IR 05000259/1986014
| ML18031A462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1986 |
| From: | Brooks C, Cantrell F, Patterson C, Paulk G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18031A460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-86-14, 50-260-86-14, 50-296-86-14, NUDOCS 8606100605 | |
| Download: ML18031A462 (27) | |
Text
ype REGNI Wp0 Op
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.
50-259/86-14",
50-260/86-14, and 50-296/86-14 Licensee:
Tennessee Va 1 1 ey Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.
50-259,. 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-g8 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted:
April l - 30, 1986 e
t, Inspectors:
G.
L.
P k, Senior Re d
C. A.
Pa erson, Resi t
C.
R. Brooks, Resident Approved by:
F.
S. Cantrell, Segij hief, Division of Reactor Projects Date Signed W cga.P ate Signed te igned 5 zu 9'5 D te Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine inspection involved 280 resident inspector-hours in the areas of operational safety, maintenance observation, reportable occurrences, previous enforcement matters, surveillance testing observation, and local information meetings.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
SbOb100b05 Sb0523 PDR ADOCK 05000259
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W.
C. Bibb, Site Director J.G. Walker, Deputy Site Director T.F. Ziegler, Assistant to the Site Director E.P. Schlinger, Manager - Engineering and Modifications S.H.
Rudge, Manager - Site Services S.R.
Maehr, Manager Site Planning and Financial Services J.G. Turner, Manager - Site Quality Assurance R.L. Lewis, Plant Manager E.A. Grimm, Assistant to the Plant Manager J.E.
Swindell, Superintendent Units One and Three R.M. McKeon, Superintendent Unit Two T.D. Cosby, Superintendent
- Maintenance D.C. Mims, Technical Services Supervisor R.E. Jackson, Chief Public Safety B. C. Morris, Compliance Supervisor A.W. Sor rell, Health Physics, Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included licensed reactor operators, auxiliary operators, craftsmen, technicians, public safety officers, Quality Assurance, Design and engineering personnel.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 29, 1986, with the Plant Manager and/or Assistant Plant Managers and other members of his staff.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exceptions.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed)
Followup Item (260/85-44-01)
The licensee has attributed the cause of the leaking fuel assemblies to crud-induced-localized corrosion of fuel rods containing gadolinium which were fabricated from certain ingots of zirconium.
The licensee plans to install new fuel rods which have been heat treated to reduce their susceptibility to the corrosion.
Since the cause of these leakers has been determined to be a failure mechanism known in the industry and the subject of several technical papers, this item is close (Closed)
Open Item (260/296/83-35-01)
This item was previously closed for Unit 1 in report 84-07.
This item is closed for the remaining units.
(Closed)
Open Item (260/83-09-07)
The inspector reviewed the corrected technical specification and the administrative error has been corrected.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Violation (296/81-26-01)
The inspector reviewed the plant work plan (7947)
and drawing revision (45N800-13RA)
for correction of the sealing between conduit and the hydrogen oxygen system solenoid valves.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Followup Item (259/260/296/79-12-02)
The gA audits of the training program were reviewed for the past-several years and the commitment to perform training audits has been performed.
The overall effectiveness of the training program is being evaluated by the NRC operator requalification testing program.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Open Item (259/260/296/82-12-02)
This item consisted of four discrepancies concerning the reactor core isolation cooling system.
Three of the material items have been corrected.
One item regarding two drain valves has been noted as a drawing discrepancy from the licensee system walkdown program.
Correction of the errors identified in the walkdown will include addition of these valves to'-the system drawings'.
This item i s-closed.
(Closed) Violation (296/83-43-01)
Revisions to plant procedures were made to insure that the correct fuel assembly rack size are verified.
This included revisions to Technical Instruction TI-14 and General Operating Instruction GOI-100-3.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (260/79-16-02)
The inspector reviewed the administrative control for the control rod withdrawal sequence sheets and noted several improvements.
Surveillance Instruction SI 4.3.B requires that all high worth rods be designated.
?he rod sequence is required to be verified by a second nuclear engineer.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Open item (259/260/296/81-35-03)
Licensee Event Report (LER) 85-04 discusses the current problems with the low pressure coolant injection motor generator (MG) coil clamps and recti fier rings.
All Unit 2 MG sets have been returned-to the vendor for permanent repair.
Units
and 3 will be repaired after Unit 2.
The condition of the MG sets will be reviewed prior to startup.
LER 85-04, regarding this item, is open for further review prior to a unit startup.
(Closed) Violation (259/260/296/84-15-01)
Operating Instruction OI-32 for the control air system has undergone a complete revision.
This was the
first major procedure revision performed by the procedures rewrite group.
The revision included updating the system valve lineups from walkdowns of the system piping.
(Closed)
Open Item (259/260/296/85-06-06)
The reason for the reactor vessel bottom drain temperature being low was found by the licensee to be due to a
valve being closed or partly closed in the drain line preventing adequate circulation to provide an accurate temperature reading.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Followup Item (259/260/296/85-48-01)
The inspector has determined the location and status of the sixteen uninstalled defective ferroresonant power supplies used in the reactor protection system.
Eight power supplies were installed but not wired in the-system and the remaining power supplies tagged and located in a warehouse.
The Unit 2 power supplies have been replaced with new ones obtained under contract 835043 and a work plan has been written to replace the Unit 1 items.
None were installed in Unit 3.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Open Item (296/83-27-06)
The diesel door locking mechanisms have been routinely observed during plant tours and no problems noted.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation (296/83-19-05)
-The inspector reviewed the licensee response for late reporting because of an omission by the shift technical advisor.
Improvements have been noted in this area by the completion of a licensee form to determine if events are reportable.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Open Item (296/85-06-05)
The plant operating instruction for venting the drywell was reviewed and deemed adequate by the licensee.
Any accident condition was thought to quickly activate the high pressure in the drywell trip while a
slow transient could be vented through the filtered standby gas treatment system.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Followup Item (259/260/296/86-05-10)
The inspectors received from the licensee a probabi listic ri sk assessment of a tornado-generated missile striking the safety-related equipment located in the reactor building vent towers.
The analysis concluded no modifications were necessary for additional protection of the equipment.
The vent towers are constructed of sheet metal siding over structural steel and are not designated to withstand a tornado-generated missile.
The analysis has been forwarded to other NRC offices for review.
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (259/260/296/81-13-02)
The Nuclear (}uality Assurance Manual, Part III, Section 1.4 '
has been revised to require controlled copies of procedures be;made readily available to plant sections performing work.
This item is close (Closed)
Violation (260/83-46-01)
The licensee has made procedure revisions to improve post-trip evalua'tions.
Standard Practice BF-12.8, Unit Trip and Reactor Transient Analysis and Technical Instruction TI-74, Post Trip'eview and Analysis, were revi sed.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Violation (260/83-46-02)
The inspector reviewed the Technical Specification Amendment in regard to tripping of inoperable reactor protective system channel and has no further questions.
This item is closed..
Unresolved Items" (92701)
5.
There are unresolved items in paragraphs S.a., 5.b., 5.e.,
and 6.
Operational Safety (71707, 71710)
The inspectors were kept informed on a routine basis on the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff.
The inspector's made routine visits to the control rooms when an inspector was on site.
Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings; status of operating systems; status and alignments of emergency-standby systems; onsite and offsite emergency power sources available for automatic operation; purpose of temporary tags on equipment controls and switches; annunciator alarm status; adherence to procedures; adherence to limiting conditions for operations; nuclear instruments operable; temporary alterations in effect; daily journals and logs; stack monitor recorder traces; and control room manning.
This inspection activity also included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis.
Portions of the turbine building, each reactor building and outside areas were visited.
Observations included valve positions and system alignment; snubber and hanger conditions; containment isolation alignments; instrument readings; housekeeping; proper power-supply and breaker; alignments; radiation area controls; tag controls on equipment; work activities in progress; and radiation protection controls.
Informal discussions were held with selected plant personnel in their functional'areas during these tours.
Weekly verifications of system status which included major flow path valve alignment, instrument alignment, and switch position alignments were performed on the condensate transfer system and residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) systems.
"An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to t
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio A complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the condensate transfer and RHRSW system was conducted to verify system operability.
Typical of the items checked during the walkdown were:
lineup procedures match plant drawings and the as-built configuration, hangars and supports operable, housekeeping adequate, electrical panel interior conditions, calibration dates appropriate, system instrumentation on-line, valve position alignment correct, valves locked as appropriate and system indicators functioning properly.
In the cour se of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program.
The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities to include; protected and vital areas access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
In addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting and protected and vital areas barrier integrity.
a.
Unlocked Doors on High Radiation Areas On March 29, 1986, at 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br /> a normally locked door to the Unit 2 reactor water cleanup (RWCU) heat exchanger room was found open by the licensee and was neither occupied nor guarded.
This room is normally locked because of the high radiation levels.
,Technical Specification 6.3.A.2 requires each area greater than 1000 mr/hr be locked or guarded.
A survey performed on March 28, 1986, indicated the general area reading to be 2000 mr/hr.
The Health Physics staff stated that based on a survey conducted March 31, 1986, using a ruler at 18 inches, that the general area reading was 500 mr/hr and a violation had not occurred.
However, the resident inspector stated at the exit interview that the evaluation should have been based on the survey conducted on March 28, 1986, and plant management agreed that a violation had occurred and was licensee identified.
This item is being left un-resolved (259/260/296/86-14-01)
pending further Region II inspection and review..
A similar type event occurred on March 31, 1986, when the cleanup sludge pump room door was identified by the licensee as being unlocked.
This area is normally locked because there is a potential for dose rates to be greater than 1000 mr/hr.
Surveys performed prior to and after indicated the general area reading was 500 mr/hr.
b.
Low Level Contamination in Underground Tunnels On April 10, 1986, during a routine plant tour, the inspector learned of a low level contamination problem in the tunnel between the turbine
bui lding and pump intake structure.
Thi s tunnel houses various electrical cable trays.
Water was found on the floor but the contamina-tion levels were below any posting requirements for radioactive contamination.
The source of the water has not been determined but it was believed due to leakage from an adjacent tunnel sharing a
common wall.
The adjacent tunnel contains piping connecting the condensate storage tanks (CST) to the reactor building.
The CST are a
source of water to various emergency core cooling systems.
The inspectors toured the CST tunnel on April 18, 1986, entering from the radwaste building.
During the tour several problem areas were seen.
At the end of the tunnel-near the condensate storage tanks, one inch of water was on the floor.
A sump pump in the area appeared not to be functioning properly.
Numerous supports for the condensate were very corroded at the base plates which were covered with water.
Numerous pipe brackets had missing or loose fasteners.
The area was in a
general state of deterioration.
This item will remain unresolved pending a review of the licensee inspection program to inspect areas not readily accessible and correction of the identified material deficiencies (259/260/296/86-14-02).
Resolution of High Background Radiation Areas Identified by EG&G Aerial Survey EG&G Energy Measurements Incorporated ender contract with the NRC took aerial gamma spectroscopic measurements of the site on July 12-17, 1985.
These measurements determine the natural background radiation levels which would be used for baseline survey data in case of an accident.
Three locations indicated the presence of license material, specifically cobalt 60.
One of the areas was identified as the reactor building and refuel floor area.
A second area was identified as radwaste trailers parked near the low level radwaste storage facility.
This storage is located outside the plant protected area but on TVA property.
This storage facility is not licensed as a storage facility.
The third area was inside the protected area north of the switchyard.
The source of the cobalt 60 in this area was at first not readily identified.
After receiving detailed photographs on April 18, 1986, and reviewing plant records, the source was determined to be a
temporary radwaste storage area.
Environmental thermoluminescent dosimeters in the area supported that the source was from radwaste.
EG&G initially thought the location was a
mound of dirt next to the area of the radwaste storage trailers.
A survey of the mound of dirt using a Micro R survey meter indicated only background readings.
EG&G stated that part of the problem may have been due to a "positioning" error caused by taking the aerial photographs and surveys on different day The inspectors inspected the two radwaste storage areas.
The several trailers next to the low level waste storage facility appeared to have been there for some time due to rust, etc.,
noted on the trailers.
The inspectors questioned this practice as the facility is not licensed as a
storage facility.
Health Physics supervision stated they would
'etermine the reason and need for the trailer storages.
Conduct of Operations The licensee recently completed a
major revision to Standard Practice 12.24, Conduct of Operations.
The revised instruction more clearly delineates operations personnel conduct, responsibility and authority.
It also formalizes shift turnover, communications, inspections and log keeping.
One of the major enhancements brought about by this revision is a formal Operations Critique.
The critique is required for any unusual event, spill, valving or personnel error.
The on-shift shift engineer conducts the critique with all involved personnel as soon as conditions warrant but before the personnel leave the site.
The critique must be completed before the evolution is allowed to continue.
Four teen critiques have been completed since December 1985.
The inspector reviewed these critiques and found them to be quite compre-hensive.
The analysis of roo't causes, contributing causes and personnel errors was extensive and to the point.
Corrective action consisted of a
range of actions each of which clearly aims at preventing recurrence of the event.
Some of the more significant findings and recurrence control are as follows:
(1)
When jumpers were found to be reversed on a Temporary Alteration of the Reactor Protection System, one of the causes was determined to be alligator clips coming off of the jumpered terminals.
A Corrective Action Report (CAR) was written which will prevent the use of alligator clips for future temporary alterations.
Only ring-tongue terminals wi 11 be used in the future.
This is to prevent incorrect replacement of an alligator clip which was originally installed correctly but subsequently came off of the terminal.
(2)
An inadvertent start of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) during maictenance was partly attributed to illegible, drawings.
A complete survey of drawings used by operators was conducted.
A Corrective Action Report (CAR) was written to replace all of the poor quality drawings.
(3)
When portions of the High Pressure Fire Protection System were found isolated, a
general lack of knowledge of administrative controls over the system was detected.
Detailed training was initiated.
Fire protection personnel were also to evaluate the merits of and install a lock-out system to prevent recurrenc (4)
An inadvertent carbon dioxide release from the fire protection system was determined to be caused by a leaking valve.
Although many people recognized that the valve leaked under certain circum-stances it was not previously recognized'hat a fault existed in the valve.
The critique also identified a problem with a carbon dioxide vent line which discharged to the room.
A modification request was submitted to re-route the vent line outside and a
temporary alteration was completed to prevent carbon dioxide build-up in the room during the interim.
The Operations Critiques are considered to be a major improvement over past event evaluations.
Although originally limited to the Operations Section, the Site Director has issued guidance that all sections will use a similar methodology.
e.
Drywell Platform Steel The inspector reviewed Nonconformance Report (NCR)
BFNCEB 8402.
The licensee classified this NCR as a significant condition adverse to quality in March 1984.
At that time it was discovered that the drywell platform steel at elevations 563 and 584 had not been analyzed following the addition of significant loads'uring plant modifications.
Further licensee investigations revealed other discrepancies in the platform design calculations.
These are:
I) some eccentric loads were.
not included, 2)
some uplift loads were not included, 3)
some calculations were not second checked, 4)
the structural behavior of the overall platform under combined loads was not analyzed.
Corrective action is still in progress and consists of walkdowns to determine the as-built configuration and a structural evaluation of the as-built configuration, The inspections have been completed for Unit
and analysis of the lower platform is complete.
The upper platform analysis is in progress and shows a potential for beam overstresses during an SSE.
This item must be resolved prior to each respective unit's startup and is being tracked as an Unresolved Item (259/260/296/86-14-03)
pending completion of the analysis and the licensee's reportabi lity determination.
f.
Operator Staffing
.
In a letter to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) dated January 28, 1986, the licensee requested concurrence with an inter-pretation of
CFR 50.54(m)
and the Browns Ferry Technical Specifications regarding minimum plant staffing.
The licensee conclud-ed that with Units I and 2 defueled, the common Unit 1'nd 2 control rooms need not be continuously manned with licensed personnel.
Unit 3, being in cold shutdown, would be. staffed with a
licensed reactor operator in the control room and a senior reactor operator on the site.
In its March 28, 1986 reply, NRR rejected the proposed interpretation
citing the provision of 10 CFR 50.54(m) which supersedes the technical specifications.
According to the rule, the minimum requirements per shift for a three unit plant with two control rooms and no units in operation are one senior operator and three operators.
Since Unit 3 is fueled, the operator must remain at the controls and not elsewhere in the control room.
The operators for Units 1 and 2 would not be limited to the area at the controls, but must be present within the protected boundary of the Browns Ferry site as would the senior operator who would be responsible for all three units.
The licensee is following this interpretation pending additional review by NRR.
g.
Bomb Threat 0'
bomb threat was received at the plant site at 1325, April 18, 1986.
The licensee responded in accordance with the plant security plan and emergency procedures.
A Notification of Unusual Event (IP2)
was declared at 1332 with NRC notification at 1350.
The Security force posture was increased and all'affected plant personnel were evacuated.
The Alabama State Police bomb experts assisted in the search activities.
Search activities were completed at 1640 with negative results.
The IP2 was cancelled at 1640.
The resident and regional staffs followed up on the activities associated with this event.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
Plant maintenance activities of selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operations were met; activities were accompli shed using approved procedures;
'functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or system to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accom-plished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; proper tagout clearance procedures were adhered to; Technical Specification adherence; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Maintenance requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which might affect plant safety.
The inspectors observed the below listed maintenance activities during this report period:
Wrong Impeller on Five RHRSW/EECW Pumps On April 8, 1986, the inspector learned from an entry on the plant daily status sheet that five of the residual heat removal service water pumps had the wrong type impeller installed.
The problem was identified by the licensee after pump C3 was unable to meet the ASME Section XI total head requirement.
Four other pumps were believed to contain the wrong impeller
as they were purchased under the same purchase order.
The licensee conducted a safety evaluation which concluded the pumps were acceptable and could meet the technical specification flow requirement of 4500 GPH.
The manufacturer supplies both a
high and low head impeller.
The five impellers were low head but should have been a high head impeller.
The inspectors inspected two of the different impellers in storage and physical differences were easily identified.
The inspectors expressed a concern to plant management about receipt inspection of safety-related, parts and equipment.
The licensee has sent the two style impellers to the manu-facturer for an evaluation and is considering a Part 21 Report.
This item will remain unresolved pending review of the licensee's evaluation (259/260/296/86"14-04).
Surveillance Testing Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed and/or reviewed the below 1 i sted surveillance procedures.
The inspection consisted of a
review of the procedures for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation on the conduct of the test, removal from service and return to service of the system, a review of test data, limiting condition for operation met, testing accomplished by qualified personnel, and that the surveillance was completed at the required frequency.
Surveillance Instruction Review As indicated in Inspection Report 259/260/296/86-05 the licensee has initiated a 100% review of technical specif4cation surveillance instructions to verify that surveillance requirements are being satisfied.
The review effort is about 10%
complete with a June 30, 1986, scheduled completion date.
The inspector reviewed the program and some initial results.
The review is being conducted by experienced General Electric employees reporting to the Procedures Upgrade Supervisor.
Each review is documented on the Surveillance Instruction Technical Review Checklist.
The checklist was developed based upon similar programs at several other utilities as well as the program recently completed at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
The checklist was found to be adequate for documentation of deficiencies and resolution of these deficiencies as well as technical content.
It was obvious by'he detail contained in the checklist that lessons learned from previous review programs as well as previous operational events (such as inadvertent logic actuations)
were included in the program development.
The review effort has lead to several significant findings.
The battery surveillance instruction was found to lack a specific gravity correction factor for electrolyte level variation.
The surveillance instruction for scram discharge instrument volume vent and drain valves was found to be
missing acceptance criteria for valve stroke time.
The surveillance instructions for neutron monitoring system functional tests (SRM, IRM, APRM, RBM, Hi, Hi-Hi, and Inspection trip functions)
have been found to not fully satisfy the surveillance requirements as amplified in the notes to Technical Specification Tables 3.2.C and 4.2.C.
The program provides for rapid correction of these types of deficiencies as well as a clause for report-ability evaluation per
CFR 50.72 and
CFR 50.73.
This program should be extremely beneficial in preventing recurring problems with surveillance and operability tests.
8.
Reportable Occurrences (90712, 92700)
The below listed licensee events reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included:
adequacy of event description, verification of compliance with technical specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional in-plant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an asterisk.
The foll'owing licensee event reports are closed:
LER No.
259/82-05 Date January 9,
1982 Event
EN Rmov Boar'd (LPCI)-
MG Set Removed from Service Due to Loss of Lubrication on Generator Coupling.
259/86"05 February 10, 1986 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Actuation.
296/86-01 January 5,
1986 Reactor Protection System Trip on Low Voltage Due to Personnel Error.
"259/85-30 July 6, 1985 Incorrect Surveillance Instruction Frequency.
There were no violations or deviations in this area.
9.
Local Information Meetings (94600)
An important factor in the effectiveness of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspection program at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant is the NRC's visibility to the general public and local officials.
In keeping with the
policy of familiarizing local officials with the mission of the NRC, introducing key NRC personnel associated with the facility, discussing lines of communication between the public or local officials and the NRC and discussing the status of the facility and related community concerns with the public, three meetings were held recently as described below:
a.
Meeting with Region II Section Chief and Senior Resident with the Mayor of Athens, Alabama, on April 24, 1986.
b.
C.
Speaking engagement with presentation by Senior Resident on the "Role of the NRC at Browns Ferry" at the Decatur Civitan 'Club on April 23, 1986.
Speaking engagement with prefentation by Senior Resident on the
"History of the NRC Resident Program" at the Decatur Lions Club on March 4, 1986.
10.
Licensed Operator Accelerated Requalification Training Two inspections were conducted on March 2-3 and April 15-16, 1986 by members of the Operations Branch of Region II.
Both inspections were of the licensed operator accelerated requalification training program and covered instruction being presented at the site.
This was due to the unacceptable performance of the licensed operators on a Commission administered examina""
tion in November, 1985.
Future inspections will cover other components of the program.
A Commission administered examination will be given the week of June 16-20, 1986 to ascertain whether the program has upgraded operator competence.
Concerns which were identified during these inspections and TYA's corrective action are as follows:
b.
The theory and thermodynamics portion of the training program was presented from an "engineering" point of view, that is to say, it was very mathematically and problem-solving oriented.
The six-week time frame which was originally allocated for theory topics was seen to be inadequate,to allow the students to learn at this level of expertise.
Browns Ferry agreed with this conclusion and extended the curriculum by one week.
Further review to reduce the mathematical content of the training for future groups is being made.
One instructor for the theory section had not completed all of the TYA instructor competency requirements as defined in the Nuclear Training Program Manual, Section 0202.03.
While the significance of this requirement was minimal, it reflected an inattention to detail within the training department management.
The records of all Browns Ferry instructors have been reviewed; the one deficiency described above had been corrected by the instructor's completion of the required training cours t
All of the contractor instructors being utilized by Browns Ferry have not been certified at the SRO level by the Commission.
This require-ment was established in NUREG-0737 and is still in force today.
Those instructors who have not been certified by the Commission have, however, been certified at the SRO level, by their respective employers.
Additionally, all of these instructors have previously requested Commission evaluation, but has been deferred due to resource con-straints.
Browns Ferry submitted, by letter dated April 2, 1986, an action plan to ensure the technical competence of the instructors.
It addressed four criteria as being necessary for instructors without previous NRC SRO license or certification:
(1)
Have completed a vendor approved SRO training program, and; (2)
Have requested a Commission examination, and; (3)
Have assimilated BFNP specific information into their training presentations, and; (4)
Be enrolled in an appropriate requalification training program.
Criteria (1), (2)
and (3) were adequately addressed.
Criteria (4) is addressed further in d below.
d.
A specific methodology was proposed to ensure that all contractor instructors were
"Browns Ferry Competent".
This consisted of a
minimum of two hours preparation time before teaching BWR-4 generic systems and attendance at a
systems lecture, self pre-paration and an oral checkout prior to teaching a non-generic system.
A list of generic systems was modified to reflect that all Containment and Rod Control systems would not be generic for instructors certified on the Perry plant design, and that the Residual Heat Removal System was not generic for those certified on the Dresden plant design.
The program proposed in c.
and d.
above concerning instructor quali-fications i.s under review by the regional and headquarters staff.
Conclusions derived from these inspections are as follows:
(a)
A-sixteen week accelerated training program has been initiated.
It addresses all areas of 'identified weakness from Examination Report 50-259/01-85-03.
(b)
Instructor competence appears adequate.
Platform skills and technical knowledge are good enough to provide effective and relevant instructio (c)
Training materials are acceptable.
They contain all of the information required by the operator to attain and demonstrate his competence.
(d)
Student motivation is critical.
While training may be exceptional, if the student, is not motivated to learn and perform well, he will not.
While difficult to measure, motivation appears to be improving from an initial low starting point.
(e)
The independent audit exam planned will be invaluable as the objective filter to identify unprepared personnel.
Its separa-tion, as much as possible, from the daily instructional staff is seen as promoting an objective and effective audit function.