IR 05000263/2018010
| ML18303A416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2018 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B2 |
| To: | Church C Northern States Power Company, Minnesota |
| References | |
| IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18303A416 (13) | |
Text
October 30, 2018
SUBJECT:
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANTNRC BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2018010
Dear Mr. Church:
On October 5, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. On that date, the NRC team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for the use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety conscious work environment. Your employees appeared to be willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No NRC-identified or self-revelaing findings were identified during this inspection. Further, the inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation determined to be of very low safety significance, in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Seciton 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-263 License Nos. DPR-22 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2018010 cc: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedure (IP) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The team reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
The team performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program (CAP),use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment. The assessment is documented below.
- (1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: Problem Identification, Problem Prioritization and Evaluation, and Corrective Actions (CAs) - The inspection team reviewed the stations CAP and the stations implementation of the CAP to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs.
- (2) Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits - The team evaluated the stations processes for the use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
- (3) Safety Conscious Work Environment - The team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs.
INSPECTION RESULTS
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
ObservationCorrective Action Program Effectiveness 71152 Corrective Action Program: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification: Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the CAP as required by station procedures. The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. Action plans to address these items were reviewed by station leadership to ensure appropriate corrective actions were issued and the items were being resolved effectively to improve performance.
The team noted that issues identified as non-Conditions Adverse to Quality (non-CAQ),were not part of the CAP. Instead these items were typically addressed at the department level, under station procedure FP-PA-ARP-03, Management of Change (MOC) Process, Revision 15. This process was similar to, but less restrictive than those associated with CAP items. Items could either be directly entered into the MOC or moved there during CAP screening. Through observations of screening meetings and selected review of issues, the team noted that potential CAQs were not being inappropriately closed to the MOC process.
The team walked down portions of the AC distribution system, refuel floor and bridge crane, and control room areas. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in the area of problem identification.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues: In depth reviews of CAP items, work orders/requests and cause evaluations were completed for selected issues reviewed by the team.
The team reviewed CAP items, work orders/requests and cause evaluations generated since June 2013 for the uninterruptable AC power distribution system. This system included the inverters and the associated 250 volt batteries and battery chargers. The team determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the CAP for this system, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that CAs were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.
As part of the walk down of the refuel floor and bridge crane, the team reviewed the licensees actions to address an emergent CAQ (CAPs 501000017224 and 5010000017286) with a crack on the crane trolley rail. This crack potentially impacted the licensees ongoing loading of spent fuel into dry cask storage. The licensee had developed a repair to prevent further crack propagation, including monitoring of crack growth between heavy lifts and was developing further evaluation and corrective actions. The team concluded that this issue was being adequately monitored and prioritized.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions: The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely.
The team concluded that the licensee had implemented appropriate corrective actions to address significant conditions adverse to quality associated with non-conservative setpoints on the wide range gas monitors (AR 500001537833) and a White finding associated with the high pressure core injection system that was documented in inspection report 05000263/2016011.
The team evaluated the licensees corrective actions for recurring cracks found in the horizontal storage modules used in the independent spent fuel storage installation. These modules were concrete structures which contained the individual dry cask storage units. The issue was documented as a condition adverse to quality (CAP 501000011521) and the cracks were repaired. The licensee also determined that these cracks did not occur at other nuclear facilities using similar storage units. Although the condition was corrected by repairing the cracks, the licensee had not evaluated why the cracking was occurring. The licensee documented this observation as CAP 501000018059.
ObservationOperating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits 71152 Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the stations performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety. In particular, the team concluded, overall, that operating experience was adequately evaluated for applicability and that appropriate actions were implemented to address lessons learned, as needed. This conclusion was supported by the fact that a violation of an NRC requirement had been self-identified during the review of operating experience from another station, as described below.
In general, the team determined that the licensee was effective at performing self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluated those issues, and resolved them commensurate with their safety significance. The team noted that self-assessments were performed primarily to address identified areas of concern and not to review overall department effectiveness; instead, the licensee typically relied on Nuclear Oversight to perform overall department audits. The team noted that these audits were generally intrusive and thorough and that identified issues were properly addressed in the CAP.
Licensee Identified ViolationFailure to Document Combustible Material in Fire Areas 71152 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and had been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Monticello Technical Specification 5.4.1.d requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for implementation of the Fire Protection Program.
Procedure 4 AWI-08.01.01, Fire Prevention Practices, Section 4.10.4.A, requires that significant combustible loads are identified in each fire area. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify the combustible load of transformers lube oil (~422 gallons) in Fire Zone 34 and flammable storage cabinets in multiple fire areas.
Significance/Severity Level: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using SDP Appendix F and concluded the violation was of very low safety significance (Green).
Corrective Action Reference: AR 01554755; OE Fire Strategy NRC Violation at Dresden; 04/04/2017
ObservationSafety Conscious Work Environment 71152 Safety Conscious Work Environment: The team found no evidence of challenges to the organizations safety conscious work environment. Employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The team observed various morning planning meetings, meetings to review CAP items, and interviewed station personnel both individually and in focus groups. Additionally, the team interviewed the Employee Concerns Coordinator and reviewed recent case logs and case files.
During interviews, the team identified a consensus among licensee staff that there was a lack of feedback regarding the resolution of identified concerns and a perception that most issues were closed to trend. Although there were many issues that were closed to trend, the team did not identify that this was the prevalent approach towards issues captured in the CAP. The licensee initiated CAP 501000017154 to evaluate this observation.
The team noted that a March 2018 site safety culture survey had identified an issue with a potential disrespective work environment at the station with a particular emphasis in security.
A similar observation was also made by the station Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel, which had identified the concern as an Area for Improvement. Although a CAP had been written to address the security department concern, the team noted that none had been written to address the station-wide concern. The licensee documented this observation as CAP 501000017888.
While reviewing the above observation, the team also noted that station procedure FP-STND-NSC-01, Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Process, revision 8, was not specific regarding when to document potential safety culture issues in the CAP nor what actions were required to address a concern rated as an Area for Improvement. The licensee documented this issue as CAP
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The team confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect it from public disclosure. No proprietary information is documented in this report.
On October 5, 2018, the team presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. C. Church, Site-Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Station Procedures
-NSPM-1; Quality Assurance Topical Report; Revision 13
-FP-AP-ARP-01; CAP Process; Revision 52
-FP-STND-SCP-01; Station Common Priority Scheme; Revision 4
-FP-PA-ARP-03; Management of Change (MOC) Process; Revision 15
-FP-OP-OL-01; Operability/Functionality Determination; Revision 21
-FG-PA-CTC-01; CAP Trend Code Manual; Revision 20
-FG-PA-EVAL-01; Procedure Change Request (PCR) Initiation, Screening and Processing;
Revision 20
-FP-WM-WOI-01; Work Identification, Screening, Validation and Cancellation; Revision 26
-4 AWI-04.09.01; Calibration and Control of Inspection, Measuring and Testing Equipment, and
In-Process Instrumentation and Devices; Revision 17
-4 AWI-08.01.01; Fire Prevention Practices; Revision 51
-EWI-08.06.01; MNGP Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program; Revision 22
-EWI-08.14.02; Air Operated Valve Program Engineering Standard; Revision 7
-FP-PA-OE-01; Operating Experience Program; Revision 26
-FG-PA-EVAL-01; Evaluation Methods; Revision 5
-FP-OP-OB-01; Operator Burden Program; Revision 10
CAP Items/Action Requests
-AR 1537019; PI&RPotential Design Issue Loss of SDC; 10/6/2016
-AR 01526442; CAP Administrative Program Requirement Issues; 6/27/2016
-AR 50100003320; Site Human Performance Decline 3rd Quarter; 10/3/2017
-AR 500001557235; ST28 Trend Human Performance Errors; 4/27/2017
-AR 01529748; Site DRUM: Possible Adverse Trend in Loggable Events; 7/27/2016
-AR 500001536864; PI&R 2016 Untimely Resolution of AR 0118; 10/5/2016
-AR 501000009993; PI&R FSAAFI Procedure Use RE: ARP-01; 3/26/2018
-AR 500001549262; NOS ID; CE Lacks Details to Support Conclusion; 3/20/2017
-AR 501000004071; NOS Finding: Incomplete Docs for Rad Ship; 10/19/2017
-AR 501000001203; Adverse Trend in Tagging Events; 8/1/2017
-AR 500001561000; Non-Conservative OLMCPR Values Used in Cycle 29 COLR; 6/13/2017
-AR 500001530367; Potential Trend in NRC DEP Performance; 8/3/2016
-AR 501000000922; Received Hot Engine Alarm for 12 EDG; 7/23/2017
-AR 501000000893; Inadequate Causal Evaluation for MO 2398; 7/21/2017
-AR 500001483971; SVOS-4 Failed During 0009 Stope Valve Test; 6/24/2015
-AR 501000006425; 2017 PI&R FSACAP Working Inventory; 12/14/2017
-AR 1537029; 2016 PI&R Resolution of Needed RCIC HELB Analysis Untimely; 10/6/2016
-AR 1543391; NRC PI&R Green NCV; 11/29/2016
-AR 501000003523; Technical Specification Bases Errors; 10/9/2017
-AR 500001548085; Tech Spec Bases for 3.3.6.1 (5.d) Not Aligned With LCO 3.1.7; 1/19/2017
-AR 500001478409; Electrical Calculations Do Not Analyze Below Degraded Voltage;
5/10/2015
-AR 500001391696; Condenser Room to FW Pump Room RHRSW Fire Penetration HELB;
7/27/2013
-AR500001493218; A CS Discharge Pressure Low; 9/15/2015
-AR 500001554909; CAP Changed to DAR and then Closed While SSC Still OBN; 5/30/2017
-AR 501000008779; NOS ID: B CAPs Without an Evaluation; 2/23/2018
-AR 500001527567; Corrective Actions not Done in a Timely Manner; 4/14/2017
-AR 500001560946; RHR Voids Identified by Procedure 8905; 6/13/2017
-AR 500001518921; Refuel Bridge Vulnerabilities; 4/15/2016
-AR 500001416521; 30 New Orphan ECs Created in the Last 60 Days; 1/28/2014
-AR 500001179515; MCC 111 Feeder Cable Megger Results Lowe; 4/24/2009
-AR 500001305502; AC Ripple Values Out of Spec High on TSI; 9/26/2011
-A-DES-MNGP-2018-1; Nuclear Oversight Audit Report; 06/15/2018
-A-PROG-MNGP-2017-1; MNGP NOS Programs Audit-2017; 12/29/2017
-AR 01512250; NRC IN 2015-012 EQ Qualification File Impact; 02/15/2016
-AR 01524694; Large Number of Doors Non Functional from Inspection; 06/09/2016
-AR 01533604; OE: NRC Part 21 2016-41-00 Safety Related Component Welding; 09/02/2016
-AR 01536786; FSA: Environmental Qualification (EQ) - CDBI Focus; 02/17/2017
-AR 01543981; OE: NRC Part 21 2016-54-00 SOR Qualification Test Report; 12/05/2016
-AR 01550860; 2017 EQ FSA: Untimely Resolution of EQ Actions; 02/17/2017
-AR 01561365; OE: NRC RG 1.164 Dedication of Commercial Grade Items; 06/19/2017
-AR 500001131704; Trend CAP Breaker Racking and Alignment; 03/19/2008
-AR 500001197202; CDBI-Calculation Quality - Adverse Tre; 09/10/2009
-AR 500001523732; Potential Part 21 Defect of Electroswitch; 02/07/2017
-AR 500001525026; NOS: Design Interface Control Issues; 06/14/2016
-AR 500001525686; NOS Finding: SQA Program Requirements not Met; 06/20/2016
-AR 500001527421; Calc Assumption Based on Actual Value Changed; 07/06/2016
-AR 500001537040; EDG Overload Relay Omitted from Calculation; 10/06/2016
-AR 500001540743; NOS ID: Unapproved Transient Combustible; 11/04/2016
-AR 500001555798; D Outboard MSIV Closing Time Out of Band; 04/15/2017
-AR 500001555906; Hole in Wall 102 Near Ceiling in HPCI Room; 04/17/2017
-AR 500001556319; AO-2-86C Exceeded App J Tech Spec Surv; 04/20/2017
-AR 500001558125; SR not Performed Within Required Period; 05/06/2017
-AR 501000000027; Elevation of HPCI Trend; 06/21/2017
-AR 501000001720; External OE: Fermi NCV for TOL Sizing; 08/19/2017
-AR 501000002530; ECCS Sump Pump Acrid Odor during Run; 09/11/2017
-AR 501000004062; LPCI Loop Select DPIS-2-129(A-D) Cycling; 10/19/2017
-AR 501000004619; NOS ID: Coatings Log Discrepancy; 10/30/2017
-AR 501000004661; Standalone Degraded Coatings Log; 10/30/2017
-AR 501000004759; EDG Reliability Program Trigger Values; 11/01/2017
-AR 501000006025; DBA-FSA - Poor EC 50.59 Screening Prep; 12/01/2017
-AR 501000008158; Trend on MOV Calculations; 02/18/2018
-AR 501000011907; MO-2007 Failed to Close; 05/12/2018
-AR 501000012713; Vendor Interface Program; 05/31/2018
-AR 501000012714; NOS: EFWS Calculation Safety Classification; 05/31/2018
-AR 501000013045; NOS: Vendor Calculation Justification not Documented; 06/08/2018
-AR 501000013065; NOS: Vendor Calc Rev Justification; 06/08/2018
-AR 501000015357; 11 SBLC Accumulator Leakage; 08/09/2018
-AR 501000015357; 11SBLC Accumulator Leakage; 08/09/2018
-AR 501000017947; 2018 PI&R: No Extension Justification; 10/03/2018
-AR 01516361; Repair HPCI Oil Leak to Restore HPCI Function; Revision 0
-AR 500001478412; FW-94-2 Post Maintenance Leakage; Revision 0
-AR 500001532322; V-AC-5 Cooling Coil Leaking at Approximately 1-2 GPM; Revision 0
-AR 500001535749; CV-1995 Failed to Open when Required; Revision 0
-AR 501000012880; Steam Leak from Valve Packing on AO-2-86C; Revision 0
-AR 500001131704; TREND CAP Breaker Racking or Alignment; 03/19/2008
-AR 500001511046; Scaffold in MG Set Rm Listed as Non-Seismic in Seismic Area; 02/03/2016
-AR 500001519960; Potential Trend in RWCU Valve Body to Bonnet Leaks; 04/25/2016
-AR 01521708; OE: NRC Part 21 Event No. 51915 Various Electroswitch Products; 05/12/2016
-AR 01526027; OE: NRC IN 2016-17; 06/22/2016
-AR 01530984; OE: RIS 2016-10 License Amend Req for Chgs to ERO Staff-Aug; 08/09/2016
-AR 500001543140; Small Water Leak Under HPCI Steam Turbine; 11/26/2016
-AR 500001543956; Reactor Building Crane is Out of Alignment; 12/05/2016
-AR 500001547444; MNGP Maintenance Rule Program does not Meet FP-E-MR-01/02;
01/13/2017
-AR 500001548081; 16A-K18 Replaced with Non-SR Aux Adder Contacts in 1R27; 01/19/2017
-AR 500001549532; NOS ID: Relevant Indication on Reactor Cavity Shield Hook Box;
2/03/2017
-AR 500001553684; NOS: Suspect Valve Disc Holders Received; 03/22/2017
-AR 01554755; OE Fire Strategy NRC Violation at Dresden; 04/04/2017
-AR 500001557410; NOS ID: Missed QC Hold Point on FW-94-2; 04/29/2017
-AR 01502637; Fire Strategy PCRs, Fire Protection Change Request ID 3830-17-028;
04/30/2017
-AR 500001557432; FME Plug Found Missing from HPCI EGR Port; 04/30/2017
-AR 500001558443; Lower 4KV Door #201 Handle Is Broken; 05/10/2017
-AR 01558459; OE: NRC Part 21 Defect of Fisher Controls; 05/10/2017
-AR 500001558988; OE: NRC PART 21 2017-28-00 Degraded Snubber Hydraulic Fluid;
05/16/2017
-AR 01559598; NOS ID: Combustible Control Issues; 05/23/2017
-AR 01560272; NOS: Potential for Valves Installed in the Plant W/O Packing; 06/02/2017
-AR 01560279; NOS ID: ISFSI Gate Damage During HSM Movement; 06/02/2017
-AR 500001561455; OE: NRC Event 52810 Part 21 Interim Report - Connectivity Relays;
06/20/2017
-AR 501000000713; Monthly PM Missed for D EVD; 07/17/2017
-AR 501000001484; Part 21 on Two A RHR Time Delay Relays; 08/09/2017
-AR 501000008094; OE: NRC Part 21 2018-02-00 Velan Inc.; 02/07/2018
-AR 501000009977; I&C M&TE Calibration Out of Tolerance; 03/27/2018
-AR 613000000644; PM Reduction for SR Service Water Coils; 03/28/2018
-AR 501000010176; NOS ID: 10CFR72.48 Review Requirement; 03/30/2018
-AR 501000012629; SR Grease Expiration Concern; 05/30/2018
-AR 501000012634; Possible Missing Fastener A RHR; 05/30/2018
-AR 501000012015; Functional Equipment Failures Trend; 07/31/2018
-RCE 01537833; Past RBV WRGM Settings Prevented Transition to Mid/High Range;
Revision 2
-AR 500001537833; Past RBV WRGM Settings Prevented Transition to Mid/High Range;
10/13/2016
-AR 501000002562; Operations Manual Operability Note not Accurate; 09/12/2017
-AR 501000007674; Operator Fundamentals - Job Preparation; 01/25/2018
-AR 501000013007; ISFSI Module Roof Cracks; Spring 2018
-AR 501000005025; Planned Use of TS 3.0.3 for Return to Service Testing: 11/07/2017
-AR 500001555785; Reactor Water Level Transient During Shut Down; 04/15/2017
-AR 500001559312; Indications of Declining CAP Performance; 05/19/2017
-AR 501000014939; MSRC Analysis of ISFSI HU Issues; 07/31/2018
-AR 501000000363; Slight Rise in Drywell Unidentified Leak; 07/05/2017
-AR 500001517339; DG Room and Cabinet Temperature Calculation Issues; 03/30/2018
Self-Assessments/Audits
-CR 606000000121; 2018 FSA: MT PI&R Readiness; 9/4/2018
-A-CAP-MNGP-2018-1; MNGP NOS Corrective Action Program Audit 2018; 3/7/2018
-A-IOS-FLEET-2017-1; Independent Oversight Audit - 2017; Revision 0
-A-MAINT-MNGP-2017-1; MNGP NOS Maintenance Audit - 2017; Revision 0
-Snapshot Self-Assessment (SSA) 606000000276; AFI MA.2 Corrective Action Effectiveness;
2/09/2018
Maintenance Requests/Work Orders
-MO 70000340; Realign Breakers and Cubicles 1R25 Bus 14; 7/2008
-MO 70000433; HPCI-33 Failed PMT; 7/2010
-MO 700042659; HWC Trip-MALF H2 Gas Detector; 9/26/2018
-MO 700035580; Low Voltage PA Zone 12; 2/25/2018
-MO 700023416; RR-7801B PT 5; 8/4/2017
-MO 700012965; Perform 8905 Prior to CSP Venting; 6/15/2017
-WO 00560009-01; Mech - RCH, Blend Weld on Hook Box and Perform NDE; 03/23/2017
-WO 700007933-0020; CV-1997, Perform As Left Diagnostic Test; 07/27/2017
-WO 700008962-0010; CV-1995, Perform As Found Diagnostic Testing; 07/28/2017
Engineering Change Requests
-6DOCGM014197; Replacement of a Portion of the Feeders; 6/21/2017
-6EQVENG28124; Refuel Bridge Upgrades; 1/27/2017
-6EQVENG28693; Add High Point Vent at RHR Side of PC-1; 6/14/2017
-6DOC00018766; Update VTM NX-8435-87 for TSI Power Supp; 9/22/2011
-6DOC00019730; Evaluate Disposition for Analogic Module; 3/13/2012
-EC 27783; Replace V-AC-4 and V-AC-5 Cooling Coils; Revision 0
Procedure Change Requests
-1405355; Revise 4048-PM Procedure Steps Need Clarification; 1/18/2017
Other
-Strategy A.3-02-C; Fire Zone 2-C; Revision 12
-Strategy A.3-30; Fire Zone 30; Revision 15
-Strategy A.3-34; Fire Zones 34, 35 and 36; Revision 15
-Strategy A.3-43; Fire Zone 43; Revision 4
-File 18-0216.00; Topographic Survey for ISFSI Pad Elevations; 06/19/2018
-Monticello Plant Status Report; 10/03/2018
-CAP Screen Team Meeting Report; 10/1/2018
-CAP Screen Team Meeting Report Part 1; 10/3/2018
-CAP Screen Team Meeting Report Part 2; 10/3/2018
-Operations Plan 2018; Revision 2
-QIM 606000000402; Operator Fundamentals Deep Dive; January 15, 2018
CAP Items Generated During the Inspection
-AR 501000017154; 2018-PI&RNRC ObservationCAP Follow; 9/20/2018
-AR 501000017997; 2018 PI&R WO 700008685 for 4250-01; 10/3/2018
-AR 501000018100; 2018 PI&R Anonymous CAP Documentation; 10/4/2018
-AR 501000017727; Y71-a(1) Action Plan not Timely; 9/28/2018
-AR 501000018042; 2018 PI&R NSCMP Procedure Issues; 10/4/2018
-AR 501000017888; 2018 PI&R Action Completion was too Narrow; 10/2/2018
-AR 5010000018052; 2018 PI&R NRC CAP Screening Observation; 10/4/2018
-AR 501000017986; 2018 PI&R Inadequate Detail to Close Corrective Action; 10/3/2018
-AR 501000018035; 2018 PI&RCE Did Not Document Extent of Condition; 10/4/2018
-AR 501000018059; 2018 PI&RObservation of Horizontal Storage Modules; 10/4/2018
-AR 501000017947; 2018 PI&RNo Extension Justification; 10/3/2018
-AR 501000017100; 2018 PI&R No WO to Resolve Equipment Issue; 10/19/2018