IR 05000269/1990031
| ML15224A728 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1990 |
| From: | Blake J, Chou R, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15224A727 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-90-31, 50-270-90-31, 50-287-90-31, NUDOCS 9012050081 | |
| Download: ML15224A728 (17) | |
Text
0 ta REGoj UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
0101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: 50-269/90-31, 50-270/90-31, and 50-287/90-31 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and and 50-287 DPR-55 Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3 Inspection Condu ed* October 15-19, 1990 Inspectors:
N.. E onomos D te Sidned RDate Signed Approved by:
//f/
c)
J
. Blake, Chief Date Signed a rials and Processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of review of licensee action(s) on open items (Units 1, 2 and 3) and inservice inspection (ISI) activities conducted in Unit 2, during this scheduled refueling outag Results:
By record review, interviews, and observation, the inspectors determined that the licensee had taken sufficient corrective action(s) to justify closure of certain open items, including:
one Notice of Violation, 89-37-02 and one Unresolved Item, 89-37-0 The inspectors found the inspection effort for this outage was well organized, examinations had been conducted by qualified personnel in accordance with approved procedure Inspection results and findings were documented and evaluated as required. The inspectors identified an apparent weakness in the program for engineering evaluation of inspection findings concerning pipe
_supports, and in the procedure which appears to limit QA reviews to items identified as PIR This weakness is the subject of an unresolved item concerning the disposition of pipe support discrepancie In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identifie.
REPORT DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees M. W. Addis, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- E. L. Anderson, Site Design Engineer
- H. R. Barron, Station Manager
- G. L. Blubaugh, Technical Support QA B. W. Carney, Mechanical, Technical Support R. Childs, Design Engineer, Corporate
- T. J. Coleman, ISI Coordinator QA I. E. Few, Mechanical Technical Support E. LeGett, Compliance Supervisor
- B. W. Millsaps, Maintenance Service Manager
- R. A. Morgan, QA Director, Operations
- S. C. Perry, Compliance Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector
- W. K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a. (Closed) Violation 50-287/89-37-02, Inadequate Review of Unit 2 ISI Plan The licensee's letter of response dated February 16, 1990, has been reviewed and determined acceptable by the Region II staf The inspectors held discussions with the Cognizant Engineers and examined the corrective actions as stated in the letter of respons The inspector concluded that the licensee had determined the full extent of the subject noncompliance, performed the necessary follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of these problem Corrective actions taken included the following:
(1) Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 ISI Plans have been revised, via procedure QA-513 Rev. 6, which provides for the use of an ISI Plan Addendu In this instance, Addendum SN30CN-0231 shows that thE calibration standard in question has been replaced with calibration standard No. 50373 which is made of Inconel SB-167
materia Addendum OCN-0030 to the ISI Plan indicates this material was produced from heat No. Nx 486 Major dimensions of the new standard are 4.5 inches diameter and 0.0625 inches in thickness, and therefore, code acceptable for the applicatio Bimetallic welds subject to ultrasonic examination are now examined with a procedure using a 45' transducer which produces a refracted longitudinal wave with the capability of penetrFtirig these type weld (2) The inspectors reviewed a report issued by the licensee's Applied Science Center/Metallurgical Laboratory, on Calibration Standard SN 4036 The report, which had been rEQuested by the inspector of record, stated that the maximum depth of the largest surface discontinuity i.e., was approximately 0.004 inche The length of the largest lap in the section, from tip to mouth, was approximately 0.010 inches. Reportedly, there was no evidence of cracking or other degradation due to the presence of these surface discontinuitie The material was reported to be ASME SB-166, Inconel 600 hot finish round stock. The report concluded that the condition in question was caused by surface laps attributed to the manufacturing proces There was no
evidence of crack initiation or propagatio b. (Closed) Unresolved Item 50-269,287/89-37-01, Ultrasonic Examination of Dissimilar Metal Welds Using Shear Wave Mode Transducers This item was identified when the inspector of record determined that the licensee was using shear wave transducers to examine dissimilar metal weld Following discussions, over the inability of this type of ultrasonic wave to penetrate the dissimilar weld material, i.e.,
carbon steel/inconel metal, and the code requirement that weld integrity be verified by volumetric examination, the licensee agreed to begin using refracted longitudinal wave transducers whose sound emission penetrates dissimilar material welds. By review of Oconee's ISI Plan and ultrasonic examination records of dissimilar metal welds, discussed elsewhere in this report, the inspectors verified that the licensee has implemented this ultrasonic inspection technique on the subject weld. Inservice Inspection The inspectors reviewed documents and records as indicated below, to determine whether ISI was being conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitment The applicable code for ISI is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code,Section XI, 1980 Edition with Addenda through winter 198 Independent third party inspection service (ANII/ANI), was provided by Hartford Boiler Compan III3 At the time of this inspection, scheduled ISI examinations had been complete Accordingly, inspectors elected to review QA documentation relative to inspection reports, procedures, personnel qualifications, and certifications of materials and equipment used in these examination a. Review of NDE PrccedurEs - Unit 2 (73052)
The inspectors reviewed the procedures listec belowv to determine whether they were consistent with regulatory requirEments arc licensee cummitment The procedures were also reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE pErsonnel, and compilation of requirEd reccrds; and, if applicable, division of responsibility between the licensee and contractor personnel, if contractor personnel were involved in the ISI effor ISI-130 Re, Ultrasonic Examination of Vessel Welds and Nozzle Inside Radius Sections ISI-182 Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Piping Welds joining Similar and Dissimilar Materials ISI-119, Rev. 12, Ultrasonic Examination of Stainless Steel and Nickel Base Alloy Weld Seams NDE-35, Rev. 13, Liquid Penetrant Examination NDE-25, Re,
Magnetic Particle Examination Procedure and Technique NDE-44, Rev. 8, Ultrasonic Examination of Bolts, Studs, Bushings, and Threads in Flanges for PSI and ISI ISI-418, Rev. 6, Technical Procedure for Multifrequency Eddy Current Examination of OTSG Tubing in 177 Steam Generators Using MIZ-18 QCL-14, Rev. 10, ISI Visual Examination, VT-3 and VT-4 MP/2/A/3018/010, Re,
Snubbers. -
Grinnel -
Hydraulic Unit 2 Inaccessible Inspection MP/2/A/3018/011, Re,
Snubbers -
Grinnel -
Hydraulic Unit 2 Accessible Inspection MP/2/A/3018/019, Rev. 9, Snubbers -
Pacific Scientific -
Mechanical Unit 2 Inaccessible Inspection MP/2/A/3018/020, Rev. 10, Snubbers -
Pacific Scientific -
Mechanical Unit 2 Accessible Inspection
b. Observation of Work Activities - Unit 2 (73753)
(1) Radiographic Review of ISI Class 2 Piping Welds The inspectors evaluated the below listed radiographic films for Class 2, pipe welds which were radiographed under the licensee's radiographic Procedure NDE-12, Rev. 8 and the ISI program.'
These radiographs were evaluated in order to determine if the radiographic quality was in accordance with the applicable procedure and ASME Code requirements and to specifically verify thE following: penetrameter type, size, and placement; penetrameter sensitivity; film density rad dersity variaticn; film identification; film quality; weld coverage; and disposition of the welds rediographe ISI Item Weld Number Pipe Size
- C05.021.057 2-03-18.2-40 20"dia. x 1.031" C05.021.060 2-03-21WB91-A 14"dia. x 0.75" C05.021.061 2-03-21WB91-E 14"dia. x 0.75" C05.021.063 2-03-FWD84-C 14"dia. x 0.75" C05.021.064 2-03-FWD82-B 24"dia. x 1.219"
- C05.021.119 2-01A-5.4-27 26"dia. x 0.875"
- C05.021.129 2-O1A-4.3-03 24"dia. x 0.969
- C05.021.201 2-03A-10-62 6"dia. x 0.562" C05.021.203 2-03A-67-7 6"dia. x 0.562" C05.021.207 2-01A-16-01 12"dia. x 0.562" C05.022.004 2-01A-5.4-27L 26"dia. x 0.875"
- Radiographs taken on these weldments during the previous interval were compared to determine whether any discernable changes were evident in the welds, adjacent area of interest or film. In all cases conditions appeared satisfactor (2) Verification of Visual Examintions - Pipe Supports, Unit 2 One-hundred-thirty-two pipe supports were scheduled for visual examination during this refueling outag These supports are subject to VT-3/VT-4 examination under the requirements of ASME Section XI (80W80), as implemented by procedure QCL-14, Rev. 10, ISI Visual Examination VT-3 and VT-The NRC inspectors conducted independent visual examinations of 13 pipe supports selected at rando This independent verification was conducted in order to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's examination procedures and to assess the validity of the information being reported by the examiner The verification examinations generally agreed with the ISI findings, with the exceptions stated under "Discrepancies/
Comments/Licensee Remedy" in Table I belo Table I lists the individual supports examined by the inspector TABLE I Independent Verification and Data Review of Supports Support N Re Discrepancies/Comments/Licensee Remedy 2-01A-0-1441-H4
Two stiffener plates, (2"x5"x1'-61")
were not shown in the drawing. The licensee will revise the drawing to include the A-0-1441-R7
2-O1A-O-1441-R8
QC records indicate that this support was installed in 1983, but was discovered missing during ISI walkdow The licensee refabricated and reinstalled this suppor O1A-O-1441-R9-1
The orientation of four welds at two ends of the tube steel was wrong. The licensee will revise the drawings to show the as-built conditio A-1402A-DEO41
2-07A-1402A-DB-PS-1101
Approximately 4" of clearance exists between face of support rod and existing L4x4 The licensee will evaluate this condition 2-07A-1400A-DE048
2-07A-0-1400A-SR5
(1) Two stiffener plates at existing column were not shown in drawin (2) Couple of welds were missing in field. The licensee agreed to reinspect this support in the as-built conditio A-0-1400A-SR6
2-07A-1400A-SR6A
2-07A-1400A-SR8
2-53B-2-0-436E-H3
(3) Snubber Inspection based on Technical Specification Requirements One-hundred percent of all snubbers used to protect the Reactor Coolant System and other safety-related systems must be operable and are required to be examined during each refueling outage per Technical Specification (TS) 4.18 Snubber TS 4.18.1 states that snubbers located in the accessible areas can be inspected during normal operation, while those located in the inaccessible areas, are to be inspected during refueling outage Procedure Nos. MP/2/A/3018/010 for hydraulic snubbers and MP/2/A/3018/019 for mechanical snubbers are used in the inaccessible area Procedure Nos. MP/2/A/3018/011 for hydraulic snubbers and MP/2/A/3018/020 for mechanical snubbers are used in the accessible area No major problems, concerning snubber maintenance, were found by the license The NRC inspectors conducted independent visual examination verifications on 23 snubbers selected at random. These.snubbers were located in both accessible and inaccessible areas, and included 15 mechanical and 8 hydraulic snubbers. The inspectors examinations generally agreed with the findings of the visual examiners, with the exception of some minor discrepancies which will be corrected by the license Listed below are snubbers and/or supports verified by the NRC inspectors:
TABLE II Snubber Examinations Verifications Support or Mechanical or Accessible Discrepancies/
Snubber N Hydraulic Area Comments/Remedies 2-01A-0-1401B-R12(A)
Hydraulic Yes A 3/4" gap existed between the bushing
.and washer on load pin at pipe clamp A-O-1401B-R12(B)
Hydraulic Yes A 5/8" gap existed between the bushing and washer on load pin at pipe clamp A-2-0-1403D-SR5 Hydraulic Yes Hot setting was out of rana A-2-0-1403D-SR7 Hydraulic Yes 2-03A-1-0-14008-SR100 Hydraulic Yes 2-13-7-0-1400A-SR1 Hydraulic Yes Hot setting was out of rang Support or Mechanical or Accessible Discrepancies/
Snubber N Hydraulic Area Comments/Remedies (cont'd)
2-13-7-0-1400-B-SR4 Hydraulic Yes 2-01A-0-1403B-DE068 Mechanical Yes 2-01A-0-1403B-DE077 Mechanical Yes 2-03-0-551-DE002 Mechanical Yes 2-03-0-551-DE003 Mechanical Yes 2-03-0-551-DE004 Mechanical Yes A spring can rod from the nearby support contacts and wears this snubber body. The licensee will redesign and relocate the spring ca A-1400A-DE039 Mechanical Yes 2-07A-1400A-DE043 Mechanical Yes 2-07A-6-0-1400A-H60 Mechanical Yes 2-07A-6-0-1400A-H61 Mechanical Yes One nut on an anchor bolt located at north-west corner was loose. Work Request No. 51180K
'was issue A-6-0-1400A-H68 Mechanical Yes 2-01A-0-1441-DE062 Hydraulical No 2-01A-0-1441-DEO60(A)
Mechanical No 2-01A-0-1441-DEO60(B)
Mechanical No 2-O1A-0-1441-DEO61(A)
Mechanical No 2-01A-0-1441-RI Mechanical No 2-O1A-0-1441-R2-1 Mechanical No
During the verification, inspections, the NRC inspectors found that snubbers at support Nos. 2-OA-0-1401B-R12(A) and -R12(B),
shown in Table II, had gaps of 3/4" and 5/8" between the bushing and the washers on the load pins, which exceeded the
-"
tolerance permitted in the licensee's temporary inspection guideline When the NRC inspectors questioned the licensee's snubber evaluation engineer about the gaps, he replied that although this condition was known, it had not been recorded in the inspection sheets, becausc the desion drawirgs specified that the total cap between two clamps is 21" and that was met in the fiel The NRC inspectors pointed out that total spacing requirements for the clamps is to avoid the damage to the pipe, because of excessive pressure, during installation, while the spacing requirement between the bushing and the washer is to avoid the problem with the bushing being displaced and causing the connection to be improperly loade Snubber hot settings for support Nos. 2-O1A-2-0-1403D-SR5 and 2-13-7-0-1400A-SR1 shown on Table II were found to have 21" difference between the hot setting shown on drawings and the actual hot setting in the field when the system was hot and in operating condition. The snubber evaluation encineer and design engineer originally opined that the system might not have been in the hottest condition during the inspectio The NRC inspectors pointed out that if the hot or cold settings were off that much, from the drawing requirements, there may be problems in the design drawing or stress calculation assumptions, or it may have been caused by other unusual operational events. After the NRC inspectors requested a further evaluation, the licensee's engineer found that the cold and hot settings specified in the design drawings were reversed. This situation appeared to be a weakness in the evaluation of data by the snubber evaluation engineer, in that he did not find the resolution of the unusual snubber setting until prodded by the NR C. Data Review and Evaluation - Unit 2 (73755)
(1) Inservice Inspection Records Review Records of completed nondestructive examinations were selected and reviewed to ascertain whether:
the method(s), technique, and extent of the examination complied with the ISI plan and applicable NDE procedures; findings were properly recorded and evaluated by qualified pErSennel; programmatic deviations were recorded as required; personnel, instruments, calibration blocks, and NDE materials (penetrants, couplants)
were designated. Records selected for this review are listed belo Examination Component/Area ISI Item Weld N Method of Examination Circumferential Welds 802.040.001 2SGA-WG58-1 UT-0 0,46o,600 Upper head to tube Sheet, PC8 to 51 B03.110.009 2PZR-WP26-1 UT-0 0,450,60 0 Pressurizer Sense and Sample No between W&X axes PC30 to 04 803.110.011 2PZR-WP25-3 UT-0 0,45 0,60 0 Pressurizer Sense and Sample Noz. 470 off W-Axis PC30 to
803.130.005 2SGA-WG25 UT-0 0,450,60 0 2A Inlet Noz. Lower head, PC70 to 8 805.050.001 2PIAl-7 UT-Refracted Al Suction Pump SE Long. 450 to Pipe, UT from Pipe Side B05.050.001A 2PIAl-7 PT Al Suction Pump SE to Pipe, Circle Seam PC55 to 56 B05.050.004 2PDA2-2 UT-Refracted A2 Discharge Pump Long. 450 SE to Elbow, UT from Elbow Side Same Seam on above B05.051.011 2PDB2-11 PT B2 Discharge High Pressure Injection Noz. to Safe End, PC46 to 4 Reactor Pressure Vessel Studs 806.030.006 2RPV-25-204-06 UT B06.030.006A 2RPV-25-204-06 MT 806.030.010 2RPV-25-204-06 UT B06.030.010A MT
- I
Examination Component/Area ISI Item Weld N Method of Examination (cont'd)
Nozzle Weld B09.011.001 2PIAl-1 UT,0 0,450,600 ONS-003, PC67 to OTSG Moz. Code Relief Requested B05.051.011 2PDB2-11 PT B2 Discharge HPI Noz. to Safe End, PC46 to 47 o
Certification records of UT Equipment and Materials Ultrasonic Instruments Manufacturer/Model Serial N Panametrics/2002 1363 KB/USK-7 27276-5175 KB/USD-10 31501-537 KB/USD-10 31501-921 Ultrasonic Couplant Ultragel II Batch No. 8976 Magnetic Particle Test Unit Equipment -
Serial No. 841001/OCQA-149 Blach Light Meter - Serial No. 32591/OCQA-1 Liquid Batch, Batch No. 89LO4K o
Steam Generator (S/G)
Tubing Eddy Current Examination Unit 2 Eddy Current testing of S/G tubes had been completed prior to the start of this inspectio By records review and discussions with the responsible engineer, the inspectors ascertained that the licensee had examined and analyzed 9325 tubes in "A" S/G and 9328 in "B" S/ Examination included previously sleeved tubes which totaled 126 in "A" and 132 in "B" S/G(s).
The licensee is replacing previously installed inconel-600 plugs with inconel-690 material plug The latter material has shown improved resistance to stress corrosion cracking in this applicatio Tubes plugged during this refueling outage include five (5)
in "A" and 17 in "B" S/G Through discussion the inspectors ascertained that tubes plugged prior to this outage include 35 in "A" and 67 in "B" S/G *
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie (2) Missing and Wrong Installation of Pipe Supports (Units 2 and 3)
The licensee discovered that support No. 2-01A-0-1441-R8 for a 36" diameter, main-steam line was missing during the examination of supports for IS The sway strut and pipe clamps for the support were missing (apparently having been removed), but the end attachment for the sway strut still remained attached to steel base plates attached to the concrete colum Problem Investigation Report (PIR), Serial No. 2-090-0088, was issued on September 18, 1990, to evaluate the potential problems caused by the missing support and to find the root cause of the missing support. The PIR preliminary report of the review of associated constructicn documentation, this support was changed from a rod support to a sway strut and installed around November 1983. No determination had been made as to when or why the sway strut was remove The licensee had already refabricated and reinstalled this support in the field and inspected it per detail drawings. It appears that the licensee had not determined the root cause of the missing support even though the sway strut and clamps are very heavy and require a crane to install or remove the The inspectors reviewed stress calculation No. OSC-440; Piping Analysis Problem 2-01-01, Main Steam Piping, Re ; and 20 pipe support calculations evaluated by the licensee, based on the new stress analysi The pipe support calculations are listed below in Table II This stress calculation reanalysis and support calculation evaluations, based on the assumption of Support No. 2-01A-0-1441-R8 been missing, were to evaluate the impact of the missing support on other piping and support All support calculations evaluated by the licensee were adequate and acceptable, except support Nos. 2-01A-0-1401B-R-14 and 2-01A-0-1441-R7, which have incorrect figures and loading location on calculation Sheet B6, Attachment B and Sheet C3, Attachment C respectively. The maximum overstress ratio between the actual stress and allowable stress is 7.4 percent, exceeded-allowable, at the snubber, in the faulted condition, for support No. 2-01A-0-1401B-R1 This support is acceptable due to the extreme conditio The stress calculation indicated that there were overstressed areas in the pipin One area was 26811 psi, which was 28 percent above the allowable stress of 21000 psi, and another area was 29614 psi, or 41 percent above the allowabl The licensee's explanation was that the overstresses occurred at
local areas where lugs or stanchions attached to the pipe and were slightly under or over the pipe yield stress of 28000 psi, (the 26811 psi is four percent under and the 29614 psi is six percent over) and are considered to be acceptable without taking additional step These overstressed cases are for the normal operating conditions, which combined pressure load, dead weight load (or gravity load),
and steam hammer loa These actual stresses may or may not have occurred during normal operations, depending on the magnitude of any steam hamme Therefore, there is a possibility that a crack may have occurred at those locations where the local pipe stresses approach or exceed the yield stres Without evidence provided by field inspections of those potentially overstressed locations for cracks, deformation, or other defects, the licensee's conclusion of
"acceptable by engineering judgement" did not seem appropriate to the NRC inspectors. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the licensee did not walk down this main steam line to inspect the piping and supports potentially affected to record the existina conditions after the event was discovered or after the calculations identified potentially overstressed areas. A written surveillance report would seem to be a minimum require ment in such an event, and the lack of such an inspection appears to be a weakness in the area of engineerin Table III Review of Pipe Support Calculation Evaluation for Missing Support Pipe Support N Calculation N Re Comments 2-01A-0-1401B-H5 OSC-0980-01-0056
2-01A-0-1401B-H18-0032
2-01A-0-1401B-R1O-0043
2-O1A-0-1401B-R12-0045
Snubber over stressed 7.4%
2-01A-0-1401B-R14-0047
2-O1A-0-1401B-R15-0048
2-O1A-0-1401B-R16-0049
2-01A-0-1441-DEO60-0050
2-O1A-0-1441-H3-0003
2-O1A-0-1441-H13-0007
2-01A-0-1441-H14-0008
2-01A-0-1441-H15-0009
2-O1A-0-1441-H16-0010
2-01A-0-1441-H17-0011
2-O1A-0-1441-R7-0021
2-01A-0-1441-R8-0022
2-O1A-0-1441-R9-1-0023
2-01A-0-1441-R9-2-0024
2-01A-0-1441-R9-3-0025
2-01A-0-1441-R9-4-0026
To further evaluate licensee engineering evaluations, and dispositions of drawing revisions, required to resolve ISI pipe support inspection defects or discrepancies, the NRC inspectors reviewed File:
05-105, Oconee Unit 3 Support Restraint In-service Inspections for EOC-11 Final Report, from design engineer to QA Director of Operations, dated September 6, 199 This letter listed 47 supports with discrepancies out of 164 supports inspecte The EOC-11 outage for Unit 3 started in September 1989 and ended in December 1989; per the above letter, all support calculations and drawings which required revision had been completed by September 199 The NRC inspectors randomly selected nine supports for a review of the revised drawings, revised calculations, ISI inspections sheets, and the engineering evaluations and disposition Table VI lists the supports reviewe Table VI Previous ISI Pipe Support Review (Unit 3)
ISI Inspection Pipe Support N Dwg. Revised Calc. Revised Sheet Reviewed 3-54A-2-0-2435B-H31 Note 1 Note 1 3-14B-2438D-DJB-2603 Note 2 3-14B-6-0-2438B-SR10 3-14B-6-0-2438B-SR8 3-07A-2400A-LC-2401 3-07A-0-2400A-H17 Note 2 3-14B-6-0-2444-SR18 3-03A-2401A-DE017 Note 2 3-03A-1-0-2400A-H109 Notes:
(1) The revised drawings and calculations were not available at site, as they were at the Engineering Office in Charlotte, N (2) Drawings were not required to be revised since a work request was issued to restore the support to meet the detail drawing The NRC inspectors generally agreed with the drawing and calculation revisions, and the engineering evaluations and dispositions, of the discrepancies or defects shown on all inspection sheets except support No. 3-54A-2-0-2435B-H3 The support calculations, listed in Table VI, were only partially reviewed, that is the review was limited to the statement of the purpose of the revision, because the calculations were not available at the sit During the licensee ISI examination of installed support No. 3-54A-2-02435B-H31 it was found to be a sliding rigid support instead of the spring can required by the support detail drawings and the stress analysi The licensee's design engineering comments/disposition was that this support was acceptable for service and that the support sketch would be revised to reflect the existing condition This engineering evaluation and disposition did not provide the basis for accepting the ExistinC condition. Furthermcre, the licensee did not initiate an investigation to determine the root cause for the departure from desig Licensee QA personnel were questioned by the NRC inspectors as to why the QA department did not get involved and investigate this condition. QA's basis for not being involving in this case is procedure QA-514, Procedure for Discrepancies found During Inservice Inspection Visual Examination of Supports, Revision 2, dated April 15, 1988. The note in Section 5.2.b, of Page 1, of QA-514 states that design engineering will evaluate the discrepancy and notify QA of the results:
discrepancies which are determined by Design Engineering to be acceptable for service do not require the initiation of a PI The NRC inspectors consider this note and QA's response to be symptomatic of a weakness in the engineering evaluation process and QA'a oversight of that proces At the very least, NRC would expect a strong engineering organization and/or an aggressive QA department to have initiated and completed the following actions:
-
Investigation of the root cause and full extent of the problems associated with support Nos. 2-01A-0-1441-R8, Unit 2 and 3-54A-2-0-2435B-H31, Unit 3. This should have included a walkdown of the affected system Review Procedure of QA-514 to determine if additional guidance is needed for the initiation of investigations for root cause and system walkdown surveillances to support
"accept as is" dispositions. The procedure should also be reviewed to determine if an interpretation is required for QA to provide reviews of all design dispositions rather than just those identified as PIR' Pending further review of above problems, this item is identified as Unresolved Item 50-270,287/90-31-01, Pipe Support Installation Problem. Independent Inspection Efforts, Unit 2 Welding Repairs and Replacement (55050)
Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Piping (Generic Letter 90-05)
Discussion with the responsible engineer and site management, revealed that the licensee has reviewed GL 90-05 and has taken under
consideration the guidelines delineated by the subject document when performing such repairs. The licensee stated that non-code repairs such as those described in the subject document are not permitted at Ocone Clarification was requested on the exclusion of pumps, valves, heat exchangers and components other than piping, which is discussed under paragraph B.1 "Scope" in Enclosure 1 of the subject documen The inspectors indicated that this was perhaps an oversight on the part of the author and that these components should be included as required by the regulatio Because GL 90-05 is not specifically addressed in the site procedure controlling component repairs, the inspectors requested that the licensee consider these guidelines in their controlling document and include GL 90-05 a reference on the next procedure revisio The licensee indicated that the next revision was scheduled for January 1991 and agreed to take this matter under consideration at that tim Erosion - Corrosion, Pipe Replacement, Unit 2 The licensee is continuing to monitor pipe degradation due to erosion-corrosio Replacement of some piping and adjoining elbows was performed in Line "C" of the high pressure extraction piping from the turbine to the main separator and in the bleed line to the "C" heate The replacement pipe is made of type 304 stainless steel materia The replaced pipe sections involved large diameter piping measuring 24" diam.xO.375" and some cases 30" diam.x0.375" wal In the heater-drain system the licensee replaced three fittings/
elbows and a pipe to elbow sectio This replacement involved 10" diameter piping of the same thickness as above and the replacement sections were made from stainless steel material als During discussions with the responsible site engineer, the inspectors ascertained that design engineering was actively involved in this project and that trending and root cause analysis was pursued in the course of establishing the present progra Spent Fuel Canisters Manufactured by Equipos Nucleares SA (ENSA)
of Spai The inspectors and cognizant QA personnel discussed the status of canister No. DSC-1 which has been rejected because lack-of-fusion indications, identified by the licensee during their receipt inspection. At the time, the canister was set aside for repairs to be performed in accordance with procedures that were to be supplied by the vendor/ ENSA. In preparation for this effort, the licensee radiographed the two (2) welds in question to verify the location of the aforementioned indications and to map-out the area prior to grinding. The attempt to locate these defects proved unsuccessful in that the rejectable indications shown in the vendor radiographs did not appear in the radiographs taken at Ocone Because optimum
source alignment and film placement is restricted by component design/interferences, the licensee will not pursue additional radiography at this tim The licensee has agreed to notify Region II when further action is taken on this matte Within the areas examined violations or deviations were not identifie. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 19, 1990, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Proprietary information is not contained in this repor (Open)
Unresolved Item 50-270,287/90-31-01, Pipe Support Installation Problems, paragraph 3.C.(2).