IR 05000267/1987025
| ML20195J015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1988 |
| From: | Farrell R, Michaud P, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195J000 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-87-25, NUDOCS 8801200450 | |
| Download: ML20195J015 (9) | |
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APPENDIX B-U. S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION.
REGION IV
.NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/87-25 License:
DPR-34 Docket:
50-267 Licensee:
Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Inspection-At:
Fort St. Vrain-(FSV) Nuclear Generating Station,
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Platteville, Colorado and PSC Offices, Denver, Colorado
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Inspection. Conducted:
October 18 through November 21, 1987
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/d.fff Inspectors:
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R.
E. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
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W. Michaud, Resident Inspector (RI)
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Approved:
[vh
//4/88
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T.
F. Westerman, Chief Date Reactor Projects Section B i
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October 18 through November 21, 1987 (Report 50-267/87-25)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, security, radiological protection, and design control.
Results:
Within the seven areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to make management notification as required, paragraph 3).
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DETAILS ~
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Persons Contacted Prinicipal Licensee Employees D. Alps, Supervisor, Security F. Borst, Manager, Support Services / Radiation Protection L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Fuels
- M. Cappello, Superintendent, Planning,-Scheduling & Stores R. Craun, Manager, Nuclear Site Engineering
- W. Dender, Licensing Coordinator
- M. Deniston, Shift Supervisor
- J. Eggebroten, Superintendent, Technical Services Engineering D. Evans, Superintendent, Operations
- H. Ferris, Manager, QA Operations W..Franek, Superintendent, Plan / Scheduling & Stores
- C. Fuller, Station Manager
- J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations
- R. Gunnerson, Supervisor, Nuclear Projects
- M. Holmes, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
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M. Niehoff, Marager, Nuclear Design
- F.~Novachek, Manager, Technical / Administrative Services
- H. O'Hagan, Outage Manager
- G. Schmalz, Engineer, Fire Protection
- L. Scott, Manager, QA Services
- N. Snyder, Superintendent, Maintenance T. Stokoe, EnginG r, Quality Assurance
- D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering D. Weber, Nuclear Production
"R. Williams Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operations The NRC inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel
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during the inspection.
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted November 30, 1987.
2.
Followup of Licensee Action on Previously Identified Findings (CLOSED) Violation (267/8419-01):
Improper Distribution of Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) Amendments to the NRC.
This violation concerned the licensee's failure to submit RERP amendments to the NRC within 30 days after a change in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q).
The licensee has corrected its distribution problems and no recurrence has been observed.
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(CLOSED) Violation (267/8503-01): Quality Related Purchase Orders Processed Without NED and QA Review.
Confirming orders for control rod drive and orifice assembly parts were placed over the phone without a purchase requisition reviewed by NED and QA in accordance with Administrative Procedure Q-4, Procurement Document Control. All nuclear production, nuclear engineering, and quality assurance personnel were given supplemental training on the requirements of Procedure Q-4.
The licensee also reviewed previous procurements from GA to ensure proper technical and quality requirements were specified on the purchase orders.
The NRC inspector found no indications of any recurrence of this type of problem.
This item is closed.
(CLOSED). Unresolved Item (267/8701-01):
Resolve Adequacy of "G" and "J" Wall Suppression System Design. This issue concerned the adequacy of the sprinklei system, which protects the areas of heavy cable concentration along the "G" and "J" walls outside of the three-room control complex.
NRR has evaluated this concern and in a letter dated October 15, 1987, concluded that although the sprinkler systems do not fully conform with National Fire Protection Association Standards Numbers 13 and 15, the present design represents a significant improvement over the original design concept and fully complies with staff recommendations to the
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licensee in a letter dated June 4, 1984.
This item is closed.
3, Operational Safe _ty Verification The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control. system is effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operatiot..
The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent
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verifications of safety system status ard limiting conditions for operation, and review of facility records.
During tours of accessible areas, particular attention was directed to the
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Monitoring instrumentation
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Radiation controls
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Housekeeping
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Fluid leaks
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Piping vibrations
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Hanger / seismic restraints
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i Clearance tags
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Fire hazards
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Control room aanning
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On October 26, 1987, the NRC resident inspertors received notification from the shift supervisor that a contractor electrician had fallen while working on the fire damaged cable trays immediately below the elevation 6 floor grating. The man had not fallen far, but had struck his back in the fall.
The man did not lose consciousness during the event. As a precautionary measure, the man was transported by ambulance to offsite medical facilities for ' examination. There was no potential for contamination in the area the man had been working. All actions necessary to protect the injured worker were taken.
The NRC resident inspectors interviewed the shift supervisor-and inquired as to whom the shift supervisor had notified of the injury. The shift supervisor did not notify licensee management personnel as required by
"Fort St. Vrain Medical Emergency Plan," MEP-Issue 20, effective July 29, 1986, as modified by Procedure Deviation Reports 87-2039 and 87-2042.
The requirement to notify management personnel is contained in Section 2.1 and Attachment 2 of the procedure. This failure to follow the FSV MEP is an apparent violation of NRC regulations (267/8725-01).
The NRC resident inspectors observed cold weather preparations by the licensee. AdministrativeOperationsOrder(op. order)86-06, Issue 2, of applicable system operating procedures (personnel to specific sections prescribes actions to be taken and directs 50Ps). The op. order and each of the referenced procedures were reviewed by the NRC resident inspectors to verify their agreement and completeness. The NRC resident inspectors independently verified that heat tracing for the fire protection system was energized, that cooling tower and transformer sprays were drained, and that specified portions of the domestic water system were isolated and drained.
It was noted that op. order 86-06 correctly specifies actions to be taken in preparation for cold weather and that there are individual records of the accomplishment of each action.
There is no status or other means to verify that the actions have been completed without searching for the individual records. The licensee indicated that they plan to take action to provide a status of completion. The inspector plans further followup on this issue. This is considered to be anopenitem(267/8725-02).
A walkdown of all areas of the plant was performed by the NRC resident inspectors accompanied by the licensee's fire protection engineer. No fire hazards were identified during this inspection.
The NRC resident inspectors continued to monitor fire detection system recovery and improvements following the October 2,1987, fire. Discrepancies in the labeling of certain zones of fire detection were noted by the NRC inspectors.
KIDDE (ionization detectors) panel labels were placed between alarms leaving the location of the alarming zone unclear.
In addition some zones were labeled permanently on the KIDDE panels, some were labeled with labeling tape, and some had directories on the outside of panel doors. Also, some labels were hidden by the KIDDE panel doors, which had no handles and were difficult to open.
On the Gamewell (linear beam
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detectors) panel, the area. location descriptions on the panel labels and in the operating, instructions for the panel did not agree. The licensee indicated that actions will be' initiated to correct the labeling discrepancies. These discrepancies in the fire detection system panels are considered an open item (8725-03).
The NRC resident inspectors followed up the loss of 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2 event of November 11, 1987.
In order to perform maintenance on "B" battery charger power to 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2 was switched to its alternate 480 V Bus 3 source. Approximately 5 minutes later, the feeder breaker on 480 V Bus 3 tripped, deenergizing Instrument Bus 2.
The breaker was reset and again tripped approximately five minutes later.
Instrument Bus 2 was returned to its normal source, "B" static inverter powered from "B" battery charger, and all components in the alternate supply were tested. The feeder breaker on the 480 V Bus 3 was found to trip at approximately 30 amps, which is at the low tolerance of the specified 35 + 15% setpoint of this breaker. Actual load is 32-33 amps.
An engineering evaluation was perfonned, which determined all downstream equipment capable of safely operating with this breaker set at 40 + 15%
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amps. The breaker on 480 V Bus 5 as well as the alternate supply breaker to Instrument Bus I located on 480 V Bus 1 were reset to 40 amps.
Instrument Bus 1 and 2 were subsequently supplied from their alternate sources for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with no problems.
As a result of the initial loss of Instrument Bus 2, "0" circulator tripped. After recovering Instrument Bus 2 and returning circulator auxiliary systems to service,
"D" circulator failed to self turbine on bearing water flow. A surveillance test was performed as discussed in Section 4 to verify operability of "D" circulator. The NRC resident inspectors will continue to monitor circulator trips and operations.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation Surveillance SR RE-105-X, circulator startup on minimum bearing water flow, was performed on "D" circulator on November 14, 1987, and observed by the NRC resident inspectors.
This surveillance test was performed due to the failure of "D" circulator to self-turbine when bearing water was restored following the trip caused by the loss of Instrument Bus 2 (as discussed in Section 3). This surveillance verified the ability to start and run "D" circulator after it had apparently stopped with the bearing cartridge slightly out of position following the trip. The surveillance was completed satisfactorily and "0" circulator has subsequently been stopped and allowed to self turbine normally.
This phenomenon has occurred previously and the purpose of this surveillance is to verify no problem exists with the circulator if it fails to initially self turbine.
The NRC resident inspectors observed performance of SR 5.6.1A-W, Standby Diesel Generators Weekly 50% Load Test. Both emergency diesel generator sets were successfully started, loaded to approximately 600 KW, and run for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. No discrepancies were noted.
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.
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Monthly Maintena_nce Observation The fire recovery effort involved a significant number of maintenance activities, which were monitored by the NRC resident inspectors.
Cable pulling in conduit and cable trays was observed and was performed in accordance with Procedure MPE-1907, Issue 3, Cable. Pulling and Installation. The NRC resident inspectors observed the licensee's
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performance of independent verifications of cable termination. Megger testing in accordance with Procedure MPE-1904, Issue 4, was observed by the NRC resident inspectors.
Replacement of steel support members and hydraulic snubbers with qualified replacements was observed by the NRC resident inspectors. Reas,embly of four of six hot reheat safety relief valves was observed, as well as replacement of the hydraulic actuators on valves HV-2292 and FV-2206.
The control rocm ventilation system was repaired to allow the control room to remain at a positive pressure relative to the turbine building.
Documentation of functional tests on the control room HVAC equipment will be in a subsequent inspection report.
The NRC resident inspectors observed work on Control Rod Drive (CRD) 9, in accordance with Station Service Request (SSR) 87509577, Rebuild and Perform Post Maintenance Testing on CRD Serial No. 09. This CRD failed to scram and exhibited performance degradation during elevated temperature testing at GA. The work is to be performed in accordance with a controlled work instruction attached to the SSR. At the end of this reporting period, the rod drive assembly had been approximately 90%
disasserrbled, with conditions found during disassembly documented.
The NRC resident it.spectors will continue to monitor work associated with this CRD.
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.
6.
Security The NRC resident inspectors verified that there was a lead security officer (LS0) on duty authorized by the facility security plan to direct security activities onsite for each shift.
The LSO did not have duties that would interfere with the direction of security activities.
The NRC resident inspectors verified, randomly and on the backshift, that the minimum number of armed guards required by the facility's security plan were present.
Search equipment, including the X-ray machine, metal detector, and explosive detector, were operational or a 100% hands on search was being utilized.
The ]rotected area barrier was surveyed by the NRC resident inspectors.
The aarrier was properly maintained and was not compromised by erosion, openings in the fence fabric, or walls, or proximity of vehicles, crates
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.or other objects that could be used to scale the barrier.
The NRC resident inspectors observed that the vital area barriers were well maintained and not compromised by obvious breaches or weaknesses. The NRC resident _ inspectors observed that persons granted access to the site are badged indicating whether they had unescorted or escorted access authorization.
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.
7.
_ Radio _ logical Protection The NRC resident inspectors verified that required area surveys of
' exposure rates are made and posted at entrances to radiation areas and in other-appropriate areas..The NRC resident inspectors observed health
physics professionals on duty on all shifts including the backshift.
The NRC resident inspectors observed the health physics technicians checking area radiation monitors, air samplers, and doing area surveys for radioactive contamination.
The NRC resident inspectors observed that when' workers are required to enter areas where radiation exposure is probable or contamination possible the health physics technicians =are present and avsilable;to provide assistance.
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The NRC resident inspectors observed removal of reflector block handling and shipping equipment from the hot service facility for decontamination.
Contamination levels were low and the relocatian.of equipment was completed with no problems.-
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Control Rod Drive 9, was disassenbled to examine failed components and to refurbish the assembly. The NRC resident inspectors observed uncrating and movement of the assembly and portions of the disassembly.
Proper radiological precautions and controls were observed. Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 06114 was examined by the NRC resident inspectors and verified to contain the appropriate information concerning job description, radiation and contamination levels, and protective clothing and dosimetry requirerents. The NRC resident inspectors observed personnel entering and exiting the work area, including proper use of the RWP, proper wearing of protective clothing and dosimetry, and correct frisking activities. Health physics personnel were observed directly involved in these activities.
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.
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Des _ign Control
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The NRC resident inspectors continued to follow lice see actions with regard to temporary configur*n reports (TCRs) contaitted to by the licensee in licensee letter 29, dated September 23, 1987.
This
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letter was in response to un enforcement conference conducted on Septerrber 10, 1987,.in the NRC's Region IV offices in Arlington, Texas, and docunented in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/87-17.
The NRC resident inspectors reviewed:
TCR-85-08-08 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation TCR-86-09-02 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation TCR-86-02-20 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation TCR-87-05-07 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation TCR-85-12-25 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation TCR-86-01-25 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation TCR-85-12-06 and associated engineering evaluation for continued
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operation including Change Notice CN 2658 TCR-85-11-06 and calibration records of associated instruments
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TCR-86-06-01 verified removal of this TCR
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Additional licensee conmitments regarding TCRs will be reviewed in future inspections. The engineering evaluations were conducted by the licensee to demonstrate that completion of each particular TCR was not necessary for the involved systems to be capable of performing its intended safety function; i.e., all license and Technical Specification operability requirements were being satisfied by the existing systems prior to accortplishment of the associated TCR.
No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.
Exit Meeting.
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An exit neeting was conducted on November 30, 1987, attended by those identified in paragraph 1.
At this tirre the NRC resident inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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