IR 05000271/1979013
| ML19291C304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1979 |
| From: | Kalman G, Keimig R, Rekito W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19291C302 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-79-13, NUDOCS 8001240151 | |
| Download: ML19291C304 (10) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-271/79-13
Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation 20 Turnpike Road
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Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Facility Name: Vemont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection at: Vernon, Vemont Inspection conducted: September 26-28 & October 2-4, 1979
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G. Kalman', Rent r" soector date signed
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W. Rekito, Reactor Inspector crate ' signed date signed Approved by: [
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//- /4 - 79 R. R.,Kei
, CM Reactor Projects Section date signed Inspection Summary:
Inspection on Seotember 26-28 & October 2-4,1979 (Recort No. 50-271/79-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of refueling preparation, refueling activities, refueling outage related maintenance and surveillance activities, containment integrated leak rate test preparations, and licensee actions on IE Bulletins, Circulars, and previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 60 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC regional based inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
1795 170 Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Mr. H. Boguslawski, Lead Plant Mechanic
- Mr. R. Burke, Engineering Support Supervisor
+*Mr. W. Conway, Plant Supervisor
+Mr. P. Donnelly, I&C Supervisor Mr. J. Gianfrenscesco, Technical Assistant
+*Mr. D. Girrior, Engineering Assistant Mr. S. Jefferson, Reactor and Computer Supervisor
+Mr. R. Leach, Health Physicist Mr. R. Lopriore, Engineering Assistant
+*Mr. W. Murphy, Assistant Plant Supervisor
- Mr. J. Pelletier, Maintenance Supervisor
- Mr. D. Reid, Lead Technical Assistant
- Mr. W. Rekito, NRC Reactor Inspector
+Mr. L. Thonus, NRC Radiation Specialist
+Mr. G. Weyman, Chemstry and HP Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel duriig the course of the inspection.
- denotes those present at the exit interview on September 28, 1979.
+ denotes those present at the exit interview on October 4,1979.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (78-29-01):
No procedure addressing loss of containment integrity. The licensee originated procedure OP 3108, " Loss of Containment Integrity Emergency Procedure," on September 11, 1979.
The inspector reviewed this procedure and had no further questions.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (79-04-02):
Review cleanup system cracked flange analysis.
The inspector reviewed " Topical Report on Examination of Cracks In the Weld Neck Flange From Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station," by Battelle.
The report identified the cause as stress corrosion cracking.
The inspector had no further questions concerning this matter.
(Closed) Unresolved Itea (271/78-16-07):
10 CFR 50.55a(g) requires thst Section XI of the ASME P2iler and Pressure Vessel Code be implemented on a specific schedule.
In a letter dated April 11, 1979, the NRC denied the licensee's request for a six month delay in implementing ~ the inservice testing requirements of 10 CFR 50.55.
Subsequently, the licensee revised 1795 171
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the Inservice Inspection Program Description and included a temporary Relief Request, No. G-2, to be effective from July 30, 1979 to January 29, 1980. This request, requested relief from certain procedural, programmatic and record keeping requirments necessary for full compliance with the pump and valve testing program of Section XI.
During a meeting onsite, July 18-19, 1979, the NRC (ISI/IST Review Group, DOR) reviewed and accepted the relief request and the Inservice Inspection Program as described. This item is considered closed.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (271/78-16-03): The licensee requested exemption from the increased frequency of the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) required by Section III.A.6.(b) of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.
This exemption request was based on a corrective action plan described in the Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Report dated November 17, 1978.
The NRC denied this request and subsequently, the licensee scheduled a CILRT during the 1979 refueling outage.
This item will remain open pending results of the above test.
3.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
Bulletin 79-04, Velan check valve weight discrepancy.
The inspector reviewed a licensee evaluation which established that the subject check valves were not used in seismically qualified systems.
The inspector had no questions concerning the licensee's actions.
b.
Bulletin 79-09, Failures of GE AK-2 type circuit breakers in safety related systems.
The inspector's review of the licensee's response to the Bulletin included:
(1) Verification that all AK-2 circuit breakers in safety systems were identified; (2) Preventive maintenance procedures and schedules were consistent with the manufacturer's recomendations; and, (3)
Interviews with maintenance personnel to gage their knowledge of the maintenance requirements.
This review identified an incorrect reference on the periodic maintenance (VISI) cards.
The licensee initiated action to correct this discrepancy.
The inspector also questioned the omission from the preventive mainten-ance schedule of a trip torque test.
Subsequent communication between 1795 172
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the inspector and a manufacturer's representative established that the trip torque test was devised to test the operability of an undervoltage trip accessory.
The licensee does not use the undervoltage device and, therefore, is not obligated to perform the torque test.
The inspector had no further questions concerning the licensee's response to the Bulletin.
c.
Bulletin 79-10, Requalification training program statistics.
The licensee submitted the requalification statistics as requested.
d.
Bulletin 79-15, Deep draft pump deficiencies.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Bulletin response and confirmed through review of maintenance records that the subject pumps did not experience the type problems described in the Bulletin.
Circular 79-02, Failure of 120 volt vital AC power supplies.
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Circular 79-04, Loose locking nut on limitorque valve operators.
Circular 79-12, Potential diesel generator turbocharger problem.
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Circular 79-13, Replacement of diesel fire pump starting contractors.
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Circular 79-17, Contact problems in SB-12 switches.
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The inspector reviewed licensee followup actions regarding the above Circulars.
The review verified that the information contained in the Circulars was disseminated for review to the appropriate personnel and that, if required, the recommended action was performed.
4.
Refueling Preparation a.
Scope The i1spector reviewed the receipt and inspcction records associated with the 96 new fuel assemblies received onsite for use during reload number 6.
The fuel handling and core verification procedures were reviewed for conformance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and other standards.
The fuel handling equipment interlock test procedure was reviewed and it was verified that the required checks were made prior to handling fuel.
1795 173
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b.
Documents Reviewed Fuel vendor new fuel shipping documents and quality certification.
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AP 1500, Revision 9, March lo,1979, Health Physics Activities
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During New Fuel Receipt and Inspection.
OP 1400, Revision 10, September 14, 1979, Fuel Receipt and Preli-
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minary Handling.
OP 1401, Revision 8, September 14, 1979, New Fuel Inspection and
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Channeling.
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OP 1200, Revision 6, September 21, 1979, Preparation of the Reactor Vessel for Refueling.
AP 1000, Revision 5, September 18, 1979, Refueling.
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OP 1410, Revision 8. July 24,1979, Fuel Loading.
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OP 1411, Revision 4, September 14, 1979, Core Verification.
c.
Findings No discrepancies were identified.
5.
Refueling Activities a.
Scope Fuel transfer operations on the refueling floor and supporting activities in the control room were observed during the initial phase of the refueling.
The inspector verified that refueling prerequisite plant conditions, tests and inspections, were satisfied.
The operations were observed for conformance to Technical Specifications, procedures, and other applicable standards.
As part of the above inspection, fuel status boards were checked for accuracy and manning in the control room and refueling area was compared to procedural requirements.
Housekeeping and health physics practices were inspected.
b.
Findings No items of noncompliance were identified.
The inspector verified that whenever core alternations were in progress, operators in the control room were communicating with personnel on the refueling floor 1795 174
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and that during this time, the source range monitors (SRM) were being monitored continuously.
Failure to monitor the SRM's during core alternations had been an item of noncompliance (78-22-04) during the previous refueling.
6.
Outage Maintenance and Surveillance a.
Scope The procedures and supporting documents for m.tintenance and surveillance activities scheduled during the refueling outage were reviewed on a random basis to verify compliance with applicable standards. The scope of the maintenance activities was reviewed to verify that the proposed work was in compliance with Technical Specifications and did not include an unreviewed safety question.
Maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and cognizant personnel were interviewed.
The following activities were chosen for review:
(1) Control Rod Drive (CRD) return line rerouting and nozzle capping.
(2) Target Rock Relief Valve periodic maintenance and set point check.
(3)
Diesel generator maintenance.
(4)
Feedwater nozzle inspection.
b.
Documents Reviewed Revision 1 of the Mercury Company procedure package for CRD
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rerouting and nozzle capping was approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee on October 3, 1979.
A safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 was included in the licensee's review.
OP 4200, Revision 4, July 24, 1979, Main Steam Relief Valves.
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OP 5201, Revision 3, July 13, 1978, Safety System Valves.
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OP 5223, Revision 2, June 6,1978, Emergency Diesel Generator
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Maintenance Procedure.
Preventive Maintenance Work Order No. 649753L for C3-1A air start
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compressor.
1795 175'
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Maintenance Request No. 559, fireproof ceiling repair in emergency
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generator room.
Maintenance Request No. 726, fuel oil inlet hose repair.
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Maintenance Request No. 647, jacket water cooler repair.
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Maintenance Request No. 84, casing oil leak repair.
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OP 5200.2, Revision 0, October 2, 1979, Feedwater Nozzle, CRD
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Hydraulic Return Nozzle Inspection and Repairs.
c.
Findings No items of noncompliance were identified.
The inspector expressed concern regarding the adequacy of a portable water level measuring device being used to monitor reactor water level.
The device was located under a maintenance platform that had been constructed inside the reactor vessel to perform the feedwater nozzle inspection.
Licensee personnel stated that all drain paths from the vessel had been secured and any water loss was highly unlikely.
However, in view of the inspector's concern, control room operators were instructed to log the reactor vessel water level every two hours as a precaution against inadvertent water loss.
7.
Pipe Supports and Restraints a.
Scope The snubbers inspection program was reviewed for compliance with regulatory guidelines.
Snubbers and pipe hangers were inspected on a random basis and cognizant personnel were interviewed.
b.
Documents Reviewed OP 5203, Revision 5, July 27, 1979, Shock Suppressors, including
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completed visual inspection data sheet, c.
Findings A failure of the snubber test machine delayed completion of the snubber inspection.
The licensee visual inspection identified 5 snubbers with dry hydraulic fluid reservoirs.
These snubbers will be functionally tested to determine their operability for the purpose of establishing the frequency of the subsequent inspections.
The final results of the 1795 176
snubber inspection will be reviewed during a future ins, action. This matter is designated as an inspector follow item (271/79-13-01).
8.
Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT)
a.
General The inspector reviewed Procedure No. 4030. " Primary Containment Leak Rate," Revision 5. dated September 14, 1979, for technical adequacy and compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, ANSI N45.4, and Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications. The inspector also discussed various aspects of the CILRT with the licensee's representatives including current NRC positions and the licensee's plans for the 1979 CILRT.
With the exception of the items noted below and in Paragraph 2, the inspector found no discrepancies and had no further questions in this area.
b.
CILRT Procedure The below items assviated with the CILRT procedure are unresolved and are collectively designated item No. (271/79-13-02).
(1) Atmospheric Conditions ANSI N45.4 requires that atmospheric pressure and ambient temper-ature be recorded hourly.
This requirement is not in the current procedure.
The licensee's representative proposed monitoring the atmospheric conditions of the secondary containment in lieu of the outside conditions.
The inspector agreed that this would meet the intent of ANSI N45.4.
The licensee's representative stated he would revise the procedure to include this requirement.
(2) Acceptance Criteria The NRC requires that the Acceptance Criteria include corrections of the measured leakage for (a) containment free volume chances (such as Reactor Vessel and sump water levels), and (b) local leakage test (type C) results for systems that are required to be in operation for proper conduct of the test or for maintaining the plant in a safe condition, but could become exposed to the containment atmosphere during a LOCA.
The inspector questioned whether the Control Rod Drive and Reactor Water Cleanup systems were in this category.
The licensee's representative stated he would revise the procedure to include the above mentioned correc-tions to the measured leakage test results.
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c.
Valve Lineup Review On a sampling basis, the inspector checked the CILRT procedure valve lineup sheets to verify that:
Each penetration was provided with a valve lineup;
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Valves were in the correct positions;
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Proper vent paths were provided; and,
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Artificial leakage barriers were not created which could mask
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containment leakage.
The items identified below are unresolved and are collectively designated item No. (271/79-13-03).
(1) Service Air Penetration X-21 Appendix J requires that systems which are part of the reactor containment boundary and which may be opened directly to the containment or outside atmosphere under post accident conditions shall be opened or vented to the appropriate atmosphere during the test.
The current valve lineup for the service air system (penetration X-21) does not vent the system inside or outside of containment. The licensee's representative agreed to correct this discrepancy.
(2)
Instrument Air Penetration X-22 The NRC requires that sources of instrument air and service air into the containment shall be isolated and vented or disconnected during the CILRT. The current valve lineup for the instrument air system (penetration X-22) results in air system pressure against isolation valve V72-90D.
The licensee's representative stated he would revise the procedure valve lineup to vent (depres-surize) the system upstream of the containment isolation valve V72-90D.
9.
Unresolved Items Items about which more information is requires to determine acceptability are considered unresolved.
Paragraphs 6.c, 8.b, and 8.c of this report contain unresolved items.
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10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (see Detail 1 for attendees)
at the conclusion of the inspection on October 4,1979 and on September 28, 1979. The inspector sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that time.
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1795 179