IR 05000254/1981017
| ML20032E057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1981 |
| From: | Chrissotimos N, Dupont S, Reimann F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032E052 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-81-17, 50-265-81-17, NUDOCS 8111190571 | |
| Download: ML20032E057 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
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REGION III
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Report No.
50-254/81-17; 50-265/81-17
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Docket No.
50-254; 50-265 License No.
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post-Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690
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Facility-Name: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station', Units 1 & 2
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Inspection at: Qaad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: September 5, 1981, through October 16, 1981
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. DuPont
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Approved by:
F. W. Reimann, Acting Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 1C i
l Inspection Summary i
Inspection on September 5 through October 16, 1981 (Reports No. 50-254/81-17; 50-265/81-17
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a-Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Licensee Event Reports Followup, Review of Licensee's Monthly Performance Report, Plant Scrams, Refuel Activities, and Inspection During Long Term Shutdown. The
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inspection involved a total of 288 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 58 inspector-hours onsite'during off-shifts.
Results: Of the 8 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in 7 areas;-1 item of noncompliance was identified in 1 area -
failure to follow procedures, paragraph 9.
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8111190571 811102 PDR ADOCK 05000284 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Kalivianakis, Superintendent T. Tamlyn, Assistant Superintendent Operations D. Bax, Assistant Superintendent Maintenance L. Gerner, Assistant Superintendent for Administration
- J. Heilman, Quality Assurance, Operations
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Flessner, Technical Staff Supervisor The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including shift engineers and foremen, reactor operators, technical staff personnel and quality control personnel.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 16, 1981.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of September.
The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for. equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the month of September, the inspector walked dovn the accessible portions of the Unit 1/2 Standby Gas Treatment System to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated witt. radwaste shipments and barreling.
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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements-2-
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established under technical specifications, 10 CFR,.and Adminis-trative procedures.
No items of noncompliarca were identified.
3.
Monthly Maintenance observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority !s assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were reviewed:
Unit 1 WO-13670 1A CRD Pump Outboard Bearings WC-13800 1B Service Water Pump Cooler WO-14108 1C RHR Service Water Pump Bearings WO-14121 Torus Level Recorder WO-14905 SBLC Squib Meter Relay WO-14907 1A RFP Suction Valve Unit 2 WO-14926 RHR Service Water Pumps Cooler WO-14927 RHR Service Water Pump Bearings WO-14936 Reactor Vessel Service Platform-3-
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Following completion of maintenance on the 1D and 1C RHR Service water Pumps, the inspector verified that these systems had been returnec to service properly.
No items ci noncompliance were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed technical specifications required surveil-lance testing on the Unit 1 Traveling Incore Probe and Unit 2 Refueling Interlocks and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical speci-fications and procedure requirements and were reviewad by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies-identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 1 QOS 1000-2 LPCI Pump Operability QOS 1000-3 LPCI Valve Operability QOS 1000-4 RHR Service Water Flow Rate QOS 1000-5 RHR Service Water Valve Operability QIS-60 Power Operation Functional Test QOS 6600-1 Diesel Generator Load Test QoS 6600-3 Diesel Fuel Transfer Operability Unit 1/2 00S 6600-1 Diesel Generator Load Test QOS 6600-2 Diesel Starting Air Unit 2 QFP 100-5 Prior to outage checks QFP 100-4 Refueling Interlock Checks No items of noncompliance were identified.
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5.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed
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to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
Unit 1 RO 81-14, dated July 23, 1981, Suppression Chamber to Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker Valve failed during surveillance.
Unit 2 R0 81-14, dated July 24, 1981. Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breaker Pressure Switch tripped in excess of limits during surveillance.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Review of Licensee's Monthly Performance Repo_r_t_
The inspector reviewed the licensee's monthly performance report of Units 1 and 2 for the month of September, 1981.
Areas covered by the report were amendments to Technical Specifi-cations, summary of corrective maintenance performed en Safety Related Equipment, Licensee Event Reports, OperatinF Data Tabulations, and refueling information. The report was reviewed for compliance with Technical Specifications 6.6.A.3.
No items of nonccmpliance were identified.
7.
Plant Scram Following the plant scram of Unit 1 on September 23, 1981, the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry.
The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
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Unit 1 was operating at 94 per cent power while the torus water level was being pumped down to the condenser by procedure QOP 1000-10 Suppression Pool Water Transfer to Main Condenser via the Condensate Demineralizers.
The unit operator had failed to check the position of the isolation valve 1/2-2001-84 (Floor Drain Collecting Tank) prior to lining up the torus to the condenser.
The valve was in an open position, which allowed the condenser to draw a suction on an empty tank, which resulted in a rapid loss of condenser vacuum and a reactor scram.
Detailed discussion with the licensee revealed that the Unit 2 operator had previously positioned open the floor drain collecting tank isolation valve to provide a continuous drain of the Unit 2 torus to radwaste while the unit was in a refueling outage to allow maintenance inside the torus.
Discussion also included the procedure QOP 1000-10 which did not clearly identify related system lineups.
Discussions with the unit operating engineer resulted in an agreement to increase communications between units. Before the completion of the inspection, the procedure QOP 1000-10 was submitted for revision.
All systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation on September 23, 1981.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Refueling activities The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the technical speci-fications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing'of refueling related equipment was performed as required by technical specifications; observed two shif ts of the fuel handling operations (removal)
and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by technical specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling in accordance with technical specifications and approved
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was procedures.
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The inspector also witnessed portions of the following activities:
Removal of the vessel head Removal of the vessel internals Refuel interlock checks Inspection of 15 new fuel assemblies Inspection of the jet pump hold down beam bolts During the Jet Pump Hold Down Beam Bolt inspections on September 25, 1981, the service platform was required to be raised out of the vessel to reposition the UT probes. Mainte-nance personnel prepared the service Jib boom with a single securing line fastened to a one point rig.
As the service plat-form was being lif ted on the 9-ton auxiliary hook, the platform appeared unbalanced. The maintenance personnel operating the overhead crane noticed that the crane was not centered over the load.
In an attempt to correct the situation, the crane was repositioned with the service platform off of the vessel flange.
Moving the crane increased the load unbalance until the platform came to rest at an approximate 55 angle inside the vessel.
Further inspection into this area also revealed that the vessel service platform's Jib crane was not discussed in the licensee's response of September 22, 1981, to NUREG-0621 " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." These findings were discussed with the licensee, NRR and regional inspectors.
The final followup of the licensee's response to NUREG-0621 will be conducted by NRR.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed appli-cable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of September / October.
The inspector verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accomplished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of containment integrity.
Tours of all accessible areas, including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified implementation of-7-
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radiation protection controls. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's jumper / bypass controls to verify there were no conflicts with technical specifications.and verified the implementation of radioactive waste system controls, The inspector witnessed portions of the radioactive waste systems controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
The inspector witnessed the following teste during unit shutdown:
turbine overspeed tests, HPCI overspeed test, electromatic I
relief valve operation, and normal unit shutdown which included l
a manual scram from low power.
During the electromatic relief I
valve testing, one of the valves did not operate (LER 81-07/03L-0).
During a review of the radiation logs on September 29, 1981, the inspector discovered that two contractor maintenance personnel had exited the drywell with higher than normal contamination levels on the evening of September 28, 1981.
The cause was a result of the removal of packing from the 4B recirculation pump suction valve.
l While operating this cycle, the valve developed leakage and was temporarily repaired, thus disassembly during shutdown for repairs was necessary. Prior to any work performed on the 4B valve, radiation protection consistently expressed their concerns to everyone of radiological hazards that would evolve when disassembly began.
On the morning of September 28, 1981, radiation protection was informed by maintenance that work on the 4B valve was to begin.
The work to be accomplished was general rigging and set up, thus no special radiological protection was imposed.
That evening radiation protection inquired of maintenance as to what work was planned on 2nd shift.
Maintenance personnel indicated that rigging and set up was still continuing.
However, maintenance personnel removed the packing of the valve without notifying radiation protection. Upon exiting the drywell, contamination on both persons was higher than normal and smearable contamination levels in the drywell significantly increased.
This is contrary to procedure QRP 100-1 Radiation Control
Standards C.2 which states in part, when radiation work involves
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disassembly of radioactive equipment, radiation protection shall be informed before the fact so that a proper evaluation of the radiological consequences may be made, and is considered an item of noncompliance.
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'Following normal decontamination procedur6J, whole body Counts of the persons involved were taken, which revealed no internal body burdens had resulted from this event.
Prior to the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action which included discussions with the departments involved stressing the importance of communications and co-operation. As a result of the review, the inspector has no further concerns and therefore no response to this item of noncompliance is required.
Except as described, no other items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conc 1rsion of ehe inspection on October 16, 1981, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors comments.
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