IR 05000267/1987019
| ML20237F818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1987 |
| From: | Fisher W, Hackney C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237F792 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-87-19, NUDOCS 8709010430 | |
| Download: ML20237F818 (9) | |
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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEA,R REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/87-19 License:
DPR-34 Docket:
50-267
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Licensee:
Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
P. O. Box 840 Denver, Colorado 80201-1840 Facili+y Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
Inspection At:
FSV Site, Weld County, Platteville, Colorado Inspection Conducted: August 3-7, 1987 Inspector:
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C. A. Hackney, NRC Team Leader O
Date Accompanied By:
W. L. Fisher, NRC, RIV J. B. Baird, NRC, RIV L. Wilborn, NRC, RIV
D. B. Spitzberg, NRC, RIV M. Skow, NRC, RIV R. T. Hogan, NRC, HQ G. E. Arthur Jr., Sonalysts Corporation
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Approved:
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b L. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials and Date Emergency Preparedness Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted August 3-7,1987 (Report 50-267/87-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's emergency response capabilities during an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Eight deficiencies were identified by NRC inspectors.
Four of these deficiencies were also identified independently by the licensee.
(Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.)
9709010430 870828 PDR ADOCK 05000267 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee
- R. Walker, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
- D. Hock, President
- R. Williams Jr., Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
- F. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager, NPD
- K. Collins, Quality Assurance Technician
- M. Holmes, Nuclear Licensing Manager
- 0. Lee, III, Quality Assurance Technician
- J. Clayton, Emergency Planning Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Agency E. Hargett, Regional Director G. Jones, Chief, Technological Hazards Branch NR_C
- R. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector P. Michaud, Resident Inspector
- G. Madsen, Reactor Inspector
- Denotes attendance at exit interview.
The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, and emergency response organization.
2.
Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-01): The NRC inspectors observed that the scenario was not complete and consistent, creating unnecessary simulations and coaching of the players.
Some of the scenario objectives were not met.
The scenario was complete and challenging for the players. All exercise objectives were met during the exercise.
(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-02): The NRC inspectors observed that controller actions in the control room indicated a deficiency in controller and player training for conducting the exercise.
The controllers located in the control room exhibited good scenario control and training.
Control room personnel were not observed being distracted from participating in the exercise due to control room operations.
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I (Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-10):
The physical layout of the Forward
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Command Post (FCP) and licensee support staffing of the FCP required the Corporate Emergency Director (CED) to act more as a communicator between the Technical Support i. enter (TSC) and the state representative.
This is
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a deficiency in the direction and control of the licensee's emergency response activities.
The NRC inspectors observed that the CED demonstrated coordination of radiological assessment, development of offsite recommendations for public protective actions, and management of FCP activities.
l (Closed) Violation (267/8622-01):
j a.
During the 1985 exercise, internal inconsistencies and lack of completeness in scenario data and instructions for players and i
i controllers resulted in a failure to fully demonstrate some scenario objectives.
During the 1986 exercise, NRC inspectors identified scenario inconsistencies and dose assessment, indicating that this deficiency had not been corrected fully.
The NRC inspectors noted that the scenario deficiencies had been corrected concerning data and instructions.
The licensee met all objectives for the 1987 exercise.
j b.
Controller actions in the control room during the 1985 exercise were found to be deficient in allowing players to depart from the exercise scenario.
During the 1986 exercise, this deficiency was found to have not been fully corrected.
The NRC inspectors did not observe any instance where players were all m d to depart from the exercise scenario c.
During the 1985 exercise, a deficiency in the training of rescue j
personnel for first aid and personnel decontamination was identified.
The NRC inspectors observed a similar lack of attention to first aid and personnel decontamination considerations during the 1986 exercise, indicating a failure to correct this deficiency.
The NRC inspectors observed the first aid response and determined that the personnel had received required training.
Response personnel were responsive to the simulated victim and discussed decontamination versus not decontaminating due to injuries.
d.
During the 1985 exercise, the licensee was deficient in not fully demonstrating coordination of radiological and environmental assessment, development of protective action recommendations, and management of the utility FCP (Emergency Operations Facility). The NRC inspectors observed similar weaknesses in managing the licensee's emergency response activities and formulating protective action recommendations during the 1986 exercise, indicating that the deficiency had not been corrected full _
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a.
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The NRC inspectors noted that the licensee demonstrated command and
control of the emergency response activities in the FCP.
Specifically, the CED activated the FCP after full staffing and I
briefing from the TSC.
An announcement was made specifying that the responsibility for emergency response activities had been assumed by the FCP.
The CED briefed the staff periodically and clearly demonstrated his decisionmaking function.
The CED initiated protective action'
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discussions with the state when appropriate.
The CED made protective action recommendations for the public.
Press releases were reviewed, corrected as necessary, and initialed by the CED before issuance.
e.
Following the 1985 exercise, during the post-exercise critique, the licensee reported a deficiency in which the control room director oreempted the corporate emergency director's decision making responsibility by making an emergency declaration.
During the 1986 exercise, the NRC inspectors observed the TSC director declare a General Emergency and provide protective action recommendations, although it was the CED's responsibility to perform these functions.
The NRC inspectors observed licensee personnel following the chain of command and control for each emergency response facility.
(Closed) Deficiency (267/8622-02):
Information flow to the control room was deficient in that tre shift superviscr was not informed of the status of accountability, staffing of the Personnel Control Center, or dispatch of the onsite monitoring team in a timely manner.
The control room was informed as to the status of accountability and
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onsite response teams.
The control room was not informed of the PCC and FCP having been activated timely.
The delay of the emergency response facility activation did not impact the exercise.
j (Closed) Deficiency (267/8622-03):
The FCP was not activated and operational in 90 minutes after declaration of an Alert emergency classification.
The NRC inspectors determined that the FCP was activated and operational within 90 minutes following the declaration of an Alert by the control room.
(Closed) Deficiency (267/8622-04):
Certain provisions of RERP implementing procedures controlling emergency response activities at the FCP were not followed.
The NRC inspectors observed FCP personnel following the appropriate RERP..
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1 3.
Program Areas Inspected The followirg program areas ' tere inspected.
Unless otherwise noted, the inspection was completed M.d revealed no violations, deviations, deficiencies, unresolved items, or open items.
The inspection included interviews with cogn;zant individuals, observations of activities, and record reviews.
The depth and scope of these activities were consistent with past findings and with the current status of the facility.
Notations after a specific inspection item are used to identify the following:
I = item not inspected or only partially inspected; V = violation; D = deviation; H = deficiency; U = unresolved item; O = open item.
Procedure Program Area and Inspection Requirements
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82201 Emergency betection and Classification 021 - Site emergency plan and procedures contain measurable and observable emergency action levels (EALs) based on
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inplant conditions and onsite and offsite radiological monitoring results.
022 - Initial offsite notification procedures include criteria based on EALs.
Procedures also contain criteria for recommending protective actions for onsite nonessential personnel.
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023 - State and local agencies agree with EALs and have reviewed these EALs each year (10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Part IV.B. ) (I)
024 - Emergency event classifications include the four classes specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Part IV.C.
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025 - The licensee can effectively use post-TMI indicators i
for core and containment status. (I)
026 - One individual onsite (i.e., Emergency Coordinator)
at all times understands authorities and
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responsibilities to clM sify events and initiate emergency :" r.s.
027 - Emergency Operating, Alarm, or Abnormal Occurrence Procedures direct the user to classify emergencies.
028 - EALs are consistent with appropriate control room instrumentation.
Decisional aids are readily available in the control room, TSC, and EOF.
029 - Shift supervisors and other personnel can classify events promptly and correctly.
82202 Protective Action Decisionmaking 021 - Authority and responsibility are assigned unambiguousl G
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022 - Authority and responsibility for making protective action decisions are reflected in procedures and understood by licensee personnel.
023 - Emergency response facilities can implement onsite and recommend offsite protective measures.
024 - Licensee personnel understand relationship between plant conditions, offsite consequences, and effectiveness of protective measures.
025 - Offsite officials have the capability to make prompt
public notifications and protective action decisions.
(I)
82203 Notifications and Communications 021 - Procedures for emergency classification and emergency action level.
022 - Procedures for alerting, notifying,- and activating emergency response personnel.
(I)
023 - Initial offsite messages.
024 - Prompt public notification system.
(I)
025 - Communication procedures and equipment.
026 - Operability of emergency response facility communication equipment and conduct of periodic communications drills.
027 - Portable communication eauipment for radiation monitoring teams.
028 - Redundant onsite and offsite communication links.
029 - Notifications by emergency response personnel.
82301 Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors (1) Control Room (2) Technical Support Center (3) Emergency Operations Facility (H)
(4) Operational Support Center (PCC) (H)
(5) Corporate Command Center (I)
(6) Offsite Monitoring Team i
(7) Corrective Action / Rescue Team (H)
(8) Security / Accountability Team (9) Press Center (I)
(10) Medical Team (H)
(11) Postaccident Sampling (I)
4.
Emergency Operations Facility (Dose Assessment) 82301 (3)
The NRC inspectors noted that no offsite monitoring team measurements were available until more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the release of radioactivity i
started and a declaration of Site Area Emergency made at about 10 a.m.
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During the next 2h hours, 'only 4 plume centerline direct radiation
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measurements were reported to the FCP and no air samples for radioiodine were collected and analyzed.
The failure to collect air samples during this time was due apparently. to malfunction of the inverter power supply for the sampler and the lack of backup capability for this function.
The relatively few direct radiation measurements reported and lack of radioiodine determinations during this period resulted in a limited confirmation of dose assessment calculations.
Based on the observation above, the following is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
Insufficient direct radiation and radiciodine measurements were made by offsite field teams to support confirmation of dose assessment calculations.
(267/8719-01)
5.
Operational Support Center (PCC) 82301(4}
The NRC inspectors noted that friskers and a radiological control point were set up at the appropriate entry point into the primary PCC in accordance with Procedure RERP-PCC.
However, the frisker and control point shown on Attachment A to that procedure were not put in place at the exit from the potentially contaminated decontamination route.
Based on the above observation, this item is considered to be an emergency
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preparedness deficiency:
Procedure RERP-PCC was not followed, in that the frisker and control point specified in Attachment A to that procedure were not
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established when the PCC was activated.
(267/8719-02)
6.
Corrective Action / Rescue Team 82301 (7)
RERP-Survey, Revision 5, Section 2.1, states, in part, that monitoring teams shall be comprised of at least two individuals. The NRC inspectors observed that only one HP technician entered the reactor building to obtain a reactor coolant sample.
Based on the observation above, the following is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
Procedure RERP-Survey was not followed, in that two persons were not dispatched to obtain a reactor coolant sample as required by Procedure RERP-Survey.
(267/8719-03)
7.
Failure to Follow Procedure (Medical Team) 82301 (10)
a.
RERP-MEP, Revision 20, Section 2.2.1.1 states, in part, to outline and number contaminated skin area with a marker.
The NRC inspectors
observed that the licensee did not outline and number the l
contaminated skin area of an injured and contaminated individua..
b.
RERP-MEP, Revision 20, Section 2.2.2 states, in part, that tie-on
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tags be used when a contaminated victim is to be transported.
The NRC inspectors observed that the licensee did not use tie-on tags for a contaminated victim readied for transporting to the hospital.
Based on the observations above, the following is considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
Procedure RERP-MEP was not followed, in that the injured person was not appropriately marked and tagged as required.
(267/8719-04)
8.
Licensee Identified Deficiencies Accountability:
Personnel in the visitor center were missed on initial accountability.
Notifications:
Persons on the owner-controlled property were not notified of changes in emergency classification as required.
Special Teams:
HP technicians were not assigned to the first aid team.
PCC director not given medical information.
9.
Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with the NRC senior resident inspector and licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on August 7, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report, oi,
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