IR 05000263/1995001
| ML18039A974 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1995 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Watzl E NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18039A976 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9502020027 | |
| Download: ML18039A974 (13) | |
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AGCY';SSION NBR:9502020027 DOC.DATE: 95/Ol/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-263 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Northern States 05000263 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MARTIN,J.B.
Region 3 (Post 820201)
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION WATZLiE.
Northern States Power Co.
SUBJECT:
Forwards SALP rept 50-263/95-01 for plant covering period 930601-941224.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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TITLE: Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report NOTES:
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1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD DEDRO NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRIL/RSIB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 RGN3 FILE
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TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
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January 24, 1995 Northern States Power Company ATTN:
Hr. Vice President, Nuclear Generation 414 Nicollet Hall Hinneapolis, HN 55401
Dear Hr. Watzl:
Enclosed for your review is the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
12 Report for the Honticello Nuclear Generating Plant, covering the period June 1,
1993, through December 24, 1994.
As discussed between Hr.
W. Hill of your staff and Hr. S.
Ray of this office, a meeting to discuss this report with you and your staff has been scheduled at the Honticello Training Facility, on February 10, 1995, at 10:00 a.m.
During this meeting you are encouraged to candidly discuss any comments you may have regarding our report.
While this meeting is considered a
presentation and discussion forum between Northern States Power and the NRC, the meeting will be opened to any other interested parties as observers.
In accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) policy, I have reviewed the recommendations resulting from the SALP Board assessment and concur with their ratings.
Overall, your performance was excellent as indicated by the SALP Category
ratings in engineering, maintenance, and plant support and the Category
rating in operations.
The conduct of nuclear activities reflected a
conservative operating philosophy; Your strong performance reflects a
management and staff who focus on safety and quality, and who communicate effectively across the organization.
Strengths that were common to most functional areas included good teamwork between departments and the high reliability and availability of equipment.
Strong management involvement significantly contributed to this performance.
However, weaknesses in procedural adherence and self-checking resulted in an increase in personnel errors particularly in the operations area.
These weaknesses were noted to a
lesser degree in maintenarrce and radiation protection, and indicate a need for continued emphasis on procedural adherence to maintain a high level of performance among workers in all functional areas.
II Your efforts in self identification of deficiencies were considered good.
Although quality services involvement in monitoring plant operations, especially infrequent evolutions, was weak early in the assessment period, it improved by the end of the period.
Assessments were performance-based, with more in depth and timely audits performed during the refueling outage.
Self-assessments in the plant support areas were effective.
A commitment to self-assessment within the line organization was also evident.
fyQo lf
Northern States Powe mpany In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the SALP report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning the SALP Report, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.
While no written response is required, if you wish, you may provide written comments within 30 days of the SALP meeting.
Sincerely,
- ? 6!I'ird SION-0 HY IlU8 RT d. MILLER John B. Martin Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-263
Enclosure:
SALP 12 Report No. 50-23/95001
REGION III==
801 WARRENVILLEROAD USLE, IWNOIS 60532-4351 Januaxy 24, 1995 Northern States Power Company ATTN:
Hr. Vice President, Nuclear Generation 414 Nicollet Hall Minneapolis, HN 55401
Dear Mr. Watzl:
Enclosed for your review is the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)
12 Report for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, covering the period June 1,
1993, through December 24, 1994.
As discussed between Hr.
W. Hill of your staff and Hr. S.
Ray of this office, a meeting to discuss this report with you and your staff has been scheduled at the Monticello Training facility, on February 10, 1995, at 10:00 a.m.
During this meeting you are encouraged to candidly discuss any comments you may have regarding our report.
While this meeting is considered a
presentation and discussion forum between Northern States Power and the NRC, the meeting will be opened to any other interested parties as observers.
In accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) policy, I have reviewed the recommendations resulting from the SALP Board assessment'and concur with their ratings.
Overall, your performance was excellent as indicated by the SALP Category
ratings in engineering, maintenance, and plant support and the Category
rating in operations.
The conduct of nuclear activities reflected a
conservative operating philosophy.
Your strong performance reflects a
management and staff who focus on safety and quality, and who communicate effectively across the organization.
Strengths that were common to most functional areas included good teamwork between departments and the high reliability and availability of equipment.
Strong management involvement significantly contributed to this performance.
However, weaknesses in procedural adherence and self-checking resulted in an increase in personnel errors particularly in the operations area.
These weaknesses were noted to a
lesser degree in maintenance and radiation protection, and indicate a need for continued emphasis on procedural adherence to maintain a high level of performance among workers in all functional areas.
Your efforts in self identification of deficiencies were considered good.
Although quality services involvement in monitoring plant operations, especially infrequent evolutions, was weak early in the assessment period, it improved by the end of the period.
Assessments were performance-based, with more in depth and timely audits performed during the refueling outage.
Self-assessments in the plant support areas were effective.
A commitment to self-assessment within the line organization was also evident.
Northern States Power Company In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the SALP report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning the SALP Report, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.
While no written response is required, if you wish, you may provide written comments within 30 days of the SALP meeting.
Sincerely, Docket No. 50-263 J
n B. Hartin Regional Administrator Enclosure:
SALP 12 Report No. 50-263/9001 cc w/encl:.
W. Hill, Plant Manager John W. Ferman, Ph.D.,
Nuclear Engineer, HPCA State Liaison Officer, State of Minnesota INPO The Chairman Commissioner Rogers Commissioner de Planque OEDO J.
Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement W. T. Russell, Director, NRR R. Zimmerman, Associate Director for Projects, NRR A. C. Thadani, Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, NRR J.
W. Roe, Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, NRR J.
N. Hannon, Director, Project Directorate III-l, NRR C.
F. Holden, Jr.,
SALP Program Manager, DISP; NRR (2 copies)
DRP Division Directors, All Regions R. J.
Caniano, RIII H. L. HcCormick-Barger, RIII L. Cox, RIII TSS, RIII
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant SALP 12 (Report No. 50-263/95001)
1. 0 INTRODUCTION The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) process is used to develop the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) conclusions regarding a
licensee's safety performance.
The SALP report documents the NRC's observations and insights on a licensee's performance and communicates the results to the licensee and the public.
It provides a vehicle for clear communication with licensee management that focuses on plant performance relative to safety risk perspectives.
The NRC utilizes SALP results when allocating NRC inspection resources at licensee facilities.
This report is the NRC's assessment of the safety performance at the Honticello Nuclear Generating Plant for the SALP 12 period from June 1,
1993, through December 24, 1994.
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the individuals listed below, met on January 4,
1995, to review the observations and data on performance and to assess performance in accordance with the guidance in NRC Management Directive 8.6,
"Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board Chair erson G.
E. Grant, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, RIII Board Members L. B. Harsh, Director, Project Directorate I-l, NRR (former Director, Project Directorate III-1)
T. 0. Martin, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII W. L. Axelson, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, RIII 2. 0 PERFORMANCE RATINGS The current SALP process assesses performance in four functional areas instead of the previous seven.
The four areas are Plant Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, and Plant Support.
Safety Assessment/guality Verification was considered for each of the four functional areas rather than as a separate functional area.
The Plant Support functional area assesses radiological controls, emergency preparedness, security, chemistry, and fire protection.
Three category ratings (1, 2, and 3) continue to be used in the assessment of performance in each functional area.
Performance trends, improving or declining, have been eliminated as a part of the ratings.
3.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 3. 1 Plant Operations Operations performance was considered good overall.
While management routinely demonstrated an excellent safety focus, there were instances where
their expectations were not effectively communicated to the control room staff.
Examples of occasional safety focus weaknesses were cooling down the plant while remaining critical with an idle recirculation loop and failing to adequately monitor reactivity instruments while starting up the reactor.
Examples of conservative operating decisions and operability determinations included the decision to shut the plant down after the reactor went critical before the operators expected and the decision to replace scram pilot solenoid valves.
The Operations Committee was effective in ensuring performance and equipment deficiencies were properly resolved.
Management involvement in plant operations was considered excellent.
Control of shutdown risk was 'a strength, with calculations routinely performed to address time to boiling at all points during the refueling outage.
Management was aggressive in responding to industry or plant events to ensure that the events were properly analyzed. for applicability to Monticello and actions were taken to address applicable problems.
Managers routinely observed operator performance on the simulator, participated in operator training activities, and were frequently in the plant.
Efforts to identify and resolve issues in the operations area were also excellent.
Operators routinely were aggressive in identifying equipment problems and worked closely with maintenance and engineering to ensure that actions were taken to repair them rapidly.
Evidence of this was the routine lack of equipment alarms in the control room.
Although quality services involvement in monitoring plant operations, especially infrequent evolutions, was weak early in the assessment period, it improved by the end of the period.
Control room communications and logkeeping, identified as weaknesses in the previous assessment period and early in this period, were significantly improved.
However, problems with procedural adherence that occurred during a
June 1994 outage recurred during the refueling outage later in the assessment period.
Operator performance was good overall; Operators conducted most routine evolutions and responded to transients or events in an excellent manner.
However, there were instances where infrequently implemented plant evolutions conducted during outages were not performed well.
Several cases of operators not following procedures or failing to self-check their actions were noted.
Examples included the dead-heading of a residual heat removal. service water pump, inadvertent pumping of torus water to the reactor cavity, failing to adequately monitor reactivity instrumentation during a startup, and inadvertent draining of water from the reactor to radwaste.
The licensed operator training program was effective in that all candidates passed NRC-administered exams.
Overall, procedures were normally used to accomplish evolutions.
Management expectations concerning procedure adherence, especially related to the use of the words "should" and "shall" in procedures, were not well known to operators until late in the assessment period.
Prior to that point, operators sometimes considered procedures to constitute guidance and did not effectively utilize them in the performance of evolutions.
The performance rating is Category 2 in this area.
3.2 Naintenance Haintenance performance was considered excellent overall.
A high level of equipment availability, reliability, and performance was sustained by an experienced and qualified work force.
However, there were some isolated instances of personnel errors during plant outages.
Also, some minor concerns were noted in the area of plant procedures.
Hanagement demonstrated a high level of involvement in the maintenance program with a conservative safety focus.
Outage planning was a strength; the outage planning group performed detailed shutdown risk assessments and determined equipment availability based on the results.
There was a considerable amount of emergent work that arose during the refueling outage that was carefully fit into the existing outage schedule.
Hanagement displayed a conservative philosophy toward online maintenance.
Any online maintenance performed was carefully discussed and planned ahead of time and a written policy existed to only enter one planned Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) at a time.
Identification and resolution of technical issues was good with a few exceptions.
Identification and resolution of maintenance hardware issues was strong as evidenced by the excellent material condition of the plant, low backlog, and virtually no workarounds.
Honticello was proactive in performing a complete changeout of all the scram pilot solenoid valves, based on recent poor industry experience with these components.
Identification and resolution of performance issues was not as strong.
Personnel errors were higher than in the previous SALP period.
However, the involvement of the quality services group in self-assessment activities was much improved toward the end of the SALP period, with more in depth and timely audits performed during the refueling outage.
Equipment condition was excellent.
The plant regularly maintained 100K power with no annunciators illuminated in the control room.
Reliability of plant equipment and plant cleanliness was exceptional throughout the period.
Programs and procedures were good, with a few exceptions.
There were several discrepancies identified with surveillance and test procedures and work request instructions.
During the refueling outage, there was a significant improvement in details of the work request instructions and better pre-job briefings.
Significant progress was made in resolving previous concerns identified with the inservice testing program.
The quality of the maintenance performed was excellent with some exceptions.
While the majority of work was done carefully and correctly, there were several examples of personnel errors such as working on the wrong component or failure to follow procedures.
Haintenance workers started to disassemble the wrong valve on two different occasions.
With few exceptions, outage work was conducted properly.
Reactor disassembly and reassembly work went smoothly and was performed with good pre-job briefs and an excellent initiative to use a
separate procedure reader on the refuel floor.
The in-vessel core spray crack repair went smoothly and was performed with a low radiation exposure.
Teamwork was a strength throughout the SALP period.
There was a high level of
teamwork between maintenance and other departments including operations, radiation protection, and particularly engineering.
The performance rating is Category I in this area.
3.3 Engineering Engineering performance was considered excellent overall and was characterized by a strong engineering department providing quality support to other plant organizations.
Relatively few deficiencies in engineering were identified.
Management continued to support engineering initiatives and modifications and encourages the engineering staff to strive for excellence in overall engineering performance.
Focus on safety was excellent.
Engineering work was proactive and quickly identified significant safety issues before they became self-disclosing events.
In most cases, the licensee took conservative actions to address safety issues prior to the NRC requesting a response, as was the case for the justification for continued operation (JCO) regarding core shroud cracking.
Numerous plant modifications to improve reliability of important safety equipment based on the individual plant evaluation (IPE), design basis documentation (DBD) reconstitution, and industry events were completed which indicated a proactive long term approach to safety.
Examples included replacement of the main steam isolation valves (HSIVs) and modification of the safety-related air to the HSIVs and safety relief valves.
Management's effectiveness in ensuring the quality of engineering was excellent.
Management support for plant improvements based on insights from IPE and industry events was strong as evidenced by numerous plant improvements to safety equipment.
Managers were knowledgeable and involved in engineering decisions.
The licensee's approach to identifying and resolving technical issues from a safety standpoint was strong.
The DBD effort, although almost complete, continued to find old design and construction problems for which the licensee took rapid corrective actions.
For example, cable spreading room floor supports were identified as not being built per design.
Engineering support to other organizations such as operations and maintenance was excellent.
Examples of this support included restoration of the air compressors and resolution of problems with the recirculation motor-generator scoop tubes.
Self-assessment of the engineering area was strong as evidenced by the involvement of the quality services group in self-assessment of maintenance, modification, and testing activities during the refueling outage.
Licensee engineering programs were generally strong and properly implemented.
Detailed design reviews and thorough system walkdowns for the DBD program identified significant issues.
Significant progress was made in resolving previous concerns with the inservice testing program.
The licensee completed the motor-operated valve program reviews and analyses during the recent refueling outage.
The. system engineering program was extremely strong.
System engineers were proficient, well qualified and knowledgeable of their assigned primary systems, with a strong sense of "ownership."
System
engineers were extensively involved in modifications, operations, maintenance, and testing of their systems.
The licensee demonstrated a good understanding of plant design, with few exceptions.
One exception included trying to equalize temperature between the idle and operating reactor recirculation loop while the reactor was critical.
Effective technical support to modification work demonstrated the ability of plant engineering to utilize design information and to maintain system design basis.
guality of engineering work was outstanding with a few exceptions, such as, failure to update precritical calculations.
The modification for core spray crack repair was well designed and planned with installation taking much less time and dose than estimated.
Design work was proactive, conservative, and innovative, such as the engineering effort to evaluate and report design problems with Klockner/Hoeller molded case circuit breakers.
The performance rating is Category 1 in this area.
3.4 Plant Support Plant support performance was considered excellent overall.
Strong management support was demonstrated by maintaining an excellent security program, the excellent state of preparedness of the emergency response facilities, and good efforts in maintain>ng outage dose as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA).
Analytical performance in chemistry and performance during the 1993 emergency exercise were excellent.
Self-assessments in the plant support areas were effective and thorough.
However, a decline was evident in radiation protection performance.
Problems were identified during the 1994 refueling outage including inconsistent radiation worker performance, procedural adequacy and adherence, and inadequate surveys.
Additionally, weaknesses in radiation protection training concerning the handling of radioactive waste and the introduction to the plant staff of the concepts of the revised
CFR 20 in general employee training were noted.
Radiation protection (RP) performance during the assessment period was good with some exceptions.
The RP and quality assurance staffs performed high quality assessments which were critical of performance.
In the decision not to perform a recirculation system chemical decontamination during the 1994 refueling outage, the RP staff performed a detailed technical evaluation of the source term and dose benefits.
The staff maintained lower than expected outage dose, relative to the high zinc-65 and cobalt-60 source term, by implementing excellent ALARA techniques and good outage planning.
Releases of radioactive effluents continued to be low.
management was effective in ensuring that the radiation protection program and procedures were consistent with the January 1,
1994, implementation of the revised
CFR 20.
However, several weaknesses were identified in procedural adherence and adequacy of other RP procedures concerning the thermoluminescent dosimetry program, observance of electronic dosimeter alarms, respirator maintenance and assembly, and surveill.ance of high efficiency particulate air filters.
The RP staff also failed to identify and quantify alpha contamination during preparation for the main steam isolation valve replacement, leading to several
Weaknesses, observed in the last assessment period concerning the removal of a source range monitor, were also evident in a radiological assessment performed by nuclear engineering for the removal of an intermediate range monitor.
Implementation of the chemistry and radiological environmental monitoring program (REHP) continued to be excellent, with excellent analytical ability demonstrated by the staff.
The chemistry staff made significant progress in characterizing the effect of hydrogen and zinc injection on the recirculation system's corrosion film and the effect of various decontamination agents to remove the film, which was critical with respect to the zinc-65 component.
Chemistry, engineering, radiation protection and operations worked well as a
team in identifying and reducing drywell source term.
Chemistry analyses capabilities and the post accident sampling system were well maintained.
Although some weaknesses were identified in the documentation of missed REHP samples, the sample collections and annual reports were good.
Overall the emergency preparedness program was excellent.
The overall performance during the 1993 exercise was good.
Good control ro'om crew and Emergency Operations Facility staff performance, a challenging scenario, strong controller performance, and a critical self-evaluation were strengths of the 1993 exercise.
Management and station support continued to be a
strength.
Improvements to plans, procedures, and the dose assessment program, as well as increased Public Alert Notification System sirens operability, demonstrated the staffs'esponsiveness and proactive manner.
Strong management support was evident in maintaining an excellent security program.
Management was proactive in reducing security compensatory measures and in improving the reliability of the alarm monitoring function.
More realistic training was established for alarm station console operators and armed response team members.
Significant improvements were noted in the communications between management and the'security force.
Significant procedural improvements were implemented to preclude an occurrence early in the SALP period of safeguards information found unattended outside the protected area.
The performance rating is Category I in this area.