IR 05000271/1982006
| ML20054G944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1982 |
| From: | Collins S, Gallo R, Raymond W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054G933 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.K.3.21, TASK-2.K.3.24, TASK-2.K.3.25, TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-TM 50-271-82-06, 50-271-82-6, NUDOCS 8206220434 | |
| Download: ML20054G944 (20) | |
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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0PMISSION
REGION I
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Docket No. 50-271 Report No.
82-06 820510 Docket No.
50-271 License No. DPR-28 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Inspection at: Vernon, Vennont Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
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JM f
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W. J. Raymond, ior Rdsident Inspector AVA//171L Sh91%s S. 7. C611 ins, Resident Inspector
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Approved by:
R. M. Gallo, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A, Projects Branch #1 Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 1-May 10, 1982 (Report No. 50-271/82-06)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection on normal and backshifts by the Resident inspectors of: previous inspection findings; plant operations, including records and operational activities; physical security; surveillance testing; main-l tenance activities; safeguard system operability; status of TMI Action Plan require-ments; and, inspector followup of events. The inspection involved 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> onsite by two resident inspectors.
Results: No violations were identified.
Region I Fonn 12 (Rev. April 82)
8206220434 820608 PDR ADOCK 05000271
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1.
Persons Contacted The below listed technical and supervisory level personnel were among those contacted:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Mr. R. Branch, Operations Supervisor Mr. F. Burger, Quality Assurance Coordinator Mr. B. Buteau, Reactor Engineering and Computer Supervisor Mr. J. Desilets, Shift Supervisor Mr. P. Donnelly, Instrument and Control Supervisor Mr. W. Finne11, Assistant Maintenance Foreman Mr. L. Goldthwaite, Instrument and Control Foreman Mr. J. Golonka, Records Clerk Mr. S. Jefferson Technical Services Superintendent Mr. R. Kenny, Engineer, Assessment Coordinator Mr. B. Leach, Health Physicist Mr. M. Lyster, Operations Superintendent
- Mr. W. Murphy, Plant Manager Mr. W. Penniman, Security Supervisor Mr. D. Phillips, Technical Assistant Mr. D. Reid, Engineering Support Supervisor Mr. S. Skibniowsky, Emergency Coordinator Mr. S. Vekasy, Senior Systems Engineer Mr. D. Weyman, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor Mr. W. Wittmer, Maintenance Supervisor
- denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Status of Previous Inspection Findings a.
iClosed) Violation 50-271/81-15-03: Valve Lineups Contrary to OP 2124 and OP 4117. A notation was added to OP 2124 Revision 15 to alert operators to the atypical position indicator on RHR-FCV-43. Revision 9 to OP 4117 provided instructions to the oper itor to verify proper
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standby gas train alighment before starting alternate system testing.
l This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Violation 50-271/81-15-01: Late Submittal of LER 81-19 for l
Standby Gas System Filter Testing.
Revision 9 to OP 4610 provided
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guidelines to describe the corrective actions to be taken in the event that results of the halogenated hydrocarbon test are inconclusive.
Additionally, system outage time limit was established in the procedure, along with directions to initiate a potential Reportable Occurrence Report if the time limit is exceeded. This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Violation 50-271/81-12-02: Maintenance Performed on ACB for P-8-1B Without Required Documentation. Maintenance Request 81-0640 was subsequently generated, approved and completed in accordance with l
l AP 0021. Maintenance personnel were re-instructed on the requirements l
AP 0021 during a Departmental Meeting cn August 24, 1982. This item l
is closed.
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d.
(Closed) Violation 50-271/81-10-01: Licensee review of Analysis Procedures. Revision 9 to OP 2611 incorporated the contractor procedures for conducting radiostrontium and gross alpha analyses of plant effluents. This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Violation 50-271/81-08-09: AP 0803 Conformance to ANSI N45 2.2-1972. Procedure quidelines described in Revision 6 to AP 0803 meet the ANSI N45 2.2 requirements. Procedure controls-were clarified to preclude storage of Quality level components in a Storage Area with a lower designated Quality level than that es-tablished by the purchase order. The inspector noted during discussions with Stores personnel that the new AP 0803 requirements had been reviewed. This item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item 50-271/81-08-04: Requalification Training Exam Results. The 1981 licensed Operator Examination re-sults were reviewed for all individuals enrolled in the program.
Individuals who did not meet the pass / fail criteria (80% overall, 70% each section) were removed from licensed duties (as applicable)
and given accelerated retraining, in accordance with licensee pro-cedures. This item is closed.
g.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-271/80-12-03: Maintenance Training Checklist. The licensee has incorporated topic outlines in the Maintenance Department annual Training Program. The inspector reviewed an outline prepared for the 1981 Annual Training session, which listed, among other subjects, the procedures required by AP 0204 to be covered during training. This item is closed.
h.
(0 pen) Violation 50-271/80-12-02: Failure to Maintain Records of Maintenance Activities. Form VYAPF 0203.01 was completed and was included in the documentation package for MR 79-0852 to provide
the applicable Weld Data Sheets and non-destructive examination reports. Form VYOPF 5201.01 was completed and included in the documentation package for MR 80-0014 to provide the applicable value packing lists.
Licensee actions for the above are considered complete.
During interviews with Maintenance Department personnel, the in-spector could not detennine what mechanism had been established to document second line supervisor independent inspection of routine maintenance work. Further review of this area will be completed on a subsequent inspection.
i.
(Closed) Violation 50-271/81-08-06:
Documentation of Post-Repair Testing.
Revision 10 to AP 0021 changed procedure Section B to require that post-repair testing of safety related systems and components be accomplished in accordance with the applicable sur-veillance testing procedurcs, which then also documents satisfactory completion of testing. Routine inspector reviews of work completed
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by maintenance work requests have detemined that post-repair testing was performed and documented in accordance with the AP 0021 requirements. This item is closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-271/81-08-07: Documentation of Main-tenance Training. A June 15, 1981, memo to file documented that training equivalent to the Annual Training class was provided for four members of the Maintenance Department. Training files for the four individuals were also updated.
This item is closed.
k.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-271/81-08-10:
Engineering Evaluation for CRD Parts Stored in Quality Level C Warehouse. Nonconformance Report (NCR)81-13wasissuedonSeptember 23, 1981, to address this item and provide the required engineering evaluation. The items were inspected and found not degraded based on the storage
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location. NCR 81-13 was closed on Janaury 7,1982, as satisfactorily resolved. The inspector noted that on April 19, 1982, the subject control rod drive parts were stored in the South Warehouse, in a Quality Level B Storage Area. This item is closed.
1.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 50-271/82-07-01: Turbine and Feedwater Pump High Vessel Water Level Trip Setpoints. This item was open pending completion of licensee action to review and re-vise as necessary the high vessel water level trip setpoints for the main turbine and the reactor feedwater pumps.
In a meeting on May 6, 1982, the licensee reported that a setpoint change had been instituted on April 30, 1982 that would preclude a high water level feedwater pump trip without a concurrent trip of the main turbine.
The setpoint changes were effected by temporary changes to procedure OP 4313 (DI 82-02) and OP 4337 (DI 82-03) and further documented by Instrument Setpoint Change Request 82-08. The Plant Operations Review Committee reviewed the changes in meetings 82-18 and 82-19 on April 29, 1982 and May 6, 1982 respectively. As a result of the setpoint changes, the main turbine trip was set at 173+linches and the feedwater pump (along with the high pressure coolaiit injection and reactor core isolation cooling systems) trip was set at 175+l inches. The setpoint changes were acknowledged by the shift super-
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visor, as noted by a April 30, 1982 entry in the Shift Supervisor Log.
In addition to the above, the licensee is considering a design change that would separate the setpoint sensor sources to eliminate reliance upon administrative controls to maintain the current settings.
This item is closed, m.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 50-271/82-07-05:
Feedwater Regulating Valve Response.
Entries in the Night Order Book for April 30, 1982,
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provided information to plant operators regarding the expected responce of the feedwater regulating values (FRV) for specified fault conditions. Similar infomation will be incorporated in OP 3112 (see item 2.n. below). The inspector had no further consnents regarding licensee actions for this part of the open item.
Licensee long-tem review and dispositioning of the FRV response to fault conditions will be followed on a subsequent inspection.
n.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-271/82-07-03: Procedure / Documentation Revisions. Additional information on this item was provided by the licensee during a meeting on May 6, 1982. Actions were taken to complete a Reactor Coolant Temperature Check Data Sheet after-the-fact for the recirculation pump restart on April 24, 1982.
The inspector reviewed Fom VYOPF 3110.10, completed on May 5, 1982, and noted no discrepancies.
The licensee stated that OP 3112 would be revised to incorporate items previously identified by the inspector. Additionally, emergency operating procedures would be revised as appropriate to provide references to the current emergency classification. Revision of the Emergency Plan /AP 3125 emergency action levels to provide the appropriate classification of a non-LOCA ECCS actuation will be com-pleted by June 1,1982, in conjunction with actions taken in response to the NRC April 28, 1982 Confirmatory Action Letter 82-12. Licensed operator training on the revised procedures will be completed by July 20, 1982.
Inspector followup on this item will be documented on a subsequent j
inspection.
i o.
(Closed)UnresolvedItem 50-271/79-18-04: Review cycles were not specified for corporate office procedure series such as operational quality assurance (0QA), Westboro Engineering (WE), and welding and non-inservice inspection (non-ISI) nondestructive evaluation NDE.
During a recent NRC inspection of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (309/82-06), an inspector verified that appropriate administrative procedures have been revised to require that 0QA and WE procedures be reviewed at least every two years and that welding and NDE pro-cedures would be reviewed following major revisions of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes, which occur every three years. As this finding was applicable to docket numbers 50-309, 50-271, and 50-29, and based on the above, it is closed for docket number 50-271.
3.
Shift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector utilized the following plant procedures to detemine the licensee established administrative requirements in this area in preparation for review of various logs and record.
AP 0150, Responsibility and Authority of Operations Department
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Personnel, Revision 17 dated December 18, 1981 AP 0153, Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Revision 9,
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dated August 17, 1981 AP 0140, VY Local Control Switching Rules, Revision 5, dated
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October 16, 1981 AP 0020, Lifted Lead / Installed Jumper Request Procedure,
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Revision 4, dated October 16, 1980 AP 0021, Maintenance Requests, Revision 10, dated December 30, 1981
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The above procedures Technical Specifications, ANSI N18.7-1972
" Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" and 10 CFR 50.59 were used by the inspector to determine the accepta-bility of the logs and records reviewed.
b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Operating logs and surveillance sheets were properly completed
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and that selected Technical Specification limits were met.
Control Room log entries involving abnomal conditions provided
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sufficient detail to comunicate equipment status, lockout status, correction and restoration.
Log Book reviews were conducted by the staff.
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Operating and Special Orders did not conflict with Technical Specifications requirements.
Jutper (Bypass) log did not contain bypassing discrepancies
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with Technical Specification requirements and that jumpers were properly approved prior to installation.
c.
The following plant logs and operating records were reviewed periodi-cally during the period of April 1-May 10, 1982:
Night Order Book Entries
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CR Information Book
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Jumper / Lifted Lead Log Book
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Safety Related Maintenance Requests
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Control Room Operator Round Sheet
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Auxiliary Operator Rounds Sheet
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Comunications Log
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Switching Order Log
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Chemistry Log Sheet
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Shift Turnover Checklist
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Surveillance Log
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Discharge Records
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Radiochemistry Analysis Log
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Shif* c pervisor's Control Room Log u
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Equipment Status Log
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RE Log Typer-Core Performance Log
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Control Room Chemistry Log Sheets
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Health Physics Control Point Log
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No violations were identified.
4.
Plant Tours Plant tours were conducted routinely during the inspection period to observe activities in progress and verify compliance with regulatory and administrative requirements. Tours of accessible plant areas in-cluded the Control Room Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building, Diesel Rooms Security Gate House 2 and Alarm Station, Radwaste Building, Control Point Areas and the grounds within th e Protected Area.
Inspection reviews and findings completed during the tours were as described below.
a.
Control Room Panel Reviews
The operational status of standby emergency systems and equipment /
systems aligned to support routine plant operation was confirmed l
by direct review of control room panels. The following items were i
reviewed to verify adherence to Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and approved procedures.
Switch and valve positions required to satisfy LCO's, where
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applicable and personnel knowledge of recent changes to proce-dures, facility configuration and existing plant conditions.
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Alarms or absense of alarms. Acknowledged alarms were reviewed
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with on shift licensed personnel as to cause and corrective actions being taken, where applicable.
Review of " pulled alarm cards" with on shift personnel.
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Meter indications and recorder values.
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Status lights and power available lights.
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Front panel bypasses.
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Computer printouts.
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Comparison of redundant readings.
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Except as noted below, the inspector had no further comments in this area.
The inspector noted on April 30, 1982, that a high suction pressure alarm condition was in on the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)
system. The matter was discussed with plant operators, who were knowledgeable of the alarm and the reason for it. Apparent back leakage through RCIC discharge valves V13-22 and V13-21 caused slow pressurization of the upstream piping to about 100 psig.
The design pressure for the piping is 150 psig and overpressure protection is provided by relief valve SR-25. Motor-operated valve V13-21 was cycled in an unsuccessful attempt to better seat the valve. Normal pressure was re-established in the line by opening valve V23-24 to establish a vent path through the RCIC flow test return to the condensate storage tank. Maintenance work requests MR 82-538 and 82-539 were issued to rework valves V13-20 and V13-21 during the next plant outage. Licensee actions to repair the RCIC discharge valves will be follcued on a subsequent inspection (IFI 50-271/82-06-01).
No violations were identified.
b.
Radiological Controls Radiation controls established by the licensee, including: posting of radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of step-off-pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed for confomance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and AP 0503, Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas, OP 4530, Dose Rate Radiation Surveys and OP 4531, Radioactive Contamination Surveys. Confirmatory surveys were perfomed in areas toured to verify established posting of radiological conditions was proper. Radiation work permits were re-viewed to verify conformance with procedure AP 0502, Radiation Work
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Permits.
Licensee portable survey instruments were checked periodically to verify instrument response and current calibration.
No violations were identified.
c.
Plant Housekeeping and Fire Prevention Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness and storage of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in all areas toured for conformance with AP 0042, Plant Fire Prevention, and AP 6024, Plant Housekeeping.
No violations were identified.
d.
Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the existence of fluid leaks and abnonnal piping vibrations.
No inadequacies were identified.
e.
Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints Pipe hangers and restraints installed on various piping systems were observed for proper installation, tension, and condition.
No inadequacies were identfied, f.
Control Room Manning / Shift Turnov e Control Room Manning was reviewal for conformance with the require-
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ments of 10 CFR 50.54 (k), Technical Specifications, AP 0152, Shift Turnover, AP 0150, Responsibility and Authority of Operations Depart-ment Personnel and AP 0036, Shift Staffing. The inspector verified, during the inspection, that appropriate licensed operators were on shift. Manning requirements were met at all times. Several shift turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All were noted to be thorough and orderly.
l No items of noncompliance were identified.
l g.
Equipment Tagout and Controls l
l Tagging and controls of equipment released from service were reviewed i
during the inspection tours to verify eclipment was controlled in
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accordance with AP 0140. VY Local Controi Switching Rulcs. Controls implemented per Switching Orders (S0) 82-10 and 82-149 were reviewed.
No inadequacies were identified.
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h.
Analyses of Process Liquids and Gases Analyses results from samples of process liquids and gases were reviewed periodically during the inspection to verify confomance with regulatory requirements. The results of isotopic analyses of radwaste, reactor coolant, off-gas and stack samples recorded in logs and the Plant Daily Status Report were reviewed to verify that Technical Specification limits were not exceeded and that no adverse trends were apparent. Boron analysis results reported for the Standby Luquid Control system on April 6 and April 19, 1982, were reviewed.
No violations were identified.
i.
Jumpers and Lifted Leads (J/LL)
Implementation of jumpers and lifted leads through J/LL Request No.82-024 was reviewed to verify that controls established by AP 0020 were met and no conflicts with the Technical Specifications were created.
No violations were identified.
J.
Conformance with Technical Specification LCOs The operational status of plant systems and equipment was reviewed to verify compliance with selected Technical Specification LCOs.
Conditions established to meet Technical Specification 4.1.B and 3.6.A.4 were verified through direct observation and/or surveillance record review.
No violations were identified.
k, Containment Inerting Licensea procedures and actions taken to inert the primary containment (drywell) with nitrogen were reviewed. Operation with the drywell inerted to less than 4% oxygen content was achieved on April 13, 1982, three weeks before the May 4, 1982, deadline established by the NRC Rule.
Inerted operation was achieved using a temporary nitrogen supply system, that will be used until the pemanent system is com-plete. Operator training on inerted operation and the following pro-cedures were reviewed:
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AP 00507, Primary Containment Entry, devision 5, April 5, 1982
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OP 2119, Nitrogen Supply System, Revision 0, May 5, 1982
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OP 2125, Containment Atmosphere Dilution System, Revision 6, April 5, 1982
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OP 4614, Sample and Analysis of Containment Environment, Revision 0, April 15, 1982 No violations were identified.
Surveillance Activities Ongoing surveillance testing of safety related equipment was re-viewed to verify the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures; test instruments were calibrated; redundant systems were operable and LCOs were met; testing was conducted by qualified personnel; and, test acceptance criteria were met.
Portions of the following surveillances were observed:
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OP 5385, Liquid Process Radiation Monitor System Functional, April 6, 1982
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OP 4386, Liquid Process Monitor System Calibration. April 6, 1982
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OP 4126, Diesel Generator Surveillance, April 15, 1982 No violations were identified.
m.
Radwaste System Operations Implementation of Radwaste System controls was reviewed to verify that solid, liquid and gaseous waste processing activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures OP 2610 and OP 2153. The inspector's review also verified that required instru-mentation was operable during releases, effluent samples were taken and analyzed, and required approvals were obtained prior to release (whereapplicable). Discharge pemits through 82-181 were reviewed.
No violations were identified.
5.
Observations of Physical Security The inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified during regular and offshift hours that selected aspects of plant physical security were in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical security plan and approved procedures, a.
Physical Protection Security Organization observations indicated that a full time member of the security
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organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present as required.
tanning of cll shifts on various days was observed to be as
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required.
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b.
Access Control identification, authorization and badging.
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access control searches, including the use of compensatory
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measures when equipment was inoperable on May 7, 1982.
escorting.
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c.
Physical Barriers selected barriers in the protected areas and vital areas were
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observed and random monitoring of isolation zones was performed.
Observation of vehicle searches were made.
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inspector tours of gate house 2, the Central and Secondary Alarm Stations were conducted at random periods.
No violations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Testing The inspector observed or reviewed portions of the following surveillance tests to verify that testing was perfomed in accordance with procedures, that results were in confomance with Technical Specifications and proce-I dure requirements, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that redun-dantsystem(s)orcomponent(s)wereavailableforservice,thatworkwas being perfomed by qualified personnel, and that activities were in com-pliance with AP 4000, Surveillance Testing Control.
Diesel Generator Operational Readiness Demonstration per VYOPF
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4126.03, April 12 and 13, 1982, and TS 4.10.A.1 Diesel Generator Operating Data per VYOPF 4126.02, April 12 and 13,
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l 1982 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Test per VYOPF 4195.01, April 12 and 13,
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1982 Diesel Generator Weekly Surveillance Checks per VYOPF 4126.01,
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i April 12, 1982 CAD System Hydrogen Monitor per OP 4395, April 20,1982
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High Pressure Coolant Injection System per OP 4120, April 21,1982
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No violations were identified.
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7.
Maintenance Activities The maintenance request log was reviewed periodically during the inspection period to determine the scope and nature of work done on safety related equipment. The review also confirmed that:
the repair of safety related equipment received priority attention; no backlog of required repairs developed on safety related systems; and, the perfonnance of safety related systems was not impaired.
Portions of the following maintenance activity were observed / reviewed by the inspector to verify that work was completed in accordance with approved procedures; established radiation controls were proper; personnel conducting the work were qualified; and, equipment under repair was properly returned to service, including completion of required operability testing.
MR 82-419 Replacement of bushings and preventative maintenance,
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April 16, 1982 No violations were identified.
8.
Safeguard System Operability Reviews of the containment atmosphere dilution and emergency diesel generator systems were conducted to verify the systems were properly aligned and fully operational in the standby mode. Reviews of the above systems included the following:
verification that each accessbile valve in the flow path was in
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the correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication; verification that accessible power supplies and breakers were
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properly aligned for components that are required to actuate upon receipt of a safety injection signal; visual inspection of major components in the selected system for
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leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, general condition and other factors that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements; and, verification that key instrumentation required for system operation
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was functional and calibrated.
No violations were identified.
9.
Review of NUREG 0737 TMI Action Plan Requirements NURGE 0737 - TMI Action Plan Requirements with a due date of January 1, 1982, were reviewed to verify implementation in accordance with
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established criteria. The review consisted of establishing a licensee comitment to fulfill a requirement and a followup inspection to deter-mine its completion status.
References used for this review are listed below.
(i)
NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, October 31, 1980 (ii)
VY Letter FVY 81-79 dated May 15, 1981, TAP II.K.3.28 (iii)
NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/80-01 (iv)
VY Letter WVY 80-170 dated December 15, 1980, Post-TMI Require-ments (v)
VY Letter FVY 82-1 dated Janaury 5, 1982, NUREG 0737 Items Due January 1, 1982 a.
TAP Item II.K.3.28, Qualification of ADS Accumulators (1) Requirements: Reference (i)
Verify that the accumulators on the automatic depressurization (ADS) valves meet the following design requirements: provide sufficient capacity, considering normal leakage, to open the ADS valves five times at design pressures; and qualified to withstand a hostile environment and perfonn their intended function for 100 days following an accident.
If this cannot be demonstrated, show that the design is still acceptable.
(2) Licensee Commitments: Reference (ii)
VY took exception to the ADS design requirements presented in TAP II.K.3.28.
Based on the original design requirements contained in FSAR Section 6.5, the ADS valves are required to be operable for 10 minutes folicwing an accident, with the original design basis for the accumulators to provide for two valve operations at operating pressures. The criteria to de-monstrate the capability to perform 5 lifts at nonnal pressures, corresponds to 2 lifts under accident back-pressure conditions.
l As a result of actions taken under IE Bulletin 80-01, the accumulator check valves were changed to soft seated valves to insure leak tightness. A surveillance test program was implemented to periodically verify the leak tightness of the t
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following a line break in the air supply, to provide for two lift operations over a three-hour period.
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Based on the above, YY considered the existing ADS accumulators to meet the required design criteria and no further actions were planned for this item.
(3)
Inspection Findings:
Reference (iii)
Reference (iii)documentspreviousreviewofthelicensee's actions for IE Bulletin 80-01 and verification that the esta-blished test method demonstrates sufficient accumulator capa-city and leak tightness to provide for two valve lift operations over a three-hour period.
Surveillance testing for the ADS check valves and associated piping is performed per OP 4028, ADS Air Supply Accumulator Surveillance, dated November 24, 1980 Inspector review of completed VYOPF 4028.01 foms, for testing conducted during the 1980 and 1981 refueling shutdowns, showed that the appli-cable test acceptance criteria were met.
No violations were identified.
b.
TAP Item II.K.3.25, Loss of Power for Pump Seal Cooling (1) Requirements:
Reference (i)
Detennine the consequences of a loss of cooling water to the recirculation pump seal coolers.
Pump seals should be designed to withstand a loss of AC power for at least two hours. Loss of AC power is intended to mean loss of offsite power.
If seal failure is the consequence of a loss of power for two hours, one acceptable solution would be to supply emergency power to the cooling water pump.
(2) Licensee Comitments:
Reference (iv)
VY endorsed the conclusions provided in the BWR Owners Group submittal, BWROG-8142. No seal deterioration should occur with the RBCCW system in operation. Further, the loss of both seals was evaluated and considered not to lead to a safety con-cern. The RBCCW system at Vennont Yankee is designed to operate in the event of loss of offsite power and the RBCCW system is automatically restarted when AC power is restored by the emer-gency diesel generators.
Based on the above, VY considered this item complete and planned no further action.
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(3)
Inspection Findings-The RBCCW pumps are powered from 480 volt switchgear buses 8 and 9, which in turn are carried by the emergency diesel generators on loss of power. Proper loading and sequencing of RBCCW pumps by the diesels has been verified by the inspector on previous inspections (Reference: NRC Region I Inspection Report 50-271/80-22). No drywell or reactor building RBCCW loads are automatically isolated following an accident; thus, cooling water supply to the recirculation pump coolers is
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assured in the event of loss of offsite power.
No inadequacies were identified.
c.
TAP Item II.K.3.24, HPCI/RCIC Space Cooling (1) Requirements:
Reference (i)
l The RCIC and HPCI systems should be designed to withstand a complete loss of offsite AC power to their support systems, including coolers, for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
(2) Licensee Commitments: References (iv) and (v)
VY review of these systems, as presently designed, detennined
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that RCIC and HPCI can withstand a complete loss of AC power to their support systems, including coolers, for at least two
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hours.
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Inspection Findings I
HPCI support systems are powered from DC supplies. There is i
no local RRU in the HPCI room. RRU 9 is located in the adjacent (el 232 ft.) CRD pump room, which is supplied with cooling water from the service water pumps and powered from ESS MCC 88.
HVAC to the HPCI room is from Reactor Building supply fans RSF 1A and IB, which are not powered from vital power supplies, RCIC support systems are powered from DC supplies. There are no local RRUs in the RCIC room. HVAC to the RCIC room is similar to that described for the HPCI system above.
YAEC memorandum SEG 478/81 dated December 28, 1982, presented the conclusions from the engineering evaluation for this iter.
Both rooms are located below grade level and are surrounded by massive concrete walls, ficors and ceilings, Calculations of rcom heatup with the turbines running showed that the room temperatures would not exceed 1500F at the end of two hours.
The Woodward Governor has been demonstrated to be qualified at
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this temperature for twelve hours.
Condensate and vacuum blower motors can operate for two hours with no cooling to the turbine rooms.
No inadequacies were identified, d.
TAP Item II.K.3.21.B, CS/LPCI Restart (1) Requirements: Reference (i)
The core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI)
system logic should be modified so that these systems will restart, following operator reset, upon subsequent loss of vessel water level. A pre-implementation review by the NRC staff is required.
(2) Licensee Commitncnts: Reference (iv)
VY endorsed the BWR Owners Group position for this item, which concluded that the suggested modifications are not advisable. No modifications are planned.
(3) Inspection Findings The VY position will be subject to NRC:NRR staff review and acceptance.
No inadequacies were identified.
The inspector had no further comment on this area for the present. Review of licnesee actions on NUREG 0737 items with a January 1,1982, due date will be continued on a subsequent inspection.
10.
Inspector Followup of Events The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection period to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance with the Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements. The
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following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's review of operational events:
observations of plant parameters and systems important to safety
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to confirm operation within approved operational limits; description of event, including cause, systems involved, safety
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significance, facility status and status of engineered safety features equipment;
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details relating to personnel injury, release of radioactive
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material and exposure to radioactive material;
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verification of correct operation of automatic equipaent;
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verification of proper manual actions by plant personnel; and,
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verification of adherence to approved plant procedures.
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a.
Offsite Train Derailment A Boston and Maine Railroad freight train derailed at 2:15 P.M. on May 10, 1982, at the junction of the West and Connecticut Rivers in Brattleboro, Vermont, about 6 miles North (upstream) of the Vermont Yankee Site. The incident left 6 of 8 chemical tank cars off the tracks and resulted in a chemical spill into the Connecticut River.
Preliminary information on the derailment included reports that a liquid chlorine tank car was also affected by the accident. The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 2:40 P.M. based on preliminary infomation (local news reports) available on the derailment, and assuming that the then undefined chemicals posed a potential hazard to the plant. Preparations were made to switch from Open Cycle to the Closed Cycle Mode of circulation water cooling to preclude in-trusion of hazardous chemicals into the plant. State andlocal
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notifications were made.
Samples of the River water were taken at the plant Intake Structure.
Additional information received from offsite authorities revealed that 3 of the 6 tank cars went into the River and 2 of those were empty alcohol tankers. The third was a hopper car, open at the top, which contained sodium sulfate and some of its contents had spilled into the River. Of the three remaining cars that derailed, two were also empty alcohol tankers and the sixth was an empty liquid chlorine car, which remained intact during the derailment and attached to the
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engine. The sodium sulfate was deemed not to pose a hazard to plant cooling systems.
Licensee analyses of River water at 3:30 P.M. showed no sulfate concentrations above nomal background levels. Based on the above information, the licensee de-escalated from the Unusual
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Event category at 3:50 P.M.
The following was determined from the inspector's review of the event.
(1)
Initial reports of the derailment received by the licensee were through local news (radio) broadcasts at about 2:15 P.M.
The infomation was forwarded to the control room. After the Plant Manager, Operations Superintendent and Shift Supervisor reviewed the initial, unconfimed reports at 2:35 P.M., the Unusual Event was declared at 2:40 P.M. based on the potential hazard and impact'
on plant operation. The event was classified in accordance with AP 3125, Table I, Section B and the Vemont Yankee Emergency Plan, Table A.1.
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All applicable actions specified by OP 3500, including Appendices I through IV, were implemented. Notifications
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to the NRC and the Tri-State (Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts) authorities were made at 2:42 P.M.
(2) The licensee received additional, clarifying information at 3:00' P.M. from a Vermont State official at the scene of the derailment.
It was learned at this time that no chlorine hazard was present and that sodium sulfate was the material dumped into the River. The licensee concluded that the sulfate would have no adverse impact on plant cooling
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systems, based on the limited amount spilled and the dilution available from river water.
Actions to de-escalate from the Unusual Event condition were deferred pending confirmation of the 3:00 P.M. information and an analysis of the plant intake water. A sample of the river water at 3:30 P.M. showed no increase in sulfate con-centratica above the background level of 7-8 parts per million.
(Additional river samples at 6:00 P.M. on May 10, 1982, 9:45 A.M. on May 11, 1982, 3:22 P.M. on May 11, 1982 and 5:10 P.M. on May 12 1982, showed normal background concen-trations of sulfate.
After confirmir.g the 3:00 P.M. information, the Plant Manager, acting as Plant Emergency Director, ordered de-escalation from the Unusual Event category at 3:50 P.M. and resumption of normal plant operations. The change to the closed cycle mode of circulation Water cooling was not implemented.
Licensee response to the event was found to be timely and in acccrdance with applicable procedures. No inadequacies were identified.
(3) During followup of the Unusual Event in the control room, the inspector observed the shift crews response to a loss of the operating (A) turbine close cooling water (TBCCW) pump at 3:25 P.M.
The B TBCCW pump was out of service for maintenance.
Plant operators followed the requirements of RP 2183 to switch the station air compressors to alternate cooling and to monitor tenterature on equipment cooled by the TBCCW system. The A TBCCW pump was restarted by 3:27 P.M.
No operating equipment exceeded temperature alarm limits.
It was later determined that the A TBCCW pump circuit breaker was inadvertently tripped open by maintenance personnel during repair on the B TBCCW pump circuitry.
No violations were identified.
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b.
Loss of Feedwater Transient A loss of feedwater transient occurred from 75% FP at 12:59 A.M.
on April 24, 1982, while plant load was being decreased for routine surveillance testing. The transient resulted in a reactor scram and actuation of the high pressure coolant injection and reactor core isolation cooling systems. The results of the NRC inspection of the event and licensee actions subsequent to the transient are documented in NRC: Region I Inspection Report 50-271/82-07. This report was issued on May 12, 1982.
The licensee provided the following coments regarding two details of the report. The coments were discussed with the Plant Manager in a meeting on May 12, 1982.
(1) The discussions of the diesel generators in paranraph 7.c seems to indicate that a separate ECCS actuation signal exists to start the diesels. The inspector acknowledged that the diesels will start automatically on either a loss of power to the safeguard buses and/or on either vessel low-low level or high drywell pressure.
(2) The discussions in paragraph 5. of the report seem to indicate that the operators had not maneuvered the plant at rates above 1% per minute prior to April 24, 1982. The licensee stated that the operators have successfully maneuvered the plant at rates higher than 1% per minute.
A notable example included the ramp rates generated during the 1981 Stability Testing wherein control system responses up to 250% per minute were demonstrated. The inspector acknowledged the above and stated that the inspection team's finding was that the 10% per minute ramp rate used on April 24, 1982, was higher than that routinely used, and that fact together with lack of strict attention to vessel level, was a minor contributor to the event.
The inspector had no further comments in this area.
11. Management Meetings During the period of the inspection, licensee managenent was periodically notified of the preliminary findings by the resident inspectors. A summary was also provided at the conclusion of the inspection and prior to report issuance.
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