluation standards in the JPMs that were administered were objective standards. During the administration of one JPM, the facility evaluator identified that one step of the procedure

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• was not included in the copy of the JPM being used. The step was contained in the master JPM but was not included in the copy of the JPM being used. The facility evaluator adequately pursued the difference. The NRC staff observed that one JPM related to a task performed on the remote shutdown panel was done slightly differently by five operators. All operators were judged to have satisfactorily performed the task. The facility evaluator noted that the operators performed the task slightly differently and identified the concerns for a possible procedure change. The facility evaluators were observed to administer and to.

evaluate* the JPM portion of the examination effectively. Lessons learned from the examination process are being used for procedure changes or training program feedback. All operators passed the JPM portion of the examinatio The facijity licensee selected the JPMs for each examination week such that new JPMs were used for each week of examination. In addition, the facility licensee reviewed the JPMs performed by the individual operator during the last years examination to ensure that the operator did not receive the same JPM again. The JPMs sampled a bro.ad spectrum of the JPM examination bank and met the facility sample pla A reviev.r of the JPMs for the five facility examination cycles indicated that only two of the five weeks of examination required the licensed operator to enter the radiological control area and none required entry into the reactor building. A further review of the facility JPM examination bank identified that there were only 10 JPMs that required entry into the reactor *

building and eight of the JPMs related to the control roo drive system. The facility representative indicated that they want to prepare additional in-plant JPMs, but the recent effort was placed into assuring that the existing JPMs *met the Revision 7 of the examiner *

standards as well as prviding an alternative path, shut down cooling, and emergency classification JPMs. The near term plans include preparation of JPMs to override high pressure core spray injection valve, individual scram of control rods, defeat reactor protection system interlocks, manual recirculation pump scoop tube operation and resetting

. the reactor core isolation-cooling system turbine trip throttle valve. The facility continues to review the in-plant JPM need The facility has modified the JPMs based on plant modifications. As an example, the facility has installed a hardened torus vent in a recent plant outage.. The facility licensee created a JPM-related to the torus vent and developed operating examinations using the JP.3 Hope Creek Written Requalification Examination The inspectors determined the majority of written examination questions were at the comprehension level or higher. An appropriate use of reference material for evaluation of operator knowledge and skill. was evident. A few written examination questions were at the memory level but this was the exception rather than the rule. Some questions on the static examinations (Part A) were more suited for the limits and controls section (Part B) of the examinations and visa vers Individual test items were in accordance with the licensee's examination sample plan. The sample plan included examination items related to operational events, plant modifications and procedure changes. The written examinations were developed to discri~ate at the appropriate level. The facility selected a different static examination for each week of examination. Each subsequent week ha9 at least 80% new information on the written examination and only used one common question on three examinations. The facility developed written examination sampled a broad number of questions from the facility examination bank. The inspectors determined the written examinations adequately sampled the items stated in 10 CFR 55.41and10 CFR 50.4 The NRC staff observed the.administration and parallel graded a sample of written examinations. All operators passed the written examination. No discrepancies were note.4 Hope Creek Program Findings The facility licensee developed five different examinations to examine the licensed operators at Hope Creek. The approved_ facility administrative control for the Hope Creek -

requalification program is contained in NC.TQ-TC.ZZ-0305, "NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Revision 9, dated October 8, 1991. The facility used the NRC Examiner Standards (NUREG-1021, Revision 7) as the base document for the facility administered requalification examinations. The 1993 examinations administered were*

controlled.by a draft administrative procedure SH.TQ-TC.ZZ-0305, "NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Revision 10 draft. The procedure has been updated to reflect Revision 7 of NUREG-1021 and, as of the date of this inspection, had not been formally approved by the Hope Creek General Manager. The principal difference between the approved administrative procedure *and the draft procedure is the elimination of pre-scripted job performance measure (JPM) followup questions and the elimination of one of the two static simulator written examinations. Using a draft administrative procedure rather than an approved administrative procedure to implement the requalification program is considered to be a weakness in the requalification progra The licensee incorporates lessons learned from various sources, including license event reports, into the training program. Several questions that were used in the examination process _were based on events that have occurred at Hope Cree Based on a review _of licensee event reports (LERs) in 1992 and 1993, a search of the NRC database on reports to the NRC duty officer, resident inspector daily reports, interviews with the resident inspector and facility licensee* training staff, there have been no recent -significant licensed operator errors at Hope Creek. Based on the operator and training staff personnel interviews, the facility licensee has both operations and training vehicles to assure itlcidents, related operational events, procedure changes, and design modifications are assessed for inclusion into the requalification training program. _No discrepancies were noted in this are **

Based on the observed administration of the written and operating test and inter\\rl.ews of operators who took the observed examination as well as those who were examined in other weeks, Hope Creek administers an effective examination. The consensus of the operators -

was that the training and examinations were directly related to their job needs. A desire was-expressed to have more simulator scenario emphasis on abnormal event training rather than emergency operating procedure training. The operators indicated that their-evaluations were effective, fall-, and appropriate. The operators indicated that performing the simulator portion of the examination on the first day of the 1993 examination rather than the -second day as was doQe m prior years was effective in reducing individual operator stress. The operators were aware of the general standards of performance expected of them in _the simulator. The standards. of performance in the simulator were the same standards of performance expected of them in the control roo The administrative procedures for the requalification program require independent periodic

- requalification program review. The inspectors reviewed the results from the program review performed -in the period October 1 -- 31, 1992. The inspector identified no concerns with the facility licensee revie *

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Hope Creek Examination Security Measures The inspectors reviewed TQ-IP.ZZ-0017, "Examination Security," Revision 1, dated May 1,.1989, and conducted interviews with licensed operators and training personnel. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the examinations being administered to assess examination integrity. During the administration of the examinations, there was no indication or appearance of examination compromise. When one operator being examined had some knowledge of the examination details, the operator is either separated from the other operators or in the presence of a training staff member who is under the security agreemen The individual operators understand the need to avoid even the appearance of examination compromise and understand their role in the exairiination security arena. In the development of the examination, the individuals developing the examination are excluded from training instruction activities with the operators and the examination material is kept in a secure manner. Use of different JPMs and different static examinations for each_ week was a gOOd practice to avoid examination compromis Each written examination contained at least 80% new test items. However, the facility administrative controls permit 70% of tlie examination to be the same as prior examinations (at least 30% new test items). The basis of the 30%, which is used throughout the facility licensee training programs, stems from an: INPO concern and was developed to assure that if an individual only knew the information from a prior examination, the individual would not pass the examination being taken. The examiner standards do not get this specific for guidance in this are *

The facility administrative *controls-forexamination security do not address oontrols on the use of simulator scenarios for examination. There are two specific problem Th~ first

problem relates to the scenarios to be used among the examination weeks. During the week of the NRC observed examination, scernmo ESG-12 was used in week one and scenario ESG-25 was used in week two and only one new scenario, ESG-14, was used. The secon problem relates to use of scenarios during the training cycle. During the two most recent requalification training segments; the crew was exposed to ESG-12 and ESG-14. The inspectors ooncluded that while there* may be a potential for examination compromise, that the probability is extremely low. This is based on the following. The simulator instructor do not tell the operators what scenario number on which they have trained or drilled~ There are at least three controlled methods to present simulator scenarios to the operators (simulator guides, evaluation simulator guides ((ESG)), and manipulation sheets). The operators are -

exposed to numerous scenarios during a 'requalification segment. The operator interviews suggest that since they are exposed to so many different scenarios in the plant simulator they do not recall if they see the same scenarios, the operators just respond to the simulator condition The inspectors concluded that the administered examination security was acceptable. A program weakness was identified related to the administrative controls for simulator scenario.

examination use among examination weeks and simulator scenario examination similarity with that used in the most recent training segment.0 EXIT MEETING At the conclusion of the site inspection, exit meetings were conducted on May 28, 1993, (Salem 112) and June 4, 1993 (Hope Creek). During these meetings, the inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. Those personnel in attendance are noted in Attachment 1. The facility representatives acknowledged the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as propnetary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector ATTACiIMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company

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L. Catalfomo, Salem Operations Engineer J. Lloyd, Salem Principal Training Supervisor G. Mecchi, Principal Trainer~ Operations Training C. Munzenmeir, G~neral Manager, Nuclear Services P. O'Donnell, Salem Operations Engineer A. Ortice]Je, Manager, Nuclear Training W. Chausse, Hope Creek Simulator Instructor W. Gott, Hope Creek Principal Training Supervisor W. O'Malley, Hope creek Operations Manager D. Price, Hope Creek Training Instructor G. Wynn, Hope Creek Training Instructor NRC Personnel

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D. Florek, Sr. Operations Engineer B. Hughes, Sr. Operations Engineer, NRR C. Sisco, Operations Engineer P. Bissett, Senior Operations Engineer S. Stewart, Operations Engineer T. Johnson, _Senior Resident Inspector S. Barr, Resident Inspector In addition to the personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this *

inspection perio * *

• Denotes those present at the Salem exit meeting on May 28, 1993

+Denotes those present at the Hope Creek exit meeting on June 4, 1993

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ATTACHMENT 2 SALEM SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Facility Docket No: 50-272 & 50-311 Requalification Inspection Cond,ucted from: May 24 - 28, 1993 This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45 (b). These observations do notaffect NRC staff

. certification or approval of the simulation facility other tlian to provide information that may be used in future evaluation No licensee action is required in response to these observation While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed (if none, so state):

ITEM NRC IR#

91-31 92-21 93-16 DESCRIPTION Modeling problems with feedline break inside containment and also SGTR on only 22 SG. Modeling problems have since been corrected (it is also noted that 22 SGTR modeling problem was not a problem after all, but rather a communication problem between training and simulator software personnel).

P-250 problems have been corrected. Decay heat issues (absence of decay heat) are being addressed in the new model upgrade, presently in progres No problems identifie *.*

ATTACHMENT 3 HOPE CREEK SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT

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Facility Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Facility Docket No: 50-354 Requalification Inspection Conducted from: June 2, 1993 This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45 (b). These observations do not affect NRC staff certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may.

be used in future evaluation No liceD:see action is required in response to these observation While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed (if none, so state):

ITEM: NONE-r