IR 05000255/1981017
| ML18046A953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1981 |
| From: | Boyd D, James Heller, Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18046A952 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-81-17, NUDOCS 8110070303 | |
| Download: ML18046A953 (6) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/81-17 Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
August 3-7, 10-14, l2~~fo 17-21, 24-28 and 30, 1981 Inspectors:
B. L~rgensen /,/'
_,/.~~~~
J, K. Heller 9-Z/-81
.~~vL Approved By:
D. C. Boyd, Chief 9-21-8/
Reactor Projects Section lA Inspection Summary Inspection during August 1981 (Report No. 50-255/81-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection program items, including:
operational safety; surveillance; maintenance; plant trip follow up; licensee event review; and independent inspectio The inspection in-volved a total of 140 inspector-hours onsite, by two NRC inspectors including 39 inspector-hours onsite during off-shif Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified in any of the inspected areas.
( 8110070303 810922"'
- PDR ADOCK 05000255 Q
- DETAILS Persons Contacted
- R. W. Montross, General Manager
- J. S. Rang, Operations/Maintenance Superintendent
- H. J. Palmer, Technical Superintendent
- G. H. R. Petitjean, Technical Engineer
- R. E. McCaleb, Quality Assurance Administrator D. K. Powers, Shift Technical Advisor W. S. Skibitsky, Operations Superintendent G. W. Ford, Senior Engineer (STA)
W. L. Burmeister, Shift Technical Advisor A. F. Brookhouse, Shift Supervisor (SRO)
S. Ghidotti, Shift Supervisor (SRO)
R. E. Mieras, Shift Supervisor (SRO)
E. I. Thompson, Shift Supervisor (SRO)
S. F. Pierce, Radioactive Materials Control Supervisor B. L. Schaner, Operation Supervisor K. M. Farr, Public Affairs Director W. E. Adams, Senior Engineer (STA)
W. P. Mullins, Plant Health Physicist D. P. Spry, Property Protection Advisor W. R. Burgess, Shift Supervisor (SRO)
P. Bruce, Instrument and Calibration Engineer
- Denotes those present at Management Interview September 4, 198 Numerous other members of the plant Operations/Maintenance, Technical, and Chemistry/Health Physics staff were also contacted briefl.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of August 198 The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected component Tours of contain-ment auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla A tour of the security fence was conducte The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control The in-spector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls and independently surveyed a radwaste truck awaiting shipmen *
The plant completed repairs to a primary coolant pump seal and returned to power operations on August 1 While shutdown, on August 5, an inadvertent safety injection was act1vated on the
"right" channe This itl~ is similar to an event reported in a previous report except,- in this case, the breaker to inverter No. 2 apparently reset itself. The licensee actions were timely and appropriat The inspector reviewed numerous Equipment Outage Requests and Licensee-completed checklists to verify proper return to service of systems and components prior to startu The discrepancies noted were previously identified by the licensee and appropriate action take During the month the licensee made final preparation for a planned 77 day refueling outage which began on August 2 Some of the preparations observed were briefing of plant employees, initiation of daily outage status review of daily outage status review meeting, computerizing the outage schedule, training of plant supervision on use of the computerized outage schedul In addition, the licensee took swift action when contractor personnel started to exhibit poor housekeeping habits and inadequately executed the instructions on a Notice of Outside Constructio On August 23, while sluicing resin to the deborating demineralizer, the waste gas surge tank was overpressurized, resulting in an un-planned gas releas The release was terminated in a matter of minutues and NRC was notified pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7 The release rate was a small fraction of annual average Technical Specification limit This item will be reviewed when the Licensee Event Report for this item is evaluate On August 10 and August 11, two small fires we.re discovered, one in the cable spreading room and one in a dumpster located in an outside construction are Plant fire brigade response, in each case, was adequat Neither fire involved radioactive materials or safety-related equipmen The above reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations activities were in conformance with the re-quirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and controlling procedure No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they
!/ IE Inspection Report No. 255/81-15
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were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemente Replacement of an air-start motor on emergency diesel-generator 1-1 Removal of insulation from the containment dom Bus 1-C and 1-D Seismic augmentation Replacement of oil filters on emergency diesel-generator 1-Proper use of a firewatch for main steam reheater drain line modification *No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the systems/components identified below, and verified that testing was performed in accordance with.adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were re-viewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were pro-perly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The inspector examined portions of the following test activities:
R0-21 Control Rod Drive System Interlock R0-22 Control Rod Drop Times and Turbine Ruriback Initiation M0-24 Inservice Test of Auxiliary Feed Water System During performance of M0-24 the inspector observed the pump discharge pressure, as read on PI-0789, was approximately 1575 PSI, which is nearly offscale, the range of PI-0789 being 0-1600 PS M0-24 used
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- the pump discharge pressure minus the calculated suction pressure to determine the pump differential pressure, which is one of the para-meters used to prove operability of the auxiliary feedwater pump Review of the pump differential pressure acceptable, alert and re-quired action range for the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump indicates the upper limits are outside the range of PI-078 Comparison of the evaluation table with table IWP-3100-2 of ASME,Section XI reveals a round-off error for the acceptable range and a math error for the lower limit of the required action range of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pum These items were reviewed with the ISI enginee The inspector notes that no re-quirements were violated but it appears to be a poor practice to use a gauge that does not fully function in the evaluation rang This.matter was disussed at the mangement intervie No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification (Closed) LER-80-026 "Inoperable High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Flow Instrument."
During refilling of Safety Injection Tanks following sampling, a licensed operator observed that the HPSI flow transmitter to loop 2B was inoperabl The instrument was returned to operable status within the time limits of the Technical Specification Licensee investigation determined the instrument bypas*s valve was not closed following calibration in September 197 The calibration forms and administrative procedures have been revised to require dual verification when repositioning instrument bypass valve (Closed) LER 81-003 "HPSI Valve Relay Failure." During routine testing of safety injection equipment an HPSI valve failed to open upon initiation of a test signa The failure is attributed to a dirty contactor in the Design Basis Accident (DBA) Sequence The contactor was cleaned and proper activation was verifie Licensee review determined this was not a reoccurring problem and proposed no future corrective actio Investigation by the in-spector indicates the DBA contactors are not on a cleaning pre-ventive maintenance activity. (P.M.)
When a shutdown sequencer contactor failed to function the future corrective action was to initiate a The shutdown sequencers are the same type and located in the same environ-men The I&C Engineer stated a PM would be iniated for the DBA sequencer This matter was discussed at the management intervie.A~
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(Closed) LER-81-08 "Component Cooling Pump Inoperable Due to Fire." With the plant at 99% power, 1 of 3 component cooling water pumps experienced a small bearing fir The fire was extinquished and a fire watch was poste The motor was r~placed and the pump declared operable within time allowed by the Technical Specificatio The fire was caused by motor bearing failure from apparent loss of lubricating oi Cause of oil loss is unknow A P.M. was initiated to periodically inspect the component cooling water pump and motor bearing (Closed) LER-81-11 "Diesel Generator Microswitch Failure. 11 Following routine surveillance testing of diesel generator 1-1, the over-speed, low air pressure, and ground fault alarms activated and would not rese The problem was traced to a broken overspeed trip microswitc The switch was replaced and the diesel generator returned to service within the time limits of the Technical Specification The root cause of the problem was improper use of the overspeed trip lever for tagout of the diesel engine, resulting in high impact onto the microswitch, causing it to brea The operations staff has been briefed on the proper tool and method to tagout the diesel engines using the overspeed trip microswitch, and the proper tool for manipulating the mechanical trip lever has been hung at each diese No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Plant Trips Following the plant trip on August 10, caused by a worker repairing a breaker to BUS lC which caused a cascade of events leading to a reactor trip, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistr The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation early the next da No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Management Interview A management interview (attended as indicated in Paragraph 1) was conducted following completion of this inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie