IR 05000250/1991012
| ML17345A838 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1991 |
| From: | Butcher R, Crlenjak R, Schnebli G, Trocine L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17345A837 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-91-12, 50-251-91-12, NUDOCS 9105290261 | |
| Download: ML17345A838 (22) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGIONII 101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-250/91-12 and 50-251/91-12 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-250 and 50-251 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units 3 and
License Nos.:
tc er, en)or ess ent nspector chnebli Resident Inspector r L.
rocine,'esident Inspector Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects
'pproved by:
Inspection Conducted:
M rch 30 through April 26, 1991 I
ne D eSge Da e Si ne Q~o Da e Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine resident inspector inspection entailed direct inspection at the site in the areas of monthly surveillance observations, monthly maintenance observations, engineered safety features walkdowns, operational safety, and licensee self-assessment capability.
Results:
Within the scope of this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee continued to demonstrate satisfactory performance to ensure safe plant operations.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
910529026i 9i0520 PDR ADOCK 05000250 G
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J L.
- T R.
S.
K.
E.
R.
V.
- J J.
G.
H.
- L
- T D.
K.
C.
- R
- G R.
J.
F.
- M J.
- L A.
V. Abbatiello, guality Assurance Supervisor Arias, Jr., Technical Assistant to Vice President W. Bladow, guality Manager A. Finn, Assistant Operations Superintendent J. Gianfrencesco, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent T. Hale, Engineering Project Supervisor N. Harris, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations F. Hayes, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor G. Heisterman, Assistant Superintendent of Electrical Maintenance A. Kaminskas, Operations Superintendent E. Knorr, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor A. Labarraque, Senior Technical Advisor L. Marsh, Reactor Supervisor Johnson, Operations Supervisor W. Pearce, Plant Manager, Nuclear F. Plunkett, Site Vice President R. Powell, Superintendent, Plant Licensing L. Remington, System Performance Supervisor V. Rossi, guality Assurance Supervisor Sipos, Director, Construction M. Smith, Service Manager, Nuclear N. Steinke, Chemistry Supervisor C. Strong, Mechanical Department Supervisor R. Timmons, Site Security Superintendent B. Wayland, Maintenance Superintendent D. Webb, Assistant Superintendent Planning and Scheduling B. Wilson, guality Control Supervisor T. Zielonka, Technical Department Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsman, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector G. A. Schnebli, Resident Inspector
- L. Trocine, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview on April 26, 1991 Note:
An alphabetical tabulation of acronyms used in this report is listed in paragraph 1.
Plant Status The 4A EDG modifications remain on schedule with Phase II testing scheduled for early June.
Prerequisite testing is in progress on the 48 EDG with the initial test runs from the control room scheduled late this month.
Wiring modifications and terminations are still in progress on the 3A, 38, and 4A sequencers.
, Prerequisite testing of the
sequencer is in progress.
The DC bus outages continue on schedule.
The
bus was completed on schedule during this period, and was returned to service.
The 3A bus charger is set with turnover scheduled for early May.
The
bus modifications, cable pulling, and terminations continue with the bus scheduled to be returned to service late this month.
The
and
4160V bus outages were completed, and the busses were reenergized on schedule during this period.
Preparations are in progress to remove the 3A and 4A 4160V busses from service early next month, which would be about two weeks early.
The Security System upgrade continues, with the overall project
'pproximately 77K complete.
All 29 CCTVs required for vitalization are operational with focus testing in progress, and testing of individual intrusion detection and access control zones is in progress.
The new RTD system installation continues, with cable termination and Eagle 21 work in the control room in progress.
The new ATWS panels are installed, with conduit and wiring installation in progress.
Inspection and repair of the ICW intake structure continues on schedule.
Additional repair work was identified in 382 ICW bay.
The 3A1 and 4A2 bays remain to be worked and will finish during the A 4160V bus outages in May.
The Unit 3 and
8 ICW header work is complete, with the headers back in service.
The A headers will be worked during the A 4160V bus outages.
3A and
EDG modifications are in progress.
These include idle start modifications, new air compressors and air piping, upgraded turbocharger and stub shaft, and the addition of two air start motors to each unit.
The initial engine runs are scheduled for early May on 38 and early June for 3A.
The field work for the new ARMs system is complete, with turnover to startup in progress.
Unit 4 steam generator eddy cur rent testing commenced during this perio e 3.
Westinghouse commenced work on the Unit 3 high pressure turbine casing erosion on April 20, 1991.
Followup on Items of Noncompliance (92702)
A review was conducted of the following noncompliances to assure that corrective actions were adequately implemented and resulted in conformance with regulatory requirements.
Verification of corrective action was achieved through record reviews, observation, and discussions with licensee personnel.
Licensee correspondence was evaluated to ensure the responses were timely and corrective actions were implemented within the time periods specified in the reply.
(Closed)
VIO 50-250,251/90-40-01; Failure to Perform a
TS Required Surveillance on Fire Hoses Within the Allotted Time Period The cause fo'r exceeding the maximum allowed TS interval between fire hose station surveillances was inadequate administrative controls of the surveillances.
If surveillances are performed on the date scheduled by procedure 0-OSP-200. 1, the surveillances will be performed within maximum time intervals allowed by TSs.
If a surveillance is to be performed later than the scheduled date, control room personnel identify this condition during their daily review of procedure 0-OSP-200.
1 scheduling sheets.
They then track the surveillance to completion and ensure that it is completed within the allowable time frame.
However, if a surveillance is performed earlier than scheduled by procedure 0-OSP-200. 1, no guidance for controls existed at the time of this event to ensure that the maximum time interval allowed by TSs is not exceeded for a subsequent surveillance test.
The licensee completed the surveillance on November 13, 1990, and all fire hose stations were found to be operable.
The TS surveillance planner responsible for the missed surveillance was counselled.
A, memorandum has been issued to plant departmental supervisors responsible for the performance of surveillances identified in procedure 0-OSP-200. 1.
The requirement for performing TS surveillances within the maximum time interval allowed by TSs was re-emphasized.
In addition, on January 14, 1991, the Turkey Point Site Vice President formed a
Task Force to procure and implement a
computerized surveillance scheduling program.
This program will be used to implement a
new centralized accountability for the performance of required surveillances.
The centralized accountability and the computerized surveillance scheduling program are scheduled'o be implemented during the current dual unit outage.
This violation is closed.
Followup on Inspector Followup Items (92701)
Actions taken by the licensee on the items listed below were verified by the inspector.
a.
(Closed)
URI 50-250,251/89-34-03; Use of Primary Containment Temperatures from the SAS Prior to Final gualification
The licensee's PC/N closeout review process, f13-PTN-l, Design Control, was modified on September 11, 1990, to be performed on a real time basis.
The modified process of review will ensure that all the requirements of the PC/N have been adequately met and documented prior to turnover to plant operations.
In addition, the need for partial turnovers due to incomplete paperwork will be-eliminated.
Should a partial turnover be required, this modified review will ensure the essential elements of the PC/M have been satisfactorily implemented or identify the need to conduct an evaluation of the implemented portions to ensure the safety evaluation remains valid.
This issue is closed.
b.
(Closed)
IFI 50-250,251/89-49-01; Discrepancies in Breaker Numbers Between EOPs and Drawings The licensee revised drawing 5610-T-E-1592, 125V D.C.
and 125V Instrument A.C. Electrical Distribution, to reflect the breaker numbers referenced in the EOPs and equipment labels.
This item is closed.
5.
Onsite Followup and In-Office Review of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events and
CFR Part 21 Reviews (90712/90713/92700)
The Licensee Event Reports and/or
CFR Part 21 Reports discussed below were reviewed.
The inspectors verified that reporting requirements had been met, root cause analysis was performed, corrective actions appeared appropriate, and generic applicability had been considered.
Additionally, the inspectors verified the licensee had reviewed each event, corrective actions were implemented, responsibility for corrective actions not fully completed was clearly assigned, safety questions had been evaluated and resolved, and violations of regulations or TS conditions had been identified.
When applicable, the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, were applied.
a.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-07; Missed Visual Examination on Repaired Containment Penetrations Due to Personnel Error The required visual examinations were performed within one hour of discovery of the condition.
No leakage was detected.
The cognizant field engineer and construction supervisor were counseled regarding the significance of the incident, and applicable procedures were reviewed and modified to aid in preventing recurrence.
This LER is closed.
b.
(Closed)
LER 50-251/89-10; Turbine Runback Due to an Inadequate Procedure Resulting in a False Nuclear Instrumentation Rod Drop Signal The NIS rod drop signal was a result of the fast reduction in reactor power; there was no actual rod drop event.
This reduction was performed by borating and inserting control rods as allowed by procedure 4-0NOP-100.
This resulted in a rate of reduction of reactor power high enough to reach the NIS rod drop setpoint.
The root cause of this event is that procedure 4-0NOP-100, Fast Load Reduction, did not provide guidance regarding the
e
rate of reduction in reactor power to prevent the turbine runback.
Procedures 3/4-ONOP-100 were revised on September 27, 1989, to provide additional guidance to the operators on the recommended rate of reduction in reactor power to minimize the probability of causing a turbine runback.
This LER is closed.
c ~
(Closed)
LER 50-250/89-16; Collection Tank Potential for Overflowing the RCP Lube Oil This issue was previously discussed in IR 50-250, 251/89-49.
The licensee is currently increasing the size of the oil collection tank per PC/M 90-232.
This modification will ensure the tank will hold all of the oil from one RCP motor plus the expected normal leakage from the other two RCP motors for a dual cycle duration.
This LER is closed.
d.
(Closed)
P21 50-250,251/89-18; Limitorque Actuators with Melamine Torque Switches Undergo Post Mold Shrinkage Causing Cam Binding The licensee conducted a review of the applicable MOVs at the facility and identified
valves with the potential of having Melamine torque switches.
All 24 MOVs in question were found to have torque switches made of acceptable material via maintenance history records, Eg walkdown reports, and visual inspections.
This P21 is closed.
Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
The inspectors observed TS required surveillance testing and verified that the test procedure conformed to the requirements of the TSs; testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and wer e properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel; and system restoration was adequate.
For completed tests, the inspectors verified testing frequencies were met and tests were performed by qualified individuals.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following test activities:
a.
OP-0204.2, Periodic Tests, Checks, and Operating Evolutions - Test of the Site Evacuation Alarm; b.
4-OSP-030. 1, Component Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test (for CCW pump 4A);
c.
O-SMM-016.10, C-Bus Transformer Fire Suppression System Annual Functional Test (for Unit 3);
d.
3-OSP-019. 1, Intake Cooling Water Pump Inservice Test (for ICW pump 3B);
and
t
e.
AP 0190.90, ASME Section XI Pressure Tests for guality Group A, B, and C
Systems/Components (test 83-CCW-30311-H-01 for the Unit 3 CCW surge tank).
During the performance of O-SMM-016.10 for the Unit 3 C-Bus transformer on April 17, 1991, the inspector noted that there were two manual control stations and that Section 6.5 of this procedure referenced only one without identifying which station was to be functionally tested.
After inquiring about this issue, both manual control stations were functionally tested.
It is our understanding that this procedure will be revised to incorporate functional testing for both manual control stations and that it will clarify the differences between the two (i.e.,
one utilizes a break rod and the other utilizes a small slide of glass or a key).
On April 24, 1991, the licensee performed the 10-year ISI hydrostatic test of the CCW surge tank.
The test was conducted in accordance with AP 0190.90, Test 83-CCW-30311-H-01, which meets" the requirements of ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition Winter 1981 Addenda.
The inspectors reviewed the procedure prior to performance and attended both pre-shift and pre-evolution briefings.
The performance of this test required securing Unit 3 SFP cooling as the CCW system which cools the SFP heat exchanger would not be available during the test.
SFP cooling was secured at 9:05 a.m.
and was restored at ll:08 a.m.
at the completion of the hydrostatic test.
The temperature in the SFP increased about 3 degrees F, from 90 degrees F to 93 degrees F, while cooling was secured.
The inspectors witnessed the test and verified the following:
a.
testing was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, and the latest revision was available and in use by personnel conducting the test; b.
test procedure prerequisites were met; c.
valve lineups and system clearances were completed for the portion of the system being tested; d.
pressure gages of the required range and special test equipment required by the procedure were calibrated and properly installed; e.
data required was collected by the proper personnel; d.
relief paths were verified for system over pressure protection; f.
system temperature and pressure were verified to be within the required limits for the specified hold time and subsequent inspection; and g.
adequate coordination existed among the responsible personnel to conduct the test properly.
The test was completed satisfactorily with only one minor valve packing leak note The inspectors determined that the above testing activities were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements of the TS.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and reviewed to ascertain they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review, as appropriate:
LCOs were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected the maintenance performed; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; gC records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were properly implemented; gC hold points were established and observed where required; fire prevention controls were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved gA program; and housekeeping was actively pursued.
The inspectors witnessed/reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities in progress:
a.
troubleshooting of the 3C RCP seal failure; b.
changeout of the turbocharger on the Unit 3 B EDG; c.
air start modifications to the Unit 3 B EDG; and d.
replacement of ICW crossconnect valve 3-50-307.
For those maintenance activities observed, the inspectors determined that these activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed an inspection designed to verify the flowpath of the CCW system to support SFP cooling for Unit 3.
This was accomplished by reviewing the temporary procedures, governing the system (TP-689, Component Cooling Water System Flowpath Verification to Support SFP Cooling, and TP-645, Defueled Operations Without Emergency Diesel Generators)
and by performing a
complete walkdown of all accessible equipment.
The following criteria were used, as appropriate, during this inspection:
a.
systems lineup procedures matched plant drawings and as-built configuration; b.
housekeeping was adequate, and appropriate levels of cleanliness were being maintained; c.
valves in the system were correctly installed and did not exhibit signs of gross packing leakage, bent stems, missing handwheels, or improper labeling; d.
hangers and supports were made up properly and aligned correctly; e.
valves in the flow paths were in correct position as required by the applicable procedures with power available, and valves were locked/lock wired as required; f.
local and remote position indication was compared, and remote instrumentation was functional; and A
g.
major system components were properly labeled.
Some minor discrepancies were noted and were brought to the attention of the e
system engineer for correction.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
9.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift turnovers, and monitored instrumentation.
The inspectors verified proper valve/switch alignment of selected systems, verified maintenance work orders had been submitted as required, and verified followup and prioritization of work was accomplished.
The inspectors reviewed tagout records, verified compliance with TS LCOs, and verified the return to service of affected components.
By observation and direct interviews, verification was made that the physical security plan. was being implemented.
The implementation of radiological controls and plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions were also observed.
Tours of the intake structure and diesel, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations.
In addition, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of systems which are currently required to be operable/functional in order to verify proper valve/switch alignment.
The licensee conducted a safety evaluation to define control of the plant configuration during the dual unit emergency power system enhancement project.
Procedure TP-645, Defueled Operations Without Emergency Diesel Generators, was issued to proceduralize the requirements determined in the safety evaluation to be in effect from the time both units enter the defueled condition and both
EDGs are removed from service.
Also, portions of the revised TSs became effective when both units entered the defueled condition.
The licensee routinely performs QA/QC audits/surveillances of activities required under its QA program and as requested by management.
To access the effectiveness of these licensee audits, the inspectors examined the status, scope, and findings of the following audit reports:
Audit Number Number of Findin s
QAO-PTN-90-067 QAO-PTN-90-071 QAO-PTN-90-076 QAO-PTN-90-078 QAO-PTN-91-001 QAO-PTN-91-004 QAO-PTN-91-005 QAO-PTN-91-006 QAO-PTN-91-007 QAO-PTN-91-011 QAO-PTN-91-013 The QA audit reports reviewed were distributed to the appropriate departmental managers, the Plant Manager, the CNRB, and the President - Nuclear Division.
The applicable criteria, a description of the particular finding, a discussion of the issues, a statement of the impact on quality, a list of recommended corrective actions, a
recommended responsible department, and the responsible QA contact were documented for each finding.
In accordance with the licensee's QA program, the responsible department is required to respond to all QA findings in writing.
No additional NRC followup actions will be taken on these findings because they were identified by the licensee's QA program audits, appropriate corrective actions have either been completed or are currently underway, and plant management has been made aware of these issues.
Several changes have been initiated by the licensee to improve operations or obtain better utilization of staff resources.
Those changes include the following:
a.
A contract was signed with SBI for security services at both the Turkey Point and St.
Lucie nuclear plants, and it became effective April 15, 1991.
SBI replaced Wackenhut.
SBI is a subsidiary of Chambers Development Company, Inc., of Pittsburgh and has been involved in nuclear power security at Beaver Valley Nuclear Station since 1986.
b.
The success of twenty-two new SROs in passing the NRC exam in February 1991 permitted the operations staff to go to a six-shift rotation in April 199 c.
FPL has initiated a reorganization in which Mr. J.
H. Goldberg, President
- Nuclear Division, now answers to Mr. J.
L. Broadhead, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer.
Mr. Goldberg formerly reported to Mr.
S.
E. Frank, President and Chief Operating Officer.
The Nuclear Division under Mr. Goldberg is undergoing an organizational review with the help of nuclear staffing experts.
As a result of routine plant tours and various operational observations, the inspectors determined that the general plant and system material conditions were satisfactorily maintained, plant security program was effective, and that the overall performance of plant operations was good.
In addition, the inspectors verified the critical electrical system lineup and verified the availability of the required number of black start diesel generators.
Availability of the minimum number of ICW and CCW pumps was also verified.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
The inspectors reviewed the CNRB to determine compliance with the revised TS 6.5.2 requirements.
The CNRB has been meeting on the third Tuesday of each month and rotates the meeting such that meetings are held at the corporate office in Juno Beach, the St.
Lucie plant, and the Turkey Point plant on succeeding months.
TS 6.5.2 requires a
CNRB meeting at least once every six months.
CNRB membership has been designated in writing, and the membership of the CNRB was verified to meet TS composition and quorum requirements.
The inspector also verified that the members of the CNRB met TS educational and experience requirements.
The Nuclear Division of FPL has a Nuclear Policy, NP-803, Company Nuclear Review Board, which defines the CNRB responsibilities and references regulatory requirements for both St. Lucie and Turkey Point.
In addition, procedure CNRB-Ol, CNRB Rules of Conduct, sets forth rules governing the conduct of the CNRB meetings and related matters within the guidance of NP-803.
Procedure CNRB-02, CNRB Plant"Tours, provides guidance for site tours.
The CNRB administrator is required to prepare a schedule designating the month each CNRB member should conduct a site tour with the intent that each CNRB member tour both sites during each year.
The CNRB members are required to conduct their on-site tour, attend an on-site safety review group (PNSC at Turkey Point) meeting during their scheduled month, and make a verbal report to the board at the first CNRB meeting immediately following the tour.
Procedure CNRB-03, CNRB Review Procedure, sets forth rules for conducting reviews as listed in Section 6.5.2.7 of the TSs.
Procedure CNRB-04, CNRB Audit/Assessment Procedure, sets forth rules governing the initiation, coriduct, and reporting of CNRB audits as listed i.n Section 6.5.2.8 of TSs and of any CNRB directed assessments.
gA audits with findings closed since the last CNRB meeting were discussed by a lead reviewer as appointed by the CNRB chairman.
In addition, NRC Inspection Reports with either non-cited violations or cited violations that have been responded to were summarized by another lead reviewer who was also appointed by the CNRB chairma The CNRB provides
'a comprehensive overview of plant performance by experienced personnel with varied backgrounds.
At the end of the meetings, the CNRB Chairman asks if anyone has an item they would like brought to the attention of the President - Nuclear Division.
At the March 18, 1991, meeting which was attended by the inspector, four items were designated to be discussed with the President - Nuclear Division.
The ISEG at Turkey Point is not a
TS requirement.
There is an ISEG which now answers to the Chairman of the CNRB.
The Chairman of the CNRB reports to the Vice President - Nuclear Assurance.
The ISEG performs audits of functions as designated by the CNRB.
The licensee issues a
Nuclear Energy Performance Monitoring Management Information report monthly which lists monthly highlights, nuclear energy policy indicators, NRC indicators, INPO overall indicators, and additional indicators.
This report is distributed to FPL higher management.
In addition, each major area of the plant (Maintenance, Operations, Training, Technical Support, etc.)
and gA has indicators to aid management in evaluating performance.
The inspectors have reviewed all LERs as they were issued and consider the licensee's program to be adequate.
The LERs addressed root cause and specified
'orrective actions.
The inspectors attended various PNSC meetings and verified that TS 6.5. 1.2 requirements were met on membership, quorum, and meeting frequency.
The inspectors reviewed the site gA audits and found that they were comprehensive and effective in licensee self identification of problems.
The gA group has been a significant factor in the licensee's self-assessment program in performing TS required audits and special audits as requested by higher management.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the reporting period with the Plant Manager - Nuclear and selected members of his staff.
An exit meeting was conducted on April 26, 1991.
The areas requiring management attention were reviewed.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Violations or deviations were not identifie Acronyms AC a.m.
AP ARM ASME ATWS CCTV CCW CFR CNRB DC EDG EOP EQ F
FPL ICW IFI INPO IR ISEG ISI LCO LER MOV HIS NP NRC ONOP OP OSP P21 PC/M PNSC PTN QA QAO QC QI RCP RTD SAS SBI SFP SMM SRO and Abbreviations Alternating Current ante meridiem Administrative Procedures Area Radiation Monitor American Society of Mechanical Engineers Anticipated Transient Without Scram Cl osed Ci rcuit Tel evi s ion Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Company Nuclear Review Board Direct Current Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Operating Procedure Environmental Qualification Fahrenheit Florida Power 5 Light Intake Cooling Water Inspector Followup Item Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
Inspection Report
Independent
Safety Engineering
Group
Inservice Inspection
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Motor Operated
Valve
Nuclear Instrumentation
System
Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Off Normal Operating
Procedure
Operating
Procedure
Operations
Surveillance
Procedure
CFR Part
21 Report
Plant Change/Modification
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
Plant Turkey Nuclear
Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance
Organization
Quality Control
Quality Instrumentation
Pump
Resistance
Temperature
Detector
Safety Assessment
System
Security Bureau,
Inc.
Spent
Fuel Pit
Surveillance
Mechanical
Maintenance
Senior Reactor Operator
TS
V
Temporary Procedure
Technical Specifications
Unresolved
Item
Volt
Violation