IR 05000272/1993006

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Safety Insp Repts 50-272/93-06 & 50-311/93-06 on 930301-05. No Safety Significant Deficiencies Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Program for Controlling Activities During Refueling Outage & CAP
ML18100A288
Person / Time
Site: Salem  
Issue date: 03/31/1993
From: Meyer G, David Silk
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML18100A287 List:
References
50-272-93-06, 50-272-93-6, 50-311-93-06, 50-311-93-6, NUDOCS 9304090102
Download: ML18100A288 (10)


Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 REPORT NO DOCKET NO LICENSE NO LICENSEE:

FACILITY:

INSPECTION AT:

INSPECTION DATES:

INSPECTORS: *

LEAD INSPECTOR:

APPROVED BY:

9304090102 930330217* 2 PDR ADOCK 0500 G

PDR 50-272/93"'.06, 50-311/93-0, 50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 Hanc~ks Bridge, NJ March 1 - 5, 1993 J. Prell, Senior Operations Engineer D. Silk, Sr. Operations Engineer enn W. Meyer, Chief PWR Section, Operations Division of Reactor Safety Date 3 J l.,"; /13 Date

...

  • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY An announced inspection was conducted from March 1 - 5, 1993, at Salem Nuclear*.

Generating Station (Iri.spection Report 50-272/93-06 and 50-311193-06). The purpose of the inspection was to review: (1) the program to be used for controlling activities during the Salem Unit 2 scheduled refueling outage (2R7), scheduled to begin.on March 20, 1993; and (2) the Corrective Action Program. A previously identified NRC Unresolved Item (92-05"'

02) was reviewed and the item was subsequently closed. Also, a brief inspection of the status of control room instrumentation was conducte The proposed program for controlling activities during the 2R7 refueling outage was found to be very good for assuring safe plant operations. The inspectors determined that the program had been well planned and organized. The qtiality assurance organiz.ation has been involved in the o~tage planning *and is scheduled to be heavily involved in all major outage activitie Refueling procedures have been revised to address recent industry events. PSE&G has a.

good program for closing out all open items related to the outage. The valve lineup sheet for the residual heat removal system was checked and found to accurately reflect the piping and instrument drawings. The inspectors concluded that PSE&G has established a refueling outage program that was well controlled and meets NRC requirement The corrective action program was determined to be well defined and satisfactorily implemented. PSE&G's procedures pertaining to the corrective action program were thorough. Several packages addressing corrective action items appeared to be complete and the corrective actions were appropriate. Identification and analysis of the causes surrounding two unplanned reactor trips were thorough, resulting in effective and focused corrective actions. Several Human Performance Enhancement System Program reports were reviewed and found to be thorough and detailed in the analysis. Site managers provide satisfactory oversight by meeting on a weekly basis to discuss status and assignments of action items that effect plant operations. Overall, the corrective action program was determined to be in good conditio There were no violations or deviations identified during the inspection.

DETAILS R7 REFUELING OUTAGE PROGRAM Scope In order to determine the adequacy of Unit 2's plans for the 2R7 refueling outage, the inspector performed the following: Attended a preoutage coordination meeting; Interviewed the supervisor of refueling operations, reactor engineers involved with refueling, a: quality assurance (QA) supervisor, and the assistant to the Unit 2 Outage

- Manager; Reviewed Design Change Packages (DCPs) from the previous outage to verify that procedures and piping and instrument drawings (P&IDs) affected by plant modifications had been revised to reflect the modifications; Made a consistency comparison of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system valve lineup sheet for Mode 1 against the appropriate P&IDs; E. -

Reviewed the refueling procedure used during Unit 1 's previous refueling outage as well as the proposed refueling procedure for Unit 2's 2R7 outage; and Reviewed the procedure to be used for moving the Upper Internals Package (UIP) to and from the reactor vessel. (Note: the DCPs, procedures and P&IDs reviewed are listed in Attachment A to this report.)

Results Based upon the above review, the inspector determined the following: Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) Company has implemented a refueling program for the 2R7 outage that-has been well planned and coordinated with all the major organizations within Sale The QA organization has been heavily involved in auditing outage activities, verifying operator qualifications, and monitoring important operation activities. The QA organization regularly receives and reviews copies of NUS "TRENDS", which is a publication that summarizes industry events. As a conSeq_uence, they are aware of all the major refueling incidents that have occurred recentl *

  • The program for closing out discrepancy reports related to the previous outage was found to be good. An audit of DCPs from the Salem Unit 2 2R6 outage found that all open discrepancy reports at the end of the outage were resolved-within approximately seven month The valve fuleup sheet for the RHR system accurately reflected the P&ID for the RHR syste Outage management has incorporated into the refueling and UIP movement procedures steps to help preclude an occurrence of recent industry events. Reactor engineers and management are to be present during an evolutions having potential safety significanc Based on the above, the inspector eoncluded that PSE&G has established a refueling outage program for Salem Unit 2 that is well controlled and meets NRC requirement.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM Scope In order to determine the adequacy of PSE&G's corrective action program-, the inspector performed the following:

- Reviewed the nuclear administrative procedures governing the corrective action program; Reviewed selected categories or items within PSE&G's Action Tracking System (ATS) and reviewed several packages of closed items; Reviewed recent Salem Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and the associated Significant Event Report Team (SERT) report as well as Incident Reports (IRs); and Conducted interviews with various personnel involved with the plant corrective action Results Based upon the above review, the inspector determined the following: PSE&G's procedures pertaining to the corrective action program were thoroug Conditions that have potential adverse affects on plant operations are identified by -

either internal or external sources. These sources were reactive, as well as proactiv For example, deficiency reports, IRs, LERs, or NRC findings are site specific items requiring corrective action; whereas, industry event reports or generic NRC

    • correspondence are considered for applicability to Salem. Once identified, the items to be addressed were prioritized. Site events underwent root cause analysis by the sponsor department to focus the efforts of the corrective action. Responsibility for corrective actions was assigned and the item was tracked in the ATS. The review of the procedures indicated a comprehensive effort that detailed the responsibilities of those involve The inspector reviewed several categories of tracked items and found them to be satisfactory. Specifically, INPO Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs),

NRC Information Notices and QA action requests that were being tracked were reviewed. Open items were checked for prioritix.ation, responsible group, number of tasks associated with a particular item, and the status of work pertaining to the tas The priorities were based upon the criteria of NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(Q), Work Control Process. The oldest open items for SOERs and Information Notices were confirmed to be low priority items and these tasks were in the implementation status. Two closed packages were reviewed to evaluate the implementation process of the corrective actions as well as the effectiv~ness of the corrective action. Both packages appeared to be complete and the corrective actions were appropriat The corrective actions related to two recent unit trips were reviewed. The LERs and the SERT reports associated with those trips contained a complete evaluation of the circumstances and events surrounding the unplanned trips. Identification and analysis of the causes of the events were thorough, resulting in effective and focused corrective actions to address the event and prevent future reoccurrenc Site managers meet on a weekly basis to discuss assignments regarding action items pertaining to internal and external sources that effect plant operations.* The items that are to be entered in the ATS are reviewed and assigned to the responsible group or group The Human Performance Enhancement System (HPES) Program performs human and equipment causal factor analysis. Several HPES reports were reviewed and found to be thorough and detailed in the analysis. HPES has conducted training for key plant personnel on performing root cause analysis. HPES also allows plant personnel a method to.anonymously report problems. This system has been utilized by plant personnel..

Based on the above, the inspector concluded that the PSE&G corrective action program was in good conditio i l I l l

6 PREVIOUS FINDINGS (CLOSED) Unresolved Item (UNR 50-272/92-05-02: 50-311192-05-02:

Hope Creek and Salem, Units 1 & 2, Technical Specification 6.5,2.43, Audits, require that

. the off-site safety review cominittee performs annual audits of the qualifications of the entire facility staff at least once per 12 months. Hope Creek and Salem, Units 1 & 2, Technical.

Specification 6.3, Unit/Facility Staff Qualifications, require each member of the facility to meet the qualifications of ANS 3.1-1981 or ANSI 18.1-1971, as appropriate. Contrary to the above, the NRC found that Audit No.91-040, Training, conducted January 28 -

February 15, 1991, contained little indication that an audit was performed of new personnel entering ANSI 18.1 or ANS 3.1 job position In response to this NRC item, P.SE&G performed a series of verifications to confirm that new personnel in positions covered by ANSI 18.1 and ANS 3.1 met the applicable qualification requirements. During this verification process, PSE&G identified several administrative problems and took actions to correct them. Plans have been initiated to assure that future audits will include verification of qualifications of new personnel against ANSI 18.1/ ANS 3.1 position requirements.

Based upon a review of the closeout package and discussions with QA personnel, this item is close.0 CONTROL ROOM INSTRUMENTATION The inspector reviewed the status of control room instrumentation that was out of service (OOS) and found a reasonable number that were satisfactorily being monitored and

. addressed. OOS instrumentation was adequately marked in the control room. This included indicators, recorders, and annunciators. Control room operators appraised themselves of OOS instrumentation by monitoring Operations Log 13, Inoperable Control Room Instrumentation Tracking Program. The maintenance group also tracked the OOS control room instrumentation. Maintenance activities have resulted in a six month downward trend in the OOS instrumentation and have met a goal of less than 14 control room indicators per unit that do not have redundant instrumentation. Completion of work in progress on OOS instrumentation should further support the goal. Of the nonredundant OOS instrumentation in the control room, there appeared to be no significant hinderance for the operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures.

7 EXIT MEETING On March 5, 1993, the NRC conducted an exit meeting with Salem personnel to discuss the inspection scope and findings as detailed in this report. Those personnel in attendance* are listed below and were led by Mr. Polizzi. During the inspection, the inspectors did not present any. written material regarding preliminary inspection findings and conclusion PSE&G did not indicate that any proprietary information was utilized during this inspectio i

Public Service Electric and Gas Company Personnel R. Antonow R. Dolan D. Miller M. Morroni P. O'Donnell V. Polizzi W. Schultz M. Shedlock E. Villar Unit 2 Outage Manager Principal Engineer

_

Senior Staff Engineer Manager, Salem Technical Department Operations General Manager, Salem Operations Salem QA Manager Manager, Maintenance Licensing Attachment: Attachment A, Procedures, DCPs, and P&IDs Reviewed

  • ATTACHMENT A PROCEDURES, DCPs AND P&IDs REVIEWED Procedures/Reports Reviewed S2.0P-AB.RC-000l(Q)-Rl 2-EOP-FRCC-2 S2.0P-SO.RC-003-Rl S2.0P-SO.RC-005-Rl 2-II-1.3.7-R4 FP-PSE-RlO-RO FP-PNJ-R7-RO VIII" NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0006 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0054 NCNA-AP.ZZ-0057 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0058 OD-33 SQA 93-0022 SQA 92-0201

"Reactor coolant System Leak"

"Response to Degraded Core Cooling"

"Filling and Venting the RCS"

"Draining the RCS"

"Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLIS)

Normal Operation"

"Refueling Procedure for Salem Unit #1, Cycle X-XI"

"Refueling Procedure for Salem Unit #2, Cycle VII-Incident Reporting Work Control Process Operating Experience Feedback Program Action Tracking Program Corrective Action Program Operations Log 13 Inoperable Control Room Instrumentation Tracking Program

"Unit Two Seventh Refueling Outage"

"lRlO Outage QA Critique"

-.

Attach111ent A

DCPs, LERs, SERT Reporots REVIEWED

'

SC.MD-FR.FH-001 l(Q)-R2 LER 50-272/93-002 LER 50-311/93-002

"Reactor Vessel Upper Internals Removal and Iristallation n

.

.

Manual Reactor Trip due to Trouble & SERT 93-01 with the Turbine Bypass System Manual Reactor Trip from 100% Power & SERT 93-02 upon Trip of Both Steam Generator Feed Pumps