IR 05000269/1990026
| ML15224A736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1990 |
| From: | Rankin W, Testa E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A735 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-90-26, 50-270-90-26, 50-287-90-26, NUDOCS 9012170029 | |
| Download: ML15224A736 (16) | |
Text
Go,
~UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
101 MARIETTA STREET, V AATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-269/90-26, 50-270/90-26, and 50-287/90-26 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Conducted: October 8-12, 1990 Inspector:
.
i*.-*
E. D. Testa Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: W. Poertner B. Spitzberg M. Stein Approved by:_
_
_____
W. H. Rankin, Chief Date Signed W 2 Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection included observation and evaluation of the annual emergency response exercis Emergency organization activities and responses were selectively observed in the Control Room (simulator), Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operations Support Center (OSC),
and Field Monitoring Team The inspection also included a review of the exercise objectives and scenario details, as well as observation of the licensee's post-exercise critique activitie The exercise was a small-scale exercise with partial participation by the State of South Carolina and full participation by Oconee and Pickens Counties. The exercise was conducted off-hours on October 9, 1990, between the hours of 7:00 and 11:30 A separate fire drill was conducted on October 10, 1990, between the hours of 4:30 p.m. and 6:00 PDR ADOCK 05000269 G
Resul ts:
No violations or deviations were identified; however, two exercise weaknesses were identified:
(1) failure to staff and activate the TSC within 45 minute (actual time approximately 83 minutes) as stated in Section B Figure B-5 of the Emergency Plan (Paragraph 3); and (2) communications problems between the TSC (the Oconee CMC was not activated) and the State Forward Emergency Operations Center reduced the effectiveness of the State's ability to perform timely independent analysis and draw conclusions from scenario generated events. This resulted in a failure to provide adequate exercise support to the State of South Carolina to enable the State to fully demonstrate their exercise objectives during their partial participation exercise (Paragraphs 7, 8, and 10).
Within the scope of the observed exercise, which did not include activation of the Oconee CMC, the licensee demonstrated the capability of implementing its Emergency Plan and procedures to provide for the health and safety of the public during a radiological emergenc REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H-.
Barron, Station Manager
- R. Brown, Compliance
- R. Coanett, Maintenance Engineer
- T. Curtis, Compliance Manager
- D. Davidson, Compliance
- J. Davis, Technician Services Superintendent
- D. Deatherage, Operations Support Manager
- W. Foster, Maintenance Superintendent
- N. Hammett, Nuclear Security Specialist
- C. Jennings, Station Emergency Planner
- B. Jones, Operations Coordinator
- P. Kusek, Supervisor, World f Energy
- G. McAninch, Shift Manager
- T. McQuarrie, Contract Services Coordinator
- B. Norris, Interim Supervising Scientist
- M. Patrick, Performance Section Manager (Acting)
- D. Powell, Station Services Superintendent
- G. Ridgeway, Shift Operations Manager
- G. Rothenbercer, ISG Superintendent
- J. Sevic, Chemistry Manager
- D. Simpson, Nuclear Emergency Planner
- J. Snowden, Operations Shift Supervisor
- P. Stovall, Director of Operator Training
- D. Sweigart, Operations Superintendent
- W. Thompson, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- C. Yongue, Radiation Protection Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
i Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2. Exercise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response capability as well as the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The scenario was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives in advance of the exercise. The final exercise data and message.package were distributed during a pre-exercise licensee briefing held October 9, 199 The scenario developed for this off-hours exercise was detailed and only exercised the licensee's onsite emergency organization. The scenario was unique in that it used casualties on Unit 3 and Unit 1 to facilitate classification actions. The Alert was declared on Unit 3 due to losses of greater than 50 percent of the applicable Control Room status alarms listed in the Emergency Pla The condition lasted greater than 15 minutes, and by the classification procedure was classified as an Aler The Site Area Emergency (SAE)
was declared on Unit 1 as a result of the loss of subcooling in the reactor coolant system (RCS).
This was due to a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)
seal LOCA resulting from loss of component cooling (CC) and seal injectio Seal failure occurred on three pumps and RCS leakage was determined to be greater than 300 gallons per minute. The RCS leakage rapidly increased to 900 gallons per minute when pumps were secured and the loose parts monitor alarmed on RCP discharges and in cores indicating debris entering the core. A General Emergency was declared as a result of the loss of the "C" High Pressure Injection (HPI) pum A fire drill was conducted on October 10, 1990, and involved a simulated fire in the west end of Warehouse No. 4 in the storage area for surplus office furnitur The fire drill required fire brigade notification and response, offsite communications to fire departments, the use of personnel protective equipment, and the use of fire equipment brought to the scene by onsite and offsite agreement fire department The controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise and fire dril The inspector observed adequate interactions between the controllers and the players; no controller prompting was observe No violations or deviations were identifie. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergenc The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representative Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not require Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that
sufficient technical staff was available to provide for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency onsite organization, if neede The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operations Support Center (OSC).
At each of these facilities, the required staffing and assignment of responsibility was consistent with the licensee's approved Emergency Pla Because this was an off-hours exercise, the inspector observed the activation times for the TSC and OSC and noted that the response times for personnel activating the TSC exceeded the 45 minutes as stated in Section B, Figure B-5 of the Emergency Pla The actual activation time was approximately 83 minutes following the shift supervisor's decision to declare an Aler This failure to activate the TSC within the time specified in the Plan was l identified as an exercise weaknes There was no augmentation of Oconee CMC during this exercise since it was not an exercise objectiv The inspector noted that the Plan had no criteria for timeliness of augmentation or activiation for the CMC. Licensee representatives stated that staffing and activation of the Oconee CMC from Charlotte headquarters was estimated to take 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Exercise Weakness 50-269, 270, 287/90-26-01:
Failure to staff and activate the TSC within 45 minutes as stated in the Oconee Emergency Pla No violations or deviations were identifie. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:
(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organization interaction The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and that staff was available (after activation) to fill key functional positions within the organizatio Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of additional shift personnel via call-ou The shift supervisor (at the simulator) assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of the emergency coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the plant manage No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and acticn level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in NRC Information Notice 83-2 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure No. RP/O/B/1000/01 titled "Emergency Classification" was used to promptly identify and-properly classify the scenario simulated event The Alert, SAE, and General Emergency classifications were timely and correct by procedur The Alert was declared at approximately 7:15 The SAE was declared at about 8:57 p.m.,
and the General Emergency was declared at approximately 9:34 The drill terminated at approximately 11:30 During the drill, a real medical emergency occurred at Unit 2, which was in the refueling mod A medical emergency response team (MERT) was dispatched and an offsite ambulance was requested to transport the casualty to a local hospita The real medical emergency involved a heat-related problem and no contamination, and there was no emergency classificatio The response to the actual medical emergency on Unit 2 during the exercise demonstrated the depth of the response capabilities since the real medical emergency was handled with minimal impact on the scenario events occurring at that tim No violations or deviations were identifie '6. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, that the content of initial and followup. messages to response organizations had been established, and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions. to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio Notifications of the State and designated local offsite organizations were completed within 15 minutes following the classification and declaration of the emergency even The alert notification system (ANS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ)
was not actuated during this exercis No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
10 CFR 50, Appendix Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations. Communications difficulties, however, existed between the TSC and the Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC)
where the State participants were playin These communications difficulties involved telephone number problems, facsimile transmission problems (Green Sheet Notification Forms 2 and 8 were never received by the State),
dose assessment verification problems, and protective action recommendation (PAR) discussion problem These communications problems with the State were identified as an exercise weakness since they reduced the effectiveness of the State's ability to demonstrate their exercise capabilities during this partial participation exercis Exercise Weakness 50-269, 270, 287/90-26-02:
Communications problems between the TSC (the Oconee CMC was not activated) and the State Forward Emergency Operations Center reduced the effectiveness of the State's ability to perform timely independent analysis and draw conclusions from scenario generated events. This resulted in a failure to provide adequate exercise support to the State of South Carolina to enable the State to fully demonstrate their exercise objectives during their partial participation exercis This resulted in a failure to fully demonstrate exercise scenario objectives 7, 11, 12, 13, and 14 (see exercise scenario objectives attachment).
Additional supporting observations are contained in Paragraphs 8 and 1 No violations or deviations were identifie. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilitie No major equipment deficiencies were observed. Facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
(a) Control Room (simulator) - The Exercise Control Room was established in the simulatorat the training cente The inspector observed that, following review and analysis of the sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel acted promptly to initiate required response to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were available and followe The designated exercise shift supervisor evaluated the significance of each degradation in plant
conditions and quickly and continuously prioritized repair activitie The simulator shift personnel followed procedures, and command and control were demonstrated in a competent manne (b) Technical Support Center (TSC)
-
The TSC manager demonstrated effective command and control and provided periodic informative briefings on plant status to TSC and other plant staff. The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of their duties, authorities, and responsibilitie The TSC manager (new plant manager) demonstrated an in-depth knowledge of the plan (c) Operations Support Center (OSC)
-
The inspector observed that, following the request for activation, personnel responded to staff the facilit The inspector observed that adequate health physics controls were demonstrated to preclude the spread of contamination when teams returned from the work areas to the OSC. The inspector also observed that checks for contamination in the OSC were conducted periodicall Teams being dispatched to various work activities received adequate health physics and industrial safety.briefing (d) Emergency Operations-Facility or Crisis Management Center (CMC) - The CMC was not activated nor staffed during this partial participation exercis The CMC at Oconee was last activated and staffed during the April 1986 exercis Since that time a new CMC has been constructed and training provided for response personne A utility-only drill was conducted on May 23, 198 Since this facility has never been evaluated during an exercise, station management was requested to define when this facility would be activate The station management deferred commitment to activation of the Oconee CMC since this is a corporate facility as detailed in the Crisis Management Plar;.
This item will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI).
IFI 50-269, 270, 287/90-26-03:
Demonstration of the adequacy of the new Oconee CMC during an annual evaluated exercis (e) Emergency News Center (ENS)
- The ENS was not fully activated during the exercise, however, some participation in this area occurred from the World of Energy located on site and the media center located at the Clemson Operation Center Assembly Roo Comments concerning activities observed in this area were provided to the inspector by the FEMA RAC Member. The licensee activated an onsite media center at the visitor's center (World of Energy).
No one from the licensee's ENS organization arrived at the media center until late in the exercise (approximately 10:30 p.m.).
Pre-exercise miscommunication between the State and local government representatives resulted in a delayed media center licensee presenc While awaiting the media center activation, the emergency escalated through Alert, SAE, and General Emergency. An ongoing environmental release was occurring at the time the World Energy Center personnel were directed to relocate to the media cente It was noted by the
FEMA RAC member.that there was a small number of telephones available for use by the media at the media cente No press releases were available; no press kits and no real or mock media were present in the media cente These comments support the Exercise Weakness identified in Paragraph No violations or deviations were identifie. Accident Assessment (82302)
This area was observed to assure that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program included an engineering evaluation of plant status, damage caused by the simulated events, and determination of the radiological hazard to onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. Onsite and offsite radiological environmental monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plum Radiological effluent data were received and reviewed in the TSC. The inspector observed command and control of the licensee's field monitoring teams including concern for minimization of dose to team members, communications, and frequent plant status update No violations or deviations were identifie.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 5C.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector verified that the licensee had developed and implemented emergency procedures formulating PARs for the offsite population within the 10-mile EP The licensee's PARs were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and other criteri Although conditions in the plant were continuously evaluated and PARs properly formulated, the State dose assessors and decision makers operated on sketchy and fragmentary informatio This was caused by an inability of the State people to reach cognizant licensee representatives in the TS Incorrect telephone numbers and phones that had not been switched from the phone mail answering system contributed to this difficulty. The scenario stated there was an onsite release into containment, but it was rumored at the FEOC that an environmental release was underwa Unable to confirm this, the State was about to implement a two-mile precautionary evacuation
without any technical supporting information. Before these PARs could be implemented, however, the licensee confirmed that an offsite release was occurring and that they were recommending PARs that were more conservative than what the State was about to implemen The licensee recommended PAR was a five-mile evacuatio Confronted with this information, and without the benefit of an independent assessment or the ability to discuss the causal factors, the State had no choice but to accept the PARs and implement them. These coordination and communication difficulties have been previously identified as an Exercise Weaknes No violations or deviations were identifie.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted a series of post-exercise critiques on October 10-11, 199 Critiques were held with players, controllers, and managemen Findings identified during the exercise and plans for corrective action were discusse Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspection The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed substantive deficiencies and planned improvement item The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited abov No violaticns or deviations were identifie.
Actions on Previous Inspector Findings (92701)
There were no previous inspector findings to close out during this inspectio.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 11, 1990, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the license Item Number Description and Reference 50-269, 270, 287/90-26-01 Exercise Weakness - Failure to staff and activate the TSC within 45 minutes as stated in the Oconee Emergency Plan (Paragraph 3).
50-269, 270, 287/90-26-02 Exercise Weakness - Communications problems between the TSC (the Oconee CMC was not activated) and the State Forward Emergency Operations Center reduced the effectiveness of the State's ability to perform timely independent analysis and draw conclusions from scenario generated event This resulted in a failure to provide adequate exercise support to the State of South Carolina to enable the State to fully demonstrate their exercise objectives during their partial participation exercise (Paragraphs 7, 8, and 10).
50-269, 270, 287/90-26-03 IFI - Demonstration of the adequacy of the new Oconee CMC during an annual evaluated exercise (Paragraph 8).
Attachment:
Time line; Scope and Objectives SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES The Oconee exercise, to be conducted on October 9, 1990, is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, Section I This will be an off hours exercise, beginning between the hours of 1800 and 240 Oconee and Pickens Counties will participate fully and the State of South Carolina will participate on a partial basi The Crisis Management Center will not participat A separate fire drill will be held on October 10, 1990, involving support by an off-site fire departmen A formal critique involving Duke Power and NRC will be held on October 11, 1990 at 1:00 p.m. at Oconee Nuclear Statio This critique will be closed to the publi Exercise Objectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)
Emergency Management
.1 Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classifications in accordance with procedure.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State and the Counties within
minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classificatio.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or higher emergency clas.
Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classe.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a simulated emergency and provide accountability for any not present at the assembly location.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions, intercoms, and on-site radio syste.
Test primary off-site communications equipment to the County and State warning points and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification Syste Page 2 Drill Scenario NITIAL CONDITIONS Unit One at 100%:
1A HPI pump is out of service for maintenanc hour limited condition for operation (LCO) beginning at approximately 173 Oil changeout of the upper and lower motor bearings will be require B Condensate Booster Pump (CBP) is out of service for mechanical seal replacement of the inboard sea A2 RCP is operating with higher than normal vibration Note:
Unit I is running with abnormally high activity due to a problem experienced earlier in the fuel cycle with 1B2 reactor coolant pum The unit was brought down, the pump was repaired and the unit was returned to service to complete the cycl Activity is within technical specification Unit is at 410 days in the fuel cycl Unit Two at at refueling shutdown:
Secondary side drained for maintenanc Standby shutdown facility (SSF) is out of service due to condenser cooling water (CCW) intake piping being drained for pipe coatin Unit Three at 100%: Turbine driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEFWP) is out of service. 3MS 95 (main steam) was discovered broken on periodic tes SEQUENCE OF EVENTS Approximate Time 1900 Unit 3 loses greater than 50% of the applicable statalarms listed in the emergency pla The condition will last longer than 1.5 minute IME Shift people are dispatched to locate the proble Unit 1 'A' component cooling pump fails and 'B' component cooling pump starts and operates properl 'A' pump breaker will not reset due to motor shor 'A' RBCU tube rupture alarm. 1LPSW-18 develops a large body/bonnet leak. Leak can be isolated by closing 1LPSW-16
& 8 When these valves are shut the leak will reduce to a much smaller size but will continue to leak some due to seat leak on 1LPSW-1 An ALERT should be declared on Unit 3, site assembly initiated, and the TSC - and OSC recall initiate Page 3 Annual Exercise WI-
~1916
-
Pnt~lh~
d~Hg l-i-- 7 217 -kwlac penetration room creating high humidity, char,7 'ecorder in cableroom indicates 100% humidit 'C'
RBCU breaker trips due to motor failure. Ops will be unable to rese OSC reports it will take approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to repair power connection cable to breaker 3DIB2 Alert should continue on Unit 3 until panelboards are returned to servic ITE lockout. Failure is one that will take until the end of the drill to repai Unit trips on loss feedwater (FDW).
'A'
motor driven emergency feedwater pump (MDEFWP) starts but fails due to pump hearing failure. 'B' component cooling (CC) pump does not start because IXN fails to swap to its emergency power suppl RCP seal LOCA due to loss ofCC and seal injection. Seal failure has occurred on 3 pumps and RCS leakage is 300 gp RCS leakage increases to 900 gpm when pumps are secure Loose Parts Monitor alarms on RCP discharges and incore Loss of Subcooling in the RCS. Site Area Emergency should be declare Hotwell pumps (HWP)
trip on a false low hotwell level signal due to a malfunction of 1LS2 (2054)
When building spray (BS) is initiated both BS 1&2 fail to open and will not open from the control room. They can be opened with the handlhoel on the operato A false low hotwell level on Unit 3 occurs when LT 17 fails low. This results in dumping the entire upper surge tank (UST) volume to the hotwell because 3C 187 & 192 fail full ope Unit 3 emergency feedwater (EFDW) is unavailable to unit one until this problem is discovered and repaire.05 Turbine bypass valves (TRV) close ^u1ie to a false low condenser vacuum signa High vibration alarm on 'A' RBC Fan blade failure on 'A' RBCU. The cooling coils are heavily damaged but this cannot be detected due to the LPSW being isolate The 'C' HPI pump fails due to motor bearing damage. Event should be upgraded to a general emergenc Secure from dril ANNUAL EXERCISE 90-7 DRILL DESCRIPTION p-ns-i-the nhcn=e-xcercise -Include full participatibn by 'conee County and Pickens County, partial participation by the State of South Carolina and full participation by Oconee Nuclear Statio The State of South Carolina required the scenario give at least one full hour between classification To meet that requirement and still use the simulator for driving the station scenario, a different approach has been use Several scenarios were tried on the simulator to meet the state requirements of an iodine release out to five mile A fuel melt condition via the simulator could not be modeled to occur within one hour of a Site Area Emergenc The scenario finally chosen does require multiple failures and an existing fuel failure of approximately 0.9%.
Technical specifications of the Oconee Nuclear Station allows a unit to run with less than 1% failed fue Mechanical damage will be the failure mechanism of the cla Failed charcoal filters in the penetration ventilation system will not remove the iodine from the penetration room leakag A release is considered to be in progress anytime reactor building pressure is greater than one poun Oconce Nuclear Station has three unit However, only Unit 1 is modeled on the simulato The exercise will begin with a loss of annunciators on Unit No effect will be seen by the Operational Aid Computer except that more than 50 percent of the panelboards will not be li After 15 minutes and the power failure has not been corrected, the Shift Supervisor should declare an Alert, establish the Technical Support center, notify
.offsite agencies which includes Oconee and Pickens County, the State Warning Point and the Nuclear Regulatory Agenc The drill is seheduled to begin at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> which will be a test of the county and utility callback of emergency personnel after normal working hour While the Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center are being activated for the loss of annunicators on Unit 3, events will begin on Unit 1 that will eventually lead to a site area emergency and a general emergency classification Once the Technical Support Center is fully operational and to allow for one hour between classifications, a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal loss of coolant (LOCA)
is created by a loss of RCP seal injection and component cooling (CC).
A direct flowpath from the reactor building to the penetration room is created by a low pressure service water (LPSW) leak in the penetration room combined with a reactor building cooling unit (RBCU)
cooler failur Multiple failures result in elevated reactor building pressure due to the loss of RBCUs and building spray (BS). The volume of reactor coolant system (RCS)
leakage will exceed the capacity of the one available high pressure injection (HPI)
piunp and the RCS will become saturated. The already high RCS activity will be increased due to additional fuel clad failure as a result of the transient. Penetration room ventilation (PRV)
is rendered inoperable as a result of high humidit Therefore, the leakage from the reactor building is released without processing by the charcoal filters in the PRV system. The offsite release will be comprised of activity in the RCS and additional fission products from the fue.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TS.
Demonstrate proper use of the notification form and authentication methodology for messages transmitted to States and Countie.
Demonstrate access control measures to the plant sit.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate information to the news media in a timely manne.
Test primary off-site communications equipment to the County and State Emergency Operations Center.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations to off-site officials in accordance with station procedure Accident Assessment 1 Demonstrate the ability to transmit data using the Data Transmittal System in accordance with station procedure.
Test the adequacy of the following assessment tools:
1. Drawings 2. Data Display Boards 3. Maps 1 Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposur.
Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels and airborne radioiodine concentration.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance with station procedure.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TS.
Demonstrate the ability to locate a simulated radioactive plume and to measure the off-site radiation levels.