IR 05000272/1993012
| ML18100A636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1993 |
| From: | Laughlin J, Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18100A635 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-93-12, 50-311-93-12, 50-354-93-08, 50-354-93-8, NUDOCS 9310040064 | |
| Download: ML18100A636 (10) | |
Text
- Docket/Report:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection Dates:
Inspection At:
Inspectors:
Approved:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 50-272/93-12 50-311/93-12 50-354/93-08 Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. 0. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New *Jersey 08038-4800 Licenses: DPR-70 DPR-75 NPF-57 Artificial Island (Hope Creek and Salem Generating Stations)
June 22-24, 1993 Lower Alloways Creek Township and Salem, New Jersey I. ~Preparedness Speclali~
jb~re C. Gordon, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector C. Stephens, NRC Consultant, Entec Solutions, In E. C. McCabe, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section Date Areas Inspected The licensee's annual partial-participation emergency preparedness exercise conducted on June 23, 199 Results On-site response to the simulated emergency was very goo An exercise strength was Emergency Response Manager command and control. No exercise weaknesses were identifie Significant areas for potential improvement were maintenance team tracking from the Operational Support Center and public address system operability in the Technical Support Cente PDR ADOCK 05000272 a
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Persons Contacted....................................... 2 Exercise Timing
........................................ 2 Scenario Planning....................................... 2 Exercise Scenario........................................ 3 Activities Observed....................................... 4 Classification of Exercise Findings............................. 4 Exercise Observations..................................... 4 Simulator Control Room (SCR)............................... 5 Technical Support Center (TSC)............................... 5 TSC HV Ac Radiation Monitor Out of Service (IFI 50-354/93-08-01, 50-272,311/93-12-01)................................... 5 1 Operational Support Center (OSC)............................. 6 1 Inconsistent Team Briefings (IFI 50-354/93-08-02, 50-272,311/93-12-02)............................................ 6 1 Damage Control Team Tracking (IFI50-354/93-08-03, 50-272,311/93-12-03)............................................ 6 11. 0 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)........................... 6 1 Overall Response Timing................................... 7 TABLE 12.1: RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE............. 7 1 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items...................... 8 1 SCR Supervisors Keeping the TSC and OSC Informed of Plant Status...
1 No Discussion of PAR in Recommendation of Upgrade to GE........
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1 Knowledge of Administration Building Ventilation System Isolation.....
1 OSC Internal Communications........................... 8 1 Licensee Critique........................................ 8 15. 0 Exit Meeting........................................... 8
DETAILS Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting on June 24, 1993.
C. Banner, Administrator, On-Site Emergency Preparedness D. Burgin, Administrator, Off-site Emergency Preparedness R. Burricelli, General Manager, Information Systems and External Affairs M. Camp, Manager, Nuclear Communications T. DiGuiseppi, Emergency Preparedness Manager M. Dior, Nuclear Shift Supervisor P. Duca, Jr., Delmarva Power Salem Site Representative C. Florentz, Government Affairs/Public Information Liaison R. Gallaher, Operations Engineer B. Gorman, Manager, External Affairs W. Hunkele, Senior Radiation Protection Supervisor J. Johnson, Senior Staff Engineer S. Jones, Emergency Preparedness Senior Staff Engineer J. Pierson, Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor B. Preston, Projects Manager R. Reece, Lead Engineer L. Reiter, Director, Process Improvement J. Schaffer, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor G. Thomson, Emergency Preparedness Technical Specialist C. Vondra, General Manager, Salem Operations W. Weckstein, Emergency Preparedness Senior Staff Engineer During the inspection, other licensee personnel were interviewed and observed m the performance of emergency response dutie.0 Exercise Timing The Artificial Island partial-participation exercise was conducted on June 23, 1993, from 8:00 a.m. to 3: 15 The States of Delaware and New Jersey participated by providing representatives to the Emergency Operations Facility. Off-site activities were not evaluate.0 Scenario Planning Exercise objectives were submitted to NRC Region I on March 8, 1993. The scenario was submitted on April 15, 1993, for NRC review and evaluatio Region I representatives discussed scenario improvements with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff on May 5, 1993. The final scenario adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan and*
Implementing Procedures, and also demonstrated areas previously identified for further review.
NRC exercise observers attended a licensee scenario briefing oc June 22, 1993. The final scenario was discussed in depth. The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupte.0 Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario included the following simulated events:
Initial conditions: Salem Unit 2 was operating at 100% power for the last 90 day Reactor coolant chemistry indicated that several fuel pins were leaking. Equipment out of service included Safety Injection Pump #21, Service Water Pump #22, Auxiliary Feed Pump #21, Boric Acid Transfer Pump #22, Containment Fan Coil Unit #25, and Coolant Charging Pump #23. Control Room Area Monitor 2RlB was failed lo *
Loss of all Control Room annunciator *
Pressurizer Level Channel #3 failed lo *
Alert declaration due to loss of all annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.
Gas Decay Tank #21 leak.
Main Feed System leak at the discharge of the Steam Generator Feed Pump *
Failure of automatic reactor trip and manual reactor trip to bring the reactor subcritical, followed by rapid boratio *
Auxiliary Feed Pump #23 tri *
Failure of a Pressurizer Safety Valve to close, resulting in loss of subcooling and minor fuel clad damag *
Site Area Emergency due to loss of all annunciators with a plant transient in progres *
Return of Auxiliary Feed Pump #23 and trip of Auxiliary Feed Pump #2 *
Failure of Auxiliary Feed Pump #23, resulting in total loss of Main and Auxiliary Feed System *
General Emergency declaration due to loss of Feed and Condensate Systems followed by failure of Auxiliary Feed for an extended period.
Auxiliary Feed Pump #23 restored to service and steam generator levels restored.
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- Scenario clock moved ahead 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to allow for recovery plannin *
Demonstration of planning for recovery operations and exercise terminatio.0 Activities Observed NRC team members observed the activation and augmentation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), activation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), and actions of emergency response personnel. The following activities were observed: Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario event.
Direction and coordination of the emergency respons.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencie.
Communications, information flow, and record keepin.
Assessment and projection of off site radiological dose.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). Performance of technical support, repairs and corrective action.
Accountability of personne.
Accident analysis and mitigatio.
Provisions for communicating information to the publi.
Licensee post-exercise critiqu.0 Classification of Exercise Findings Exercise findings were classified as follows:
Exercise Strength: a strong positive indication of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Pla Exercise Weakness: less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone,
. constitute overall response inadequac Area for Potential Improvement: an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee evaluation for possible corrective actio.0 Exercise Observations Activation and utilization of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were generally consistent with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs). The presence of Mr. S. Miltenberger, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, in the ERFs during the exercise demonstrated management attention to EP. The following observations were made in the ERF **
5 Simulator Control Room (SCR)
The shift crew rapidly and accurately assessed and mitigated abnormal plant conditions, such as the loss of overhead annunciator Operators effectively utilized procedures to address simulated malfunctioning equipment, and proactively reviewed procedures potentially needed to address developing plant conditions. The Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) correctly classified the Alert and notifications of local agencies and the NRC were completed in the required time. The SNSS and Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) exercised good command and control by directing operators in necessary actions and briefing them on plant condition Communications flow was effective between the SCR and other facilitie In one instance, * a referee interpreted initial conditions for players instead of just providing information, but this had no adverse effect on the exercise flow of event There were no exercise strengths, weaknesses, or areas for potential improvemen.0 Technical Support Center (TSC)
Overall, expected TSC actions were done well. TSC staffing and activation were appropriat The Site Area Emergency (SAE) declaration was correct and timely. Information flow and technical assessments were effective in dealing with emergency conditions. Status boards, the Safety Parameter Display System, and checklists were kept current and appropriately used. Logs were accurate and up to date. Communications flow was very goo Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) formal briefings of team leaders and routine facility announcements were informative and contributed to effective facility command and control. At times the noise level in the TSC was high, but personnel were able to deal with this situatio The staff prioritized work assignments, anticipated plant conditions and emergency class escalations, developed "what-if" contingencies, and demonstrated an excellent safety perspectiv There were two equipment problems: 1) A copy machine failed and was repaired during the exercise, and 2) The plant public address (PA) system was not functioning in the TSC so announcements were inaudible. The SCR notified the TSC of all page announcement There were no exercise strengths or weaknesses. The following area for potential improvement was identified: TSC HV AC Radiation Monitor Out of Service (IFI 50-354/93-08-01, 50-272,311/93-12-01)
The TSC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HV AC) radiation monitor was removed for calibration/repai Attached information tags did not reflect this, nor were TSC personnel cognizant of this deficienc *
1 Operational Support Center (OSC)
OSC Coordinator (OSCC) direction and control was effective in implementing repair activities in a timely manner. Corrective actions were well-planned and OSC staff was knowledgeable in their emergency response duties. Team briefings prior to dispatch were generally thoroug Teams were also debriefed. The OSCC worked well with his team of supervisors in maintaining the current status of plant events. Equipment and supplies were readily available. Radiation detection instruments were in good working orde Improvements were noted in communications, with two-way radios and telephones providing good information flow among OSC personne There were no exercise strengths or weaknesses. The following areas for potential improvement were noted:
1 Inconsistent Team Brief"mgs (IF150-354/93-08-02, 50-272,311/93-12-02)
Briefings of team members sent to evaluate the Decay Tank #21 leak appeared to be given separately, with inconsistent information regarding stay time and radiological condition However, this did not result in any stay times being exceeded or any other safety concer.2 Damage Control Team Tracking (IF150-354/93-08-03, 50-272,311/93-12-03)
Tracking of team assignments and locations was unclear. OSC logs and status boards usually did not provide both assigned team tasks and team location.0 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The Emergency Response Manager (ERM) assumed the position of Emergency Coordinator (EC)
after a thorough turnover from the EDO and briefing his staf The ERM demonstrated excellent command and control. His staff meetings were comprehensive and he frequently briefed the EOF staff on event status. He also kept State representatives informed of key event Classification of the General Emergency (GE) was prompt and correct, and all notifications were timely. The protective action recommendation (PAR) issued at the GE was appropriate, timely, and according to licensee procedure The ERM consulted with his staff and State representatives before issuing the PA One downwind sector was added in the. PAR formulation due to a forecasted wind shift. Since PAR issuance was assessed as good, the associated weakness from the previous exercise (IFI 50-272,311,354/92-12-01) was close EOF access* control was generally adequate, but staff was observed to enter and exit through unauthorized doors. Noise levels were generally satisfactory although on two occasions the ERM had to request quie The following exercise strength was observed:
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- ERM command and contro There were no exercise weaknesses or areas for potential improvemen.0 Overall Response Timing The following RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE lists the times of significant exercise occurrences and actions for Unusual Event (UE), Alert (Al), Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency (GE) classifications. *These include simulated emergency occurrence, recognition, declaration, State and local (S&L) notifications, NRC notification, Emergency Response Organization (ERO) callout, and Emergency Response Facility activation and full staffing. Blocks which are not applicable are marked N TABLE 12.1: RESPONSE PERFORMANCE TIMETABLE MILESTONE UE Al SAE
- GE Occurrence NA 0805 1030 1200 Recognition NA 0815 1030 1205 Declaration NA 0819 1032 1220 S & L Notification NA 0822 - 0827 1038 - 1041 1226 - 1231 NRC Notification NA 0856 1132 1245 ERO Callout NA 0828-0847 NA NA TSC Activation NA 0915 NA NA TSC Fully Staffed NA 0842 NA NA OSC Activation NA 0906 NA NA OSC Fully Staffed NA 0911 NA NA EOF Activation NA NA 1054 NA EOF Fully Staffed NA NA 1000 NA PAR Issued NA NA NA 1226 The above table shows generally timely actions. The EOF was staffed at the Alert level while activation was not required until the SAE level. The inspectors noted that, since the EOF was fully staffed at 1000, the licensee could have activated that facility much sooner than 22 minutes after the SAE declaration at 1032, to provide for maximum response capability.
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1 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items The following areas for improvement were identified during the previous annual emergency exercise (Inspection Report 50-354/92-14, 50-272,311/92-14).
1 SCR Supervisors Keeping the TSC and OSC Informed of Plant Status During the 1993 exercise, the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor had frequent discussions with the TSC regarding plant status and potential emergency classifications. The inspector had no further questions on this ite.2 No Discussion of PAR in Recommendation of Upgrade to GE The Emergency Response Manager consulted at length with his staff and the TSC concerning the impending GE declaration and the associated default PAR. This was done well in this
. exercis.3 Knowledge of Administration Building Ventilation System Isolation The Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC) checklist required the RAC to have the Technical Support Supervisor isolate Administration Building ventilation for a release in excess of Technical Specifications. This was not specifically observed during this exercise and will remain ope.4 OSC Internal Communications Inspectors noted improved internal communications in the OSC. The OSCC provided thorough and frequent facility briefings to keep his staff informed of plant events. The inspectors had no further questions on this ite.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's exercise critique on June 24, 1993. The Emergency Preparedness Manager and lead facility controllers summarized the licensee's observations. The critique was thorough and self-critical. It was assessed as very good by the NRC tea.0 Exit Meeting Following the critique, the NRC team met with the licensee personnel denoted in Section to discuss the inspection findings. The licensee was informed of the following:
Overall, the on-site response to this exercise scenario was very good.
There was one exercise strength and some areas for potential improvemen.(
Licensee management aclmowledged the NRC findings and indicated that they would evaluate them for appropriate corrective actions.