IR 05000271/2008002
| ML081210140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2008 |
| From: | Racquel Powell NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Powell R, RI/DRP/610-337-6967 | |
| References | |
| IR-08-002 | |
| Download: ML081210140 (24) | |
Text
April 29, 2008
SUBJECT:
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000271/2008002
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 14, 2008, with you and members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Manual. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Raymond J. Powell, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-271 License Nos. DPR-28
Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000271/2008002
w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
Vice President, Operations, Entergy Nuclear Operations Senior Vice President, Entergy Nuclear Operations Vice President, Oversight, Entergy Nuclear Operations Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing, Entergy Nuclear Operations Senior Vice President and COO, Entergy Nuclear Operations Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations Manager, Licensing, Entergy Nuclear Operations G. Edwards S. Lousteau, Treasury Department, Entergy Services, Inc.
D. O Dowd, Administrator, Radiological Health Section, DPHS, State of New Hampshire W. Irwin, Chief, CHP, Radiological Health, Vermont Department of Health Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Mass.
D. Lewis, Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman LLP G. D. Bisbee, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Environmental Protection Bureau J. Block, Esquire J. P. Matteau, Executive Director, Windham Regional Commission D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff G. Sachs, President/Staff Person, c/o Stopthesale J. Volz, Chairman, Public Service Board, State of Vermont Chairman, Board of Selectman, Town of Vernon C. Pope, State of New Hampshire, SLO
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000271/2008002; 01/01/2008 - 03/31/2008; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;
Maintenance Effectiveness.
This report covered a 13-week period of inspection by the resident inspectors. One Green self-revealing finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review.
The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Rev. 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.4,
Procedures, was identified for Entergys failure to provide an adequate procedure for setting the A service water (SW) pump lower motor guide bearing during its replacement in May 2007. Specifically, work order (WO) 111249-14, Replace A Service Water Pump Lower Motor Guide Bearing, did not provide adequate guidance to ensure proper verification of shaft lift to prevent loading the lower motor guide bearing.
As a result, the bearing was improperly set which caused bearing degradation and unplanned A SW pump inoperability on February 12, 2008. Corrective actions taken or planned include replacement of the A SW pump motor and revisions to applicable procedures.
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affects the associated Cornerstone objectives of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability. The finding is of very low safety significance because the estimated increase in core damage frequency was less than 1E-06, assuming the reactor was operating at full power and the A SW pump was unavailable for less than 3 days. The performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, in that Entergy did not provide an adequate procedure for the installation of the lower motor guide bearing. H.2(c) (Section 1R12)
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Vermont Yankee (VY) Nuclear Power Station began the inspection period operating at approximately 100 percent power. On March 11, 2008, a downpower to approximately 60 percent was performed for a planned control rod pattern adjustment and main turbine valve and main steam isolation valve testing. Power was returned to 100 percent on March 12, 2008.
With the exception of minor power reductions to support rod pattern adjustments, VY remained at 100 percent power through the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
On February 29, 2008, the inspectors reviewed actions taken by Entergy due to severe cold weather in the vicinity of the plant. The inspectors reviewed operating procedure (OP) 3127, Appendix D, Extreme Low Temperature Walkdown Check Sheet, and performed independent walkdowns of systems listed in Appendix D, including the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), and the emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems, to determine the impact of severe cold weather on these systems. The inspectors also performed a walkdown of the condensate storage tank (CST) enclosure to determine whether the temperature was appropriate to ensure continued operability of instrumentation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Equipment Alignment
a.
Inspection Scope (4 samples)
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems to verify system alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could impact system operability. Observed plant conditions were compared to the standby alignment of equipment specified in applicable piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) and OPs. The inspectors observed valve positions, power supply availability, and the general condition of selected components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements, such as material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. A listing of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
- B train of core spray (CS) following completion of planned maintenance;
- A train of residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) while the B RHRSW pump was out of service for planned maintenance;
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Equipment Alignment
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment inspection of the accessible portions of the HPCI system. The inspectors compared the actual system configuration to approved P&IDs, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the system design basis document, and OPs. The inspectors evaluated whether major system components were properly ventilated, hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional, ancillary equipment was placed so it would not interfere with the operation of system valves, pump oil levels were maintained in the nominal band, and deficiencies had been entered into the corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors evaluated a sample of previously identified deficiencies to determine if they had been properly addressed, and whether open items impacted system operability. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Quarterly Inspection
a.
Inspection Scope (6 samples)
The inspectors identified fire areas based on a review of Entergys Vermont Yankee Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis, the Fire Hazards Analysis, and the Individual Plant Examination for External Events. The inspectors toured plant areas important to safety in order to verify the suitability of Entergys control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, and the material condition and operational status of fire protection systems, equipment, and barriers. A list of additional documents reviewed is provided in the to this report. The following combustion free zones (CFZs) and fire zones (FZs) were inspected:
- Reactor Building, 252 foot elevation, S1 cable trays (CFZ - 3/4);
- Reactor Building, 252 foot elevation, S2 cable trays (CFZ - 3/4);
- Reactor Building, 252 foot elevation, North (FZ RB3);
- Reactor Building, 252 foot elevation, South (FZ RB4);
- Reactor Building, 280 foot elevation, Motor Generator area (FZ RB6); and
- Reactor Building, 303 foot elevation (FZ RB7).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Annual Inspection
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
On March 6, 2008, the inspectors observed the performance of an announced fire drill involving a simulated fire in the east switchgear room. The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the fire brigade against the drill objectives and acceptance criteria established within the drill scenario including:
- leadership ability of the brigade leader;
- donning of protective clothing;
- use of self-contained breathing apparatus equipment;
- fire brigade control of the affected area;
- use and availability of fire fighting equipment; and
- communications between the fire brigade, the main control room, and security personnel.
The inspectors observed debriefing activities between the drill evaluators and the fire brigade to ensure lessons learned were communicated to fire brigade members. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports (CRs) related to fire brigade readiness to verify that Entergy identified issues at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the corrective action program. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors observed a simulator-based licensed operator requalification exam on February 7, 2008. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of clarity and formality of communications; ability to take timely actions; prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms; procedure usage; control board manipulations; and command and control. Crew performance in these areas was compared to Instructor Guide For Simulator Scenario LOR-26-301 and Entergy management expectations and guidelines. The inspectors also compared the simulator configuration with the actual control board configuration. Finally, the inspectors observed the Entergy evaluators discuss identified weaknesses with the crew and/or individual crew members, as appropriate.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a.
Inspection Scope (3 samples)
The inspectors reviewed Entergys evaluation of three degraded conditions, involving safety-related structures, systems or components (SSCs) for maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed Entergys implementation of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, to determine if the conditions were appropriately evaluated against applicable Maintenance Rule functional failure criteria, as found in Entergy scoping documents and procedures. For each issue, the inspectors reviewed the applicable system health report and/or discussed the issue with the Maintenance Rule Coordinator and responsible system engineer to determine if the condition was appropriately tracked against the system performance criteria and classified in accordance with Maintenance Rule implementation guidance. The inspectors also attended the Corrective Action Review Board meetings where the root cause analysis (RCA) for the service water (SW) pump was discussed. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The specific conditions reviewed were:
- numerous control rod drive accumulator alarms;
- A SW pump lower motor guide bearing failure; and
- RCIC performance greater than a(1) criteria.
b. Findings
Introduction:
A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 6.4, Procedures, was identified for Entergys failure to provide an adequate procedure for setting the A SW pump lower motor guide bearing during its replacement in May 2007. As a result, the bearing degraded, which required the operators to remove the pump from service and declare it inoperable on February 12, 2008.
Description:
In May 2007, the A SW pump was replaced. During this activity, Entergy also replaced the lower motor guide bearing. Entergy personnel used the vendors factory method, per Work Order (WO) 111249-14, Replace A Service Water Pump Lower Moter Guide Bearing, for setting the bearing following its replacement instead of the instructions provided in OP 5235, AC and DC Motor Maintenance, Appendix B, Westinghouse Motor Disassembly and Assembly (Station Service Water Pump Motors). Appendix B includes direction for setting the lower motor bearing. Step 2.2.22 of OP 5235 states, Re-assemble motor per instructions from Appendix A or B as applicable, direction from Vendor manuals/drawings, the Component Engineer or assistance from a qualified Vendor representative. WO 111249-14 did not provide adequate guidance to ensure proper verification of shaft lift to prevent loading the lower motor guide bearing. Approximately two weeks after the pump was returned to service, a thermographic examination identified that the lower motor bearing was running hotter than the lower motor bearings on the other SW pumps. Entergy placed the pump motor on the predictive maintenance watch list with monthly bearing temperature monitoring and trending.
On February 12, 2008, with the reactor operating at 100 percent power, an auxiliary operator noted an unusual noise coming from the A SW pump. Operators secured the pump, declared it inoperable, and entered the associated TS limiting condition for operation. Following replacement of the pump motor, the A SW pump was returned to service on February 14, 2008, after accruing approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of unplanned unavailability.
Entergy entered this event into their corrective action program as CR 2008-0601. In the associated RCA, the root cause team determined that the lower motor bearing had been improperly set in May 2007, which caused the elevated bearing temperatures, the bearing degradation, and the unplanned A SW pump inoperability.
The performance deficiency associated with this finding is that Entergy failed to provide an adequate procedure for setting the A SW pump lower motor guide bearing during its replacement in May 2007. As a result, the bearing ran at a higher temperature which caused the bearing to degrade and eventually led to the A SW pump being declared inoperable on February 12, 2008.
Analysis:
The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance Attribute of both the Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems Cornerstones and affects the associated Cornerstone objectives of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Per IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was assigned to the Initiating Events cornerstone because it best reflects the dominant risk of the finding. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening per IMC 0609 and determined that this finding required a Phase 2 analysis because it contributed to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment functions will not be available.
The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)using the VY plant-specific Phase 2 pre-solved worksheets in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The estimated increase in core damage frequency was less than 1E-06, assuming the reactor was operating at full power and the A SW pump was unavailable for less than 3 days (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> from when the pump was declared inoperable on February 12 until it was restored to available status on February 14). An evaluation of the VY plant-specific Phase 2 pre-solved worksheets showed that two sequences were dominant. The first involved a loss of service water (LOSW) with a failure of high pressure injection and a failure to depressurize the reactor. The second involved a LOSW and a failure of alternate cooling and a failure of containment venting. Three of the four SW pumps remained operable for the duration of the event.
The cause of this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, in that Entergy did not provide an adequate procedure for setting the lower motor bearing. H.2(c)
Enforcement:
VY TS 6.4, Procedures, Section E, requires that, Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities...preventive and corrective maintenance operations which could have an effect on the safety of the reactor. Contrary to the above, an adequate work order for setting the A SW pump lower motor bearing was not provided to plant personnel during the bearing replacement performed in May 2007. Specifically, WO 111249-14, Replace A Service Water Pump Lower Motor Guide Bearing, did not provide adequate guidance to ensure proper verification of shaft lift to prevent loading the lower motor guide bearing.
As a result, the bearing was improperly set, causing bearing degradation and unplanned A SW pump inoperability. Corrective actions taken or planned include replacement of the A SW pump motor, reinforcement of the requirement to use OP 5235 Appendix B for SW pump motors, and clarification of OP 5235. Because the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Entergys corrective action program, this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. NCV 05000271/2008002-01, Inadequate Work Order Results in Unplanned A Service Water Pump Inoperability.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a.
Inspection Scope (6 samples)
The inspectors evaluated online risk management for four planned and two emergent maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, maintenance plans, work schedules, and control room logs to determine if concurrent or emergent maintenance activities significantly increased the plant risk. The inspectors compared reviewed items and activities to requirements listed in AP 0125, "Plant Equipment," and AP 0172, "Work Schedule Risk Management - Online."
The inspectors also walked down areas of the plant containing equipment that was determined to have higher risk significance during the following work activities:
- planned B RHRSW pump replacement;
- emergent B recirculation motor generator lube oil valve work;
- planned maintenance on reactor building recirculation unit RRU-7, which rendered A residual heat removal (RHR)/RHRSW unavailable;
- emergent work on A SW pump failed motor bearing;
- planned A EDG maintenance; and
- planned HPCI maintenance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a.
Inspection Scope (5 samples)
The inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations prepared by Entergy. The inspectors evaluated the operability evaluations against the guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability, and Entergy procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determinations. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment. The inspectors also discussed the conditions with operators and system and design engineers, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed evaluations of the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
- B-UPS-1A battery cell #44 battery cover lifted and cracked;
- potential EDG fuel oil contamination;
- new motor installed on A SW pump; and
- Cooling Tower 2-1 inspection indications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
.1 Permanent Plant Modifications
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed modification EC 5963, Installation of Rewound Motor for the A Service Water Pump, to ensure it did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or functional capability of any risk-significant SSCs. The inspectors reviewed the engineering change package, completed WO, and post modification testing package following installation of the modification, and observed the SW pump in operation following the installation of the modification. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Temporary Plant Modifications
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed temporary modification EC 5858, Refueling Platform Main Hoist Encoder Setting Modification, to ensure it did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or functional capability of any risk-significant SSCs. The inspectors reviewed the engineering change package and completed WO which installed the modification, observed the refueling mast in operation following the installation of the modification, and compared the installation and control of the modification to the requirements of Entergy Corporate Procedure EN-DC-136, Temporary Alterations. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a.
Inspection Scope (7 samples)
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities on risk-significant systems. The inspectors either observed the PMT or reviewed completed PMT documentation to verify the test data met the required acceptance criteria contained in the WO, TS, UFSAR, and/or in-service testing program. When testing was directly observed, the inspectors determined whether installed test equipment was appropriate and controlled, and whether the test was performed in accordance with applicable station procedures. The inspectors also determined whether the test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability following maintenance, systems were properly restored following testing, and any discrepancies were appropriately documented in the corrective action program. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the PMTs performed for the following maintenance activities:
- B CS pump full flow test following maintenance on pump discharge check valve and relief valve;
- B RHRSW pump replacement;
- Replacement of two cells in low pressure coolant injection battery B-UPS-1A;
- A SW pump motor replacement;
- A EDG fast start following two year preventive maintenance;
- HPCI pump and valve testing following maintenance; and
- B EDG starting air tank relief valve replacement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a.
Inspection Scope (7 samples)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing to determine if the test acceptance criteria specified for each test was consistent with TS and UFSAR requirements, the test was performed in accordance with the written procedure, the test data was complete and met procedural requirements, and the system was properly returned to service following testing. The inspectors observed selected pre-job briefings for the test activities. The inspectors also determined if discrepancies were appropriately documented in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance testing:
- calibration of Bus 4 degraded grid undervoltage relays;
- HPCI quarterly pump operability and flow rate test;
- A EDG monthly slow start operability test;
- calibration of Bus 4 degraded grid ASEA RXKE1 timing relays;
- drywell equipment and floor drain leakage calculations;
- quarterly turbine valve performance testing; and
- standby liquid control pump operability test.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
On February 7, 2008, the inspectors observed an operating crew respond to a simulator-based event during licensed operator requalification training activities. The inspectors discussed the performance expectations and results with the lead instructor. The inspectors focused on the ability of licensed operators to perform event classifications and make proper notifications in accordance with station procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a.
Inspection Scope (3 samples)
Initiating Events Cornerstone
The inspectors sampled Entergy submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below for the period from January 2007 to December 2007. The inspectors reviewed selected operator logs, plant process computer data, licensee event reports, and CRs and discussed the PI data with operations personnel. The PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, and AP 0094, NRC Performance Indicator Reporting, were used to verify the accuracy and completeness of the PI data reported during this period.
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours;
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours; and
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
Reviews of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to determine whether they were being entered into Entergys corrective action program at an appropriate threshold and that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions. Additionally, in order to identify repetitive equipment failures and/or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Entergys corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new CR and/or by attending daily CR screening meetings. A listing of CRs and other documents reviewed is included in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 14, 2008, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Theodore Sullivan, Site Vice President, and other members of the VY staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergy Personnel
- J. Dreyfuss, Director of Nuclear Safety
- C. Wamser, General Manager of Plant Operations
- D. Mannai, Licensing Manager
- N. Rademacher, Director of Engineering
- T. Sullivan, Site Vice President
- M. Philippon, Operations Manager
- S. Wender, Radiation Protection Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000271/2008002-01 NCV Inadequate Work Order Results in Unplanned A Service Water Pump Inoperability (Section 1R12)