IR 05000269/1990013
| ML15224A683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1990 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A682 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-90-13, 50-270-90-13, 50-287-90-13, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 9006210440 | |
| Download: ML15224A683 (15) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA,.GEORGIA 30323 Repor Nos.: 50-269/90-13, 50-270/90-13, and 50-287/90-13 Licensee:
Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270, License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47 and 50-287 and DPR-55 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Inspection u ted-May 14-18, 1990 Inspector:(
,-I~
c Date Signed Date Signed Approved by:
J..
ake, Chief Date Signed Ma e als and Processes Section E gi eering Branch ivision of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was in the areas of Unit 1 inservice activities including Eddy Current (EC)
examination of Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG)
tubes, volumetric and surface examination of safety-related welds and visual inspection of support Applicable examination/inspection procedures and quality records were reviewed. for technical content and adequac Results:
The inspectors --found the inspection effort for this outage was well organized, examinations were being. conducted by qualified personnel in accordance with approved procedure Inspection results and findings were documented and evaluated as require In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie PDR ADOCK 05000269 F' REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees M. Addis, Mechanical Maintenance Group Specialist E. Anderson, Design Engineer
- H. B. Barron, Station Manager
- J. Davis, Technical Services Manager J. M. Baumam, Supervisor -
Nuclear EC Analysis T. J. Coleman, QA, ISI Coordinator T. M. Hilderbrand, QA, Supervisor -
Nuclear EC Acquisition R. Leatherwood, Project Engineer
- E. Legette, Compliance Engineer
- B. Millsaps, Maintenance ServicesEngineer J. Warren, QC General Supervisor
- R. M. Weatherford, Maintenance Technical Support Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and administrative personne *
Other Organization Babcock & Wilcox, Nuclear Services Company (B&W NSC)
H. Stoppelmann, Level II Examiner NRC Resident Inspectors P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Inservice-Inspection The inspector reviewed documents and records and observed activities, as indicated.-*below, to determine whether ISI was being conducted in accordance.with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and license -commitment The applicable code for ISI is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV)
Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition with Addenda through winter 198 Independent third party inspection service (ANII/ANI), was provided by Hartford Boiler Compan At the time of this inspection, ISI examinations were mostly, completed except for three bimetallic welds in the primary system, a circular seam in OTSG "B" and a sufficient n umber of OTSG tubes requiring two day s of EC examinatio The inspectors elected to observe a representative sample of the on-going examinations and review QA documentation relative to procedures, personnel qualifications, and certifications of materials and equipment used in these examination Review of NDE Procedures (73052)
The inspector reviewed the procedures listed below to determine whether they were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments. The procedures were also reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE personnel, and compilation of required records; and, if applicable, division of responsibility between the licensee and contractor personnel if contractor personnel were involved in the ISI effor ISI-120, Rev. 25 Ultrasonic Examination of Piping and Vessel Welds Joining Similar and Dissimilar Materials ISI-119, Rev. 12 Ultrasonic Examination of Stainless Steel and Nickel Base Alloy Weld Seam NDE-35, Rev. 12 Liquid Penetrant Examination NDE-25, Rev. 14 Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure and Technique NDE-44, Rev. 8 Ultrasonic Examination of Bolts, Studs, Bushings, and Threads in Flanges for PSI and IS ISI-418, Rev. 6 Technical Procedure for Multifrequency Eddy Current Examination of OTSG Tubing in 177 Steam Generators Using MIZ-18 QCL-13, Rev. 6 ISI Visual Examination VT-1 QCL-14, Rev. 9 ISI Visual Examination, VT-3 and VT-4 QCL-15, Rev. 6 ISI Pressure Test VT-2 QCF-2, Rev. 20 Piping Support Installation Inspection MP/1/A/3018/20, Rev. 13, Snubbers -
Pacific Scientific - Mechanical Unit 1 Accessible Inspection MP/1/A/3018/11, Re,
Snubbers -
Grinnell
-
Hydraulic -
Unit 1 Accessible Inspection MP/1/A/3018/019, Rev. 12, Snubbers -
Pacific Scientific -
Mechanical Unit 1 Inaccessible -
Inspection
MP/1/A/3018/10, Re,
-
Grinnell
-
Hydraulic -
Unit 1 Inaccessible Inspection MP/0/A/3018/09, Rev. 13, Snubbers -
Grinnell -
Hydraulic -
Functional Testing MP/O/A/3018/59, Rev. 5, Snubbers -
Pacific Scientific - Mechanical Functional Testing and MHCI Snubber Test Stand NDE-B, Re,
Training, Qualifications, and Certification of NDE Personnel, b. Observation of Work and Work Activities, Unit 1 (73753)
The inspectors observed work activities, reviewed certification records of NDE equipment and materials, and reviewed NDE personne qualifications for personnel that had been utilized for ISI examinations during this outag The observations and reviews conducted by the inspectors are documented belo (1) Ultrasonic Examination Figure N Item Description Search Units" B05.050.003A A2 Suction Pump 00, 450 Refracted Safe End to Pipe Long Wave B05.050.004A A2 Discharge Pump 00, 450 Refracted Safe End to Pipe Long Wave B02.040.004 S/GlB Lower Head 00, 450 Shear Wave to Tube Sheet Weld The two safe end welds above, were examined with an,.ultrasonic procedure which uses refracted longitudinal wave search units (transducers). These transducers are especially designed for use on highly attenuative materials and can penetrate complex bimetallic microstructures in and around weld joints to provide meaningful information about the area of interest, (i.e., weld-and heat affected zone). The licensee used this technique in response to NRC's initiative in the form of Information Notice 90-30: Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Weld The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the ASME B&PV Code in the following areas: availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures; use of knowledgeable NDE personnel; use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level; type of apparatus used; calibration requireients; search units; beam angles; DAC curves; reference level for monitoring discontinuities; method of demonstrating penetration; extent of
weld/component examination coverage; limits of evaluating and recording indications; recording significant indications; and acceptance limit Within these areas, the inspector noted that weld, Figure B02.040.004 exhibited a reflector at the inside radius of the wel The reflector was observed during the 450 shear wave examination and was seen over the entire circumference of the weld joint. The Level II examiner responsible for evaluation determined the reflector was associated with root geometr The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certification records were reviewe Ultrasonic Instruments:
Serial Number 31501-537 31501-921 1363 Spectrum analysis data was reviewed for the following ultrasonic transducers:
K05229 2.25MHz 1"di G07869 2.25MHz 1"di D13239 2.25MHz 1"di.50 M21256 2.25MHz
"di.25MHz
"di Ultrasonic Couplant:
Ultragel II, Batch No. 897 Ultrasonic Calibration Blocks:
403397, 40305, 40411 (2) Liquid Penetrant Examination
'-In-process liquid penetrant (PT) examination was observed on the
<<following main loop cross-over drain line weld:
C05.011.271 Weld 48A Elbow to Pipe Dwg. 1-51A-The observation was compared with the applicable procedure and the ASME. B&PV in the following areas:
specified method, penetrant materials identified; penetrant materials analyzed for halogens and sulfur; acceptable pre-examination surface; surface temperature; surface drying time prior to penetrant application; method used for excess penetrant removal; surface drying prior to developing, if applicable; type of developer; examination
technique; evaluation technique; and reporting of examination result The NRC inspector re-evaluated the subject weld following the PT examiners evaluation, but prior to the developer being removed from the weld surface The re-evaluation was conducted in order to determine if the evaluation performed by the PT examiner was in accordance with the applicable procedure acceptance criteria and to determine if the examination results were being reported as required. The re-evaluation conducted by the NRC inspector indicated that the proper evaluation was made by the PT examiners and that the examination results were being reported as require The inspectors reviewed the below listed liquid penetrant materials certification records to ascertain if the sulfur and halogen content of the material was within acceptable content limit Materials Batch N Liquid Penetrant 87KO43 Cleaner/Remover 89C011 Developer 89B05K (3) Magnetic Particle Inspection The inspectors reviewed documentation indicating that a 10 pound lift test had been performed on magnetic particle alternating current (AC) yoke OC-QA-182. The certification record for lift test plate SYCNT-11016 was reviewed to confirm the weight of the test plat A review of the magnetic particle material certification record for batch number 898014 indicated the sulfur and halogen content of the material, #1 Gray Powder, was within acceptable content limit (4); Steam Generator Tubing Eddy Current Examination
.The inspectors observed the EC activities indicated belo The observations were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code in the following areas: method for maximum sensitivity is applied; method of examination has been recorded; examination equipment has been calibrated in accordance with the applicable performance reference; amplitude and phase angle have been calibrated with the proper calibration reference and is recalibrated at predetermined frequency; required coverage of steam.generator tubes occurs during the examination; acceptance criteria is, specified or referenced and is consistent with the procedure or the ASME Code; and results are consistent with the acceptance criteri (a) Steam generator tube eddy current data collection was being accomplished by Duke Power personne Inprocess tube data acquisition, including calibration confirmation and tube location verifications, was observed for the steam generator tubes listed below:
S/G "A" -
Tape No. 127 Row Tube Number 101 1 and 2 105 1 - 6 106 1-4, 6 and 7 107 2 - 7 S/G "B" -
Tape No. 131 Row Tube Number
21-23, 25, 27-33 37-39 and 48 The following listed EC equipment, material and personnel certification documents were reviewed:
o Calibration Standards Inconel -
600 S/G "A" Outlet S/N-49154 S/G "A" Inlet S/N-49155 S/G "B" Outlet S/N-49157 S/G "B" Inlet S/N-49158 o
MIZ-18A, ROUA S/N-006 S/N-059 S/N-071 S/N-74 S/N-131
Personnel Certifications J. M. Baumann IIA Duke C. R. Black IIA Duke R. M. Barnes III B&W M. J. Klatt IIA Zetec
(5) Observations of Snubber Functional Test Technical Specification (TS),
4.18 and Maintenance Procedures MP/0/A/3018/09, for Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testing, and MP/0/A/3018/59, for Mechanical Snubber Functional Testing, define the test plan, procedures, machines and acceptance criteria for the functional testing of snubbers. The tests for the mechanical snubbers include an acceleration test and a drag force test. The bench tests for hydraulic snubbers include a bleed velocity test and a locking velocity tes There is a total population of 101 mechanical snubbers and 103 hydraulic snubbers which require functional testing in Unit-1. At least once per refueling outage, a representative sample, equal to a minimum of 10 percent of the total of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers is required to be functionally tested either in place or in a bench tes The initial inspection plan for this outage, required 11 hydraulic and 11 mechanical snubbers to be functionally teste The inspection plan requires the testing of an additional 10 percent if one snubber fails testin Any snubber which is found to be inoperable will have an engineering evaluation performed on the snubber attachment components to assure there are no adverse effects on other component All of the 11 hydraulic and 11 mechanical snubbers had been functionally tested and were found to be acceptabl The eleven (11)
mechanical snubbers were sent to Duke's Catawba Nuclear Station for functional.testing. The 11 hydraulic snubbers were tested on the machine at the sit Because at the time of this inspection, all functional tests scheduled for this outage had been completed, the licensee tested a spare on hand, for demonstration purpose The NRC inspectors observation of these tests indicated that they were performed adequately and in compliance with applicable procedure (6) Independent Verfication of Visual Examinations
-
Pipe Hangers and Supports Ninety-five supports/hangers were scheduled for visual examination during this refueling outag These supports are subject to VT-3/VT-4 examination under requirements of ASME Section XI (80W80),
as implemented by procedure QCL-14, Rev. 9, ISI Visual Examination VT-3 and VT-The NRC inspectors conducted independent visual examinations of 21 pipe supports selected at random. Eleven (11), supports were located in the Auxiliary Building and ten (10)
in the Reactor Building. This independent verification was conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's examination
procedures and to assess the validity of the information being reported by the examiner The verification examinations generally agreed with the findings of visual examiners with the exceptions stated in "Discrepancies/Comments/Licensee Remedy" of Table I belo The current procedures do not require entire gang supports to be inspected. The licensee agreed to evaluate present procedure requirements and determine if inspection of the entire gang supports should be incorporated in the procedur Table I lists the individual supports verified independently and reviewed for data adequac TABLE I (UNIT 1)
INDEPENT VERIFICATION AND DATA REVIEW OF SUPPORTS DISCREPANCIES/COMMENTS Support N REVISION BUIDLING LICENSEE REMEDY 1-53B-2-0-436E-H3
Au B-5-0-436D-H23
Au B-5-0-436B-R5
Au B-0-437B-ARM-0279
Au B-0-437B-DE052
Au B-3-0-437B-H25
Au B-0-439A-H58A
Au B-5-0-439-H57
Au B-5-0-439B-R29
Au B-439B-RTB-2601
Au B-439B-RTB-2602
Au A-0-481A-H2B
Re The support elevation is different from the restraining stee The drawing will be revised to show the correct elevatio A-H5A D1 Re A maximum gap of 1" between the saddle plate and pipe sleeve was found. The applicable drawing required a maximum of 1/8" clearance. The gap problem will be evaluated and fixed if require A-H9B D1 Re Similar problem to that stated above, with 3/4" ga A-0-479A-H3A D1 Re S1A-0-479A-H4A D1 Re A-0-479A-H5A D1 Re A-0-479A-H6A D1 Re One weld symbol showed location on far side at Elevation A. This was wrong in that it should be on near sid Drawing will be revise A-0-479A-h7A D2 Re A-0-479A-H5A
Re A-0-478A-H8A
Re (7) Snubber Inspection based on Technical Specification Requirements One-hundred percent of all snubbers used to protect the Reactor Coolant System and other safety-related systems must be operable and are required to be examined during each refueling outage per TS 4.18 snubbers. As specified by TS 3.14, the objective is to assure piping integrity in the event of a severe transient or seismic disturbance. TS 4.18.1 stated that snubbers located in the accessible areas can be inspected during normal operation, while those located in inaccessible areas, are to be inspected during refueling outages. Oconee's Unit 1 has a total population of 101 mechanical and 103 hydraulic snubber Sixty-seven mechanical and 45 hydraulic snubbers had been inspected after the last and prior to this refueling outag The remaining snubbers were inspected during this refueling outage in accordance with maintenance procedure MP/l/A/3018/09 and MP/1/A/3018/1 No major problem was found by the license The NRC inspectors conducted independent visual examination verifications on 29 snubbers selected at random. These snubbers
- were located at both accessible and inaccessible areas and included 16 mechanical and 13 hydrauli These verifications were conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the
.... icensee' s inspection procedures and to assess the information
.being reported by the examiners. The NRC inspectors examinations generally agreed with the findings of the visual examiners, with the exception of some minor discrepancies which will be corrected by the license Listed below are,snubbers and/or supports verified by the NRC inspectors:
TABLE II SNUBBER EXAMINATIONS VERIFICATIONS Support or Mechanical or Accessible Discrepancies/
Snubber N Hydraulic Area Comments/Remedies 1-01A-0-550-DE005(A)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-DE005(B)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-DE005(C)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-DE005(D)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-DE006(A)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-DE006(B)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-DE006(C)
Mechanical No 1-01A-0-550-0E006(D)
Mechanical No 1-50-0-66A-RCPM-S1 Hydraulic No 1-50-0-66A-RCPM-S3 Hydraulic No 1-50-0-66A-RCPM-S4 Hydraulic No 1-50-0-66A-RCPM-S5 Hydraulic No 1-50-0-66A-RCPM-S6 Hydraulic No 1-53A-0-479A-H5A Hydraulic No 1-53A-0-479A-H5B Hydraulic No 1-53A-0-481A-H40C Hydraulic No The snubber exten sion rubbed against the insulation cover of a nearby pip The insulation will be cut to make clearance for the extensio A-0-481A-H41C Hydraulic No 1-03-0-551-DE001 Mechanical Yes 1-03-0-551-DE002 Mechanical Yes 1-03-0-551-DE003 Mechanical Yes A " gap existed between the bushing washer on the top side of load pin at pipe clam The bushing at rear bracket is out of positio Work Request No. 52211J was issued to correct the above problem DE004 Mechanical Yes 1-03-0-551-RI Mechanical Yes One support-rod near Valve N FOWIV0189 was bent and loos Work Request No. 52212J
~11 was issued to correct the proble R13 Mechanical Yes 1-03-0-551-R14 Mechanical Yes 1-03-0-551-R15 Mechanical Yes 1-01A-2-1-0-401A-SR1 Hydraulic Yes 1-01A-2-1-0-401A-SR7 Hydraulic Yes Tag number was wrong. Work Request No. 52213J was issued to correct the proble A-2-1-0-401A-SR2204 Hydraulic Yes 1-01A-2-1-0-401A-SR2205 Hydraulic Yes The snubber inspection sheets and data shown on Table II were reviewed by the NRC inspectors and found to be satisfactor During the verification examination of snubbers, the NRC inspectors noticed that the licensee did not inspect the supporting structures to check for service induced problems such as weld crack, member deformation or deterioration, anchor bolt pullout, corrosion, etc. The licensee's engineer stated that only the snubber itself was subject to inspection under existing procedure(s).
However, the licensee stated that inspectors are trained and have been instructed to report any structural abnormalities observe The NRC inspectors pointed out, however, that the second requirement in paragraph 4.18.1 of Technical Specification states that, visual inspections shall verify that attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are secure. The NRC inspectors pointed out that the supporting structure is to support the snubber as a unit, and that if the snubber itself is functional but the supporting structure fails, due to weld crack or member deformation or deterioration, the whole support cannot perform its intended function. Furthermore, the inspectors noted that paragraph 3.14 of the Technical Specification states that the objective is to
- assure piping integrity in the event of a severe transient or seismic disturbanc The NRC inspectors also noted that the applicable procedure did
-
-
not have acceptance criteria for, nor did it require inspection of the gap between the bushing and washer at the rod end near the rear bracket or the piston rod eye near the pipe clamp Conceivably, with an excessive gap, the snubber movement or impact due to pipe movement could cause damage to the rods or pin The snubber on Support No..1-03-0-551-DE003 was found to have a k" gap between the bushing and the washer on the top side of the load pin at the pipe clamp. The NRC inspectors expressed their concerns during the exit meeting, and management agreed to study and resolve the (8) Qualification records of personnel performing nondestructive and visual examinations were reviewed to verify compliance with applicable code and ASNT-TC-1A requirement Individuals whose certifications were reviewed were as follows:
UT MT PT EC VT-3 Vt-4 G. J. Moss II J. W. Setzer II D. C. Robinson
.II G. G. Bibb II J. W. Ross II II J. M. Donald II II H. M. Moore II II A. D. Gault II II H. A. Doby II II J. B. Baumann IIA C. R. Black IIA C. R. Honeycutt IIA M. J. Klatt IIA P. S. Eberhart II II W. C. Land II II J.. W. Thompso II II A. E. Bagwell II II More specifically, qualifications for these personnel were reviewed in the following areas:
employer's name; activity qualified to perform; current period of certification; signature of employer's designated representative; basis used for certification; and, annual visual acuity, color vision examination, and, period recertificatio c. Data Review and Evaluation, Unit-1 (73755)
(1) Records of completed ISI nondestructive examinations for six (6)
UT examinations, including the reactor vessel closure head preliminary examination results, and five (5) PT, three (3) MT, and 21 VT examinations were selected and reviewed to ascertain whether:
the method(s), technique, and extent of the examination complied with the ISI plan and applicable NDE procedures; findings were properly recorded and evaluated by qualified personnel; programmatic deviations were recorded as required; personnel, instruments, calibration blocks, and NDE materials, i.e., penetrants, couplant(s) were designate (2) The inspector reviewed the preliminary EC data analysis results and a sample of associated completed records for several S/G Tubes selected at random. The reviews were compared with the applicable procedures and the ASME B&PV Code in the following areas: the multichannel eddy current examination equipment has been.identified; material permeability has been recorded; method
of examination has been recorded; and, results are consistent with acceptance criteri All of the examination reports reviewed appeared to contain the required examination information including disposition of indications, if an A random sample of current examination results were compared with historical examination result No major discrepancies were noted during the compariso In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie. Review of Pipe Support Upgrade Modification (33701)
Pipe Support No. 1-51B-436H-DE067, an anchor on the High Pressure Injection System, was required to be modified due to stress reanalysis per IE Bulletin 79-14. The modification required the addition of grout beyond the base plate and around a pipe sleeve at the wall penetration. However, because the grout could not be placed as planned due to gap and size of existing sleeve, the licensee reran stress calculation OSC-1535, Rev. 1 The new configuration will resist three direct forces and one torsio Also the licensee will add a new support, No. 1-51-436E-H5608, which will resist two direct forces and two bending moment Both of the support calculations were partially reviewed and evaluated for thoroughness, clarity, consistency, and accurac The calculations mainly contained loading and movements from stress analysis, problem descriptipn, member qualification, weld qualification, and anchor bolt and base plate qualification. In general, the design calculations were satisfactor Within the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie.
Reactor Fuel-pool Water Spill (93702)
On May 17 and 18, 1990, following notification of the contaminated water spillage and its entry into the auxiliary building spaces, the inspectors performed a walk-through inspection to observe, and ascertain whether contaminated water came into contact with metal fasteners, mechanical components. and/or piping. The walk-through inspection disclosed that pipe location and. configuration precluded these components, from coming into contact with contaminated water except for Unit-2 East Penetration room and Unit-1 penetration roo It appears that some of the mechanical components and piping inside these rooms were exposed to boric acid treated water and the licensee has agreed to investigate the potential for a problem. For more details see Report 50-269,270,287/90-1.
Exit Interview
- The inspection scope and results were summarized on May 18, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.