IR 05000259/1986033
| ML18031A930 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1986 |
| From: | Cunningham A, Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18031A929 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-86-33, 50-260-86-33, 50-296-86-33, NUDOCS 8611040285 | |
| Download: ML18031A930 (25) | |
Text
~p,g Ilb0II Wp,
+
ce r
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
'=) >4
"i986 RePort Noser 50-259/86-33, 50-260/86-33, and 50-296/86-33 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
September 22-25, 1986 Inspectors: '~ ~ we&.c~
artor, earn Lea er
. L.
unnsng am t
Accompanying Personnel:
G.
Wehmann A. K. Loposer A. H. Johnson K. M. Clark Approved by:
.
Dec er, se Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Zc/ z~lZ.
'te Soigne Fd
'te sgne ate
>gne Scope:
Routine, announced inspection of the annual Browns Ferry emergency preparedness exercise involving observations by six NRC-representatives of key emergency organization functions and locations during the exercise.
Results:
Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
Four exercise weaknesses were identified.
8611040285 861024 PDR
- DOCK 05000259
'Q PDR
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- H. P.
Pomrehn, Site Director
- R. L. Lewis, Plant Manager
- R. McKeon, Operations Manager
- T. Cosby, Maintenance Manager
- B. Thomison, Technical Assessment Manager
- A. Sorrell, Radiological Control Manager
- R. Gallien, Radiochemistry Manager
- D. Wall, Chief Controller
- M. Meek, Control Room Controller
- B. Howard, Radiological Control Controller
- D. Thompson, Maintenance Controller
- R. Ricketts, Radiochemistry Controller
- W. Deason, Field Monitoring Controller
- R. Kitts, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Controller Other licensee employees that were contacted and/or attended the exit interview included managers, engineers; technicians, operators, mechanics,--
security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Paulk, SRO
- C. Patterson C. Brooks
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September-25, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did not reidentify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
A number of minor observations were presented to the licensee during the exit interview for suggested improve-ment and are not included in this report.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92700)
This subject was not addressed in the inspectio.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's emergency plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The detailed scenario and controller package was provided by the licensee in a timely manner.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The inconsistencies identified were corrected by the licensee prior to the exercise.
Additional minor inconsistencies that became apparent during the exercise failed to detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
The scenario was particularly challenging in that the assessment/maintenance teams from the Operations Support Center (OSC)
were exercised frequently throughout the exercise.
It was identified to the licensee during the exit interview that some of the specific objectives listed in the scenario for the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operations Support Center (OSC) were not fully met.
These are discussed further in the following paragraphs.
~,
6.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond-to an emergency as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(1),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Sections II.A and II.B.
The inspectors verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the Control Room, the TSC, OSC, and the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
At each of these centers, the assignment of emergency staff personnel appeared to be consis-tent with the licensee's implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsi te Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsi te emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response had been unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.4, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspectors noted that adequate staffing of the emergency response facilities was provided for the initial accident response.
Although the responsibilities for emergency response had been unambiguously defined, some significant interface and decision making problems were observed between the TSC and OSC.
These problems resulted in an entry team being excessively delayed prior to entering the Unit 3 reactor building to determine the source of the simulated leak causing elevated dose rate readings.
Contributing factors to the delayed response were:
(1) none of the instru-ment maintenance staff had been qualified to wear self-contained breathing apparatus and, (2) lengthy discussions addressing the taking of KI by the team before entering the Reactor Building.
The delayed entry and the determination of causes therefore were identified by the licensee during the exit interview as i,tems requiring followup.
These issues were also noted by the NRC team leader during the exit snterview and will be followed as exercise weaknesses for failure to meet scenario objectives as follows:
(1) the TSC objectives of demonstrating effective command and control and the primary functional responsibilities and problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff (50-259/86-33-01),
and (2) the OSC objectives of demonstrating that there is a timely and efficient transfer of information between the TSC and the OSC and the ability to direct and coordinate inplant health physics surveys in a timely manner (50-259/86-33-02).
The inspector in the control room also noted that control room personnel (with the exception of the Shift Engi'neer)
were not familiar with the use of Browns Ferry's recently revised Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs).
This created some confusion and delay resulting in the licensee's failure to fully meet the control room objective of demonstrating the primary functional responsibilities and problem solving capabilities of the control room staff.
This was also identified as an -exercise weakness (50-259/86-33-03).
The licensee has committed to training all operators in the revised EOIs and indicated that a training program was in place.
The inspector also noted that the licensee failed to meet the objective to demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the control room staff to the TSC staff.
This exercise weakness occurred because the control room staff was not informed of the transfer of responsibility to the TSC until 15 minutes after the transfer (50-259/86-33/04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
f Arrangements for requesting assistance resources are provided for in the Emergency Pla No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(4),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the implementing procedures.
The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified; Notification Methods and Procedure (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within th'e plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
CFR 50, Appendix R, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix B, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization appeared to be adequate throughout the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency has been made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The licensee established its Joint Information Center and provided periodic news releases.
A, rumor control center was established with the Citizen Action Line.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
~
~
14.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The emergency response facilities were activated and promptly staffed during the exercise.
The facilities appeared to be adequately equipped to support the emergency response.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite conse-quences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by
CFR 50.48(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
The licensee's offsite monitoring team's performance was observed by the licensee evaluators only and areas requiring followup included:
( 1) van maintenance problems delayed one of the field monitoring teams, and (2) the use of the new radios without prior training initially caused communication problems.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten mile EPZ.
The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteri No vio'lations or deviations were identified.
15.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organizations were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted a post-exercise critique on September 24, 1986.
The results of the critique were presented to 'licensee management on September 25, 1986, and included somh 39 findings listed as requiring additional investigation or corrective actions.
The licensee's actions taken to resolve these findings will be reviewed during subsequent inspec-tions {50-259/86-33-05).
Foll'owing the management critique, the NRC inspector provided preliminary findings observed during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Inspector Followup (92701)
a.
{Closed) Inspector Followup Item'"( IFI) 50-259/85-52-01:
Failure to demonstrate assignment of responsibility in that PARs were transmitted to the State without the CECC Director's approval.
An inspector in the CECC noted no inconsistencies regarding PARs.
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-259/85-52-02:
Failure -to document emergency notifica-tions from shift engineer's office in accordance with IP-2.
Emergency notifications were documented in accordance with IP-2.
c.
(Closed)
IFI 50-259/85-52-03:
Lack of adequate radio communications between the CECC and field assessment teams.
An inspector noted adequate radio communications between the CECC and field assessment teams.
d.
{Closed) IFI 50-259/85-52-04:
Media telephones not available.
An inspector observed the media telephones were installed and operational at the Joint Information Center facility.
e.
(Closed)
IFI 50-259/85-52-05:
Data sheets to IP-20 need to be updated to reflect current plant status.
An inspector noted that IP-20 and its data sheets had been updated.
Attachment:
Browns Ferry Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative'ummary
ATTACHi1ENT
. BROWHS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EHERGENCY PLAN (REP)
EXERCISE The 1986 BFN REP exercise will be a small-scale exercise requiring partial participation by State, and local emergency response agencies.
Exercise Goals The TVA goals for the 1986 BFN exercise are as follows:
1.
To allow plant and offsite personnel to test and practice their response capability in accordance with the BFN REP and REP implementing procedures to protect plant personnel and the general public as appropriate.
2.
To ensure that deficiencies observed in previous exercises have been corrected.
3.
To identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.
Exercise Ob ectives General Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize TVA emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to activate TVA emergency centers in a timely-manner.
3.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency communications equipment and the adequacy of the communications systems.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command and control over all emergency response activities conducted from his facility throughout the exercise.
5.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and/or problem solving capabilities of emergency response personnel.
6.
Demonstrate that timely and accurate information can be supplied to the State on a frequent basis.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively generate protective action recommendations.
Specific Objectives A.
Control Room Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Site Emergency Director (Shift Engineer)
to classify an emergency condition in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement protective action measures in a timely manne.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Engineer to periodically inform Control Room personnel of the'tatus of the emergency situation and the plant, conditions.
5.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and problem solving capabilities of the Control Room staff.
B.
Technical Support Center (TSC) Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the TSC emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the TSC in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate that effective command and control occurs in the TSC.
4.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibil'ities from the Control Room staff to the TSC staff.
5.
Demonstrate the primary functional responsibilities and problem solving capabilities of the TSC staff.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC staff to support the Control Room staff's effort to identify the cause of the incident, mitigate the consequences of the incident and place the unit in a safe, stable condition.
7.
Demonstrate the proficiency of the Site Emergency Director in the TSC to classify an emergency condition.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to account for site personnel in a timely manner.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate and implement onsite protective actions in a timely manner.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of onsite radiological conditions to support the formulation of protective action recommendation ll.
Demonstrate the timely updating of TSC status boards.
C.
Operations Support Centers (OSC) Objectives Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the OSC emergency response personnel in a timely manner.
2 ~
Demonstrate the ability to activate the OSC in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the OSC staff to initiate and coordinate activities in an efficient and timely manner.
4, Demonstrate that OSC teams are thoroughly briefed on plant conditions before being dispatched.
5.
Demonstrate that adequate health physics support is provided to OSC teams.
6.
Demonstrate that OSC team leaders provide effective command and control.
7.
Demonstrate that adequate communications are maintained between OSC teams and the OSC.
8.
Demonstrate that there is a timely and efficient transfer of information between the OSC and the TSC.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain and to analyze samples drawn from the inplant normal or post-accident sampling systems.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate inplant health physics surveys in a timely manner.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of onsite emergency workers.
12.
Demonstrate that a plant environmental monitoring team call be dispatched in a timely and efficient manner.
13.
Demonstrate the timely updating of OSC status boards.
D.<
Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) Objectives
~
Demonstrate that the Operations Duty Specialist makes the initial notification to the State in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize the CECC emergency response personnel in a timely manne Demonstrate the ability to activate the'CECC in a timely manner.
Demonstrate that'he CECC Director makes a clear announcement when he determines the CECC operational.
Demonstrate that effective command and control occurs in the CECC.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively call upon and utilize TVA corporate or outside support organizations when required.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain vendor and other outside resources as required.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC staff to direct and coordinate the deployment of Radiological Monitoring Teams in a timely manner.
Demonstrate the ability to perform dose assessment activities in a timely manner.
Demonstrate the. ability to coordinate TVA dose assessment, activities with those conducted by the State.
Demonstrate the ability of the dose assessment team to obtain, analyze, and use plant radiological condition information to produce dose assessments and to formulate timely protective action recommendations.
Demonstrate the ability to inform, update, and coordinate with State Radiological Health personnel regarding meteorological and dose assessment information in a timely manner.
Demonstrate the ability to inform and update FCC emergency response personnel regarding the status of an emergency condition in a timely manner.
Demonstrate the ability of the CECC plant assessment team to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends and potential consequences.
Demonstrate a timely and accurate flow of information from the TSC staff to the CECC assessment team.
17.
Demonstrate the ability of the Core Damage Assessment Teem to generate source term information in a timely manner.
II Demonstrate a timely and effective flow of information between CECC radiological and plant assessment teams.
18.
Demonstrate that protective action recommendations are made by use of the Protective Action Guide (PAG) logic diagram.
19.
Demonstrate the timely updating of CECC status boards.
20.
21.
Demonstrate that protective action recommendations are provided to the State in a timely and clear manner.
Demonstrate that proper security is established for the CECC.
22.
Demonstrate the ability to perform timely assessments of offsite and/or onsite conditions to support the formulation of protective action recommendations.
23.
Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal and industrial emergency contacts in a timely manner.
E.
Environs Assessment Activities..
1.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate Radiological Monitoring Teams in conjunction with the State.
2.
Demonstrate the ability of the Radiological Monitoring Teams to efficiently and effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collection and analysis of radiological samples, and other prescribed radiological monitoring activities.
3.
Demonstrate the ability of the monitoring teams to follow contamination control procedures.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of offsite emergency workers.
5.
Demonstrate effective co'mmand and control of radiological monitoring activities from the plant, FCC, and/or CECC as appropriate.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of Field Team members to use effective dress-out techniques using C-zone clothing under field condition F.
Public Information Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively function in the Joint Information Center (JIC) facility.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate a rumor control center with the Citizen's Action Line.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to produce a news release from the CECC every two hours.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to functionally staff the Public Information component of the CECC.
5.
Demonstrate the ability of the TVA chief spokesperson to brief the media in clear, understandable terms.,
G.
Communications Obj ectives 1.
Demonstrate the REP notification procedure throughout the notification chain, beginning at the BFN Control Room and extending to State and local authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of..communications links between the plant and the CEGGS 3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and the State EOC.
4.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communications links between the CECC and the JIC.
5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of communication links between the CECC and the FCC.
e 6.
Demonstrate the adequacy of radios in the monitoring vans, at Decatur, Alabama, at the CECC, and at the BFN TSC.
H.
Exercise Operation Objectives 1.
Provide specific and measurable objectives for the exercise.
2.
Improve controller and evaluator performance through an increased level of training.
3.
Provide additional information in the scenario package, i.e.,
Public Information messages, meteorological data, and evaluation forms.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately perform post-exercise critiques to determine any areas requiring additional capability improvemen.
All participating personnel will know the date of the exercise bu't not its starting time or duration.
6.
Participating personnel and radiological monitoring vans from Chattanooga will be prestaged.
7.
Participating personnel from Knoxville and equipment will be prestaged for the JIC.
8.
Provide training for new CECC personnel I. Drills That Mill Be Conducted l.
One annual plant radiologj.cal monitoring drill.
2.
One semiannual plant health physics drill.
3.
One annual radiochemistry drill.
4.
One quarterly communications drill.
5.
One annual plant communications drill.
6.
One annual offsite environs monitoring drill.
7.
One semiannual CECC dose assessment drill.
J.
Areas Hot to be Demonstrated Ingestion pathway activities.
2.
3.
Onsite and offsite recovery and reentry.
Fire drill activities.
0792E
Narrative Summar With the reactor increasing in power after a short maintenance outage, a
rod drop accident is postulated causing the reactor to scram on main stream line high radiation.
The "h" inboard and outboard main steam valves fail to close permitting a brief release of radioactive steam to the condensers before the operators can manually close the "A" valves.
This results in a release of radioactive steam thxough the stack to the environs via the mechanical vacuum pumps.
Unknown to the operators valve 85-286 off the scram discharge volume tank leaks releasing radioactive water and steam into the reactor building.
This leak is stopped when the opexator resets the scram.
The reactor building ventilation system isolates and SBGTS starts.
However, one of the two isolation dampers on the reactor building air intake fails to close.
An assistant unit operator in the vicinity of the CRD modules on the east side of the unit 3 reactor hears an air leak, locates the leak and notifies the unit operator.
Maintenance is notified to repair the leak.
In the process of repairing the air leak a union on the control air supply line which supplies air to the CRD scram inlet and outlet valves and to the drain valve at the bottom of the CRD scram discharge volume tank completely separates.
This break causes the CRD scram inlet and outlet valves to fail in the open position, a valve off the CRD scram discharge volume tank fails to close.
The scram air header depressurizes and all scram valves open.
Because of the low contxol air pressure the scram valves cannot be reset.
The valve leak off the scram discharge volume restarts causing radioactive water and steam to be released into the reactor building.
As time progresses, this leak is postulated to increase.
This results in airborne contamination in the reactox'uilding and in the operatox starting to depressuxize the xeactor using RCIC and the ADS valve A trip of the RCIC and CRD pumps with the reactor vessel pressure greater than 450 psi is postulated.
This prevents the RHR and CS systems from adding makeup water to the vessel.
It is fux'ther postulated that the aix'ressure in the accumulators for the ADS valves is so low that fuxther depressurization of the reactox vessel with the ADS valves in impossible.
The loss of makeup water capability to the reactor and the loss of the relief valves for depressurization result in repressurization of the reactor, a continuous loss of water from the vessel through the leaking relief valve flange and uncovering of the core.
Additionally, it is postulated that a maintenance team working the failed air intake isolation damper inadvertently opened the second damper.
This causes a
unfiltered release from the unit 3 reactor building to the environment.
This release continues for approximately l-l/2 hours until the damper can be reclosed.
10168