IR 05000269/1978025
| ML15223A401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1978 |
| From: | Jape F, Robert Lewis, Quick D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML15223A397 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-78-25, 50-287-78-25, NUDOCS 7901180080 | |
| Download: ML15223A401 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
230 PEACHTREE STREET. N. W. SUITE 1217 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303
'2 Report Nos.:
50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25 Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270 and 50-287 License Nos.:
DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 Licensee:
Duke Power Company P. 0. Box 2178 422 South Church Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2 and 3 Inspection at:
Oconee Nuclear Station Inspection conducted:
October 18-20, 1978 Inspectors:
F. Jape v
b D. Quick kApproved by:
11(
._
_
_176___
////S 76 R. C. Lewis, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Summary Inspection on October 18-20' 197 8 (Report Nos. 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of unresolved items, plant operations and licensee events reports. The inspection involved 4b man-hours on site by two inspector Results:
Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was identified in one area (infraction - failure to conform to minimum reduncancy requirements for protective instrumentation (269/78-25-01)
paragraph OS-a
RI1 Rpt. Nos. 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25 1-1 DETAILS Prepared by:
C. 6./
F. Jape, Reactor Inspector bate
,<<
Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch D. Quick,, Reactor Inspector Date Reactor Projects Section No. I Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection:
October 18-20, 1978 Reviewed by:
A_.(.
-
SAr I'!
/
R. C. Ledis, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Persons Contacted
- J. E. Smith, Station Manager W. M. Harris, Operating Engineer
- J. N. Pope, Superintendent of Operations G. A. Ridgeway, Operating Engineer, Unit I T. D. Patterson, Shift Supervisor E. G. LeGette, Assistant.Shift Supervisor G. M. Haynes, Control Operator J. J. Glynn, Control Operator B. K..Molloy, Control Operator D. Thompson, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer L. Wilkie, Mechanical Maintenance Support Engineer B. Carney, Assistant Engineer L. Cox, Mechanic G. Thrailkill, Staff Engineer
- R. T. Bond, Licensing and Projects Engineer
- D. J. Vito, Licensing Engineer
- T. S. Barr, Performance Engineer R. Knoerr, Engineering Support G. D. Schile, Associate Instructor
- Denotes attendance at the exit meetin RH Rpt. Nos. 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25 1-2 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Unresolved Item (Closed) (78-10-01) Cable Penetration Fire Stop Tests. Tests have been conducted on May 10, 1978, of the Chemtrol Firewall cementitious sealing materia Test results are under review by ONR Open Items (1) (Closed) (77-27-01)
Hydraulic Suppressor Inspection Procedur A revision of MP 3000/12, Functional Testing of Hydraulic Suppressors, was completed November 9, 1977 to include data relative to the as-found condition of the suppresso Data sheets are reviewed by the cognizant engineer and work requests are issued, if require (2) (Closed) (77-27-02)
Suppressor Mechanical Problem Within two weeks following the inspection, work requests were issued and completed on each of the four mechanical problems identi fied by the inspecto.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviation An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph.
Management Exit Meeting The inspectors met with J. E. Smith and members of his staff, denoted in Paragraph 1, on October 20, 1978, to discuss the inspection finding The item of noncompliance, described in Paragraph 5.b., was discusse Licensee management acknowledged the item and indicated action would be taken to correct the matte The operation of Oconee I with a missing unexploded steam generator tube plug was discussed. Licensee management stated that their safety evaluation of the matter, dated October 19, 1978, has been submitted to NRR for revie.
Review of Licensee Event Reports The inspector performed a review of licensee event reports to verify that the report details met license requirements, identified the cause of the event, described corrective actions appropriate for the identified
.cause, adequately assessed the event, and addressed any generic impli cation In addition, the inspector examined selected operdting and
.maintenance logs, records, and internal incident investigation report RII Rpt. Nos. 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25 1-3 Personnel were interviewed to verify that the report accurately reflected the circumstances of the event, that the corrective action had been taken or responsibility assigned to assure completion and that the event was reviewed by the licensee as stipulated in the Technical Specification The following licensee event reports were reviewed and closed:
RO-269/78-20, Reactor Building Cooling Unit Discharge Valve Inoperable RO-269/78-21, Reactor Building Pressure Transmitter Out-of Calibration RO-269/78-22, Core Flood Tank Level Instrument Out-of Calibration RO-269/78-23, BWST Level Instrumentation Out-of-Calibration RO-287/78-13, Reactor Building Cooling Unit Inoperable Review of the following licensee event reports resulted in identification of an item of noncompliance with Technical Specification requirement Technical Specification 3.5. states,
"In the event that the number of protective channels operable falls below the limits given under Table 3.5.1-1, Columns A and B, operation shall be limited as specified in Column C."
Contrary to this requirement, in the two cases stated below, the minimum degree of redundancy was less than that specified in Table 3.5.1-1, Column B, since the instrumentation channels specified were not placed in the tripped condition while inoperable, and the operator action specified in Table 3.5.1-1, Column C, was not carried out since the plant remained at power throughout the two event (1) RO-269/78-17, Reactor Building Pressure Transmitter Out-of Calibration At 7:45 a.m. on August 6, 1978, Reactor Building Pressure Channel
"A" was declared inoperable due to erroneous reading A work request for repair had been initiated at 7:30 on the same morning. The channel was recalibrated and restored to operational status on August 8, 1978, at a time not specifie The channel had not been placed in a tripped condition during the period of inoperability until the technicians initiated the recalibration procedure on August 8, 197 This channel is part of the Engineered Safeguards System used to initiate high and low pressure injection and Reactor Building isolatio The unit remained at power throughout the even During power operation this channel must be placed in a tripped condition when inoperable
RII Rpt. Nos. 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25 1-4 in accordance with Technical Specification Table 3.5.1-This ensures that minimum degree of redundancy is maintained, otherwise the unit must be placed in a hot shutdown condition within twelve hour Minimum degree of redundancy was not satisfied for a period of approximately two days in this instanc (2) RO-269/77-31, Reactor Coolant Loop Wide Range Pressure ES Channel One Out-of-Calibration At approximately midnight on December 28, 1977, it was discovered that reactor coolant pressure channel one was indicating more than 75 psig higher than channels two and three and a work request was initiated to check out the problem. The channel was not placed in the tripped condition until 2:30 p.m. on December 29, 197 This was approximately fourteen and one half hours after discovery of the problem. The channel was calibrated and restored to operable status by 3:45 p.m.,
December 29, 197 This channel is part of the Engineered Safeguards System used to initiate high and low pressure injection. The unit remained at power throughout this even Requirements of Technical Specification Table 3.5.1-1, Columns B and C were not adhered to during this even Further inquiries of plant supervisory, operating, and training personnel revealed the following facts:
(1) Operating and supervisory personnel interviewed were not familiar with steps necessary to place Engineered Safeguards Systems channels in the tripped condition and; (2) Training personnel interviewed indicated that information pertaining to tripping these channels had not previously been included in the operator training curriculu The two examples described in the LERs above constitute a single item of noncompliance classified as an Infraction (50-269/78-25-01).
The circumstances surrounding these two events were discussed with the licensee at the exit interview and the licensee made the following commitments at that time:
(1) Provide immediate instructions to all operating personnel to insure that any inoperable Engineered Safeguards System channel will be placed in the tripped condition at the time of discovery of the problem; (2) Revise Periodic Instrument Surveillance Procedure PT/--/600/1, by October 27, 1978, to include appropriate instructions for dealing with inoperable ES channels; (3)
Include appropriate instruction in this area in future requalification training session.
Steam Generator Tube Plugging A number of errors in steam generator IB tube plugging acitvities were discovered by the license These errors were reported to RIl on October 12, 1978, since at least one error constituted abnormal degra dation of the reactor coolant system boundar In addition, the location
RII Rpt. Nos. 50-269/78-25, 50-270/78-24 and 50-287/78-25 1-5 was lost of one plug that failed to denotate properl The other errors consisted of plugging only one end of a tube and the other end of an adjacent tub An investigation program was instituted to determine the status of every tube in the lB steam generator, and to account for each plu Each error was corrected except for recovery of the non-detonated plug and the location of a plug installed in the bottom tube sheet. Status of each tube was verified by shining a light through the tube A videotape record was made of this proces The inspector viewed portions of the videotape and observed that this technique was an acceptable means to verify an open tub Tubes that were dark or questionable were manually probed to determine their statu Personnel involved in the attempt to recover the non-detonated plug were interviewed. The plug was apparently lost when compressed air was used to blow the plug up and out of the tube and into the top hea This matter as well as other errors associated with plugging activities were discussed with management. DPC's investigation is continuing and corrective measures to control plugging activities are to be determined and implemented. This matter will be reviewed further and is designated as unresolved item 269/78-25-0 Attempts to recover the non-detonated plug were unsuccessful. Startup of the unit with the unrecovered plug was evaluated and the report was submitted to NRR on October 19, 1978, for approva Measures were taken prior to resuming operation to determine if the plug was loose in the reactor coolant system. The loose parts monitor was verified to be in service and recordings were made when a reactor coolant pump was started, while it was running and during the coast down period after it was tripped. Recordings were made with only reactor coolant pump (RCP)
1BI, running RCP 2B1 running, and with both pumps on at the same time The inspector witnessed these test runs and listened to the recording No metallic sounds were heard. Approval to resume operations with the unrecovered tube plug was granted by NRR on October 23, 1978.