IR 05000254/1982008
| ML20062D042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1982 |
| From: | Chrissotimos N, Dupont S, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062D009 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-82-08, 50-254-82-8, 50-265-82-09, 50-265-82-9, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8208050435 | |
| Download: ML20062D042 (15) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No.
50-254/82-08; 50-265/82-09(DPRP)
Docket No.
50-254; 50-265 License No.
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection at: Quad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL EnspectionConducted: Apri 28, 1982, through June 29, 1982 l
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Inspectors:
J Chri sotimos
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550 S 6 S. C. DuPont 4-27-Tr it OTY^ h J
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Approved by: Roger D. kTalker, Chief
~ [<' ~ N Reactor Projects Section 1C Inspection Summary Inspection on April 28, 1982, through June 29, 1982 (Reports No. 50-254/
82-08; 50-265/82-09(DPPE)
Areas Inspected: MontFly Maintenance Observation, Procurement, Reactor Scrams, Licensee Event Reports Followup, Radiation Protection Operation, Fire Protection and Prevention Program Implementation, Inservice Inspection Program, Review of Licensee's Monthly Performance Reports, IE Bulletin Followup, Operational Safety Verification, Followup on Regi,onal,Reques.ts,.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation, Independent Inspection, and Exit Interview.
The inspection involved a total of 462 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 96 inspector-hours onsite during of f-shif ts.
Results:
Of the 13 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in 12 areas; three items of noncompliance wece identified in one area (failure to follow procedures - paragraph ll.B; Technical Specification violation - paragraph ll.C; and failure to provide condensate flood protection - paragraph 11.D).
8208050435 820719 PDR ADOCK 05000254 Q
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Kalivianakis, Superintendent T. Tamlyn, Assistant Superintendent Operations D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent Maintenance
,L, Gerner, Aasistant Superintendent for Administration
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- J. Heilman, Quality Assurance, Operations
- G. Tietz, Technical Staff Supervisor The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including shif t engineers and foremen, reactor operators, technical staff personnel and quality control personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 29, 1982.
2.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Unit 1 WR 18655 Torus level instrumentation replacement WR 18676 Maintenance on oxygen analyzer recorder WR 18799 Repack 1D RHR service water pump WR 18801 Resurface main generator slip rings WR 18893 Repair refuel bridge WR 18925 Troubleshoot ARM channel 32
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f WR 18936 Replace reactor building vent sample pump
WR 18949 Install IB instrument air compressor flow meter WR 19341 Replace IB diesel generator air compressor WR 19793 Troubleshoot No. 4 turbine control valve Unit 2 WR 19071 Replace containment oxygen analy'er-
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WR 19117 Replace CRD discharge filter
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'WR 19225 Replace main steam line 'A'
radiation monitor
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WR 19285 Troubleshoot 2A recirculation motor generator exciter i
WR 19315 Vacuum breaker 32C shows dual indication WR 19322 Repair electromatic relief valve 3C WR 19331 Repair electromatic relief valve 3C pilot valve WR 19333 Repair recirculation discharge valve 5B WR 19343 Troubleshoot SBLC circuit 'A'
failure WR 09171 'A'
Troubleshoot tripping of the 250v DC battery charger feed circuit breaker 29-2.
Following completion of maintenance on the Unit 1 'D' RHR service i
water pump and Unit 2 electromatic relief valve 3C, the inspector
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verified that these systems had been returned to service promptly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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3.
Procurement
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t The inspector verified that safety related material and parts received on site were inspected by qualified personnel.
The
inspector also determined through document review that storage and packaging requirements were defined and controlled by approved procedures and that the traceability of materials is adequate.
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Storage areas for safety related material and spare parts were adequate.
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The following limited shelf-life items were inspected for compliance to procedures:
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Spotcheck developer Various solenoid valve repair kits
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Control rod drive rebuild kits Scram pilot valve repair kits
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Reactor Scrams Unit 1
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On April 30, 1982, the unit scrammed from 80 per cent power due to
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reactor vessel low water level.
The cause was determined to be the "lB" feed pump discharge valve going closed.
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A failed switch caused the IB discharge valve to inadvertently go closed and caused the 1C reactor feed pump to automatically go to its. runout flow condition in an attempt to compensate for decreased flow from 1B.
However, the 1C pump alone could not meet the flow requirements from this power level and thus the 8" reactor scram point was reached.
The licensee determined that the interna 1' contacts of the switch were dirty which caused shorting between switch banks. The switch was replaced with a like-for-like.
The inspectors ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicat'rs.
The inspector verified that all systems responded as expected.
The unit was returned to operation the same day.
On May 17, 1982, while closing the main steam isolation valves to bring the unit to hot standby for feedwater line repairs (Paragraph 11),
a channel "A" scram signal was received. Approximately 40 seconds later, a channel "B" scram signal was received and the unit tripped f rom 8 MW thermal.
The "B" channel signal was attributed to a spurious signal.
The channel "A" trip was attributed to an intermittent interruption of the mode switch contacts that did not allow the bypassing of the main steam line isolation valve closure scram relay. The relay is set at less than 10 per cent of valve closure and is bypassed when the mode switch is taken out of the run mode.
The licensee's inspection and review determined that the cause was dirty contacts on the mode switch. The contacts were cleaned and subsequent operation of the switch was performed without any further problems.
The unit was returned to hot standby on the same day and all systens responded as expected.
The inspector determined the status of the reactor and safety systems by discussions with licensee personnel and review of documentation.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
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, Unit 1 RO 82-05/03L, dated March 25, 1982, RCIC turbine tripped during surveillance from a temporary ground within the RCIC 125v DC relay logic circuit.
RO 82-06/03L, dated April 12, 1982, high drywell pressure / auto blowdown pressure switch drifted in excess of Technical Specifi-cation limit.
RO 82-07/03L, dated April 15, 1982, the 'D' RHR service water booster pump outboard bearing was found to be failed during surveillance.
Concerning R0 82-07/03L, the occurrence was attributed to mechanical failure of the booster pump outboard bearing.
Excessive packing leakage from the booster pump outboard stuffing box sprayed water onto the outboard bearing.
Water entered the bearing housing diluting the lubricating oil and caused the f ailure of the bearing.
The outboard stuffing box was repacked and the outboard bearing was replaced. The pump was demonstrated operable on April 22, 1982.
Installation of bearing seals that may enhance bearing life by isolating the bearing from any water inleakage is being evaluated by the station Mechanical Maintenance Department. (OII-82-08-04)
Unit 2 R0 82-05/03L, dated April 20, 1982, high drywell pressure scram test exceeding Technical Specification limits during surveillance due to instrument drift.
RO 81-16/03L, dated September 6,1981, HPCI turbine oil leak.
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Concerning RO 81-16, the cause of the occurrence was determined to be a leaky threaded pipe connection between the inboard bearing and the oil line isolation valve.
The line was replaced with a like-for-like and the HPCI turbine was returned to service the same day.
The licensee's Nuclear Engineering Department is currently reviewing the possible installation of a high pressure steel braided hydraulic hose that may minimize future oil leaks.
(011-82-08-05)
R0 81-25/03L, dated January 8, 1982, SBGT System declared inoperable.
Because of two undersized supports, this item will be followed by regional inspectors per assistance request form number QC 82-01.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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6.
Radiation Protection Operation
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Qualifications
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The inspector reviewed records of six newly assigned personnel in the radiation protection. organization to verify that the
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- qualification requirements of ANS1 18.1-1971,. Regulatory Guide
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1.8 Revision 1-R and Section 13,~ Amendment 13 of the FSAR have
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been met.
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b.
Licensee QA Audits of Radiation Protection
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All audits performed between May, 1981, and Nby, 1982, in areas relating to the radiation protection program were
reviewed by the inspector with the following licensee finding:
Contrary to licensee procedure QCP-61, no samples were analyzed and recorded for fuel warranty purposes for the months of July
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and August, 1981.
A review of the licensee response to the finding revealed that
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feedwater samples were taken as required and analyzed once a
',7 month by atomic absorption for iron, copper, nickel and chromium.
The analyzed information was documented and then transmitted
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as a chemistry report to General Electric instead of the fuel
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warranty report. The lic'ensee has committed to complete the monthly (fuel warranty report as corrective action to the audit.
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The inspector has determined that the licensee's audit program
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c.
Exposure Control
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The inspector evaluated'the dosimetry equipment to determine i
compliance with the regulations. A review was conducted on a I
selection of exposure summary' records to verify co.mpliance
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l-with 10 CFR 20.10lb limits and that adequate controls were s
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demonstrated to prevent exposure of minors in excess of 10-percent of the limits specified. The inspector also reviewed the respiratory program to verify that* adequate training, maintenance and control programs, exist to ensure-that.respir-
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i ators are individually fitted aind that the, correct protection
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factor is applied. Through discussions with the radchem super-visor, the inspector determined that the licensee is applying their program to the techni_ cal ~ requirements listed in Regulatory
. Guide 8.15.
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d.
Training The inspector reviewed the training program and changes made since May, 1981. The training program was determined to be adequate to 10 CFR 19.13 requirements by review of selected records of two (2) individuals in both the new personnel and refresher training programs.
The inspector also attended a class in both categories.
e.
Posting, Labeling and Control The inspector observed areas of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings to verify compliance with 10 CFR 20 and licensee procedures for posting and labeling.
The inspector also verified that high radiation areas were controlled to prevent inadvertent access.
f.
Instruments and Equipment The inspector reviewed selected instruments to verify oper-ability and appropriate alarm settings. During the review of the calibration program, the inspector found one (1) beta-gamma instrument at the technician's station out of calibration.
It was determined that the instrument was removed from the reactor building to the technician's station for transfer to be calibrated. The instrument was misplaced at the technician station on an upper shelf and was there for approximately two weeks until it was discovered by the inspector.
The inspector determined that this is an isolated occurrence, and that the licensee has adequate control for equipment calibration.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Fire Protection and Prevention Program Implementation The inspector toured Unit 1 and 2 reactor buildings to verify adequate control of combustible materials and flammable liquids in safety related areas. During the inspection, both fire diesels were also verified to be operational.
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A visual inspection of fire brigade equipment, fire protet. tion l
systems and installed equipment to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications was also conducted.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Inservice Inspection Program During a review of the Inservice Inspection Program, the inspector had a concern regarding Hydrostatic Testing Requirements of ASME Section XI, Class 2 and 3 piping.
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l Under the current program (Summer, 1975, Addenda), Ilydrostatic
testing requirements for pump suction and discharge piping was not readily understood by the inspector.
Further discussion with site personnel revealed that a memorandum from the technical staff supervisor, dated December 14, 1981, to Commonwealth Edison Corporate Nuclear Engineering Department had addressed the same concern.
In the response memorandum dated May 27, 1982, the corporate office stated that the hydrostatic testing requirements may be accomplished by examination as required by the Section XI,1980 Winter Addenda, Section IWA 5224-d. The test requirements of 1980 code are more conservative than the 1975 code.
The current 1975 ISI program has not yet been formally approved and an updated program will be required following the next scheduled inspection outages (Unit 1 - Fall, 1982/ Unit 2 -
Fall, 1983).
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The licensee, in an attempt to maintain a current ISI program with respect to applicable codes, stated that they will perform the required tests in accordance with the more conservative 1980 Addenda to Section XI.
The inspector further discussed this situation with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
NRR found the approach taken by the licensee to be acceptable.
No further concerns were identified.
9.
peview of Licensee's Monthly Performance Reports The inspector reviewed the licensee's monthly performance reports of Units 1 and 2 for the months of March, April, and May.
Areas covered by the report were amendments to Technical Specifi-
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cations, summary of corrective maintenance performed on safety related equipment, licensee event reports, and operating data tabulations.
The report was reviewed for compliance with Technical Specifications 6.6.A.3.
During review of the March report with regards to corrective l
maintenance performed on safety related equipment, work request
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No. 09171 was further evaluated by the inspector.
Work request No. 09171 was issued to correct the recurring tripping of the feed breaker to the Unit 2 250v DC battery charger.
By discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector discovered that the work request was written as corrective maintenance to an installed modification.
Further review determined that the l
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i maintenance was designated as an engineered work request, which
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requires an onsite engineering evaluation.
l During the review of the work request by Quality Control, it was l
discovered that this engineering evaluation had not been conducted.
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A discrepancy report was issued and the evaluation was completed prior to Quality Control acceptance.
The detailed review conducted by Quality Control identified the problem and demonstrated that adequate administrative controls f
exist to correct problems.
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IE Bulletin Followup l
For the IE Bulletin listed below, the inspector verified that the
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written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite manage-ment representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
IE Bulletin 80-11, dated May 8,1980, Masonary Wall Circumstance.
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On May 20, 1982, the Dresden SRI conducted an inspection at the
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Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) at CECO Corporate
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offices in Chicago, II.
The purpose of the inspection trip was to review the licensee's evaluation related to the interim operability
l of those masonry walls that failed to meet the original acceptance
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criteria.
For all 18 affected masonry walls at Quad-Cities, NPS,
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the inspector reviewed the licensee's criteria, potential method of failure, evaluation of affected piping, cables, components, etc.,
and final analysis to meet the safe shutdown requirements. The
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inspector found the licensee's evaluations to be acceptable for
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continued operation.
It was noted that the licensee has committed to have all of the affected walls repaired to meet the original
acceptance criteria by June 1, 1983. This Bulletin will remain open for Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2 until the final repairs are
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evaluated.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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11.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of May and June, 1982.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of af fected components.
Tours of Unit 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
a.
On May 14, 1982, the licensee observed a leaking weld on the r
Unit 1 low flow feed regulating valve drain line isolation valve. As a precaution, the licensee increased the frequency of visual inspection by shift personnel.
On May 17, 1982, while touring the turbine building, the inspector noticed that the steam leakage had increased, and condensation was evident around busses 11 and 12 and some safety related cable trays.
The unit operating engineer was called to the turbine building to further evaluate the situation.
It was decided no immediate jeopardy to safety related equipment was involved; however, the unit should be brought to hot standby for repairs. While the unit was preparing for hot standby, a spurious scram did occur.
(Paragraph 4)
The weld was repaired and the unit returned to service on May 18, 1982.
Although no safety equipment was in jeopardy, the licensee took positive safe corrective action by taking the unit down.
b.
On May 29, 1982, the senior operating engineer and the lead mechanical maintenance engineer added to the Unit 1 outage maintenance schedule the replacement of the fast closure scram solenoid for the turbine control valve number 4.
After the maintenance was completed on May 29, the shift engineer cleared the out of service cards; and as required by procedures, dispatched the work request to the Quality Control Department for processing a release to perform the work request required test on the fast closure scram solenoid.
The work request was delayed inside the station's mail process
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and subsequently was not received and released by Quality I
Control until June 3.
Concurrently, the unit operating
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engineer was unaware of the maintenance performed on the fast closure scram solenoid and the unit was returned to power operation on May 31, 1982.
The testing was further delayed on June 3 by the load dispatcher only allowing " Required Technical Specification" I
testing. The testing to be performed by the work request was i
designated as monthly surveillance and thus was not performed
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until June 5.
The normal method of processing safety related work requests is to " hand carry" the work request to and from the Quality Control Department to ensure that the required testing is performed.
For an unknown reason, the work request was processed through the station's inhouse mail system.
Technical Specification 6.2.A.6. which states in part that
"... detailed written procedures including applicable cl:eckoff lists shall be prepared, approved and adhered to for preventive I
and corrective maintenance operations which could have an effect on the safety of the facility" and Quality Assurance Procedure QP 3-52 which states in part that "The Shift engineer shall clear the out of service cards and perform required operational tests to insure that equipment is operable and document same."
Contrary to Technical Specifications and Quality Assurance procedures, the required testing was not performed prior to declaring system operability.
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j This occurrence has been determined to 'be an item of noncompliance
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(50-254/82-08-01).
c.
On June 5, 1982, while conducting the required monthly surveillance and required test per the work request, the i
No. 4 turbine control valve fast closure scram solenoid failed to operate.
Technica'l Specifications 3.1.A. requires tripping of the affected scram channel whenever a redundant instrument channel is made inoperable.
The inoperability of the No. 4 fast closure scram solenoid did degrade the capability of the unit to scram.
The redundant fast closure scram solenoid was operable and would have scrammed the unit if actuated.
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- Table 3.1-3 states in part that "The minimum number of operable
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or tripped instrument channels per trip system in the run mode for turbine control valve fast closure is 2."
t The affected instrument channel 'B' was not tripped for 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> af ter the fast closure scram solenoid was documented as inoperable on June 5, 1982.
This condition went uncorrected through two shift turnovers by three shift engineers. The third shif t engineer began a load drop at 4:00 p.m. on June 6 and i
tripped the channel as required by the Technical Specifications at 4:45 p.m.
The licensee's further review revealed chat during maintenance
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on May 29, 1982, an electrical cable to the solenoid actuator was damaged. This resulted in the loss of redundancy of the
scram function of the fast closure scram solenoid for eight
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days.
This is an item of noncompliance (50-254/82-08-02).
d.
During a tour of the control room at 1:00 p.m. on June 3, 1982, the inspector noticed that the "RHR vault door open"
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annunciator was on.
The inspector questioned the Unit 1
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operator as to the meaning of the annunciator. The operator responded that personnel were still working on the 1/2 diesel generator cooling water pump motor and the door was being i
utilized.
The inspector then decided to go to the basement to observe the maintenance work. The inspector found that the RHR service water vault water tight door was open and that no personnel were present inside the vault.
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This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.H.1 and 3.5.H.3 which states in part "That systems installed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of flooding the condensate pump room shall be operable."
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l Further discussions revealed that station personnel lef t the j
door open af ter their work was completed because contractor personnel were still in the area.
This is an item of noncompliance (50-254/82-08-03).
i The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions
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and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
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During the months of May and June, 1982, the inspector walked down
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the accessible portions of the Unit 1 core spray and Unit 2 SBGT systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed por-tions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with
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l radwaste shipments and barreling.
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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and adminis-trative procedures.
Except as noted above, no other items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
Followup on Regional Requests a.
Potential generic defect in RCIC electrical overspeed trip.
The deficiency involved the installation of a relay in the overspeed monitor unit with contacts rated at 29v DC being used in a 250v DC circuit application.
The overspeed monitor device was made by Airpax Corporation.
The inspector verified that this type of overspeed monitor is not utilized at Quad-Cities. The licensee has General Electric metered relays, Model D1257K93002 with contacts rated at 5 amps and 120v AC installed for overspeed protection.
b.
Potential generic defect in Conoflow differential pressure regulators. The apparent generic defect was revealed in the containment hydrogen analyzers.
The failure found was a split diaphram in a Conoflow differential pressure regulator furnished by Comsip-Delphi Systems Division.
The inspector verified that this type of hydrogen analyzer is not installed at Quad-Cities.
The licensee's hydrogen containment analyzer system was supplied by General Electric Company (Serial Number 6626709).
c.
Potential generic defect in protective telephone relays manufactured af ter July,1980. During routine testing in the factory, it was found that a contact button separated from the contact arm of a telephone relay.
Subsequent investi-gation revealed that this was the result of inadequate process control.
The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee and verified that the licensee does not utilize the type telephone relay described in the General Electric Company letter dated March 16, 1982.
d.
Potential generic defect in IAC over-current relays manu-factured during the period from 1972 through July, 1981.
It has been determined that two of the three specified insulation wraps were omitted between two leads of the operating coil of the time overcurrent unit. While the remaiaing
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A insulation wrap provides sufficient insulation for normal operation, there is a possibility of coil failure under very high fault conditions.
Failures have been reported on less than 0.02 per cent of the relays.
The licensee does have the type relays as described; however, the application of these relays is not used on safety related equipment.
The licensee plans to replace the identified relays.
No further concerns were identified in these areas.
13.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Unit 1 RHR/LPCI Systems and Unit 2 diesel generator and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-ities:
Unit 1 QOS 30-3 Condenser pit high level alarm test QOS 201-1 Manual operation of electromatic relief valves QoS 250-1 MSIV closure monthly scram functional QOS 700-5 IRM high flux comparison to APRM QOS 1000-2 RHR pump operability test QOS 1000-3 LPCI valve operability test QOS 1000-5 RHR containment cooling valve operability QOS 1300-2 RCIC pump operability QOS 1300-3 RCIC valve operability QOS 1400-2 Core spray valve operability QOS 1400-4 Core spray pump operability QOS 1600-1 Suppression chamber to drywell exercise QOS 2300-2 HPCI pump operability QOS 2300-3 HPCI valve operability QOS 6600-1 Diesel generator load test Unit 2 QOS 220-1 Reactor Recirc. sample system valve operability QOS 700-1 APRM high flux (heat balance) calibration QOS 1000-2 RHR pump operability
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QOS 1000-3 LPCI valve operability QOS 1000-5 RHR containment cooling valve operability QOS 1400-2 Core spray valve operability QOS 1400-4 Core spray pump operability QOS 1400-8 Core spray system valve testing (every 90 days)
QOS 2000-1 Drywell floor and equipment drain valve testing QOS 4700-1 Instrument air system valve testing While reviewing QOS-2300-S, the inspector questioned the wording y
of a statement in the procedure.
The statement is a direct quote of Technical Specifications; however, its interpretation with respect to the surveillance was not clear.
The situation was discussed with the licensee and a change was made to clarify the statement.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
14.
Independent Inspection During this report period, both units were shutdown and drywell entries were made.
During these entries, a walkdown and visual inspection of the reactor water cleanup piping was conducted as committed to in IE report 82-04.
No apparent leaks were identified.
No further concerns were identified.
15.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on June 29, 1982, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.
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