IR 05000254/1981005

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IE Insp Repts 50-254/81-05 & 50-265/81-05 on 810307-0407. No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Ler,Ie Bulletin & NUREG-0737 Followup & Plant Scram
ML19345H505
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1981
From: Chrissotimos N, Dupont S, Reimann F
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19345H504 List:
References
50-254-81-05, 50-254-81-5, 50-265-81-05, 50-265-81-5, NUDOCS 8105210029
Download: ML19345H505 (7)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI;SION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No.

50-254/81-05; 50-265/81-05 Docket No.

50-254; 50-265 License No DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:

Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 C 2 Inspection at: Quad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Con,ucted: March 7, 1981, through April 7, 1981

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Inspectors:

N. 5. d rissItimos 8-['fl fd S. G. DuPont V

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  1. rge Approved'by:

F. zw. Rei' nann, Acting Chief 9 -/9-C/

Reactor Projects Section 1C Inspeetion Summary Inspection on March 7 through April 7,1981 (Report No. 50-254/81-05; 50-265/81-05)

Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Licensee Event Report Followup; IE Bulletin Followup Plant Scram; Nureg 0737 followup; Independent Inspection ar.d Media Contacts. The inspection involved a total of 280 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 17 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: No itema of noncompliance were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

  • N, Kalivianakis, Superintendent T. Tamlyn, Assistant Superintendent Operations D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent Maintenance
  • L. Cerner, Technical Staff Supervisor G. Conschack, Senior Operating Engineer
  • J. Heilman, Quality Assurance, Operations The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including shift engineers and foremen, reactor operators, technical staff personnel and quality control perscrs.ncl.
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview on April 7, 1981.

2.

Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of MarcF. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergenc3 systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was be.ng implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.

During the month of March, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the HPCI and Core Spray, Units 1 and 2, systems to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operatior.s were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and adminis-trative procedures.

Following maintenance of a valve on the reactor water cleanup system, the operator opened a drain valve too quickly, which-2-

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caused an accelerated depressurization of the affected drain piping.

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This resulted in the pressurization of various other reactor building equipment drain tank drain lines. This caused a radioactive airborne condition in the reactor building. Contractors and NRC inspectors in the vacinity were requested to leave the area.

At the time of the event, the SBGT System was on and the normal ventilation system was isolated for a surveillance. After analysis of the air, the normal ventilation system was placed in service.

The building was removed from an airborne status approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> later. No contamination or ingestion of radionuclides was detected on the workers or inspectors, and no release to the environs resulted from this event.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3.

Monthly Maintenance Observation Staticn maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with tecnnical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior i

to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prever. tion cortrols were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following mair.tenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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Unit 1 Observed Reviewed Rebuilding of Control Rod Q05626 Replacement of CRD D-8

' Drives removed from Unit 1.

Q07397 IRM Ch#15 Q07624 RHR 18B Valve Q07718 LPRM 16-41A

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Q11274 480V Breaker S/N 024 Q11353 Target Rock Valve Q11391 1D Electromatic Q11507 RHR 16 Valve-3-

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Following completion of maintenance on the Recirculation System, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4.

Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required aurveil-lance testing on the Unit 1 Condensate Pump Room Flood Protection and Unit 2 APRM Heat Balance and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation-was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifi-cations and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activ-ities:

Unit 1 APRM Heat Balance Relief Valve Testing Core Spray Pump Operability Core Spray Valve Operability RHR (Shutdown Cooling Mode) Operability Unit 2 APRM Heat Balance RPS Weekly Functional Diesel Generator Operability

l Drywell High Pressure Alarm Operability l

l No items of noncompliance were identified.

5.

Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to pre-vent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

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Unit 1 RO 81-5, dated February 20, 1981, During Low Condenser Vacuum Calibration and Functional test, 3 switches tripped in excess of the limits.

RO 81-6, dated March 2,1981, Failure of ADS Flexible Air Line.

The licensee discovered during a routine inspection of the drywell that the flexible air line to the Target Rock Safety Relief Valve was broken. The valve was successfully tested prior to the routine inspection and after the repairs to the flexible line.

Unit 0 RO 81-4, dated February 20, 1981, During Low Condenser Vacuum calibration and Functional test, 4 switches tripped in excess of the limits.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

6.

IE Bulletin Followuo For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presentation in the bulle-tin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite mstagement representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.

IE Bulletin 81-01 and Revision 1, dated January 27, 1981, Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers.

IE Enlletin 80-25, dated December 19, 1980, Operating problems with Target Rock Safety-Relief Valves at BWRs.

The licensee does not use the Solenoid Actuators or the two-stage Target Rock Valve described in the bulletin.

IE Bulletin 80-17, Supplements 1, 2, 3, and 4, Failure of Control Rods to insert during a scram at a BWR.

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A RIII staff inspector verified that the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-17, including supp.'ements 1, 2, and 3 were complied with regarding installation of the Scram Dische,rge Volume Continuous Monitoring System.

On December 1, 1980, the licensee installed a Norfec Ultra;onie

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Detection System with transducers coupled to the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Piping to detect the presence of we'3r.

On December 22, 1980, a R11I staff inspector-was dispatched to examine the installed system following problems encountered at

'the Dresden Nuclear Power Station with similar equipment. Transducers are coupled to the side of the SDV piping at a 2% inch water level rather than on the bottom of the piping and have been tested with the lights and alarms sounding in the control room.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

7.

Plant Scram Following the plant scram on March 29,'1981, of Unit 1, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.

The reactor scram was caused by a Group one Containment Isolation.

The isolation occurred during Bi-weekly Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) testing. The unit was at full power, when the

'2A' MSIV drifted to the closed position during the surveillance. This caused an increase in the main steam line flow of the other 3 steam lines, resulting in a Group One Isolation and Scram.

All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on March 30, 1981.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

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NUREG - 0737 Followup Item III.A.2. Emergency Preparedness. The Revised Generating Station Implementing Procedures have been submitted per letter L. O. Delgeorge to H. R. Denton, dated February 27, 1981. The

.0ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has responsibility for the review.

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Independent Inspection The inspector reviewed the' licensee's monthly performance report of Units 1 and 2 for the month of February,1981.

Areas covered by the report were amendments to Technical Specif-ications, summary of corrective maintenance performed on Safety Related Equipment, Licensee Event Reports, Operating Data Tabulations, and refueling information. The report was reviewed for compliance with Technical Specifications 6.S.A.3.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

10.

Media Contacts a.

The Senior desident Inspector. discussed by telephone the Reactor Building Airborne Activity Event with the local ABC-TV reporters. Questions were directed towards contr.m-ination of personnel and a description of the event. On March 17, the Resident discussed with ABC-TV questions related to increasing the capacity of the Spent Fuel Pool at Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

Also included in the discussion was the planned news conference scheduled for April 1,1981, in Quad Cities, b.

On April 1,1981, the Director of Region III along with other representatives held a news conference, with the public in attendance, to discuss the Regulatory Performance of the Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

Major topics of discussion included Commonwealth Edison's plans to expand the capacity of the Spent Fuel Pool, transfer of fuel among the Dresden and Quad-Cities facilities, emergency preparedness and a broad range of questions concerning Nuclear Power Plant operation and radioactive waste disposal.

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On March 30, 1981, the Senior Resident Inspector met with members of the Augustana College Staff. Topics discussed were concentrated on safety / design and human performance at Nuclear Power Plants.

11.

Exit Interview

'The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 7, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitien. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.

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