IR 05000267/1987022

Insp Rept 50-267/87-22 on 870901-1017.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Lers,Monthly Surveillance Observation,Esf Walkdown,Fire Protection,Security & Radiological Protection

ML20236M371
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	11/03/1987
From:	Farrell R, Michaud P, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236M360	List: IR 05000267/1987022 ML20236M357
References
50-267-87-22, NUDOCS 8711130108
Download: ML20236M371 (13)

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'.$. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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NRC Inspection Report:

50-267/87-22.l'D,\ t ,1 Li c e n s e':

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Docket: ~50-26 , ,D, .

Licensee: Public Service Compan'y;ofiC'olcrado (PSC) _ fg , ' ' "

Faci.lity Name: Fort St. Vrain.' Nuclear Generating' t a t: ri 7 , j

.Vrai n ( FSV ), Nuclear Gene ra ti ng-lSfati on, p L (

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I n s pec ti o'ri A t : Fort S . f ..

Pl at teville , Coloradu5 Colorado ,

M and DSC Of fi ce s','" Denver ,4 h,/ :l J , -

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Inspection Conducted: Septemberui..through October /IJ, 1987- ~?t .-

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R.. L E . Farrell", S,enior Resident I n sp e c to rg,h+ R I,). D rit e

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y 3 h/,& /0627mT7 P. W. Michaud, Resident I,nspector (RI) mg Date j-y 3- >-. 1 ,

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!. . 1 jl InspectionCojductedSeptember1throughOctober 17, 1987 (Report 50-267/87-22)-

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on !

licensee event reports, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance l observation, montnly maintenance observation, engineered safety features )

Wal. Ipan, fire protection, radiological protection, security, and temporar I con 'guration report f u '

n Resu'its: Wtthin the nine areas inspected, no violations or deviations were 'f; identIYie e/

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1. ,.Psrsons Contacted "

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.i p 's g PrincipalLicenseeEdicyee p ,q

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D. Alps,. Supervisor, Security

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e F. Borst, Manager,? Support Services / Radiation Protection -

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• L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Fuels'4 .

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",. *M. : Cappello, Superintendent, Planning, Scheduling, and Store /

.R..Craun,. Manager, Nuclear Site Engineering *

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.D. Evans, Superintendent, Operations .

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• M. Ferris', Manager, Quality Assurance l(QA) Operations '

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• C. Fuller, Station Manager

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1. D.:Goss, Coordinator,LNudlear Licensing J. Gramling, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing Operations i e M. Holmes, Manager, Nuclearj licensing ,

j M. Niehoff, Manager,; Nuclear. Design "  ;

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• F/ Novachek, . Manager, Techn) cal / Administrative Services , 3 Af. Pyenger, Manager, QA Services -

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• R.'$ argent, Nuclear 0perations' '

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• P. Tomlinson, Manager, QA . .,i a R,' Walker, Chaisman of the Board and CEO / .

• D; Warembourg,. Manager, Nuclear Engineering i

• Williams Jr., Vice-President,: Nuclear Operations

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ThW hRC inspectors also contacted ot'her licensee and contractor personnel '1

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• Denates those attending the exit interview conducted Octo'oer 20, 198 ,

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2. fs LicenseeActiononyp,e.n.seeEventReportsjERd 2

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3l In ' Office Reviw of iERs t

.i> v j The NRC inspector , review $d wiected LERs to. determine whether'-

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corrective action dir;ussed ,in the LER was appropriate,'information!'

/ satisfied reporthy requirenibnts, accuracy of reporting was a N .

sufficient, and' gen dric implications wep!,ad@e.ssed., Tim following }i l

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LERs were reviewed d remain OPEN: / sV

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. 80-12- LC0 4.1.9 violation

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. c83-30 ' failed Speed Cables Negated Circulator Speed High Tri ~

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. 83-48 Bearing Water Pressure Differential Switches Inoperable l .  :

(. 84-02 Inoperable Loss of Bearing Water Switch ]

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. 85-11 Loop 1 Shutdown Due to Loss of Bearing Water Indication j

The NRC inspector discussed the status of these and other old LERs with the licensee. In some cases,-the documentation of corrcctive !

actions had simply not been closed; in others, a temporary 1 configuration is in place until permanent changes scheduled for the . 1 next refueling outage are installed; and in some cases, more operating time is required to verify corrective action The i resident inspectors will be monitoring the licensee's progress on the backlog of old LER b. Onsite Followup of LERs The following LERs were .'eviewed to verify the specified corrective actions had been completed and to ensure the corrective actions were effective to prevent a recurrence: '

LER 80-58 concerned operation in a degraded mode of LC0 4. circulator operabilit Leakage due to erosion of a carbon steel pipe required isolation of the Loop 1 emergency feedwater I heade Corrective action included the installation of bolted i flanges in the line to facilitate any future repairs, completed ;

June 8,1983, and a change of material to stainless steel for '

valve bodies and downstream piping. This was completed June 15, 1 1987, arid the lER is considered close LER.81-42 concerned ultrasonic detectors in the steam pipe -

rupture detection system found out of tolerance during surveillance testing. This entire system has been reolaced by the steam line rupture detection / isolation system (SLRDIS), and this LER is therefore considered close )

i LER 83-43 concerned the determination'that nonconservative i s assumptions were used in the development of LC0 4.1.9. A l Technical Specification (TS) amendment request was submitted in !

July 1986 and the licensee has been using the more restrictive ]

criteria contained in the proposed revision in the interi J

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This LER is considered close LER 85-01 described a neutron flux rate of change trip with the ,

reactor shutdown due to high frequency noise from a welding i machine. The NRC inspector verified all three welding machines 1 g with high frequency modes had that feature disarmed and that l

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Step 3.1.3 of Welding Procedure MP100 requires the high i

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frequency feature be disarmed before using any welding machine in the reactor building. This LER is considered close j

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-5-LER 85-07 reported the discovory of blockage in PCRV penetration pressurization supply lines di ing surveillance testin The NRC inspector verified througn a review of documentation that all supply lines had been tested and cleared, and Surveillance Test SR-RE48-X had been satisfactorily performed on June 28, 1985. Modifications made in 1985 to prevent and detect any moisture in the supply lines appears to have been successfu This LER is considered close LER 85-08 described a high count rate trip with the_ reactor shutdown due to a degraded connector, which-was attributed t moisture in an instrument box. The moisture was removed and a new connector installed,_ tested, and sealed. The source of the moisture was a damaged area of the reactor building roof, which was repaired on June 21, 1985. No recurrence of this type of problem has been noted. This LER is considered close LER 85-28 reported air flow through the fuel storage facility below that required by TSs. This was discovered during a surveillance test and was caused by leaks in some pipe chase walls. The walls were repaired on December 12, 1985, and no recurrence of this problem has been noted. This LER is-considered close No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection are . Operational Safety Verification .

i General The NRC inspectors reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatoty requirements and that-the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operatio The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verifications of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and review of selected portions of facility record Logs and records reviewed included: d

. Shift Supervisor Logs

. Reactor Operator Logs

. Eqt:1pment Operator Logs ,

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Auxiliary Operator Logs

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. Technical Specification Compliance Logs

. Operations Order Book

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. Operations Deviations Reports -q

. Clearance Log

. Temporary Configuration Reports L Station Service Requests (SSR)

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During tours of accessible areas, particular attention was directed j to the following I

. Monitoring Instrumentation

. Radiation Controls

. Housekeeping

.. Fluid Leaks

. Piping Vibrations

. Hanger / Seismic Restraints

. Clearance Tags

. Fire Hazards

. Control Room Manning

. Annunciators The NRC inspectors reviewed loop shutdown trips with the reactor shutdown on September 1 and 2, 1987. The first trip was caused by personnel error and is reported in'LER 87-22. The second trip was' !

due to a failed chip in the plant protection system and is reported in LER 87-2 Licensee response and attention to these trips was appropriat The licensee held an emergency drill for a contaminated injured person on September 30, 198 The NRC inspectors observed the onsite portions of the drill, along with FEMA and the state of Colorado. An effective onsite response was observed, including proper medical'

attention and radiological controls. No discrepancies were noted,by the NRC inspector Reactor Startup

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The NRC resident inspectors monitored the reactor startup on September 10, 1987. The actual critical rod height, 106 inches, was below the calculated estimate of 128 inches. The NRC inspectors inquired why s'uch a difference was observed and discovered the operators and technical advisors were aware of the discrepancy and expected a critical rod height of 107 inches, which was predicted using the GAUGE computer code. The NRC inspectors were satisfied the reactor operators had sufficient information and observed their i attentiveness and recognition of actual criticality during the startu However, the discrepancy in the calculated number, although within TS limits, remained a concer The NRC resident inspectors met 'with licensee management and

, engineers.on 0ctober 14, 1987, to discuss.why the discrepanc existed. The licensee explained the curves used to manually j calculate,the estimated critical rod height were generated using a i

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"four part"' GAUGE _ computer progra The GAUGE program currently in use is a "seven part" program. The discrepancies arise from the manner in which atom densities are calculated.in the two programs, I with the seven part program being more accurate. . The licensee had not generated new curves for manual calculations since the 1 discrepancy between the GAUGE code generated values-and the manually I calculated values is not prominent.at low fuel temperature The 3 discrepancy becomes noticeable for fuel temperatures above 240 The last two startups involved temperatures higher than 240 F. The licensee has assured the NRC inspectors the curves used in the manual calculations will be corrected before the next startup to bring the manually calculated valve and the GAUGE computer generated value within the administrative limits of plus or minus 0.3 percent reactivit The NRC resident inspectors will follow the licensee's actions on this matte During the reactor startup on September 10, 1987,'the NRC inspectors noticed that the startup channels of nuclear instrumentation remained  ;

energized for an excessive amount of time while at or near the high '

end of their indicating rang The startup channels are automatically, deenergized at 10-2 percent power.(increasing) on the wide range nuclear instrumentation, which corresponds to >106 CPM .

(high end of startup channel indication). The NRC' inspector inquired +

as to why these instruments remain engergized so long at high levels, I which may damage the: detectors. The answer given was that, in the

" Fuel Loading" position of the reactor mode selection switch, a 105 CPM scram is enabled. Since 105 CPM on the startup channels roughly corresponds to 10-3 percent power on the wide range instruments, the cutoff of the startup instruments was selected at 10-2 per cent so the scram function would not potentially be disabled by deenergizing the instrument before a trip was reached. The question of potential damage to the startup channels is being reviewed by the licensee. This is considered an open item (267/8722-01).

1 Followup to Fire Event At 2359 MDT on October 2, 1987, a fire occurred in the turbine 'l building at FSV. Both NRC resident inspectors responded to the sit A detailed account of the fire is contained in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/87-2 . Monthly Surveillance Observation The NRC inspectors observed a portion of the recharge of the station j batteries following performance of the annual capacity check, SR-EL8- i Readings taken 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the "B" station battery had been fully .l charged showed eight cells below the minimum required voltage. The 4 battery had just passed the annual capacity tes The battery vendor was i contacted and after reviewing all pertinent data, indicated the low a individual cell voltages did not restrict the battery's operabilit The

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vendor issued a letter to this effect, which was reviewed and found

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j acceptable by the NRC inspector Some cells were replaced as described l in paragraph !

As a result of the malfunction and replacement of "D" helium circulator, ,'

l the licensee committed to having four circulators operating when above 35 percent reactor powe In order to verify the operability of all four circulators prior to going above 35 percent power, Surveillance SR 5.2.7a j was performed. The results of this surveillance showed "A" circulator did not meet the minimum speed (helium flow) requirements when driven by emergency condensat This flow path is required under certain Appendix R (Fire Protection) configurations. The problem was examined and corrected as discussed in the maintenance section (paragraph 5) of this report. The

"A" circulator was able to meet all requirements on retest af ter repairs, and all four helium circulators were verified operationa i The NRC inspectors observed precritical tests , including SR 4.1.1.c-X, Precritical 10-inch Scram Tests, which verified scram time less that 152 seconds, limit switch operations, and correspondence between digital and analog rod position indication Also observed was SR 4.1.4.4a-P, i Multiple Rod Pair Withdrawal Test, which checks interlocks to prevent '

simultaneous withdrawal of two rod pair i No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection are ,

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation The NRC inspectors observed troubleshooting activities on the plant protection system (PPS). The troubleshooting was in response to an erroneous loop shutdown signal. LCO compliance and use of approved procedures were verified by the NRC inspectors. The instrumentation was properly removed from service and restored. . Troubleshooting activities were coordinated with control room operators, who were kept informed during the activities, i Activities associated with the problem determination and repair of the water turbine flow on "A" helium circulator were closely monitored by the NRC inspector A special tt:st, T364, was performed on September 18, 1987, to attempt to determine where any blockage in the flow path to the

"A" circulator Pelton wheel may have been. The results of this test '

indicated some blockage between the control valve and the Pelton whee The circulator iniet piping assembly was removed and a 1/4-inch diameter bolt was found lodged in one of the two Pelton wheel nozzles. The bolt,  !

approximately 1/2-inch long.was removed and the piping was_ flushed and  !

reinstalle "A" circulator was retested satisfactorily on September 27, 1 1987, and was declared operable, An exhaustive analysis of the source of !

the bolt was performed by PSC engineering, including radiography of valves 1 in the line to verify no parts were missing and examining the parts list of all components in the supply.line. No source of the loose bolt could i be determined. The NRC inspectors recognize the limited possibility of l l

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-9-conclusively establishing the source of the bolt and are satisfied the problem was sufficiently addresse The NRC inspectors also reviewed the replacement of selected cells in the safety-related batterie The cells selected for replacement had successfully passed the battery discharge test, but failed to achieve acceptable cell voltage when recharged following the test and were consequently replace .

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection are . ESF System Walkdown The NRC inspectors performed a walkdown of all accessible portions of the reactor building exhaust system. This is an engineered safeguard system J in accordance with FSAR, Section 6.1. The NRC inspectors reviewed FSAR, Section 6.2, which describes the system and requirements, TSs 4.5 and 5.5, and applicable drawings. The walkdown confirmed the system's operability, verifying damper positions, instrumentation operability, and electrical power supplies. No items were identified which might degrade system )

performance, and the overall condition of the system was goo No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection are . Fire Protection The NRC inspectors, accompanied by the PSC fire protection engineer, performed a walkdown of the entire turbine building and reactor building on September 2, 1987. The purpose was to identify any fire hazards by checking for uncontrolled material and verifying hose stations, fire extinguishers, and bunker gear were properly stored, located, and operational. Only two minor discrepancies were noted; uncontrolled rags near a work area and a fire hose isolation valve leaking by. These items were promptly correcte No fire hazards of any significance were identified during this walkdow . Radiological Protection i l

The NRC inspectors verified that required. area surveys of exposure rates l are made and posted at entrances to radiation areas and in other I appropriate areas. The NRC inspectors observed health physics !

professionals on duty on all shifts including the backshif The NRC l inspectors observed the health physics technicians checking area radiation 3 monitors, air samplers, and doing area surveys for radioactive j contaminatio '

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The NRC inspectors observed, that when workers are required to enter areas j where radiation exposure is probable or contamination possible, the health j physics technicians ace present and available to provide assistanc j

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection are !

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The NRC inspectors verified that there was a Lead Security Officer (LS0)'

on duty authorized. by the facilityusecurity plan ~ to direct securit activities onsite'for'each shift. 'The LSO did not have duties'that woul , ;

interfere with the direction of security activitie ;

The NRC inspectors verified, randomly and on the backsbift, that the "

minimum number of armed guards. required by the facility's security plan were presen Search equipment, including. the X-ray. machine, metal detector, and explosive detector .were operational or a 100 percent hands on search was'being utilize The protected area barrier was surveyed by the NRC in'spectors. Th barrier was properly maintained and was not compromised by erosion, openings in the fence fabric,.or walls, or proximity of vehicles, crates or other objects that could'be-used to scale the barrie The NR inspectors observed the vital area. barriers were maintained and no compromised by.' obvious breaches or' weaknesses. 7The NRC inspector observed that persons granted access to the site are> badged' indicating-whether they had. unescorted or escorted access authorization, e No violations or deviations were~ identified'in this inspection are . Temporary Configuration Reports (TCRs) ,

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As a followup to NRC Inspection Report 50-267/87-17 regarding temporary j configuration reports, the NRC inspectors reviewed the TCR log book in the: '

control room and individual " Justifications for Contirued Operations" (JCOs) generated by.the licensee for each safety-related TCR'

which existed on. July 31, 1987,fthe end of NRC' Inspection?

Report 50-267/87-17 reporting' period. These JCOs were' generated by the:

licensee in partial response to an enforcement conference held September 10, 1987, in NRC's Region IV office (reference' licensee's-letter P87329, Williams'to NRC). Review of the TCR log in the control' s, room identified 90 existing TCRs in place. Of these 90,14:TCRs were '

installed after the fire of October 3, 1987,'to assist'in plant. recover One of the remaining listed TCRs should have been removed according:to'the )

licensee's engineering organization,- This will be monitored in the NRC J

. resident inspector's continuing followup of this activit The TCRs identified as not safety-related by the' licensee were also <

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reviewed by the NRC resident inspectors to confirm that no safety-related 1 items were affected. The TCRs' reviewed, both safety-related and q nonsafety-related, are listed belo _

Items requiring-additional review by- i NRC resident inspector are indicated. 'This item is'being. tracked as Violation 267/8717-0 l l

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lj TCR Additional Followup by NRC Inspector to be Conducted ,

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Ej 85-01-10-85-01-14 .1 85-01-15

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85-08-03 d 85-08-07 j 85-08-08 Review JC0 af ter it is approved by Plant Operations {

Review Committee j 85-08-11- {

85-09-03 i d

85-09-06 85-10-01 85-10-03 85-11-01 i 1 85-11-03 85-11-06 85-11-08 85-11-10 I 85-11-11 {

85-12-01

?S-12-02  !

85-12-03 85-12-04 85-12-05 85-12-06 Review thermal analysis J I

85-12-14 85-12-16 85-12-19 85-12-20 j 85-12-21  !

85-12-22  !

85-12-23 85-12-24 85-12-25 Complete review of JC0 and calibration records on involved instruments 85-12-26 85-12-28 86-01-05 86-01-06 86-01-07 86-01-09  ;

86-01-11 86-01-12 86-01-13 ,

86-01-15 86-01-16 86-01-17-- .

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-12-TCR Additional Followup by NRC Inspector to be Conducted 86-01-18 86-01-19 86-01-20 86-01-22 85-01-24 86-01-25 Complete review of JC0 and calibration records of involved instruments 86-01-35 86-02-02 86-02-03 86-02-04 86-02-05 86-02-08 86-02-15 86-02-16 86-02-17 86-02-18 86-02-19 86-02-20 86-03-02 86-04-01 86-04-05 86-04-08 86-04-09 86-04-10 86-04-11 86-05-02 86-05-03 86-05-04 86-05-08 86-05-09 86-05-10 86-06-01 To be removed according to licensee 86-09-02 Review JC0 86-11-04 86-11-07 87-01-05 87-04-02 87-04-04 87-05-07 Cancelled but logged in TCR log 87-09-02 Installed after July 31, 1987 87-10-01 Installed after July 31, 1987 l 87-10-02 Installed after July 31, 1987  ;

87-10-03 Installed after July 31, 1987 l The remaining review items identified, as well as fulfillment of 1 additional licensee commitments regarding TCRs, will be reviewed in future inspection No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection are f

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11. Control Room Bre,athable Air System j l

The NRC inspectors walked down the control room breathable air system, which is used by the control room operators during a fire. The system normally takes a suction on outside air, which is compressed and held in bottles at approximately 2200 psig. Provisions exist to shift the suction of the compressors to the technical support center inlet filte Procedure A0P45-03 provides instructions on how to shift the lineup during i situations. There are, however, no instructions in emergency procedures j to key personnel to that procedure during an emergency. This was brought !

to the licensee's attention and is considered an open ite (267/8722-02) l 12. Exit Meeting An exit meeting was conducted on October 20, 1987, attended by those q identified in paragraph At this time, the NRC inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspectio i

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