IR 05000271/1979012
| ML19256F118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1979 |
| From: | Guzman J, Mccabe E, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256F105 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-79-12, NUDOCS 7911210447 | |
| Download: ML19256F118 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
79-12 Docket No.
50-271
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License No. DPR-28 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pnwar enrnnration 20 Turnpike Road Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Facility Name:
Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at:
Vernon, Vermont.
Inspection conducted: August 13-17, 1979 Inspectors:
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T. F. Stetka, Reactor Inspector date signed
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J. Guzman. Reactor Insnoctnr (rn_nn)
date signed Approved by:
d O k M. } t-Tl17.[77
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E. C. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on August 13-17, 1979 (Report No. 50-271/79-12)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations, action taken on IE Bulletin, LER 79-13, previous inspection findings, and plant tours..This report also documents in-office review of monthly operating reports.
The inspection involved 63.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> onsite by one region-based inspector and one region-based inspector C0-0P.
Results : Two items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction-failure to start reactor feedwater pumps as required by procedure; Deficiency - failure to write Maintenance Request as required by procedure).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Licensee Personnel
- Mr. R. Branch, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- Mr. R. Burke, Engineering Support Supervisor
- Mr. W. Conway, Plant Superintendent Mr. P. Donnelly, I&C Supervisor
- Mr. D. Girroir, Technical Assistant
- Mr. L. Heider, Assistant Vice President, (Yankee Atomic Electric Company)
Mr. S. Jefferson, Reactor and Computer Supervisor Mr. B. Leach, Health Physicist Mr. R. Mossey, Associate Engineer (Yankee Atomic Electric Company)
- Mr. D. Moody, Manager of Operations (Yankee Atomic Electric Company)
Mr. W. Murphy, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mr. J. Pelletier, Maintenance Supervisor Mr. W. Penniman, Security Supervisor Mr. J. Sinclair, Records Clerk Mr. G. Weyman, Chemistry and HP Supervisor b.
State of Vermont Personnel Mr. P. Paull, State Nuclear Engineer (Vermont Public Service Board)
c.
Mercury Company Mr. T. Murphey, Crew Foreman The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel including operations, engineering, maintenance, and health physics personnel.
- Present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previo Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (271/77-16-01):
The inspector reviewed documentation that adequately addressed bleed rate acceptability with respect to unrestricted thermal growth.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (271/79-08-02) and (271/79-08-06): valve /
breaker / switch lineups and drawing inadequacies identified by the inspectors have been corrected.
In addition, the licensee conducted a review of lineups and drawings and identified additional items that needed correction or revision.
These items have also been corrected.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/79-08-03): The licensee has checked
. valves and breakers to assure that all items are properly tagged.
Items that were not tagged or had broken tags have had temporary metal tags installed until permanent tags are provided.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/79-08-04): The licensee has detennined that the F0-41 valves do not exist.
Operator sign off for these valves was due to confusion between the F0-41 designation and F0-14 valves.
The affected procedure (R.P. 2195) and its associated valve line-up have been revised to correct this error.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/79-08-05):
The licensee has written, issued and implemented procedure OP 4321, Instrument Valve Lineup, Tagging and Control.
This procedure provides an instrument valve lineup which will be conducted after each refueling and major maintenance outage, provides for tagging of all instrument valves, and provides controls to assure that valve tagging remains intact.
This valve lineup was completed en all safety-related instrument valves on July 25, 1979.
Inspector observation of instrument valve tagging during plant tours confirmed the effectiveness of this program.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/79-08-07):
The licensee has revised procedure OP-4378 (revision 8 of July 24,1979).
Licensee review of procedure OP-4368 determined that no revision was required.
Inspector discussions with licensee personnel and re-review of this procedure confirmed the licensee's determinatian.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/79-08-08):
The Ticensee has revised procedures OP-4341 and OP-5313 by DI 79-13 on June 27 and DI 79-17 on July 30, respectively, to correct the procedural descrepancies.
3.
Review of Plant Operations a.
When the inspector arrived on site on August 13 plant power was being increased after a maintenance outage.
At 1803 hours0.0209 days <br />0.501 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.860415e-4 months <br /> on August 14, with the reactor at 88.9% power, a reactor shutdown (scram) occurred due to high neutron flux on the average power range monitor (APRM) channels.
The scram was attributed to a failure in the main turbine control system.
The main turbine vendor was called in to investigate control system operation and the reactor was taken critical at 2235 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.504175e-4 months <br /> on August 14.
By 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> on August 15, the reactor was at approximately 50%
power in a nonnal power escalation.
These events were reviewed by the inspector and di: cussed with licensee represenatives.
There are no further questions concerning this item at this time.
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b.
The Shift Supervisor's Log, Control Room Operator's Log and scram reports were reviewed.
This review identified the following event that occurred during a startup of the reactor on August 13, 1979.
The reactor was shutdown on August 9 to repair a gasket leak on the "A" recirculation pump discharge valve (located within primary containment).
Following repairs, a reactor startup was begun.
At about 0031 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> on August 13, with the reactor critical-and heatup in progress, a reactor scram occurred due to low reactor water level.
Procedure OP 0101, Reactor and Generation Systems Heatup to Low Power, Revision 7, requires, in step I.A.15, starting of a reactor feed pump (RFP) when reactor pressure is "approximately 350 psig".
Contrary to this procedure, a RFP was not started until reactor pressure was approximately 480 psig.
The lateness of pump start resulted in a lower than normal water level for this evolution, and the decrease in measured level in the annular region due to void collapse in the boiling region ('from the higher rate of relatively cold feedwater injection) compounded this condition. When the annular water level decreased to the protective system setpoint, the reactor automatically scrammed.
Review of this event indicates the operator error of failing to adhere to procedure OP 0101 was the initiating cause.
This item of noncompliance is contrary to Technical Specification 6.5.A (271/79-12-01).
c.
During the course of this inspection, various, tours of the facility were conducted.
These tours included the Reactor Building (including Corner Rooms), Turbine Building, Diesel Generator Rooms, Radwaste Facility, and Cable Spreading Room.
(1 ) Monitoring Instrumentation. Tha following instrumentation was observed to verify that indicated parameters were in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO):
Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure;
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Reactor Power Level;
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Control Rod Positions;
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Equipment Operating Status;
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Area Radiation and Stack Gas Monitors;
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Suppression Chamber (Torus) Water Temperature and
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Volume;
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Process Computer Core Operating Parameters; and, Suppression Chamber (Torus) to Drywell Differential
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Pressure (2) Annunciator Alarms. The inspector observed various alann conditions received and acknowledged by the Control Room Operator on duty.
These conditions were discussed with the operator who was knowledgeable of the alarms and the actions required by these alarms.
Continuous alarms were identified and the reasons for these were known to operating personnel.
(3) Shift Staffing. The inspector verified by spot checks that the operating shift met Section 6 of the Technical Specification with regard to numbers and licenses.
(4) Radiation Areas.
Radiation control zones were observed to verify proper identification and implementation. These observations included review of step-off pad conditions, disposal of anti-contaminati6n' clothing and area posting.
No adverse conditions were identifi6d.
(5)
Plant Housekeeping Conditions.
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to safety and fire hazards.
General housekeeping appeared acceptable.
(6)
Fluid Leaks: No significant leaks were noted.
(7)
Piping Vibration.
No excessive piping vibration was noted.
(8)
Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints.
Several pipe hangers and seismic restraints (snubbers) on safety-related systems were observed.
The licensee is presently replacing questionable bolt anchors on safety systems as arresult of failures identified during testing in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-02.
Further-details on this replacement program are discussed in paragraph 5(a).
(9) Valve Position / Equipment Start Positions. Valves in the Core Spray, Standby Liquid Control, HPCI, RCIC, and the Residual Heat Removal Systems, and the Torus drains were observed to be locked in their required positions.
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(10) Fire Protection.
Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be unobstructed and recently inspected for operability.
No evidence of smoking was observed in designated "No Smoking" areas and the Cardox fire suppression systems were observed to be operable.
4.
Fuel Bundle Reconstitution During this inspection the licensee was testing fuel rods and reconstituting (rebuilding) fuel bundles (reusable rods from non-reusable bundles are used to re-build other fuel bundles for future use).
Each fuel rod to be reused is tested for cladding integrity and evidence of water within the rod.
The rods are also visually inspected, cleaned and then reassembled into a fuel bundle.
This work is being performed, under contract, by the General Electric Company in accordance with procedure OP 1403, Fuel Bundle Nondestructive Testing and Reconstitution, Revision 1.
The inspector reviewed these activities by discussions with licensee personnel, review of procedure OP 1403, and observation of the testing and re-building in progress.
No inadequacies were identified.
5.
IE Bulletin Review Site documents related to the following IE Bulletins were reviewed to verify that the licensee's responses were timely, accurate and adequate.
This review identified the following items.
(a)
IEB 79-02 - Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts The ;icensee stopped testing of anchor bolts in accordance with proceeire OP 5200.16 (see IE Inspection Rep irt 79-09 dated August 6,1979) and began an anchor bolt replacement program.
That program has been subcontracted to the Mercuiy Company of Norwood, Inc. and is being conducted in accordance with Mercury Company procedure SP-49774-700, Concrete Expansion Anchor Removal and Replacement Anchor Installation, dated August 15, 1979.
The licensee has also employed the services of Earthquake Engineering Systems, Inc. (EES), to detennine the seismic applicability of each hanger by analysis.
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On July 26, an Inmediate Action letter (IAL) was sent to the licenseerequesting further infonnation to clarify their response letter to IEB 79-02.
The IAL was followed up by a meeting at NRC Headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland on August 8.
The results of the IAL and this meeting clarified the licensee's present anchor 13/5 B2
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bolt replacement program and identified a number of safety systems that would be near resonance if a seise : event occurred.
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systems were subsequently tested in acc,rdance with procedure OP 5200.16 and the one hanger in the HPCI system failing the testing was replaced.
The licensee was also required to verify that no anchor bolts existed in the drywell (as was stated in their response to this Bulletin).
This verification was accomplished during a maintenance shutdown on August 10.
The licensee has identified a number of anchor bolts in the steam tunnel,an area that is inaccessible during plant operation.
These anchor bolts will be tested and the program of anchor bolt replacement completed during the refueling outage scheduled to begin on September 22, 1979.
The inspector toured the facility accompanied by the cognizant engineer for this project.
During this tour the hanger identification program, new anchor bolt installation, work in progress, and Mercury Company scheduling of this work was observed.
Review of the licensee's actions to replace the HPCI hanger discussed previously resulted in an item of noncompliance.
The licensee initiated an " Unanticipated Nonroutine Corrective Maintenance" procedure in accordance with AP 6023, Administration of Unanticipated Nonroutine Corrective Maintenance on Safety Class Systems, Components, and Structures.
Procedure AP 0021, Maintenance Requests (MR),
requires issuance of an MR prior to initrating any work on a safety system. This prerequisite assures that all operational and redundant system testing requirements are met prior to working on a system.
Failure to adhere to procedure AP 0021 is contrary to Technical Specification 6.5A and is an item of noncompliance (271/79-12-02).
Further inspection activities with respect to this Bulletin will be conducted during subsequent inspections.
(b)
IEB 79-03 The inspector informed the licensee that his response to this Bulletin is inadequate because the specific questions were not addressed.
The licensee will submit a new response to this Bulletin.
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(c)
IEB 79-11 The licensee stated that, during each subsequent refueling outage (after they are scheduled for September 22 in which all four-r breakers would be repaired and tested), two of the four breakers
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would be tested.
The inspector disagreed and stated that all four breakers should be tested on the next subsequent refueling outage (scheduled for the Fall of 1980) and, if all breakers tested satisfactorily, a reduced test program of two breakers per outage appeared justified.
The licensee will review this issue and provide a revised response with regard to this testing program.
(d)
IEB 79-14 The inspector emphasized to the licensee that a response to this Bulletin addressing the inspection of redundant nonnally accessible systems is expected by the due date of September 2,1979.
The licensee is comitted to ; 'rogram to verify all as-built safety-related piping syster.s r i has subcontracted this task to EES as part of their work wi.
respect to IEB 79-02.
fhis work will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.
6.
Review of Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation On July 25, 1979, the licensee's reactor vendor (General Electric)
issued Service Information Letter (SIL) Number 299 entitled "High Drywell Temperature Effect on Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation".
The SIL addressed an inaccuracy that may occur in the reactor vessel water level instrumentation under very high drywell temperature conditions during an accident.
These high temperatures could result in faulty and nonconservative measurement of reactor vessel water level.
The licensee is presently reviewing SIL 299 to determine the applicability of this issue to Vermont Yankee.
This review is expected to be complete by August 30.
This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections and is considered to be unresolved.
(271/79-12-03).
7.
Review of Administrative Controls for Sys, tem Tagging and Return to Service
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The following procedures require revision to assure systems are properly returned to service.
OP 1200, Preparation of the Reactor Vessel for Refueling, Revision
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OP 1201, Assembly of the Reactor and Drywell Systems, Revision 5; 13/S
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OP 5204, Cleaning and Flushing, Revision 0; and,
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OP 5224, Cable Penetration Sealing, Revision 2.
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Th'e licensee committed to complete the required revision to these procedures by September 22, 1979.
This item is unresolved (271/79-12-04).
8.
Review of '_icensee Event Report The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Report (LER 79-13) to verify that:
The report accurately describes the event;
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The safety significance is as reported;
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The report is accurate as to cause;
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The report satisfies requirements with respect to information
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provided and timing of submittal; Corrective action is appropriate;
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Action has been taken; and
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The event was reviewed and evaluated by the Plant Operations
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Review Committee (PORC).
No inadequacies were identified.
9.
NRC In Office Review a.
NRC:RI in office review of LER 79-12 has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified.
b.
NRC:RI in office review of Monthly Operating Reports for the months of June 1979 and July 1979 has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or items of noncompliance.
Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of this report.
11.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 17, 1979 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report.
During this meeting, the unresolved items and items of noncompliance were identified.
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