IR 05000266/1994018
| ML20149G487 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1994 |
| From: | Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149G482 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-94-18, 50-301-94-18, NUDOCS 9410240010 | |
| Download: ML20149G487 (9) | |
Text
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-266/94018(DRP); 50-301/94018(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License No. OPR-24; DPR-27 Licensee:
Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan - P379 Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Rivers, Wisconsin Dates: August 20 through September 17, 1994 Inspectors:
T. J. Kobetz, Senior Resident Inspector A. C. McMurtray, Resident Inspector K. K. Bristow, Reactor Engineer J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector, Kewaunee Approved By:
I.
/ON/P/
,
Martin J. Farber, Chief Dats
'
Reactor Projects Section 3A Inspection Summary Inspection from Auaust 20 through September 17. 1994 (Recorts No. 50-266/94018(DRP): No. 50-301/94018(DRP)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by resident and region-based inspectors of plant operations, maintenance, engineering, plant support, safety assessment and quality verification, and corrective actions on previous findings.
Results:
Of the six areas inspected, one unresolved item was identified.
9410240010 941004 PDR ADOCK 05000266 G
.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.
Plant Operations Plant Operations and operator performance remained adequate throughout the inspection period.
However, the inspectors did note minor instances of inattention to detail during routine plant activities (Section 1.c).
Maintenance Performance in this area remained consistent. No significant issues were noted.
Enaineerino Two instances of procedure / program inadequacies were noted.
These are of concern since one caused an inadvertent fast start of emergency diesel generator G02 and forced entry into a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) due to the loss of a safety related battery charger (Section 3.b) and the other caused the licensee to declare an isolation valve used to isolate non-essential service water during an event out-of-service and enter an LC0 (Section 3.c).
Engineering involvement in the testing and troubleshooting of the G02 redundant start system was considered a strength (Section 2.b).
Plant Supoqrt Performance in this area remained consistent.
No significant issues were noted.
i l
.
.
.
DETAILS
.
1.
Plant Operations (71707) (40500) (93702)
a.
Unit 1 Ooerational Status The unit continued to operate at full power during most of this period. On September 4, 1994, power was reduced to 50% due to reduced load demand, b.
Unit 2 Operational Status The unit continued to operate at full power during this period.
Load following was not performed for Unit 2 due to a slightly increased primary to secondary leak rate.
c.
General Observations The inspectors evaluated selected activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility inspections, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility records.
During routine inspection activities the inspectors noted the l
following concerns:
j The licensee continues to have problems controlling ladders
.
around safety related equipment.
During inspections of the auxiliary building, the inspectors noted a ladder left unattended for over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the volume control tank room.
In addition, the licensee has documented in condition reports instances of unattended ladders in safety related
,
areas.
Further efforts should be made to ensure personnel adhere to the requirements of NP 8.4.12, " Control of Portable Items in Safety Related Areas."
Operators occasionally stepped out of sight of their
.
assigned control panels without notifying the DOS or DSS as required.
Improvements were noted in this area near the end of the inspection period.
The inspector accompanied an auxiliary operator on the
.
midshift tour of the Unit 1 turbine building.
During the tour, the operator noted that the oil level of a service water pump motor was below the acceptable level. On previous tours, inspectors have noted the oil level low on the same pump motor.
The inspector questioned why this condition had not been noted during previous auxiliary operator tours over the past several days. The inspector
. - -.
.
also questioned engineering regarding the low oil level's effect on pump motor operability.
Engineering analyzed this
'
condition and discussed the motor oil level with the vendor.
It was determined that sufficient oil was always present in the pump motor.
2.
Maintenance (627031 (617261 a.
General Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed safety related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these t.ctivities were conducted in accordance with technical specifications, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standards.
No discrepancies were found.
The following maintenance activity was observed and reviewed:
I DT-2080 /1DT-2081 Auxiliary Trip Valve Drain Trap Joint
.
Gasket Replacement j
The inspector had some concerns with the mechanics'
understanding of foreign material exclusion (FME) and the j
work procedure's informal control of FME. The inspectors will perform a more detailed inspection of FME controls during future inspections.
j b.
General Surveillance Observations.
The inspector observed performance of RMP 1108, which tested the redundant start systems of G02.
The activity was well coordinated with excellent support from engineering. Although initially the test results appeared to be satisfactory, the engineer, using newly developed surveillance equipment for the control relays, noted that the relays had not operated properly. A second test was then performed to verify the engineer's concern. This time the test failed when one of the redundant start systems failed to fire. The licensee declared the EDG out-of-service and entered a 7-day LC0 to troubleshoot the problem.
One of the relays was found to actuate too fast and was subsequently reset.
G02 was satisfactorily retested and returned to service.
Had engineering not performed the testing of the relays, G02 would have been returned to service without all of its redundant start capabilities.
Further actions to determine the root cause will be performed during or immediately after the Unit 2 refueling outage.
The inspectors considered the engineer's questioning attitude a strength.
.
.
3.
Enaineerina (375511
.
a.
General Enaineerina observations The inspectors evaluated engineering and technical support activities to determine their involvement and support of facility operations. This was accomplished during the course of routine evaluation of facility events and concerns, through direct observation of activities, and discussions with engineering personnel. During tnis inspection period overall engineering involvement in plant activities was good; however two instances of
-
procedure / program inadequacies were noted. The engineering staff reviewed upcoming refueling outage maintenance and modifications with the inspectors. No concerns were identified.
b.
Unanticipated ESF Actuation and loss of a Safety Related Battery Charaer
,
,
Description of Event On September 9,1994, power was momentarily lost on the B-train i
4160VAC Safeguards bus 2A-06. All associated loads were stripped and emergency diesel generator (EDG) G02 started on an undervoltage signal as required.
The licensee entered a 3-hour LC0 on both units per technical specifications 15.3.0 and 15.3.7. A.1.h, due to the loss of battery charger D-08 (loss of battery charger D-08 was expected in this event).
Power was restored to D-08 approximately 15 minutes after it was lost and the LC0 was exited. All systems worked as designed.
Power was lost to 2A-06 during the performance of IWP 91-116*V1 which was removing breaker A53-72 and the associated I
synchronization switch from control board panel CO2.
This work was in preparation for installation of the new EDG, G04, during the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage. During the work technicians j
,
inadvertently shorted one of the leads they were working on to the
control board cabinet causing the 2A-06 potential transformer
'
'
secondary side fuse to blow. This caused the undervoltage relays to sense a loss of bus power and open the feeder breaker to 2A-06.
The fuse was replaced and power was restored to 2A-06.
Root Cause Determination The inspector discussed the event with engineers involved in the G04 project. They noted that the work procedure did not provide adequate isolation instructions for the electrical leads being worked on by the technicians. This item will remain an unresolved item pending inspector review of the final root cause evaluations and corrective actions of condition reports CR 94-363 and CR 94-364, and the Licensee Event Report (URI 301/94018-01 (DRP)).
-
.
c.
Failure of Service Water Valve Durino Inservice Testina
.
On September 9,1994, service water (SW) valve 2816 failed its inservice test (IST) when it failed to meet its stroke time acceptance criteria. This auxiliary building air conditioner supply valve was promptly declared out-of-service and the licensee entered the appropriate LCO.
Recent Maintenance History On August 23, maintenance was performed on SW-2816 to install a four rotor limit switch on the valve's actuator.
Following the maintenance, operations performed the required return to service test and the valve met the acceptance criteria stated in operations standing order 4.12.17. The operators performing the test flagged the results to indicate that new IST baseline data was needed since modifications had been performed on the valve.
Review Process for IST Results Following the completion of an IST, the results are sent to an operations planner for review.
During this review, the results are placed in a computer database for trending. When the results are flagged to indicate that new baseline data is needed, the operations planner and IST engineer prepare to take the required actions needed to establish new baseline data. These required actions consist of performing an additional test or using the previously performed test as a basis for the new baseline data.
Once the new limits are established, the results are sent from the IST engineer to the operations planner. The operations planner updates the computer database used for trending, while the IST engineer revises the standing order. These actions should ensure that the new baseline data is incorporated into the standing order prior to performing the next scheduled test.
Licensee personnel stated that this process normally requires two to three working days.
However, in this case over two weeks had passed since the maintenance was performed on the valve and the new data was not yet incorporated into the standing order.
Root Cause and Corrective Action The licensee issued a condition report to document this event.
The inspector was concerned that the necessary corrective actions needed to prevent recurrence were not identified on the condition report form since it is believed that the lack of timeliness in updating the standing order contributed to this event and caused the licensee to enter an LC0 unnecessarily. The incomplete documentation of corrective actions was considered to be a corrective action program weakness. Additional attention in this area may be warranted since a similar event occurred on September 18, 1993.
.
.
.
.
.
Additional Failure of Service Water Valve Durina IST
,
On September 9, 1994, SW-2838 failed its IST when it closed 0.04 seconds too slow.
SW-2838 is the raw water valve which is used to provide cooling to EDG G02.
SW-2838 was declared out-of-service and placed in the fail open position such that it could still perform its safety function.
Work History Through discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector dete) mined that no recent maintenance work had been performed on SW-2538.
Past IST data also indicated no signs of valve degradation. The licensee plans to perform an engineering evaluation on the valve which will include performing additional tests to determine if the results received during the September 9 test were valid. The results of the increased testing will also be used to either verify existing baseline data or justify the need for any valve repairs and new reference values.
Corrective Actions The inspector had no other concerns with the technical portion of this event. However, the licensee failed to initiate a condition report to document this event and track necessary corrective actions.
The failure to initiate a condition report was considered to be a corrective action program weakness.
4.
Plant Sucoort (71750)
a.
Health Physics The inspectors routinely observed the plant's radiological controls and practices during normal plant tours and the inspection of work activities.
Inspections in this area included direct observation of the use of Radiation Work Permits; normal work practices inside contaminated barriers; maintenance of radiological barriers and signs; and health physics activities regarding monitoring, sampling, and surveying. The inspectors had no radiological concerns this inspection period.
b.
Physical Security The inspectors, by direct observation and interview, verified that portions of the physical security program were being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
This included checks that identification badges were properly displayed, vital areas were locked and alarmed, and personnel and packages entering the protected area were appropriately searched.
The inspectors monitored compensatory measures associated with the installation of the new boundary fence and security monitoring
.
. _ _. _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
. - _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _
.
equipment now used to include the new EDG building in the protected area.
In addition, the inspectors performed a security
inspection of the new EDG building prior to its inclusion into the d that protected area. During interviews, security personnel note one camera position did not provide adequate coverage of a small area outside the protected area. The inspector discussed this condition with the Supervisor Security who stated that corrective actions were going to be taken to alter the camera position and provide full view outside the fence.
The inspector has no further concerns in this area.
5.
Self Assessment and Ouality Verification (40500)
Wisconsin Electric's process improvement programs were inspected to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management control, verification, and oversight activities.
Special consideration was given to issues which may be indicative of overall management involvement in quality matters such as self improvement programs, response to regulatory and industry initiatives, the frequency of management plant tours and control room observations, and management personnel's attendance at technical and planning / scheduling meetings.
6.
Corrective Action on Previous Insoection Findinas and Licensee Event Reports (92901) (92902) (92903) (92904)
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (Insoection Reports No. 50-266/91005-01:
50-301/91005-01):
.
This item was described in Section 7.a of the above noted report and addressed the licensee's method of selecting personnel for random fitness-for-duty testing. This issue was forwarded to NRC Headquarters (NRR) for their evaluation.
NRC is pursuing rule changes and developing additional guidarice to the Fitness-For-Duty
,
regulation to address this issue and other fitness for duty
'
issues.
No additional action is required by the licensee on this issue at this time. This item is, therefore, closed.
7.
Definitions a.
Inspection Follow UD Items
'
Inspection follow up items are matters which have been discussed with Wisconsin Electric management, will be reviewed further by the inspector, and involve some action on the part of the NRC, company or both.
No follow up items were disclosed during the inspection.
b.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items,
I i
items of noncompliance, or deviations. The unresolved item
-
disclosed during-the inspection is discussed in Sections 3.b.
'
8.
Exit Interview (71707)
A verbal summary of preliminary findings was provided to the Wisconsin Electric representatives denoted in Section 9, on September 19, at the conclusion of the inspection.
Information highlighted during the
-
meeting is contained in the Executive Summary.
No written inspection material was provided to company personnel during the inspection.
The likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection was also discussed. Wisconsin Electric management did not identify any documents or processes that were reported on as proprietary.
,
9.
Persons Contacted (71707)
- G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager J. J. Bevelacqua, Manager - Health Physics A. J. Cayia, Production Manager
- F. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist
'
W. B. Fromm, Sr. Project Engineer - Plant Engineering F. P. Hennessy, Manager - Chemistry W. J. Herrman, Sr. Project Engineer - Construction Engineering N. [.. Hoefert, Manager - Production Planning G. J. Maxfield, Plant Manager J. A. Palmer, Manager - Maintenance i
S. A. Patulski, Nuclear Engineering Manager
'
J. C. Reisenbuechler, Manager - Operations
"D. D. Schoon, Regulatory Services Manager
,
J. G. Schweitzer, Maintenance Manager
R. D. Seizert, Training Manager l
G. R. Sherwood, Manager - Instrument & Centrols Other company employees were also contacted including members of the
,
technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operators.
j
- Denotes the personnel attending the management exit interview for summation of preliminary findings.
l l
l
.
,
.
.
.
.
.